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BBC Sounds. Music, radio, podcasts. India has nuclear weapons. Its neighbour Pakistan has nuclear weapons. So when they fall out with each other, it creates a potentially very dangerous situation. And fallen out they have following a terrorist attack in the Indian-administered part of Kashmir in which 26 civilians were killed.
India blames Pakistan for this as for past attacks in Kashmir, a region partitioned between the two countries. Pakistan indignantly denies it. Sabres are rattling. So what is happening in Kashmir and why? And could this crisis lead to a serious conflict between these two nuclear powers? Step into the briefing room and together we'll find out.
First, a brief history of Kashmir. Caroline Bailey spoke to former BBC India correspondent Andrew Whitehead, who's an expert on Kashmir and its history, and author of A Mission in Kashmir. First of all then, Andrew Whitehead, how far back do the tensions in Kashmir go? Well, Kashmiris have got a long memory, and some Kashmiri historians would say you need to go back to 1586.
because they would say that was the last time that Kashmir was governed by Kashmiris. Ever since then, it's been, in their view, a succession of outsiders. But I think, more approximately, it was 1947 when the British left India and in leaving, they partitioned the area that they controlled to carve out Pakistan, a mainly Muslim nation. So they bequeathed independence to two nations.
Now, the whole logic of Pakistan was that adjoining Muslim majority areas would go into the new nation.
Well, Kashmir, the realm governed by the Maharaja of Kashmir, was adjoining what became Pakistan, and it was three-quarters Muslim. So there was a very strong case for Kashmir becoming part of Pakistan. But the small print of the Indian Independence Act said that it was up to local princely rulers to decide whether to opt for India or to accede to Pakistan. And so it was for the Maharaja to decide.
And basically, he delayed a decision. Pakistan got impatient and encouraged an invasion of armed tribesmen from Pakistan. And that scared the Maharaja and he promptly acceded to India. And India sent a military force which airlifted to Kashmir, managed to repulse the invaders. But what happened?
Well, within weeks, India and Pakistan were at war in and over Kashmir. In the spring of 1948, Pakistan openly sent its own army into Kashmir to try and repulse the Indian troops. By the time that war ended at the end of 1948, Kashmir had been informally divided. There was a United Nations ceasefire line drawn up.
And that continues to be the line that basically divides Kashmir into two. Though India got the larger share, and the important point, all of the Kashmir Valley, which is a Kashmiri linguistic, political, cultural heartland, stayed with India, and it remains with India. So that's what the problem is about. It's about that 10% of the area, which is the Kashmir Valley.
And how many times have India and Pakistan actually gone to war over Kashmir?
Well, since 1947, and including the Kargil conflict in 1999, which was a war in all but name with quite substantial casualties on both sides, there have been four wars between India and Pakistan. Of those four, three have been principally in and about Kashmir. There's also been a history of insurgency within India-controlled Kashmir. When did that start and how has that developed? Well,
Well, it started rumbling from the 1960s, but it really became acute in 1989 when a group of young Kashmiris, quite well educated, believing that they never had a chance to actually have their voices heard within Indian Kashmir, that elections were rigged, nobody took any notice.
They went over to the Pakistan side and they were trained and equipped to fight. And they came back across the ceasefire line into Indian Kashmir and started an insurgency, which became for a number of years in the 1990s, which is when I started going to Kashmir, became really a very acute conflict in terms of military activity across the border. We have seen that
after a particularly bloody attack on an Indian base in Kashmir in 2016. Then three years later in 2019, there was a car bomb attack in Kashmir
targeting a Indian military convoy and 40 members of the Indian security forces were killed. And in response to that, India launched an air attack on what they said was a Kashmiri militant base in Pakistan. And that also led to an aerial dogfight between India
Indian and Pakistani planes and actually an Indian pilot was captured but then released. That was the most serious India-Pakistan military clash for many years. Now what about the semi-autonomous political status of Jammu and Kashmir because that changed, didn't it? So when India became independent, there was a process of accommodation to try and welcome Kashmir into newly independent India.
