Hello and welcome to the panel discussion of World Today, I'm Ding Han in Beijing. French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer have in recent days traveled to the White House with a key message to U.S. President Donald Trump, don't abandon Europe.
The US president's shift on Ukraine is shaking the transatlantic alliance, causing panic on a continent that has relied on US security assurance for 80 years.
Suspicions are deepening that Trump is effectively pulling the plug on decades of US support for Europe. So, are transatlantic relations over as some Europeans have said? And what are the challenges that Europe must overcome if it wants to pursue strategic autonomy? These questions and much more in this edition of the program.
To listen to this episode again or to catch up on our previous episodes, you can download our podcast by searching World Today. So joining us now on the line are Kathleen Burke, Professor Emeritus of Modern and Contemporary History with the University College London, Professor Doug Guthrie from Thunderbird School of Global Management, and Christies Tambados, Associate Professor with Monash University.
So, thank you very much for joining us. Professor Burke, to start with you, French President Emmanuel Macron recently warned that "Do not think that the unthinkable cannot happen, including the worst." Do you think for Europe, the unthinkable and the worst is already on the doorstep? Some people say we are seeing an unprecedented transatlantic crisis. What is your take?
Well, there's been a long history, and the idea that this is actually the worst is problematic. But it is difficult. The transatlantic crisis is that the dependable United States is becoming less dependable.
The difficulty is, I mean, President Trump is only 30-odd days into his term of office, and I think Europe and the rest of the world is only trying to come to terms with what he actually means to do or not to do. I mean, certainly his main idea is power, the use of power.
And the use of power can also be the lack of the use of power. And I think that's what Europe is worried about. They have always been, with the encouragement of the United States, I may say, complimentary.
And therefore, the United States also finds Europe useful because traditionally, the Navy in particular has inoperability. That is to say, we use the same ball bearings as the United States does. So I think it's unprecedented because the United States is...
saying it is not dependable. I don't think President Trump will withdraw entirely. I think he's doing what Obama did in a rather more polite way, which is to say, get your act together or there's going to be difficulties. What he has done is implicitly threatened them, and Europe is indeed trying to get its act together, whether it will be in time or
whether the United Kingdom is trying to. But Europe is fundamentally a trade organization. It is not fundamentally a military organization. And what President Trump appears to be trying to do is forcing them to pay more attention to their military. And this is proving difficult because it's not the usual thing that Europe does.
is used to doing. I take your point. So, Professor Guthrie, going to you, if President Donald Trump, as some people suggest, does not believe in alliances, especially military alliances, then what do you think he would believe in? For example, some people are talking about that he is believing in sphere of influence or something else.
So I will just speak as as an American who is embarrassed by what's going on right now. I think our leaders, I mean, initially when he was elected, I was very nervous about the transatlantic alliance. I was nervous about U.S.-China relations.
I sort of calm myself down by thinking, well, these guys are business people. It's going to be OK, which is true. But these are very, very transactional, self-interested business people. So the fact that the richest person in the world paid $250 million to get somebody elected who would help him get tax cuts for the wealthy, I think is just atrocious. I think it's embarrassing. But the key thing to your question, what are they focused on?
They're focused on one, trying to create a situation in which they can claim victory for, you know, making America first again and creating jobs in America, which, by the way, tariffs are not going to do. But then the question is, what are they going to try to do and what is their focus? And I think their focus is to to have a lot of bluster around what
they can do to make these industries great and then make claims about cutting government, right? And so I think the Doge initiatives are crazy and I think it's the whole thing is insane and nobody's really thinking through carefully what is going to be the implications of say cutting government funding to things like USAID or to US universities. It's all craziness. But
To go to this larger point about what is their focus in the global political economy, you know, their idea is to make America first and they want to flex their muscles and, you know, have control over the relationships with China and with Europe.
And I think it's very dangerous. And so so their focus, I think, you know, they've talked a lot about their focus being international relations and a lot of the issues that we look look at. But I think what their real focus is, is on creating tax cuts for themselves and for the rich.
I think it's a very bad situation for America right now. Okay. So, Professor Tambadil is going to you. In the meantime, we have also noticed that some Europeans are accusing the Trump administration of intervening in the politics of European countries, saying the United States is not only decoupling from the European continent, but also, and probably more importantly, deciding for and disrupting European countries.
