Hello and welcome to World Today. I'm Zhao Ying. Three months after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Syria's interim president has been struggling to unite the country. In a landmark breakthrough, the government struck a deal to merge the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces into state institutions.
The agreement will see the SDF cede control of civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria, including border crossings, airport and oil and gas fields. It guarantees the rights of all Syrians in the country's political process, regardless of their religious and ethnic backgrounds. While Syrian Kurds celebrate the deal with Damascus, residents on the northwestern coast remain wary after days of sectarian violence that killed over 1,000 people.
The government blamed pro-Assad groups for instigating the violence and said the security threats had already been neutralized. President Ahmed al-Sharal also issued a decree to form a National Security Council to manage the country's security and political policies. So will the fragmented country be able to achieve peace and unity after 13 years of civil war?
Joining our discussion today, Dr. Wang Jin, Associate Professor with Northwest University in Xi'an, China; Dr. Joseph Siracusa, Professor of Global Futures with Curtin University; and Dr. Stephen Wright, Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at Hamad Bin Khalifa University. Gentlemen, welcome to you all. Dr. Wright, let me start with you.
I mean, how big a breakthrough is this deal between the government and the SDF? Like, will it be able to unite the country and establish a civil peace as Ahmad al-Shara has promised? Yeah, the deal is incredibly significant, in particular as the country is divided largely between the with the SDF, the Kurdish based force, and then also HDC under Ahmad al-Shara.
This was the key challenge about how you can actually bring these two main groups together in a way that actually can provide a pathway forward for the country to actually start moving towards a degree of stability.
I think it is very significant and it's quite promising. However, I think we also need a good degree of caution because it's still very early days. I mean, what's been panned out is that over the pace, over the duration of the rest of the year, these issues and integration of the SDF forces into the Syrian army is
will have to take place and actually be achieved. Likewise, also, then it's about the oil resources in the north of the country, in the northeast of the country under control of the SDF. And it's how those can be done in a way which balances the desires of the Kurdish SDF for some form of federal approach and greater autonomy within Syria.
So basically, I think it is a significant breakthrough. But is it really, to come back to your question, like a civil peace? Is it really looking towards that? I think it's still early to tell. Yeah. So Dr. Syracuse, how optimistic are you that this could be a step toward an inclusive Syria? Or would you feel it's more like
a tactical move by HTS to consolidate his power? I think it's both a good move and a tactical move. It has the advantage of stopping one of the players from attacking him, and it also has the advantage of sort of corralling the Kurds there who were at the Turks' neck. And keep in mind, he's dealing with a basket case. Syria's been at war for nearly 14 years.
14 million of its 22 million people are either displaced internally or living abroad. We've had five foreign nations intervene in the civil war. I mean, Assad, of course, is now in one of his apartments in Moscow. And so the leader of the attacker, the leader of the guy who displaced them,
Assad is trying to put these things together. And, you know, I have seen many, many civil wars in my lifetime, written about them, talked to people who were in them. Takes a long time to put Humpty Dumpty back together again.
And as I say, he can get northeast Syria on board to be integrated in the government. It won't be a real federalism. I don't even know how long it'll last, but it gets everybody at the same table. And, you know, I'm a big believer in diplomacy. Everyone's at the same table talking about the problem. At least they're not killing each other. OK, well, Dr. Wong, the agreement actually grants security.
Syrian Kurds' constitutional rights and citizenship. How much of a turning point is this for the Kurdish population in Syria? I think I totally agree with our two colleagues because actually it's just a beginning point. We cannot say that it absolutely will reach a kind of level where the different sides will reconciliate with each other, with all the countries
the areas and all the fields of the issues. And we cannot say also that all the divisions between the different sides has been successfully settled. It is just at the beginning point, because actually in this kind of agreement, a lot of, we could say that a lot of the good terms, a lot of the good promises has been made. For example, that they hope to, they hope to through the dialogue to end all the rivalries and they hope that the kind of certain kind of autonomy would be reached.
and also that the kind of national unity will be organized. But it's just pretty words. So when we are talking about something new, how to put down the weapons and how to be reorganized into the coherent and unified military factions led by the central government, it is still far from done.
