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From Asia Society Switzerland, this is State of Asia. I'm your host, Rem Koutaris. As the American president has us all in a rollercoaster of news on trade and tariffs, leaving governments and companies flabbergasted at what measures are even in force anymore, Chinese leader Xi Jinping is on a high-profile visit to Southeast Asia.
He started out in Vietnam, followed by Malaysia, which holds the chair of ASEAN this year, and she ends his week in Cambodia. His message is clear. China is the stable, reliable partner you need to weather the reliably, unreliable high-stakes quirks coming out of Washington.
In this episode of State of Asia, I'm speaking with Selina Ho, an associate professor and co-director of the Center on Asia and Globalization at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. She researches Chinese politics and foreign policy and the way China wields power, particularly in South and Southeast Asia.
Salina Ho, welcome to State of Asia. Earlier today, I was reading about a video clip of former Chinese leader Mao Zedong from 1953. It has now resurfaced in Chinese propaganda. And in it, Mao says...
How long this war will last, we are not the ones who can decide. No matter, we will never yield." Mao was referring to the Korean War, which is remembered in China as a time when the country successfully stood up to the US through support of North Korea. This time around Mao's words are put in the context, of course, of China's trade war with the US, or more accurately, America's trade war with China, which Beijing also has vowed to fight to the end.
How does that narrative land domestically in China, that promise of Beijing wanting to fight to the end and retaliating against tariffs the US is imposing on it? Yeah, thank you so much for having me on this podcast, Remco. I appreciate the time to share some of the views that I have on China and China.
the region. With regards to your question on Mao, this resurfacing of this Mao video and his comments with respect to the Korean War, I think what the Chinese leaders are doing is several things. Of course, the first thing is to rally the nation
the whole Chinese nation behind the trade war, the tariff war with the United States. China compares this as war. And that war may not need to be about a military war, but it can be war in many forms, whether it's a trade war or tariff war or things like that. I think so the first objective is to pull the entire nation behind the leadership
to manage the hardship and the difficulties that are expected ahead. I think that's one key thing. The other thing is when you resurface this comment from Mao in 1953, it's related to the Korean War, as you rightly pointed out just now. I mean, the Korean War was about fighting war
It was a war to resist American imperialism. So this is again painting the picture of the trade war as a form of imperialism. And therefore it is in a way a propaganda campaign against the United States and what the Trump administration is doing.
In a way, that's also about rallying the third world, the global south, in this fight because everyone is affected by the tariff that's been slapped on them. I think the third point that I would like to make is what's interesting for me is this reference to Mao. When leaders...
When current regimes need to boost their legitimacy, they usually go back to former leaders or founding leaders, right? So this is, again, a return back to Mao and the legitimacy it accords the CCP leading this fight against the United States. So I think it's for three purposes. One is to rally the nation and to...
Let the nation know that there are going to be hardships and difficulties ahead. The other one is to paint the fight against the tariff war as a fight against imperialism. In a way, that is also a way to rally the third world, the developing world and global south. And the third point is that by referring to Mao, this is a way also to boost the legitimacy of the current leadership in China. Kind of reminded me, I should say, of the narrative that
the party in China has been using ever since the beginning of being the only body of authority able to have ended the Chinese age of humiliation, the century of humiliation from mid-19th to mid-20th century, which apparently now through this American bullying, it's being bullied again, especially because it's now somewhat singled out as the only country being shut out of the American market.
At a conference in Paris this week, Asia Pacific chief economist for French Bank and Atixis, Alicia Garcia Herrero, also previously a guest on this podcast. She said this is not a trade war and this is a war for hegemony. The US wants to maintain it and China wants to obtain it.
And China is in it for the long game, willing to suffer because the stakes are so high, because China believes, according to Alicia, if it doesn't come out on top this time, it has missed the chance of a lifetime. Do you agree? And also more looking at Chinese society, which, of course, before all this started, wasn't in too good a spot economically, was kind of disappointed in not getting the economic recovery after COVID they expected. And now comes this. Is the Chinese society also willing to suffer and suffer?
going with the leadership in painting this as we have to suffer maybe, but in the end we'll win? So I think your first question about whether China is looking at this as they will fight to the end primarily because, well, it will be a missed opportunity if not. Maybe I should comment first with why the US is doing this, right? I mean, I think it's clear that the US is doing this. It's because
It's signaling that it is willing to do whatever it takes to retain its preeminent status in the whole world, in the global world. This is not just during the Trump administration. Biden himself is also determined to retain administration.