Do you think that is the case in your observation? And do you think Washington is justified to intervene in the politics of European countries in a scenario in which the United States is still largely responsible for the continent's security issues? So the United States is certainly intervening in European politics in a rather significant way.
The Trump administration celebrates anyone who opposes the European idea. Boris Johnson, Nigel Farage, Viktor Orban and so on. The visit of the Vice President of the United States to Europe was very much in line with this approach.
Jay Devance's statements at the Munich Security Conference were case in point. He accused Europeans as repeating from fundamental values, particularly free speech, using the example of the fining by the UK government of a British army veteran by the name of Adam Smith-Connor for praying outside an abortion clinic.
This is a rather sort of amusing point. It seems to me that the Americans are very selective when it comes to launching this kind of accusations. Incidentally, you know, talking about this particular incident that occurred in the United Kingdom, I'd like to point out something.
These sort of demonstrations of faith outside abortion clinics are, in my view, rather despicable. The faithful are there to intimidate vulnerable women going through a very difficult time, nothing more. Americans seem to confuse the right to free speech with the right to a free audience. The first is guaranteed by their Constitution, the second is not. Regardless of this particular point, though, the fact that the Vice President of the United States
went to Europe and chose the occasion to launch accusations of this type is a clear indication of the United States' intention to undermine the Union and to challenge the relationship between the European Union and the United States.
Of course, Vice President Vance proceeded to have a meeting with Alice Wedel, the leader of the ultra-nationalist far-right AFD party, which naturally angered the Europeans. The meeting was part of a broader strategy by the Trump administration to support far-right populist movements in Europe, aiming to reshape the continent's political landscape.
So yes, the Trump administration is intervening in European politics in a rather significant way. And I do not think that Washington is justified to intervene in European politics, despite the fact that it might have traditionally been largely responsible for the security of Europe. I believe that the U.S. has gained as much from Europe as Europe from the U.S.,
And that does not give it the privilege of interfering with European politics, and certainly in this particular way, which aims to undermine the state of the European Union. So, Professor Gatharet, going back to you,
Some people are still trying to figure out this question. Are the Trump's European policies shaped more by impulses or by a deliberate geopolitical strategy? What is your take? For example, do you think Trump is intent on weakening Europe or simply trying to
push or coerce, let's put it this way, coerce European countries into, for example, sharing greater burden in terms of defense issues or buying more weapons or buying more energy, for example, electrified natural gas from the United States.
It's a great question. And here again, I'm very cynical about what's going on. But I will say, you know, these individuals are very transactional and they're very, very they're not collaborative in terms of how they think about these broader issues. And so just to give, you know, you raise issues about resources and such. I mean, the issue that, you know, as a part of
NATO and, you know, given what's been happening with the Ukraine over the last two years or three years, we've really needed to really step up and focus on what we were doing. And I think we were. But the idea that we would go back now and
and say, well, we want access to we want you to repay us and get access to all of your rare earths is, you know, this is not how geopolitical negotiations are done. And so I just think it's very transactional and very, very aggressive and oriented towards what are in the best interests of a few industries and in particular, Elon Musk.
And I think this is just a very dangerous moment for the United States because we're so focused on these sort of broad brushstrokes of, you know, making America great again and downsizing government. But then in terms of our international relations,
you know, we're not acting like a good partner in these processes. And so I do think, to your question, there is a very transactional approach to these issues and what resources we can get out of this. That's what they're aggressively going for. And so I think, you know, it's a very cynical approach to politics, and I think it's wrong. The United States is not in the right here. So, Professor Burwick,
To what extent do you think the current situation represents a wake-up call for European countries? Some people say what is being asked of European countries right now is not just simply to do a little bit more than usual, but for the whole continent to effectively take actions that would enable it to emerge as a superpower on a global stage.
Like you mentioned earlier, the EU is largely a trading bloc, but now there are calls for this bloc to transition from a trading bloc to a military and a geopolitical power. Would you agree with these ideas?