And as part of that accommodation, India's initial constitution set down a level of autonomy for Kashmir. It had its own constitution, its own flag. Not all Indian laws automatically applied to Kashmir. Over the years, those privileges were eroded bit by bit.
But the clause was still in the constitution and it made Kashmiris feel a little bit more valued. And then in 2019, without really any notice and any discussion, India revoked that autonomy.
And the way that it did it was also deeply wounding. Many more troops were sent to Kashmir, schools and colleges were closed, the internet was switched off, mobile telephony was switched off, and there were hundreds of arrests, including of mainstream politicians, and human rights activists and many others were also detained.
And that still leaves a deep sense of wound with many people in the Kashmir Valley. Has there been pushback against that 2019 move to take away the semi-autonomous status? Yes, there has. And even the newly elected chief minister, who is one of the three chief ministers who was detained back in 2019, he wants Kashmir at least to regain the status of a state.
And ideally, he would like autonomy back, though I think it's fairly clear that India will never restore that level of autonomy in the constitution. That's something that I think most Kashmiris regret losing, but they think they realize it's gone forever.
Otherwise, there's not very much room for Kashmiris to be politically involved. A lot of political parties have been outlawed, even if they weren't necessarily advocating any form of violence. And there's very little trust, I found, in the Kashmir Valley of the political process. Andrew White says...
Before we carry on, just a quick reminder that you can subscribe to the Briefing Room podcast by visiting BBC Sounds and you'll get access to the entire back catalogue, which includes the one which asks how we fix the NHS and the very recent one which asks whether the UK can become an AI superpower. Back to Kashmir and that attack. How serious was it? Ambarasan Ethirajan is the BBC's South Asia regional editor.
Ambarasan Ethirajan, tell us about the attack last week on the Indian tourists. Can you remind us what happened?
So this happened in the region of Kashmir in northern part of India. This is Indian-administered Kashmir and this is the peak tourist season. Now why? Kashmir is full of snow-capped mountains, lush green valleys. It is described as the Switzerland of the East and the government has been asking people to go and visit Kashmir because the situation is returning to normalcy after years of separatist insurgency.
Now in the Bajoran Meadow near Pahalgam in Kashmir, when there were hundreds of people enjoying watching this beautiful view, because this is a very remote area, even though it's closer to a town, to reach here you need to either trek or go by a pony.
And all of a sudden, what the videos emerged on social media showed, a gunman emerged from the woods, from the mountains, and they started shooting at these tourists. 26 people, including a local guide, died. They were clearly targeting men, and almost all of them are Hindus except for one porter.
This triggered widespread anger and dismay across India. And this is a very rare attack. Even one of the senior officials of the government was saying, we had never seen this kind of attack on civilians for years.
So the government was taken aback by this attack on civilians. So they describe it as a terrorist attack. There are also questions about how this was allowed to happen, given that Kashmir is one of the heavily militarized zones in the world with nearly 400,000 Indian troops stationed in Kashmir, especially, you know,
along the line of control that devised the Kashmir region held by India and Pakistan, and also paramilitary forces and police. So soon after this, the television channels and the social media, they were having debates and discussions about who was responsible for this, and they should be taking action on that.
Has anyone claimed responsibility? Initially, there was an offshoot of one of the militant groups that it was responsible. But a couple of days ago... A Kashmiri militant group. A Kashmiri militant group. And then a couple of days back, they retracted their responsibility.
So it's not clear who carried out, but the Indian government blames these militants. And they also say two of the three gunmen, they were from Pakistan, but they have not provided any evidence to substantiate the claim so far.
And Pakistan says that they have nothing to do with this particular attack, even though they used to say that we provide moral and diplomatic support to the Kashmiri people. The Indians say that they think they know who did it, do they?
So the Indian government says they have enough information to show that some of these attackers were from Pakistan and they had support from the militant groups based in Pakistan. That has been a long-standing accusations by India. They're talking about Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, one of the banned militant groups, banned by the UN. There's a Jaish-e-Mohammed. There are different militant groups operating from Pakistan. But on the Pakistani side, they say they were operating, but now they are defecting.