We need more realistic practice and realistic actions. So that is just the beginning point. Although this sounds like a historic moment, we should say we should encourage this kind of process, but it's still far from the reality. It's just at the beginning of the process. Yeah. Well, Dr. Wright, what do you think are the key factors that drove the two sides to strike this integration deal at this very moment?
Oh, that's a great question. I think there are different motivations on both sides for this deal to be achieved. I think if we're looking at Ahmad al-Shara, basically it's
it's the need to try to rebuild the country requires some form of unification to take place. Otherwise, basically, it would fragment and then the risk is you would, it would descend into a wider sectarian conflict internally. So I think really a lot, much for him was about trying to actually
bring together the form that deal with the SDF. So also it can provide some reassurances to the Alawite and Christian communities as well. But I think for the SDF, it's a little bit different. It's also, I think in their case, related to the United States and in particular, the position of the Trump administration, which is much more reticent and hesitant about
being involved internationally. And I think it was also, there was probably a recognition that things have started to shift in terms of the backing that they were receiving from Washington.
And for the Trump administration, I think they probably were more likely to say, well, look, you know, we don't necessarily want to be fully to be involved as we have been. So therefore, try and find some type of accommodation because the SDF were very much supported by the US. So I don't see the SDF actually willing to actually do.
come to an agreement with Al-Shara unless they had the green light from the US to actually do this. And I think also it's also about Turkey as well, because Turkey within the region is very concerned about the role of the Kurdish SDF
and the links that it has to the PKK, which Turkey sees as a terrorist organization. And Turkey is very worried about wider moves towards a Kurdish federal entity within Syria. So I think the
And the SDF probably, you know, you could say read the tea leaves that basically internationally its support from the U.S. was not as it was. And also it would be facing more pressures from Turkey as well. So coming to an accommodation with Al-Shara actually made a lot of pragmatic sense, which
And I think, you know, broadly speaking, that can help the sides move towards stemming the wider risks of sectarian violence within the country. But of course, for the Al-Shara, forming some type of agreement with the SDF is critical because that's where the oil resources are.
And it's also then about trying to rebuild the economy, which is in tatters. Yes. So, Dr. Siracusa, I'd like to get your thoughts on the U.S. factor. Like, what do you think this has something to do with the U.S. withdrawal from its global leadership? Because actually, recently, Donald Trump has denied ordering a withdrawal from Syria. But he did say that Syria is a mess that doesn't need U.S. involvement.
So does this indicate that Syria has become less of a priority in U.S. foreign policy? Well, I don't know about that. I mean, Trump is...
not an isolationist, he's non-interventionist. He wants to get involved in the world up to the point where he doesn't get dragged into it. And this view, of course, is as old as the founding fathers. This is what was embedded in their lifestyle while working against the reactionary forces from Britain in the 1770s and 80s. I mean, Trump is really kind of just an old-fashioned type of realist. He doesn't want to get in over his head. On the other hand, Trump has an ally,
with whom he's obligated up to his eyeballs, and that is Israel. One of the things going on now in this reconstitution of Syria is the thoughts or the actions of Israel versus Turkey. Turkey wants a very strong, unified-type Syria to come out of this.
take a lot of pressure off a lot of things. And the Israelis want to see it weak. They want that airspace. They want to be able to attack Damascus or anti-Israeli hostility anywhere in the country. So we've got these people in the background who are, Turkey and Israel are doing kind of this shadow dance in the background. They're deeply involved in Syrian politics. And the United States is deeply involved in Israeli politics.
So if Netanyahu overreaches, overreacts, I think Trump is going to be stuck with him. And you're right. Trump says that Syria is a mess. He said it's up for them to solve the problem.
He hopes it will stay as a regional thing. But look, one of the reasons the leaders of Syria have to do something positive here is they have to borrow money pretty soon to rebuild the place. They have to go into the international markets or the IMF or whatever it is. And they have to look like, you know, they got their head screwed on straight here.
So no one's going to lend people money if they look like they can't put the place back together. So I think Trump is taking a very cautionary approach. And look, nothing about Donald Trump's administration suggests a hard and fixed position on anything. A lot of these people are just sort of watching events unfold and trying not to get involved.