America as the top dog in the whole world, right? So what is different is that this is Trump. Therefore, he's a lot blunter, more direct and unconventional and therefore willing to do things that are not diplomatic or polite in any way.
But it's clear that the U.S. wants to retain its preeminence at all costs, including costs to partners, allies, and friends. For China, it is... So it will be in this for the long haul, this fight with China, whether it's going to be in tariff forms or, you know, any other sort of...
form, they are in it, the US is in it for the long haul. So is China in a sense that if they believe that this is the time that they have to fight when the US is actually less dominant in a sense that its power has declined in the last few decades compared to, say, at the end of the Cold War with its unipolar moment. And China also believes that given its economic problems and the advancements as well, same time that it has made in the last few decades,
this is probably the best time for it to challenge the US in any form. Now, having said that, I think one has to caution what is China's final aim, right? The US believe that China's ultimate aim is to replace its position in the world and therefore is taking all these preemptive measures to stop China from doing that, right? I think for me, whether China intends to be a global power in the same way that the US is a global power
meaning to take global leadership, be the number one in the whole world, I think it's still early to say. Because while I believe China intends to be number one in Asia, whether it intends to be number one globally is a question mark because it knows it has not arrived yet.
Being number one globally means you have to take a lot of responsibilities. You have to spend a lot of money on foreign aid. You need to have bases. You need to have your military, your navy that can go many places. Be some sort of a policeman in the world. But the Chinese know that they are not there yet in terms of their development and their resources and their capabilities. And therefore, they have talked about the concept of multipolarity. They realize that they need to share power at the moment.
And multipolarity is a concept that is in contrast to U.S. unipolarity. So while it doesn't want the U.S. to be unipolar, to do whatever it wants in the world, it also knows it cannot be number one at the moment. Now, whether China will be number one or wants to be number one one day,
that will depend on its own development. It is facing a lot of economic problems now. And so how it comes up from those economic problems, what happens politically with the sea leadership and
whoever succeeds him next, will play into whether China has ambitions to be number one in the world. So the US is pre-empting something that may or may not even happen. That's the first thing. The second question you have about Chinese society and whether they're willing to suffer the cost. I think it must be a huge disappointment, extremely uncomfortable for Chinese citizens and young people these days, primarily because they were hoping that
that China will get economic problems and increase, in particular, youth unemployment rates, right? I mean, lower youth unemployment rates. So we're just starting to pick up a little bit, right? For like the domestic consumption and things like that. Yeah. And so in the sense that this came at a really bad time and a time where there could have been improvements in the Chinese economy. So they will be disappointed.
It's too early to say whether Chinese society will be behind the Chinese government going all the way. I believe that when the Chinese citizens look at what the US is doing to China, they will be very angry. There will be rising nationalism against the US. So I think what Chinese leadership is doing now is to prepare the people for the difficulties ahead. And, you know, it's too early to say whether how that will turn out, but I
I think my guess would be that they probably will hunker down
Because there's no other way anyway. There's no other choice. They don't have any other choice. They will just have to hunker down and deal with whatever is coming ahead of them in the best way that they can. We're speaking in the week as Chinese leader Xi Jinping is making a grand tour of three Southeast Asian nations. He's going to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia. What is Xi Jinping looking for in these three nations and maybe Southeast Asia more broadly? What does he have on offer and how are these
three nations, Vietnam, Malaysia, Cambodia specifically, likely to respond to his overtures? I think for Vietnam and for Cambodia, in the case of Vietnam, Vietnam has been friendly with the US recently. And I think this is an effort to build socialist brotherly relations.
and to make sure that Vietnam still does not slide too much towards the U.S. In the case of Cambodia, Cambodia has been quite faithful to China in that sense. But there's also, you know, people think of Cambodia as a crony of China, but it has also made efforts to diversify, for example.