What was the immediate reaction from India with regard to Pakistan? What was actually done about it all? Soon after this attack, the Indian government announced various measures to punish Pakistan. For example, they revoked visas given to Pakistani nationals who were already in India. They cancelled all those visas. So that means that they had to leave? They have to leave the country and also made some of the high commission officials at personal non-great asking them to leave.
and closed one of the main land borders and suspended trade. Most important of them all is suspending a key water-sharing treaty between the two countries. So this was signed in 1960. This is about the Indus River and its tributaries, where the water goes from India into Pakistan. Despite the various wars, this treaty was seen as an example of
international cooperation, stability in the region. This was negotiated by the World Bank. Now, 80% of Pakistan's irrigated agriculture, they depend on the water from the Indus River. So if India says we're suspending the treaty, that is causing concern in Pakistan. And how did Pakistan respond?
Now, Pakistan also announced various measures, including cancelling visas for Indian nationals, suspending trade through Pakistan for third countries, for example, like Afghanistan. And most importantly, it closed its airspace for Indian-owned airlines. And Pakistan has also warned that any military action or any action by India will be met with a very decisive response. So that is why there is tension between the two countries.
Ambarasan Ethirajan. So, right now, how dangerous is the situation between India and Pakistan? And by right now, I mean at the time of recording. I'm joined by Hussain Haqqani, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C., and former Pakistan Ambassador to Sri Lanka and the U.S., Michael Kugelman, South Asia analyst based in Washington, D.C., and author of foreign policy magazine's South Asia Brief newsletter, and
and Sumantra Bose, Professor of International and Comparative Politics at Kriya University in India and author of Kashmir at the Crossroads, Inside a 21st Century Conflict.
Hussain Haqqani, how likely is it that the Pakistan government was either behind the attacks on the Indian tourists in Kashmir or had some prior knowledge of them? Historical records suggest that there are groups that operate from Pakistan which have had patronage of the Pakistan government. They have been responsible for attacks in India in the past. They have been responsible for attacks in Jammu and Kashmir.
And so based on that track record, it is an easy presumption to make that the Pakistan government may have had something to do with this attack either. That said, the Indian government's knee jerk reaction was too quick for the international community to digest. Many people say they should have waited to actually collect some evidence that would link Pakistan to this particular attack.
Michael, what do you think? I agree with Hussain Haqqani that there is this track record in the past of Pakistan sponsoring certain groups that have indeed carried out attacks in India and the minister of Kashmir and in India. There's a lack of clarity in this case. And indeed, India at this point has not provided any evidence publicly pointing to specific levels of Pakistani involvement. Sumantra, does the manner of the attack give us any clue as to the kind of group behind it?
For the last few years, a number of small mobile groups consisting of just a few men each have been roaming both the Jammu region and the Kashmir Valley
and mounting sporadic but lethal ambushes against Indian military targets, and occasionally against civilian targets as well, though nothing as high-profile as this last incident. It looks to me like one of those groups struck in Pahalgan. I should say that these small mobile groups of insurgents, consisting of just a few men each, so a cellular structure really,
typically consists of a mix of Pakistanis and local Kashmiris. And from what little we know of this attack, that seems to have been the case for this group as well. Now, Hossein Haqqani, let's move on from who may or may not have actually been responsible, because it may be very difficult to dig that out. At the time we're recording this programme, both the Indian government and the Pakistan government are issuing threats or counter-threats
How dangerous do you think the current situation is? Or are we looking at essentially posturing? Well, there is always a lot of posturing and hyperbole between Indians and Pakistanis. There is a lot of baggage that goes all the way back to the partition of the subcontinent. There are people in Pakistan who think India is a permanent enemy because it does not like the idea of a separate country called Pakistan. There are now people in India who say, well, we really do need to
tackle the terrorist problem by getting to the source and finishing off Pakistan. So that results in the kind of hyperbole we are hearing from both sides. But when it comes to actually doing something, the fact that both countries are nuclear armed, both have relatively limited options. Pakistan has been conducting subconventional warfare against India under the umbrella of
of nuclear weapons. And that makes it very difficult to actually strike Pakistan because if you start a conventional war, it could always escalate into a nuclear conflagration. And that is why the international community always counsels both sides to exercise restraint.