Trump is, you're correct, he is non-interventionist in the sense of he's not too adventurous about getting involved in things and he's risk averse. He doesn't want to slide into something he can't get out of. Dr. Wang, your thought on this? Because we know that the SDF was a key U.S. ally against ISIS and American troops still maintain a presence in northeastern Syria. So does this integration deal work?
suggest perhaps a winning u.s role in the region i think united states exactly hopes to win in this region because from donald trump perspective the united states should not waste too much energy and too much attention in the region particularly in the conflicting region without enough resources and uh
and economic potentials like Syria, because Syria now is still the kind of war-prone country and a lot of internal crisis and uncertainty is still maintained. And the United States should insert a lot of efforts and energy into the country if the United States want to play that kind of role. So that's why I think
United States does not want to maintain a kind of too high profile role in this region. And meanwhile, inside Syria, like Turkey, like Israel, like Jordan, and maybe to some extent Iraq, they all have some kind of influence in part of the country or in the large areas of the country. So that's why United States does not need to get involved too deeply or play the very least
in this in the country. So that is why in the future is make a lot of more uncertainties inside the country because without the leader or without the leading country external forces, it will make a lot of things much more complicated because everybody will compete with each other and nobody can determine everything.
So that's why I think this kind of the external uncertainties and external instability factors that would influence continuously the future reconstruction process of Syria. Well, Dr. Wright, as just now we discussed, actually the two sides are still in the early stages of this reconciliation process and a lot needs to be wait and see. But actually they are planning to put this into practice by year end.
So how optimistic are you about this timeline and other major obstacles that may derail this process? Yeah, I think it's cautiously optimistic. That's probably my position on it. But I think the amount, the scale of things that need to be done are considerable. You know, the
domestically within the country, the economy is devastated. Al-Shara needs to bring together
a degree of confidence that he wants to have an inclusive role for all the different sectarian and ethnic groups within Syria as a pathway forward. And there won't be necessarily retributions being carried out in an uncontrolled manner, especially with the Alawite community.
In addition to that, it's also the, you know, he's overseeing a patchwork of different groups within Syria. And, you know, this includes, for example, even mercenaries and Chechen fighters. It's the degree to which he will be able to control those different groups within the country.
And I think there's also, in addition to that, there's also the separatist or the desires on behalf of the SDF Kurds to actually have a greater degree of autonomy. And I think that's really the key underlying issue that's really going to be there. It's the amount, it's the, while the Kurdish SDF are willing to actually integrate into the Syrian army, what will be the nature of the amount of autonomy
relative independence or autonomy that they would have within the future Syria. And that is going to be the key stumbling block because the agreement that was signed was weak on the details.
But even domestic, even outside the domestic issues, there are, of course, the challenges that Syria will face from countries within the region. You know, whether it's from Turkey intervening in one way or another, given the role of the PKK and the Kurdish forces and Turkey's own national interests in preventing a Kurdish federation.
as well as that, of course, what's going on with Israel and Iran as well, and other meddling countries that could actually destabilize the process.
But internationally, there's also some obligations that need to kick in for this to be successful. And that's going to be about easing sanctions, allowing the economy to rebuild, because unless those things all come together, it's going to be very difficult to actually achieve the promise of what's been agreed on. So I would say, yes, I'm cautiously optimistic, but I don't want to downplay the challenges. The challenges are real and they could easily take it off road.
So it's a very precarious situation. Okay. Well, Dr. Syracuse, what do you think? How realistic do you think this timeline is? And what do you think are the internal and external factors that may derail this process? The timeline from my study of history, whether it's the American Revolution from 1774 to 1783 and beyond, you know, it takes decades.
10, 12 years to wrap up a civil war. I mean, it may take that long, might even take longer. But, you know, in the first instance, they stopped killing each other, except for the recrudescence of violence the other day when they started
killing Alawites and all the rest of it. There are some scores to settle. And of course, the central government of Syria has to make sure that these vigilante killings do not come from their offices and do not have their hand all over it, because that would generate mistrust through the system. But I reckon it'll take about seven to 10 years to settle the place down. And like many parts of the Middle East that have been bombed, you know, in this case by
Russian Air Force even. I mean, it's going to take years and years to rebuild Syria. And of course, its geography is a little spectacular and fraught. It's fraught because it's in Israel's neighborhood and Israel is always going to be looking over its shoulder of who's there. I mean, Israel was always claiming to be killing elements that were trying to kill them, that is ISIS type elements.