I mean, the Rim Naval Base, which is what a lot of people consider to be built for the Chinese Navy, Pembura has actually openly invited different parties to use the Rim Naval Base. Whether that divestigation actually happens, we don't know because it's still early days yet. But they would want to discuss issues related to, well, other than trade, right? All these security cooperation will be, I think,
a topic of conversation. With Malaysia, Malaysia is ASEAN chair this year. So it's an important visit for SEA to look into what Malaysia is doing and to perhaps shape some of the agenda on ASEAN as part of the ASEAN chair. I think these are probably some of the key reasons for these visits. Of course, with the trade, with tariff wars, he will be talking about tariff wars and what possible actions countries can take together
to deal with US tariffs. Are you yourself still surprised by the idea now that China is the champion of stability and open global trade? Not surprising because I think the Chinese have been doing that since the first Trump administration. Even before that, it has been trying to portray itself as a responsible great power, right?
So it is part of rhetoric for a while already. So it's not entirely surprising that it will continue to do so. But I think this gives a really, what the Trump administration is doing in terms of
Slapping tariffs all over the place actually gives the Chinese an opportunity to up this rhetoric and to sell itself as a responsible great power and selling the US as an irresponsible great power. Rightly so, actually. But I think one has to be careful to see whether China really is that open to trade. I think it also has some protectionist measures in place.
And that it also, you know, if you think about the inward lookingness of the transformation of the Chinese economy to look inwards and to talk about self-reliance and all that, I think the question of how open it is to trade and the external world, one must be careful not to overplay, overemphasize how open China is to trade.
In a speech, Xi Jinping pledged to strengthen the strategic bonds with neighboring nations by appropriately managing differences with these neighboring nations. I was on Hainan last month, the island province off China's southern coast. And it was astonishing to just look out at the South China Sea and see the steady stream of Navy ships, Coast Guard ships going into the South China Sea, and not small vessels either.
Of course, the South China Sea dispute is one of those major issues that, as she said, might need an appropriate management of this issue with the neighboring countries. How do you see this going? And what are some other main differences in need of appropriate management? And also because what one side might call appropriate, the other side might find very assertive or insulting. Yeah.
So the South China Sea, honestly speaking, there are no big problems within China and Southeast Asia, except the South China Sea dispute. In fact, I think that the region will be a lot more comfortable with China if there was no South China Sea dispute. And
Deceptions of Chinese threat or concerns about Chinese power and influence in the region will be less obvious if not for the South China Sea. So this issue moving forward, different claimant states have different ways of dealing with it. With Indonesia, with Malaysia, I think there's some form of understanding that there are certain red lines that must not be crossed. With Vietnam, a lot of differences can be resolved through party-to-party relations. I think that's one of the ways, mechanisms for
managing the differences between them. The only problem remains, therefore, is China and Philippines over the South China Sea. Now, the reason why China reacts in such a fashion towards Philippines that it comes across as bullying
And the way that Philippines reacts to China, this has something to do with the perception that the Philippines' display of assertiveness has got to do with the United States. That the United States is the provocateur, that the United States is egging the Philippines given their close ties, all-around kind of ties, and the Philippines being a US ally.
very close defence and foreign policy diplomatic relations between the two. China sees the US hand behind the Philippines. So this is the reason why it reacts in such a belligerent manner towards the Philippines. So the difficulty is how do you deal with this issue? I think China needs to realise that yes, the Philippines and the US are close.
But they should also recognize that the Philippines have its own concerns and its own agency as well. And it's not like, you know, I mean, if you think about bilateral relations, right, they went through periods, right, where, you know, the U.S. military bases, they were closed, right? And now it's been revived. I think it's necessary for China to understand that whatever it's doing is pushing the Philippines closer to the United States.
Whether the US is actually provoking the Philippines to undertake these kind of actions against China is a secondary question because ultimately, if China continues to be, instead of reaching out to the Philippines to come out with some sort of consensus and trying to understand the Philippines' position, it will ultimately push the Philippines closer to the United States. And in that way, it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
I was kind of intrigued by your recent description of China's rise as both assertive and insecure. Could you elaborate a little bit on how these two characteristics mix and how are they visible in China's foreign policy? I think that the most visible characteristics of these two things in Chinese foreign policy, less so now, it has toned down, but previously what is known as the Wolf Warrior Diplomacy. So the Wolf Warrior Diplomacy just...
signifies both assertiveness and a certain brand of insecurity. The need to be so belligerent actually stems from insecurity. What kind of insecurity we're talking about? I think there are worries, for example, whether the CCP legitimacy and control over power is one big issue. And that explains why Xi Jinping went into a whole campaign to fight corruption and crime.