The Indians are definitely, and in my opinion as Pakistani, legitimately very angry with Pakistan that for the last many, many years, Pakistan has not tackled this problem if Pakistan wants to tackle it. But one thing I would say is that there are also political rewards for both sides at home.
The Pakistani military leadership right now is under attack from supporters of former Prime Minister Imran Khan. And the ministry's standing in the public eye is relatively low. So this gives them an opportunity to consolidate support because if Pakistan is going to come under attack, nobody is going to criticise the military leadership currently.
or for that matter, the civilian leadership. On the Indian side, the Hindu nationalist ideology is actually very similar to the ideology of the Islamists in Pakistan, which is based on the notion of incompatibility between the Hindus and the Muslims of the subcontinent. That extreme view helps both sides fuel the conflict, but there's always much more smoke than fire.
Michael Kugelman, I want to come a little bit more onto the internal pressures on both parties in a moment. But do you expect an Indian retaliation? And if so, what form might you expect it to be in? I do think that some form of a military retaliation is highly likely. You know, going back to the attack that triggered this crisis, not only did it target civilians, it targeted Indians. The one of the fatalities was from Nepal. It also targeted Hindus.
The government in India is one that could be described as a Hindu nationalist government. So, you know, for these reasons, this particular attack hit especially hard. And I think that is one reason why there has been so much pressure on the Indian government to do something. Sumantra Bose, do you agree that the Indian government will feel under significant pressure to have some form of military response? And could you describe that pressure? Oh, absolutely. Absolutely.
The Modi government, the BJP government, which is now in its third term, is a prisoner of its own hardline rhetoric and policies vis-à-vis Pakistan and on the Kashmir conflict. It's almost impossible for this government, which has been implementing an extremely harsh and draconian policy in Indian Kashmir since 2019, to back away from that stance.
They think it pays electoral dividends, and that aside, it's a deep ideological commitment among Hindu nationalists. But secondly, Prime Minister Modi's own carefully cultivated strongman image as a tough, no-nonsense leader is at stake here. And thirdly, the Modi government, the BJP government, has for the past few years been
been peddling a narrative of paradise restored and normalcy in Kashmir.
And the tourist influx from India was held up quite recklessly, I think, as a barometer of that claimed normalcy, which was superficial and, in fact, deceptive. Now that that narrative of paradise restored and normalcy has been so brutally punctured, the compulsion on the part of the Indian government to compensate or rather overcompensate
by resorting to punitive military action against Pakistan becomes not only strong, but perhaps overwhelmingly strong. So what I want to ask all three of you now is what will govern or limit how the two sides now act?
What are the limitations on India and what are the limitations on Pakistan's reaction? Or are we actually in a very, very dangerous situation? Hussain? Look, the situation is inherently dangerous. But at the same time, I think that it is not in the interest of either country to escalate to a point where the situation is not in their control.
The conventional military balance is such that while India has a much larger army, it does not have the air assets, for example, that qualitatively match Pakistan's air assets. As Mr. Bose rightly pointed out, any negative fallout would be detrimental to Prime Minister Modi's image as a strong man. So he wants to do something, but he doesn't want to do something in which the outcome is not entirely clear.
in India's control. And lastly, neither side wants to escalate at a time when Pakistan is in the mode of economic recovery and India is on a trajectory to continue to rise economically. Wars are very bad for economies. Michael Kugelman, this therefore faces in two ways. You have the public pressure to have some action,
but you have also a longer-term sense of how it's not in either country's interest to do it. How do those things get reconciled in terms of what actually happens? Neither side wants to escalate to a point where you have to worry about a nuclear exchange. Another point I would make here about how it proceeds...
is the issue of external involvement, external mediation. There is a precedent of the U.S. periodically intervening during crises and indeed conflicts between India and Pakistan to push for de-escalation. And it's pretty notable that we've already seen some messaging on that front from the Trump administration in the last day or so, as well as from countries like China, Russia, Turkey, and most recently Saudi Arabia. If you do have countries that have leverage, that have influence, and I would certainly count the Arab
Gulf states among them because they have very good relations with both India and Pakistan and supply the two countries with energy products and other assistance. If you have countries like that intervening, trying to push for de-escalation, that might help. Not necessarily right now where India clearly is intent on doing something and Pakistan would be intent on responding. But down the road,
If you have that initial Indian military action and a Pakistani response, that's where I think the question of external mediation would become a more salient factor. And that could perhaps lead to a situation where each side feels that it's time to think about looking for offerings. Sumantra Bose, when it comes to international mediation, one is bound to say that things seem to have changed a little bit since January of this year and the advent of the Trump administration.