Hamas friendly elements. And so, you know, that feeling is still there below the ground. It's a very complex place. And I wish to say that a lot, you know, I hope that I'd hope that more Americans and Australians understand the complexity, not only in the Middle East, but this neck of the woods, because...
anything can and will happen. Yeah, well, Dr. Wang, we know that the SDF currently detains about 10,000 ISIS fighters and holds 46,000 related individuals, mostly women and children in several camps.
So with this deal transferring control to Damascus, how confident are you that the new government can prevent ISIS resurgence? I think even that the deal has been implemented, would be implemented in the future, it does not necessarily mean that the central government led by Shah
would directly control the affairs, particularly the justice and security affairs locally in the northeastern part of Syria, particularly in the areas controlled by SDF. Because SDF, I think, will maintain all the Kurdish political and military factions,
led by YPG will maintain the major kind of the mechanism or the major power in this area. So that means that they would continue to have the very determining power over the future of the ISIS fighters and the ISIS related
individuals, about more than 40,000 or nearly 60,000 individuals. So the only problem is that on the one hand, whether or not that the new agreements will lead to the assistance from the central interim government to the
uh kdf areas controlled sdf controlled areas because with more resources and more money and more political and economic support from the central government damascus to uh to the to to the sdf controlled area it means that sdf controlled area will have enough power capabilities to
to maintain the control over the region and prevent the coming back of the ISIS. And on the other hand, whether or not a new round of division or new round of even conflict will be erupted after the, we call it the honeymoon time between the two sides and between the interim government and the SDF.
because now it's the only beginning point. But then when something coming to maybe implemented, when something come into the practice, a lot of divisions and a lot of problem emerge. So whether the two sides or the different sides will find ways to end all these rivalries is still the kind of the question. So that is why I think maybe
We hope and we expect, we know that the ISS comeback will then finally lead to the disasters of everybody. We'll actually disorder the region. But we should say I am cautiously optimistic about the deal and we expect and we hope that this deal could work to help pacify the tension and prevent the ISS comeback again in this region.
Well, Dr. Wright, we do agree. Do you think there's a risk that we might see a resurgence of ISIS in this transferring process?
Yeah, well, it depends really on the ability for al-Shada to actually keep control within the country. I would say that the likelihood is that he'll be able to keep a good degree of control because now actually having the unification with SDF actually provides a much greater degree of control over the country as a whole. And I think also the move towards strengthening the central Syrian army, I think,
think is going to be or security force is going to be very key to doing that. He also has a clear interest as well in preventing the resurgence of ISIS because it would completely derail the country, derail also what he's trying to do. And also, remember, these people are already been captured. I mean, the 10,000 fighters and 46,000 family members related people. It's about then keeping them under control and managing them.
Do I think actually they have the ability to de-radicalize such individuals? No, I mean, they don't have that capacity. It's far from that. It's more of a case of just keeping them imprisoned.
and under control. The ideology that underpins ISIS is something that is not realistic to completely eradicate because it will always be there and it's about the conditions of the country. I mean, before ISIS, for example, we had Al-Qaeda and this is all part of the same ideology that exists.
So whether it has a different name, different form, yes, the ideology will be there. So there's always a risk. But I think it really depends on Al-Shada's ability to stabilize the economy, firstly, to maintain degree of social stability, prevent
of descending into sectarian violence within the country and also having a control over the security forces. That's the way I think how we can prevent the resurgence of an ISIS form of ideology coming up. Let's take a short break. Coming back, we'll continue our discussion. Stay with us.
Welcome back. You're listening to World Today. I'm Zhao Ying, joined by Dr. Wang Jin, Associate Professor with Northwest University in Xi'an, China; Dr. Joseph Siracusa, Professor of Global Futures with Curtin University; and Dr. Stephen Wright, Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at Hamad Bin Khalifa University. Dr. Siracusa, we actually don't know many details of the seal yet, but do you think the Kurds
will retain some sort of autonomy, perhaps in a federal state, or will this integration mark the end of this long-held aspirations of the Kurds? I think it'd be more like a confederation rather than federated. I mean, they're not going to give up any major way of life for the central government, but they are prepared to go along in terms of...
foreign policy, domestic policy, that kind of stuff. So, you know, a loosely confederated Syria wouldn't be a very bad idea right now. And I think the Kurdish leadership, if they're real smart, they've played a pretty good hand up till now.