These are concerns that the CCP is losing its way, that society is losing its way, its people are losing its way, and therefore the need to reassert control. When regimes do that, that's usually a sign of insecurity. Regime insecurity and insecurity about where the nation is going. So the more belligerent and more assertive form of foreign policy is really a reflection of this insecurity internally.
And knowing that a lot of Chinese foreign policy has its roots domestically.
And sometimes this wolf warrior kind of diplomacy, the belligerent form of assertiveness is really for the domestic audience to rally the nation around the leadership, around the CCP. It is a way to spur on nationalism and to ensure cohesion and support for the CCP and the Chinese state. It is born out of insecurity in that sense that the worries about CCP legitimacy and how to maintain that.
So it's domestically driven in a sense. You also wrote in a recent article that China regards Southeast Asia as its periphery and seeks to shape the region to reflect its preferences. And also that Southeast Asian elites are generally opposed to that China-led regional order. How is China trying to accomplish this anyways? And what are the key mechanisms of resistance coming from ASEAN? Well, I think there are several ways that China is trying to...
accomplish this idea of ensuring its dominance in the region. And I think one of the greatest factors it had to deal with is the US, right? The US has been dominant in the region since the end of the Cold War. And in that sense, in the 1990s, the unipolar moment was also evident in
regional order in Asia's regional order. So it wasn't just global, but also in Southeast Asia. And in that sense, China was happy to let the U.S. dominate in those years because it needed time to grow. And it just came out from Tiananmen. And the U.S. did create an order with access to markets and an emphasis on growth,
and security, right? Stable security order. All these helped China grow. So I think China was happy with that kind of order until the early 2000s to presently when its economy started to grow and after its entry into the WTO. All these points to China's ascension and growth, rapid economic growth, such that it does not see the order as necessarily conducive to itself. But
But for the region itself, it has used several mechanisms to try and assert its dominance. One way, I mean, it would want to dilute US influence. So there are several ways of doing this. One is persuasion, right? Persuasion can happen in the form of using
ideas, norms and beliefs to do that. That's why it comes up with certain ideas like harmonious Asia, harmonious society, which reflects its own harmonious society efforts internally. And this is under Hu Jintao, it wasn't Xi Jinping. So it's as early as Hu Jintao's time, maybe right after 2008. I remember the slogan of the 2008 Beijing Olympics being like one world, one dream. Chinese dream, yeah.
The Chinese dream can extend to the rest of Asia. There's an Asian dream too. So Asia for Asia, all these kind of slogans, it is about persuading people to the way it's worldview, right? The other way is inducement, where you use economic tools, right? BRI,
rather than a road initiative, you know, and concessional loans, zero interest loans, and a certain amount of aid, which is not a lot, some small amount of aid to regional countries. All these using economic goodies are usually a form of inducement.
Now, obviously, there's also coercion, right? Because these are all the tools that states can use in external relations. Persuasion, inducement, coercion. So coercion, you can see that happening in the South China Sea to some large degree there. But China generally prefers not to use coercion because coercion is one of the most counterproductive ways of doing things. And it's something that I think the Trump administration is going to find out with this terrorist. In the longer run, I think...
it's going to just make people gang up against the United States because it's going to cause people to be very unhappy. So these are some of the tools and mechanisms they can use to try and
exert its dominance in the region and it has been doing some of these things as well. So in a recent article about elite perceptions of a China-led regional order, which was published recently in the April issue of the Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, it's based on a survey of six Southeast Asian countries, primarily Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,
Philippines and Vietnam. Six countries which we considered the least likely cases to yield to a regional Chinese-led order. We have left out Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos because they are very close to China. These six countries actually reflect a preference for ASEAN-led regional order.
So that is how they see the region. But what is noteworthy in the survey is that after ASEAN, China was the second preference.
So I don't want to overplay the resistance or the opposition. There is some form of resistance, but I will not use the word opposition because it's a little stronger than resistance. There is some resistance. And the way they resist is, I think, the result of how the region has always been historically. It's always been so diverse. I don't think there's any other part of the world that is as diverse as Southeast Asia.
where there are so many different ethnicities, so many languages are spoken, and so many religions are being practiced.