Do you see the Americans as being a significant force in intervening to try and solve this problem? I don't know, because the nature of the Trump administration is so unpredictable and erratic. Certainly there are precedents in the past, but...
But this time around, it's really hard to bet on American diplomacy coming to the rescue yet again. Iran, of course, has offered itself as a mediator, but I don't think that's a very plausible proposition as of now. The Gulf states, yes, the UAE, Qatar, they may be able to play some kind of a middleman role if things get out of control. I should say that there is an elephant in the room, and that's the People's Republic of China.
Pakistan, of course, is a longstanding ally for the last 60 plus years of the People's Republic of China.
Now, if there is a military escalation and China comes to Pakistan's rhetorical aid, at the very least, then that's going to once again jeopardize the very fragile and delicate Sino-Indian relationship. I'm not confident because I'm speaking from India, where the atmosphere is not just inflamed, but fevered. Hussain Haqqani, that raises a very interesting question, which is the possibility of
of conflict by proxy to a certain extent with relations between the US and China very bad, China supporting Pakistan, and by and large, the West has been more economically interested in India. Do you see that as an aggravating factor? Or do you see the international community as something that really has its interest set in making sure that peace is to the forefront?
Proxy wars are best conducted where there are no stakes for those conducting the proxy war. When two countries are nuclear armed and they are at China's border, then it's not in China's interest to let this become a proxy war with China. As far as the West is concerned, if their primary interest in India is economic, they certainly don't want a war that would jeopardise their investments. Michael, what do you think?
I would agree. If you look at either the U.S. or China, neither has an interest in any type of conflict, and especially an extended one. China has significant numbers of investments in Pakistan. So the prospect of more instability posed by a regional conflagration is the last thing that China would want. And indeed, China has been quietly trying to seek some level of rapprochement.
With India in recent months, I don't really think any external player would have any interest in anything other than this crisis easing sooner rather than later.
I read you as all three of you essentially saying this is not good, but probably the worst will be avoided. So let's not panic. Samantha Bowes, very quickly. It looks grim, but it's not unsalvageable. I believe that both countries, India and Pakistan, have a lot to lose from a spiral of escalation.
But India probably, arguably, has much more to lose in terms of its socioeconomic development ambitions and its ambitions of emerging as a major but responsible power on the global stage. Prime Minister Modi has himself said repeatedly that this is not an era of war. Is that also your view, Michael, that essentially this is not going to end in some great conflagration?
That is my view, but I think it's important that we not be complacent just because India and Pakistan are neighbors, they're nemeses in their nuclear states, and they fought multiple wars against each other. I imagine this will be a limited conflict that will be brief, but it's important not to be complacent about the worst case scenarios, even if they're quite remote. Hussein Akhani, final very brief word from you.
Situation is fraught. I don't think the worst is going to happen just now. But at some point, India and Pakistan have to figure this out because the rest of the world is definitely running out of bandwidth and dealing with a problem or a crisis between India and Pakistan every three or four years. And that's all we have time for. My thanks to Hussain Haqqani, Michael Kugelman and Sumantra Bose. My conclusion, fingers crossed. We'll be back at the same time next week. Goodbye.
You've been listening to The Briefing Room with me, David Aronovich. The producers were Kirsteen Knight, Nathan Gower and Caroline Bailey. The production coordinator was Gemma Ashman. The sound engineers were Sarah Hockley and James Beard. The editor is Richard Varden. Another edition of this podcast will be along again soon. News moves fast, but understanding takes time.
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