I think they're going to look at the chips on the table and they're going to say to themselves, well, we got good relations with the Americans, Trump or not. And President Erdogan may back off a little bit. And they got now standing in Damascus. They might be biding their time. I mean, it doesn't hurt any of these people, the Kurdish backers, to play this game for a while and see what they can get out of it. Certainly you're going to get out of it more than
than being shot at or anything like that. So I think the Kurdish leadership is very smart to play this game so far. And I think if they can get on with Erdogan, and Erdogan, of course, is carrying on Damascus to keep the Kurds under wraps. So, you know, it's all starting to fall into place.
And if we could diminish the violence, then we can start to rebuild the country. So Dr. Wang, what form of government system do you think might be the best option for the country to move forward? I think the best kind of format of the government should be the format that people choose by the Syrian people. Because only the Syrian people themselves know what kind of format would benefit them well, and only the Syrian people have the right to choose what kind of format they hope to establish.
But the precondition, as we always repeatedly stress, is that all kinds of divisions should be properly settled, particularly given the fact that there were still wars and conflict in parts of the region, and there were still possibilities of wars coming back in other parts of the region, particularly in the southern parts between the local military factions and the interim government.
and also between the pro-Assad, some kind of military groups in the western coastal provinces, like Latakia areas, where the Alawi minority ethnic groups are located, and they are still resisting in some areas. Small towns are still resisting the occupation of the area.
of the al-Sha'a'a led the interim government. So that is why I think we still need patience and time. No kind of good government could be established or finished construction within a very short time. All the things need to be settled down through a longer term and needs patience and needs a lot of efforts to bring everybody
sit down together and to end the rivalry. So that's why I think the Syrian people should make their own choice. Yes, the Syrian people need to make their own choice. But we know this is a country with multiple ethnicities and religions. So
I mean, just as we see this deal that is trying to unify the Northeast, the violence is actually rocking the West. And Syria has just experienced this worst violence since Assad's fall. And over 1,300 people, mostly Alawite civilians, have died in the clashes between government forces and Assad loyalists on Syria's coast.
So, Dr. Wright, what do you think this reveals about the depth of sectarian division that is still plaguing this country? And what lessons do you believe the government could learn from this crisis?
Well, the situation is incredibly fragile. What it tells us is that we have to have a long-term perspective on how the country will be able to address those issues. You know, we have to think back what happened in Iraq after 2003. I mean, it was, I think, in 2005 that a constitution was formed. But in
But it took more than 20 years for the country really to have a degree of stability. And there were episodes of reprisal violence, lack of control within the by the country, by the central leadership moves towards separatism by the Kurds within that country, challenges with regard to the rise of extremist ideologies, which, you know, resulted in the Islamic State rising within Iraq. Syria is going to be facing very similar issues.
And I think that's really the challenge. I mean, what happened in the west of the country was really like remnant forces of the Assad regime rising up. And then that then saw then an outbreak of uncontrolled violence and attacks being done against the Alawite community, which, of course, were part of the Al-Assad or the Al-Assad were from the Alawite themselves.
The risk is, I think, that there is genuine fear, especially among the minority communities within Syria, the Christians and also the Alawites, that there could be widespread attacks being taken on them and the Druze as well, and also that they would be excluded in the future order of Syria more broadly. So I think the challenge is,
is a long-term one for al-Sharaa and also I think it's one now he really needs to build an inclusive form of system that genuinely actually gives, secures people's rights and provides security. He may have the control of the various groups but they are acting with the degree of agency, they're acting quite autonomously and we saw this in the violence in the area.
I think we have to have a long-term perspective on this and the challenges are very real. Okay, well, Dr. Syracuse, Al-Shera's government actually said that the security threats has been neutralized in northwestern coast as they announced the end of the military operation. But do you think Al-Shera can really restore order without alienating minorities like the Alawites or perhaps this heavy-handed response
risk a broader backlash. I'm sort of an old-fashioned historian. I don't think human nature has changed much in 2,500 years. There'd be people in Syria who have scores to settle, ancient scores to settle. I mean, if terrible things were done to one's group five, seven years ago, people are going to try to get even and
And so, you know, you have to be able to control this. This happens after every revolution or after every civil war. I mean, even in parts of America, we still fight the American Civil War 100 years after the event, 100 more. So, you know, he's got a job on his hand. And so what he's got to do is, as your guests have suggested, is to look for common cause. I mean, the only way to go forward is to stay on the same page and not kill each other. And look, the alternative to diplomacy at the domestic level is violence.