The problem is, of course, democracy. That is to say that a single power broker or power projector, such as President Trump clearly intends himself to be, can improve.
improve the chances of actually, at least in the short term, of having, well, his colleagues or his opponents do what he wants them to do. I think if Europe actually got its act together as a military, and certainly the United Kingdom and France, which are the major military powers in Europe, already do things together, that is to say they have a joint strategy,
a joint strike force. And, of course, the United Kingdom is working closely with the Baltic countries and with some of the others to actually organize what's going to happen. Now, I think President Trump thinks he would like Europe to be stronger, but he would not want a strong Europe not to do what he wants them to do. And he clearly...
assumes that in his position he will be able to enforce his own theories. But I don't think he wants Europe as a superpower. He is a man of the 19th century in terms of balances of power, where the great powers actually decide over the individual countries on the basis of
well, of Britain containing the empire and France doing what they can in Europe. Do you see what I mean? So I think cooperation is not his style, but I think he will find that cooperation
Telling people what to do with the implicit threat of him doing something to them that they will not like is not an approach that's going to work entirely. So because he can't at this point control Russia, he can't control China, he's not going to be able to control India, which is going to clearly be sooner rather than later another superpower.
So the point is that he will not be able to control the other 100 countries, or he can perhaps if he wishes to do so. But there are going to be countries which are strong enough and secure enough in their own ability to wage power that he's going to come up against and it's going to be more difficult. So in short answer to your question, I think he wants Europe out.
to be much more militarily powerful, but not so military powerful that they can ignore what the United States wants them to do.
So, Professor Bourque, since you are joining us from Britain, let's talk a little bit about the British perspective regarding this. Because Jonathan Powell, who is the British Prime Minister, Keir Starmer's National Security Advisor,
He once called on Britain in 2010 to stay close to American presidents even when things get tough because his logic at the time is that the United States will remember this and reward the UK by letting its officials, I mean by letting officials from London give counsel to Washington. So looking at the situation today, do you think
Such a mentality will continue to work for London today. And we know on the part of the UK, for quite some time there has been a self-appointed role as a bridge, serving as a bridge for the United States to the European continent. Do you think this role will continue or somehow disintegrate?
Ever since the end of the Second World War, forgive me for being a historian here, it has been the conviction that you have to stay close to the United States for all sorts of reasons, but mostly because of U.S. power. And it is easier to elicit that power from the United States if the U.S. thinks you're worth helping. Alliances require...
a balance. Both sides have to put something in that the other wishes. Now, Henry Kissinger said that we're so close to the United Kingdom that it seems strange if we don't talk to them. And any superpower needs someone to talk to. But the question about being a bridge to Europe, this is much more difficult for the United Kingdom in no longer being a part of Europe.
But Starmer is clearly wanting to put a foot in both camps. He's trying to reconstruct this, and it depends on whether Trump is going to find this useful. Frederick Merz, the new chancellor of Germany, thinks that they cannot just give in to Trump. Macron...
things that they cannot just give to Trump, but they have to be able to produce something that Trump wants to happen, that Trump needs. And transactional, as all my colleagues have emphasized, certainly is the case. And what Jonathan Powell and Lord Mendelsohn, the new British ambassador to the United States, have said, you have to have something to present, that
that he wants and hence being able to present that the United Kingdom is ideally on the upward slope with reconstituting a powerful military is something that Trump wanted and Trump appreciated. And the main thing is that the negotiation has to be so skillful that even though you may ideally get what you want,
President Trump has to feel he has a victory. And so the question then is, do you stand up to him publicly, like Macron did, the French president, or do you go on your knees and essentially what the British are trying to do is neither, to make themselves useful to the United States, which I think the U.S. will in due course find them useful, but
not ever take it for granted and to be very careful how you present your case to President Trump while not being supplicant certainly talk to him as well as an equal but in the nicest possible way and
So, Professor Tambadou, as early as 1963, former U.S. President John F. Kennedy urged Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own defense capabilities. And over the years, the same message has been repeated for decades, basically. Why do you think Europe has basically or consistently ignored these warnings?
So, as a matter of policy, American presidents may always ask for more, but their demands are not always justified. I do not think that Europe ignored such warnings. The European spending on defense during the Cold War was significantly higher than it is now, for example.
The UK, during the years of the Cold War, used to spend between 3 and 4% of its GDP on defense, whereas now it spends only about 2.2% of the GDP. Similarly, Germany used to spend between 3 and 4% of its GDP then and only 1.4% now.