This has something to do with historical factors of trade routes and how the flow of goods and people and ideas and religious beliefs flow through the region, right? So historically, the region looks for diversity. It is sort of in our DNA, honestly speaking, and to seek alternatives. So these continue to be the kind of tools that the region uses to diversify, seek alternatives, reduce reliance on China, and then sometimes even China.
modifying Chinese behaviour through some sort of persuasion, socialisation, as we try to do through ASEAN.
That's what we do try to do in ASEAN, which is to modify Chinese behavior, to give China a stake in the region and to modify Chinese behavior in such a way that is less threatening, being such a big power. And then you have countries that openly challenge China, which is the Philippines. Occasionally, challenging China may not take overt forms.
But a lot of things happen behind closed doors. And I'm sure that Southeast Asian countries have a way of challenging China in a way they may not be direct, but in an indirect fashion. And that happens. You mentioned how small and mid-sized countries in Southeast Asia have this long experience of navigating great power rivalry by balancing economic ties with one, more security alliances with the other. Let's not forget India in this aspect as well. I was wondering if there are any lessons learned
European countries can learn from Southeast Asia now that the relationship with the US isn't ironclad as it used to be, while also probably not want to run into China's arms right away. Yeah, I think it does well for most countries to diversify their relationship. I think Europe is looking for ways to be closer to Asia and it's mutual.
I think that Southeast Asian countries are keen to have Europe play a larger role in the region. We think positively of Japan and of Europe now that we have problems with the United States. China is still a concern, even though relations with China are close and they're good.
But they're always at the back of, I think, Southeast Asian minds' worries about what China will do with its huge power. And because it's a resident power, you know, it's not like a big hegemon somewhere far away, but it's a big hegemon in our own backyard. There's always concerns about China.
So I think that it will be good for Europe to have a greater presence in the region. I think we see individual countries doing that. Germany, France, UK, they've all shown greater interest in the region for trade reasons, for security reasons. I think those are positive signs and should continue to do that. And especially now with COVID,
Problems with the United States in terms of tariffs, increasing trade among these countries ourselves is actually should be a major factor and consideration in our relations, right? I mean, how do we trade now if both the US and Chinese are protectionists, right? We have to trade with each other.
And Europe is made up of small nations, which also need to trade in the same way as Southeast Asia. So there are mutual interests and benefits to be derived from a closer relationship. You've studied power asymmetry in various contexts, right? Including China's water policies, real diplomacy. So in power asymmetry and how China uses water policies, real diplomacy, how does China's approach to managing these asymmetrical relationships differ from China's?
the way, like how the US managed its relationships with smaller countries, which is pretty much any country in the world. Yeah, actually, it is actually a topic that I think about differences with the way that the US exercise power asymmetry.
And I'm trying to write a book that has power asymmetry more on its front. And one of the points that I was trying to make was that there could be a difference in the way that China practices power asymmetry as opposed to, say, what the U.S. does, right? I think when you talk about power asymmetry that the United States conduct, you think about Latin America, the Monroe Doctrine, right? If you think about it historically, the U.S. has been reestablished
really, there's a lot of interference in the domestic politics of these countries. And sometimes overly so in supporting some governments, pro-US governments against those that are communists, right? And making efforts to topple those that are not pro-US. Invasions, even in places like Cuba, right? So it's...
It's a great extent of interference. And I have to say that the Soviet Union does the same in Eastern Europe in the past, right? So it is...
In the theoretical literature, you would imagine great powers, when they're trying to create something known as a sphere of influence, they tend to interfere a lot in the domestic politics of these countries, the smaller states, the subordinate states, as you call them, the spheres of influence. Now, China doesn't really have a sphere of influence per se, a real sphere of influence. I mean, you can think about the tributary system in the past as subordinate.
something akin to a sphere of influence. But the tributary system, you'll find that China's interference is actually not as extensive. And some scholars have argued that the way China exercises hegemony is through attraction. Attraction to its civilization, to its ideas.