And the violence hasn't paid off. I mean, the country is devastated. Futures are destroyed. Commerce is destroyed. Manufacturing is destroyed. Education is destroyed. And God knows what the health services are like in Syria. And so, you know, this is a time where people have to put their...
sort of their feelings aside, and whether you were loyalists or not, or whether you were a hell raiser or not, you got to come together on this occasion. I mean, this is going to require a great deal of enthusiasm on the part of the central government in Damascus. That is, they're going to have to call on people to be their better selves. And this is the hardest thing after a revolution, is to get people to forget their grievances and to rally around the new flag.
Okay, well, Dr. Wang, could this unrest be seen as some kind of a test of the new government's ability to unify Syria? And if so, what lessons do you think the al-Sharif government should learn from this crisis?
I think every kind of the government or every kind of regime, they face different problems. Although those different problems seem to be similar with each other, and particularly inside one country, the problem always comes from
out of the very particularly the same or particularly similar circumstances, such as ethnic crisis, ethnic tensions, such as the different secondarian rivalries, such as the different regional and the tribal crisis.
Although they come out of the similar and even same problem, but these problems finally are different because they are under the different circumstances and they happened under the different powers interactions. So for Al-Shahar, I think on the one hand, he has, or the new interim government has to
consider what kind of format, as we mentioned, that what kind of format, what kind of structure would benefit most for the Syrian people. Because if they want a very centralized power government, it means that they have to melt down their local power and the local capabilities. But given the fact that the different factions are scattered,
all around the country, it is very difficult to realize this goal within a very short term. And on the other hand, I think Al-Shahar has to carefully deal with relations with different countries, because although Turkey, Jordan and Iraq
and maybe United States, and maybe, for example, Iran, they could, to some extent, reach a kind of balance outside the territory border. But this does not necessarily mean that there will be no division in the future, given that the fragility of economy and fragility of military forces and fragility of political balance inside the country, I mean, inside Syria, any kind of external turbulence,
will lead to the faction collapse inside Syria and lead to the further bigger disasters for the country. So that is why I think he needs to be very, very careful and needs to be very, very cautious about
any kind of division on any kind of the problem and not to overwhelmingly using violence that because that could easily provoke the further tension and then finally destroy all the construction efforts. So that is why I think he's facing the very, very big problem. And we hope that the Syrian people will have good luck in the future. Well, so do you think
it might be more realistic for these regions to maintain some sort of autonomy, where the regions like the Kurdish northeast, the Alawite coast, and the Druze in the south govern themselves to some extent.
I think we're talking about reality because the Kurds in the northeast, this is kind of reality because after 2011, the Kurdish people were not talking about, okay, the YPG, okay, the SDF.
no matter what kind of a slogan or no matter what kind of the brand, they had already been standing there and they are becoming the very dominant role or dominant factions in that area for more than a decade. We cannot say within the night that all this kind of the power would
be would disappear. It's impossible. So we should respect the reality and then construct the peace based upon that kind of reality. And also we are talking, as you mentioned, that Alavi in the western coastal provinces like Latakia, it has been there, I mean, for centuries. And then Alavi powers, particularly in the government, al-Assad government,
They have already become a very dominant power faction for decades. So Azov now, they enter the new period of the interim government. But then we cannot say that these Alawi factions, they will follow all the others directly from the central government. They still have their own secondary freedom. They still have their own secondary power.
and they have a totalitarian willingness that they hope to maintain. So they have to also respect this reality and construct a peace upon this reality. And also in the south, it's become more complicated because on the one hand, Israel maintains a very closely monitoring system in this region, and particularly in some areas, they still keep their military presence there. And then on the other hand, in the south in Syria,
The U.S. minority has close ties with the U.S. minorities in Syria, in Lebanon, in Israel, and also in history, the U.S. minority always kept a very, very high level of autonomy in the southern part of Syria.
this kind of reality should also be respected because they have their own groups, they have their own areas and they have their own independent tribal connections. It's very difficult to completely tame them within the short term. So all kinds of this kind of reality should be respected.