So, following the Cold War, the Soviet bloc was in shambles and no longer presented a threat, and the relationship with other global powers, such as China, for example, was mutually beneficial, so they did not present a threat. Understandably, with the absence of foreign threats, the continent reconsidered its priorities, and social welfare became more important than security. Now, of course, things are very different.
The United States is re-evaluating its position in NATO and Russia is emerging as a credible threat, which of course will naturally lead to a re-evaluation of Europe's security decisions. Okay. So, Professor Gasri, very briefly, give your thoughts about this question before we take a short break.
Sure. Yeah, I mean, I agree with what's been said here. And again, this is we're headed into a very just uncertain and I think dark and transactional time because, you know, it's in the post-World War II era. A lot of bridges have been built in terms of creating alliances and
and building a stable approach to dealing with issues and adversaries. And then we saw the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of China in this time period. And, you know, the United States has worked to be a partner and collaborator with Europe and NATO. And in the current era, it's just very unpredictable because President Trump and
His main advisors are just very, very uncertain in terms of what it is that they're trying to achieve and what it is they're trying to do. But it is clear that they are trying to take a position that positions them as sort of the lead superpower rather than sort of having a collaborative alliance across the regions. And so I think it's a very dangerous time. Okay, let's take a short break here. And coming back, our discussion will continue. Stay tuned.
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You are back with World Today, I'm Dinghan in Beijing. Today we are talking about the future of transatlantic alliance amid the crisis it is faced with. Joining our panel, Kathleen Burke, Professor Emeritus of Modern and Contemporary History with the University College London, Professor Doug Guthrie from Funderburg School of Global Management, and Christies Tambazos, Associate Professor with Monash University.
So, Professor Guthrie, going back to you, from a different perspective, some people might say the current situation surrounding the Transatlantic Alliance might present an
an opportunity for Europe. For example, US Defense Secretary Peter Hack says has told Europeans that the US will "prioritize empowering Europe to own responsibility for its own security."
So are you optimistic that Europeans can somehow seize on this to build up their own defense industrial capacity or capabilities? Is there a real alternative to the U.S. security guarantee, in your opinion?
I think it's a great question. And I would argue that there is a tremendous opportunity right now. I think U.S. isolationism is a it's we're in a very bad direction right now. And I would argue that not just in terms of security, but in terms of economic development, Europe is.
stands in a very, very powerful position if they take advantage of the circumstances. So let's, for example, think about the U.S. withdrawal of things like USAID, right? I mean, they're arguing that this is really good for just budget cuts and overspending it with U.S. government. But USAID is a tremendous force in helping developing nations in places like sub-Saharan Africa, where there are tremendous rare earths. So right now we're focusing on the Ukraine.
Ukraine and the desire to have rare earths, which are important for a lot of different aspects of industry, especially in the high tech sector. But why then would we pull ourselves out of sub-Saharan Africa?
And the interesting player here is, in my view, China. So China and the realignment of the BRICS economy and the BRICS coalition and also the Belt and Road Initiative really stands to benefit tremendously from the U.S. withdrawal from the aid of the world.
And as that pivot happens, my guess is that we're going to start to see much stronger economic alliances between China and Europe. And so you're asking mainly the question about sort of this military positioning, but I think economic development and economic integration is going to be a key piece of this. And so as the United States continues to isolate itself economically,
I think Europe can fill that void. And the more that Europe acts like a coalition, and we don't even have to talk about the NATO alliance, we could talk about sort of a rebranding and re-empowering of the EU.
I think that there's tremendous opportunity for Europe. Okay. Thank you very much, Professor Guthrie. Thank you so much for having me. Okay. So, Professor Berg, in your understanding, is there a real alternative to the U.S. security guarantee for Europe?