And military adventurism is not as much, although I think Vietnam may not agree with that, with its history of invasion from China. So it varies from country to country, but I would say that there are similarities in the sense that in asymmetrical relations, hegemonic powers will tend to want to exercise control over its periphery.
And I think China is doing exactly the same. But the manner of its interference and the way it goes around doing it, I think is different. It's also different timing, given that in the past, where the concept of sovereignty wasn't such a... I mean, it was an important concept, but it was given the way that the world has advanced. Norms like sovereignty has helped even more clearly and dearly since the end of World War II. And that's why Russia...
Russia's action in Ukraine met with so much opposition and international opprobrium because it's unheard of. It's incredible that even in these modern times that another nation will do that to another nation, right? So the way that now that China is rising again in this modern era, for China to interfere to that extent in the domestic politics of countries, even to contemplate invasion is something that is unthinkable.
And I don't think China will do things like that. So the way it exercises asymmetry will be through influence. And it could be a lot more insidious in the sense that it's not going to be in your face, but it could be through societal influence.
through business influence. In Southeast Asia, one very obvious way that the Chinese have tried to influence countries is through things like clan associations, business associations, because it's a Southern Chinese practice, right? And there are large proportions of Chinese in Southeast Asia, even though in most countries, there are minorities except for Singapore. So these kind of influences will be
will be a bit different from the way that hegemony was practiced in the past. So what I'm trying to long and short of it is that there are differences and there are a lot of similarities still. But the context has changed such that the kind of things that a great power can do in its own backyard, you know, you cannot just do it without
without the kind of reaction that you will get in the modern world. You're in Singapore, a small, rich, very trade-dependent country as Singapore, which is also preparing to have its national elections later this year. How's it doing? How's the atmosphere there? And are people nervous or are they just like, well, we'll deal with it? I think for normal day-to-day people, they are perplexed.
why is America doing this? And they don't understand tariffs. I think normal people don't understand what it means for them. What they will find is that prices are rising. Ha ha ha!
I think that's a thing that they're going to find. And then they'll be wondering, what do these terrorists mean for them in everyday life? And I think the most obvious one is inflation and prices rising, right? But I think that the elites and sub-elites, meaning the people who are actually experts and policy makers, I think they're very concerned. I think the key thing was that I think you might have seen our prime minister's statements, our minister of trade's statements. I thought they were uncharacteristically harsh, his statements, like,
Oh yeah, I mean like our Minister of Defence actually called the Trump administration a rent-seeking. And things like that. But the way that the policymakers are concerned because we actually have a trade deficit with the United States. One of the few countries that do that because we buy more from the US than we export to them. We also have a free trade agreement. So this slapping of 10% tariffs makes very little sense to us.
So we don't understand it and we don't know why. And I think we're trying to find out why a 10% tariffs have been imposed on our exports. We are very concerned as a small trading nation beyond this 10% tariffs, because if there is a global trade war, a global tariff war, in the end, we will suffer because even if it's just 10% tariffs, right?
We will suffer because of the flow of goods that go through us and that we are part of the global value chain. We are very concerned what a global tariff war would mean for our economy. So you can hear our ministers and our policymakers coming out to sort of prepare the nation for harder times ahead. And we are thinking about ways how to deal with it.
we have mechanisms actually in place that we can use. We are part of the RCEP and the CPTPP, both organizations that emphasize free trade as our foundations. And it's timely that these organizations and frameworks are in place because this is where, this is the opportunity actually for
to give substance to these frameworks, RCEP, CPTPP, and for the nations that are members of these frameworks to actually come together, find some sort of solution. And even if it means trading among ourselves, living out the United States, I don't know whether that's possible. I'm not an economist, so I can't really...
say whether it's possible. But I think there is a need to step up on these frameworks and to move forward. And I wouldn't be surprised if our policymakers are thinking about that. We have conversations with many countries in ASEAN and also in other parts of the world. And I think we need to think out of the box how to do it. Selina Ho, thank you very much for your insights. It was very valuable. Thank you very much, Janko. And I appreciate the time that you spent speaking to me.
That was Celina Ho, Associate Professor in International Affairs and Co-Director of the Center on Asia and Globalization at Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. We'll be back with more soon, so be sure to subscribe to State of Asia in your favorite podcast app to not miss out. For now, my name is Rem Kotanis. Thanks for listening.