And then the new government should be constructed based upon this kind of realities. And I think that is why we need a lot of patience and we need a lot of dialogues, not only within the interim, not only within Damascus, but also between Damascus and different cities, northeastern, western and southern cities, with the local factions to discuss what kind of the future that they hope to construct there.
altogether.
Yeah, well, Dr. Wright, so do you think this SDF deal can serve as a model for integrating other minority groups like the Druze and the Alawites? Or does it risk alienating them even further? Yeah, I mean, I think there is some possibility that it could help, you know, work as a model, you know, moving forward. But I think the, you know, more broadly, I would say that
It depends on how it's framed by Al-Shara. Is he going to be looking for a meaningful integration for these parties or is it going to be one of just finding some form of accommodation? I mean, I think the SDF deal...
is going to be is unique in Syria, simply because of the bargaining position that actually the Kurds had. It is different. The Alawites and also the Christian, the Druze, they don't have that same position that the Kurds actually had for any type of integration. So I think the
It's unlikely to be replicated, but aspects of it in terms of integration, meaningful integration, can be adopted by al-Shara in terms of how he can approach the Alawites and the Druze to try to find some form of move towards national unity. But no, I don't think it's going to be a complete model because it's just a totally different dynamic for the Kurds' SDF.
and what exists with the other minority groups within Syria. But the underlying principle of trying to find some form of inclusive dialogue
approach that can actually accommodate these other ethnic groups is certainly there. So yeah, I think aspects from it can be adopted. Okay, so Dr. Syracuse, would you agree, do you think this Kurdish deal can be a test case for a broader reconciliation framework that could also be applied to Alawite and Druze communities, or do you feel the situation are totally different? No, I think it could serve as a positive model about what could be done, and I was...
Thinking here, as the gentleman had been talking about that famous Shakespeare quote from, I think it's The Tempest, where, you know, misery acquaints a man with strange bedfellows. Well, politics makes strange bedfellows. I mean, I think people can see the way forward. And I'd like to see the United Nations embrace this idea, you know, give these people a chance to think.
and give them some kind of international support, whether it's economic, monetary, or even spiritual, emotional support. I mean, they have to know they're headed in the right direction. And I think at the end of a miserable time for a nation,
I think people are prepared to lay down their weapons and to make common cause. I'm thinking here of the great surrender at Appomattox between Robert E. Lee and General Grant. I mean, there comes a point where killing each other doesn't make any sense, doesn't further anything, and it makes life very, very precarious. But look, I never thought 2025 would see Syria as sort of a moment of peace.
Most international relations lately have been so miserable. But, you know, the idea that the Syrians themselves and they can come together over the future of their country, I think offers people like me anyway, great hope that common sense will prevail. Yeah. So, Dr. Wong, what do you think? Because...
I mean, if you look at the Kurds in the northeast and also these coastal clashes, they both highlight serious minority challenges, like the Kurds are seeking their rights and Alawites, they're fearing persecution perhaps. So with that in mind, how challenging will it be for Shara's government to turn its promises of inclusivity into action? I think now that the people have come out,
suddenly, I mean, in different parts of the country, just because Syria is actually at a very historic moment, because now the Syria interim government, they are organizing a kind of national committee or the national conference to determine what kind of future they hope to choose.
And that is why there were different models. For example, we know Al-Sha'a, he led the HTS, and other factions are very, very Islamic and very, very conservative political Islamic factions.
and which they hope, for example, the Shagia law, the Islamic law, should become the foundation of the country. And the Islamic idea is particularly, in some areas, very conservative ideas of the Islamic religion should be maintained as a very leading belief or leading ideology for the daily executive as well as the daily communication manner. So that means that...
the leading ideology now is that it actually might threaten the life of everybody. But then in some other parts of the region and some other parts of the country that the minorities, they hope to maintain their own autonomy, cultural autonomy, religious autonomy, and political freedom. So when now all this kind of the
these kind of divisions now meet together. That is why that in some areas, Alawi, for example, their groups, they hope to voice their own kind of
kind of the claims to the government and also in the past weeks that although some kind of agreement has been bridged between Kurdish people and the interim government, there are still a lot of things that are unknown. For example, what kind of structure the country would establish.
and what kind of ideology, leading ideology for the country. It would be secular or it would be very religious. So that is why I think Syria is now facing a very critical moment. That is why different factions and different groups, they hope to voice their own claims. They hope to speak out their own understandings of what country should be. So that is why I think Syria has to make a very difficult choice
to make concessions with each other for different groups and also to establish and seek a kind of consensus with each other in the future.