Well, of course there's an alternative, Europe banding together more closely, increasing their military spend, and trying to keep in balance their own national egos, which is always part of any, if we want to talk about national egos. Of course, we know whom we can talk about. I take the point of Professor Guthrie in that the United States is pushing
Europe in other directions. There is a possibility of a closer trade relationship with China, but in that case, Germany and China will have to come to some sort of agreement about cars. I think people forget that if they work together, the European economy is much larger than the American economy. So President Trump
Pushing this through is possibly, although perhaps not during his term of office, if he leaves when he is supposed to constitutionally, is going to find Europe is much more difficult to deal with because using economic weapons will not always solve
He cannot attack Europe particularly. I mean, one of the main reasons for NATO was not just to save Europe. It was also to give the United States a landing strip for actually sort of any invasion of Europe if necessary. People who think that NATO is only for Europe are just wrong. But the Americans certainly think of it that way.
that it's their gift to Europe. And what Trump is saying, of course, is that it's not a gift. You have to pay for it.
And then the question is, what is it worth Europe to pay to have the association of the United States that is wholly untrustworthy? What President Trump has done is to take dependability out of international relations at this point. It has always been the case that the world works together when it's predisposed
predictable in most respects what other countries, what their reactions are going to be. And again, as I put before, Trump's major intention is the gathering of power. And his power is, of course, undependability, unexpected moves, and the idea that
that the United States controls the room, controls the way things are going to move. And if Europe doesn't get its act together a bit more, and they have prioritized social network for their own peoples, it's going to be an even worse, unpredictable world that we're all going to have to live in. Hmm.
I take your point. So, Professor Chambazos, some people say that when we talk about how to pursue strategic autonomy for European countries, the first real test for Europe will be providing security guarantees to Ukraine without a U.S. backstop.
We understand that's currently a key demand from the British Prime Minister Keir Starmer when he was visiting Trump in the White House earlier this week. What is your take?
Okay, that's an excellent question. Before I get to that, though, if I may, I'd like to elaborate a little bit on the previous question that you had. Is there a real alternative to the United States security guarantee?
And I would argue that there certainly is. The concept of a European army has been floating around for a very long time, since the 1950s, actually, with the idea of a European defense community. However, that idea failed to garner enough support and never materialized for well-known and well-understood reasons.
Still, there have been several initiatives that lay the groundwork. Importantly, there is the European Defence Union, which is an ongoing effort to integrate Europe's defence capabilities more closely without merging individual armies. And this includes a number of initiatives, such as the European Defence Fund, which finances collaborative defence projects.
It's the permanent structured cooperation in which European states cooperate on military training and share equipment and so on, and various other things. So the current crisis is likely to reinvigorate these efforts. And in any event, Europe does not really have a choice but to become self-reliant.
So moving on to your current question, whether the first test for Europe will be providing security guarantees to Ukraine without the U.S. backstop. I would think that this would have been the first test if the U.S. withheld future reports.
support to Ukraine. However, Mr. Trump has managed to blackmail Ukraine to sign an agreement giving the United States significant rights over the mining of minerals in Ukraine. And it's understood that this was in return for some undisclosed as of yet explicit security guarantees.
So, my expectation is that to some extent or another, the U.S. will continue its military support to Ukraine, perhaps not to the extent that it has been providing that support so far. Therefore, I do not think that Europe will have to pass this test.
because the U.S. is not out of the game of supporting Ukraine yet. Unless, of course, Mr. Trump changes his mind, which is very possible, because Mr. Trump is not someone who exhibits a commitment to alliances.
but rather someone who thinks in very narrow transactional terms and who lives for the now, not for the long run. So, by the way, Professor Tambadzouz, do you think some EU member states, especially those on the eastern flank of NATO...
Do you think they will be somehow pushed by the current situation to pursue nuclear proliferation as the ultimate security trump card? Why or why not? Well, I would think that that is unlikely. Most countries in Eastern Europe are NATO members.
And the alliance provides a nuclear umbrella through its nuclear sharing agreements. This is backed, it's important to point out that this is backed not only by the United States nuclear capabilities, but by other nuclear nations such as France and the United Kingdom.
Incidentally, given that the United Kingdom is now losing the United States as an ally, it is likely to reconsider its position in Europe. And a number of commentators are now talking about a possible rejoining with the European Union.