Well, Dr. Wright, let's look at the Israeli factor, because since Assad's fall, Israel has taken control of the UN buffer zone in Golan Heights, and it has carried out hundreds of airstrikes on targets in Syria since the overthrow of Assad. Does this signal a permanent Israeli push into Syrian territory? Well, I think the motivation for Netanyahu is about creating some type of buffer zone in particular.
It's about trying to deal with the potential risks from the various groups that actually are operating within Syria. It's opportunistic. It's, as I said, creating a buffer zone of some form. Whether it's permanent, I think it's unlikely. And it can be used as some form of negotiation tactics in the future.
But broadly speaking, I think this is a pattern that we've seen with Israel, that it's going to be taking advantage of the situation to
you know, maximize its security. I think, you know, Israel in general, I think what it would be looking for, it finds that a, you know, a weak and, you know, Syria, you know, which is fairly, which is divided. Actually, you know,
it works in its own national interest because it isn't actually then a threat that's credible on the northern border. But at the same time, I think the challenge for Israel is really the various groups that are operating within Syria.
So I think actually, yeah, it's a buffer zone, but it will be more likely that it won't necessarily be a permanent presence. There will be something that can be used in negotiations with the government in future, provided that actually al-Shara and the Syrian armed forces can actually exercise, you know, proper control over the territory and the different groups operating within it. Mm-hmm.
Mm-hmm. Well, Dr. Syracuse, would you agree? What do you think? Yeah, I agree. I mean, I think Israel is kind of the sleeper here. It depends what it wants to do. I mean, if it just wants a buffer zone, that's fine. If it wants to keep the government in Damascus permanently weak and on the back foot, that's something else again. I mean, I'm not seeing too many clear thoughts coming out of Jerusalem. I mean, Netanyahu's government...
it doesn't really have um really didn't know what to do with syria that is they didn't expect they would have to do something with syria aside from attacking their enemy or opposed enemy from time to time so uh this leaves them something but i i worry about the the possible confrontation between the turks and the israelis in these buffer zone areas or in the route to damascus by air etc i mean the
Turkey, of course, is not spoiling for a fight, but the president of Turkey has made it very clear that Netanyahu is the bad guy here. And if he starts using the Turkish Air Force to intercept...
the Israeli Air Force, we're going to be in for quite a ride. Well, Dr. Wang, what role can the international community play in helping restore peace and honor in Syria? Like, should the international community...
step in to shape Syria's future? Or is this like strictly an internal matter for Syria to resolve? Where do you draw the line? I think the international community also has to
to determine what should be done, what should not be done. Because actually, we're looking at the Syrian crisis has been lasted for more than a decade. One of the important reasons is that the international community, particularly some countries, I mean, some great powers as well as the regional powers, they hope to do the things.
They hope to intervene the internal affairs of Syria and they hope to determine what the Syria construction should be. So then it led to division. Then inside Syria it led to wars. But on the other hand, the international community really need to do something, particularly international community should give
uh much more economic aid humanitarian aid and political assistance to the to the new government and to encourage a more inclusive and more sustainable and stable government inside syria because we know that uh the syrians just after war a lot of reconstruction uh and
efforts are highly needed and nor a lot of investment are highly needed particularly that we know the United States is still a Blockading is still set importing sanction against a serious makes a serious economic reconstruction very difficult so that is why I think international community should on the one hand to reach the kind of consensus and the on the other hand to try to try themselves to based on this positive consensus to to restart
a real approach with Syria and to start the kind of assistance to help the Syrian people and to help them to end the wars and the rivalries to establish kind of the more inclusive and the more open-minded government as early as possible.
Okay, thank you, Dr. Wang Jin, Associate Professor with Northwest University in Xi'an, China, Dr. Joseph Siracusa, Professor of Global Futures with Curtin University, and Dr. Stephen Wright, Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at Hamad Bin Khalifa University.
Thank you again for being with us. And that's all the time we have for this edition of World Today. To listen to this episode again or to catch up on previous episodes, you can download our podcast by searching World Today. And you can also follow us on next CGTN video. I'm Zhao Ying. Thank you so much for listening. See you next time.