In any event, nuclear programs are prohibitively expensive and in addition there are other constraints, other legal constraints, notably the European Union's firm support for non-proliferation and disarmament. So in this context, I doubt that any of the eastern flank countries
of Europe is likely to be able to pursue a credible nuclear ambition. May I just make one further comment? The eastern flank has deep rifts
uh... slovakia is very pro russian and hungry as you know uh... also ten more to russia than it does uh... to well tell me today the rest of europe and so those are our with europe cannot expel those too because that because russia could well move troops up there uh... poland is the one country there
that has the possibility of building nuclear it already spends four and a half percent of its gdp on weapons on on uh its uh military forces but the problem is that if they tried uh russia would would be very tempted to take them out or at least to so threaten uh that it would be more dangerous
then it's worse. So your point's well taken. Professor Burke, by the way, when we talk about, say, European countries shoring up their own defense budgets, this will likely come at the expense of social safety nets.
Do you think that's something that Europeans, especially European voters, judging from the current political dynamic on the continent, are willing to accept?
They may not have no choice. I mean, you're absolutely right that that's probably the crux of the situation in Europe. Europe has prided itself, or most of Europe anyhow, on its social network, on people not having to sleep on the streets, on people having houses, on people being able to feed themselves, and this is particularly strong in the Scandinavian countries. So, it
It's going to be very difficult to answer your question directly. It's going to be difficult for European voters to make this choice. And that was one of the problems between the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats in the current German election, is which direction to go in. I think there's not so much the problem in the United Kingdom, because it has more of a military tradition than
than many of the European countries, and people implicitly understand what is it, you know, what they have to do, what is at stake. But even in the United Kingdom, there is quite a reaction against this, and there was a very strong reaction against this.
uh... cutting some of the foreign aid uh... so the money can be spent on the military force so you're absolutely correct that going to be the real problem but it's going to depend on to what extent european electorate
except that there is a threatening problem that they cannot let the united states take care of and at this point europe can't strongly take care of so europe is a crux is it a turning point i think eventually
They will accept that money has to be spent on their forces, but whether that's going to be in time is what we have to wait and see, or not wait and see, but prepare for whilst waiting and seeing.
So, Professor Burke, the EU, the European Union is known to have common-sum decision-making processes. And again, once again, you are talking to us from the UK. I guess that's one of the key reasons why London decided to have this divorce with Brussels a couple of years ago. So if Europe wants to adopt a new collective defense strategy,
Is it going to be structured around the EU or some kind of new and yet more efficient grouping specifically for military related matters?
Well, there's already a number of bilateral military agreements, as I mentioned before, I think. The United States and France have worked together for some years. I mean, institutionally, they've set up joint military forces as a rapid reaction force. The United Kingdom and the Baltic states have agreements. The United Kingdom and the Scandinavian states have agreements. The difference is that
There are no others of those countries who actually have working bilateral, militarily-based bilateral agreements, because they haven't needed to have so. And Britain is not going to rejoin Europe in the sense of they will not join open borders, for example. And Starmer doesn't want that, and he wouldn't be allowed to go for it.
politically here in the UK. But you're quite right is that he wants to help organize a military ability, a military response. And I think Europe is going to have to accept that
because, again, Britain is one of the two only military powers on the continent. One real problem in foreign policy is that America has always resented having to hold back on some of its foreign policy ideas because in an alliance they have to modify their demands just as other people in the alliance have to. And the difference here is that
under the President Trump, he has the power
that he does not need to take any account of other opinions. He's going to find this is a bit wrong, but he's only been in power for 31 days, although it seems like forever to some of us. Now, Professor Tompadzold, some people say the last major example of European powers acting independently of the United States was the Suez Canal crisis in the mid-1950s,
So looking to the future, how comfortable do you think the United States would be with independent European security policies if somehow that became the reality? Earlier in our discussion, we heard Professor Berg giving her observation regarding this question like,
Washington wants European countries to become stronger militarily, but not to a point that European countries can somehow begin to challenge the dominance or the military, the global military dominance of the United States. What is your take about this?
So this independence is not in the benefit of the United States, not because it is ever likely to engage in military conflict with Europe, but because it cuts the ties between the two, which have other, notably economic, benefits
to the United States. However, the Trump administration, as both my colleagues and myself have argued in this discussion, does not live in the long run. His approach is transactional, and it concentrates on immediate benefits that President Trump can take to his electorate,
and claim as successes of his overall strategy, notwithstanding that there is not such thing as an overall strategy.
A lot of the time, President Trump shakes the tree and waits for something to fall out. And when something falls out, he takes that, presents it to his electorate and claims to be the result of his strong position in negotiations with international partners.
So, I don't think that future administrations would be comfortable with an independent European security policy, but certainly the Trump administration couldn't care less about that. It focuses on the now, on what it can gain, and not on tomorrow and what its behavior is likely to create in the future.
If I may comment on your earlier question regarding some kind of a more efficient grouping in Europe, specifically for military-related matters, and I agree with everything that my colleague pointed out, though I would like to add one point.
more consideration that a more efficient grouping, I believe, is already morphing in Europe. And it includes the countries that President Macron recently invited in Paris to discuss the war in Ukraine. The invitees were very carefully selected and were the leaders of the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, Italy, and Denmark.
Together with France, this group includes two nuclear powers and Europe's most capable defense forces. And I believe that a future European army is likely to be led by this collection of nations at first, before the remaining European countries will be asked to contribute further.
So, Professor Burke, even if the two sides of the Atlantic can somehow survive the current crisis in their alliances, do you think that the two sides of the Atlantic can somehow survive the current crisis in their alliances?
will the scars heal easily? For example, if four years from now, if we're talking about a scenario where a pro-European or a European-friendly U.S. president is once again elected into the White House, will that weaken or delay the Europeans' determination to pursue strategic autonomy? I think it will not.
because Europe will have learned its lesson. One thing that President Trump may not have thought of, but others probably have, which is that a stronger, one reason he may like a stronger Europe, because it provides another barrier against Russia growing, getting too many ideas about
how to do things on its own. If you see what I mean, that the United States has oceans on both sides of it. That is something that has always been part of their safety. Now that there are missiles that can fly across the Atlantic, hemming in Russia on land, it can only...
be a contribution in that sense. One small comment on whether American power and Ukraine is that publicly the Europeans are calling and Ukrainians are calling is for air cover. I think probably at least as important is continued access to air.
American intelligence cooperation, and of course, the Elon Musk satellite organization. I can't recall if it's Starlight or Starbright, but you know what I mean. That by use of that, Zelensky and the Ukrainians can keep attract drones, both being the aggressor and fighting the ones coming in from Russia.
So American power includes intelligence power. But I think if a new democracy
democratic president comes in in four years' time. Democrats wanted the Europeans to pull themselves together, military as well. So I don't think that Europe will feel it can now return to its own position of depending on American power. I think
once Europeans and the United Kingdom are on this particular track, they won't turn around, not least because they will have at that time invested in the factories and the education needed to build up their own industries, their own defense industries. For example, in the United Kingdom, its
It's not that we don't have the metals and the expertise. What we don't have is welders. It's the...
the manpower, the woman power that can actually build these things. Engineers, yes, but unless they can get on the shop floor and help build them, all the thought and planning is not going to be particularly useful. So I think that it's more than one layer. You decide to build, you're going to start building, and then you're going to find you don't have the skilled labor actually to build it. Okay. If I may add,
regarding whether the scars can heal easily. Briefly, please. Yes. My view is that the scars are here to stay. Regardless of future administrations, Mr. Trump has destroyed the trust between Europe and the United States. He has provided a glimpse of what can be, and this is not something that Europe is likely to forget anytime soon.
Donald Tusk, the prime minister of Poland, put it very eloquently in a tweet recently. And his tweet said something along the lines that the new international order is no longer guided by alliances of trust, but uncertainty, unpredictability and deals. And I think he absolutely hit the nail on the head.
Okay, thank you very much. So the final question before we let you go, Professor Tompazos, do you think a transatlantic crisis will prompt Europeans to rethink their engagements with other powers in the world? I can answer this in 10 seconds. So as the ties with the United States are strained, I believe that Europe is very likely to
re-evaluate its engagement with other powers of the world, most notably China. Not so much Russia, but China without a doubt is a country that is likely to be viewed very differently by Europe once the ties with the United States, between Europe and the United States,
given that those ties are no longer what they used to be. Well, a big thank you to our dear panelists, Christine Stambadult, Associate Professor with Monash University, Kathleen Burke, Professor Emeritus of Modern and Contemporary History with the University College London. And earlier, we were also joined by Professor Doug Guthrie from Thunderbird School of Global Management.
That's all the time for this edition of World Today. I'm Dinghan in Beijing. Thank you so much for listening. Bye for now.