EP87: Philippines Mid-Term Elections with Professor Ronald Holmes
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Welcome to Straight Talk Southeast Asia. This is a podcast that covers current developments in the region, particular countries, domestic politics, as well as regional issues. We look in depth at what is happening, why it might be happening. We speak to analysts, academics from the region, based in the region, and to better understand what's happening and what might be the projections of what's happening ahead. We're now in our second season.

I'm Bridget Welsh. I'm a political analyst and academic who's worked on Southeast Asia for many decades. I was raised here. I'm living here. And very importantly, I care about what's happening in the region. Thanks for joining me. Welcome to Straight Talk Southeast Asia. This is episode 19 of season three. You're here with Bridget Welsh and Zach Abouza as we discuss developments in the region. This week, we'll focus in on the Philippine elections that are coming on May 12th.

But before we do that, I want to start the conversation by talking about the Singapore election results, which happened over the last weekend. Prime Minister Wong secured a decisive and landslide victory for the People's Action Party. Victory not unexpected, but the scope was something that brought smiles to the PNP leadership.

We saw the gain of 5% in the popular vote was significant for the PAP. This was seen as the marker. This is one that Lawrence Wong and his team succeeded very handily in achieving.

To understand the results, however, I think we need to point to four different things. The first of which is that there were a lot of opposition parties in Singapore. There were 11 parties that contested in the election. The weaker parties, new parties that people had never even heard of, helped to account for why there is such a significant political gain in the popular vote. And that is in places where the PAP contested against parties like Red Dot United, the

The impact was the PAP secured almost 80% of the vote. And these types of constituencies in the 33 constituencies, 32 that were contested, one was a walkover. This brought the voter support for the PAP at a higher level. The second factor is we do see globally and regionally a Trump effect. The Trump effect was evident in Canada, Australia, and in Singapore.

governments that are seen to be addressing and trying to challenge the tariffs, as well as incumbents, the flight to safety, what other colleagues in Singapore talk about the flight to familiarity, such as Ian Chong describes it. I think we see a situation where these factors are at play.

Singapore, being such an important country that is dependent on trade, used this issue strategically. And importantly, we can see that there was the rally around the PAP leadership. A third factor that I think people underestimate was Lawrence Wong himself.

In the campaign, there were pictures everywhere of Lawrence Wong in the different constituencies. For some, this was a risk to put everything around the leader. In fact, it was a risk for Lawrence Wong if he had gone in a different direction. But it was a gamble that paid off.

his style of leadership was seen as more likable, more approachable, and a sense of moving forward, especially among certain core voters that aren't necessarily given the same attention and some of the other communities. So, for example, we see among women voters, many of them who received the cash vouchers, many of them who found Lawrence Wong's style and demeanor

to be comforting, to be forward-looking, were very much at the core of the PAP's support. There were other constituencies and groups that were less so. So, for example, we saw quite significant change among the Malay vote,

We see a situation where the young vote was more split. But my general sense is that Lawrence Wong effect was a very positive one because he instilled a more positive campaign from the perspective of avoiding negative campaigning.

While there wasn't a clear positive image for Singapore, things were moving forward. The new groups and candidates helped to instill a sense that things were forward-looking, and it inspired renewal at a very difficult transition point.

Singapore's results, be it driven by domestic, personal, as well as international factors, do signify that the region as a whole is focusing heavily on political stability at a time of difficult regional transition. May 2nd was World Press Freedom Day, and this year it coincided with a significant setback to the media in Southeast Asia.

According to Reporters Without Borders, no country in Southeast Asia has anything even close to a free media. Their 2025 World Press Freedom Index ranked Malaysia and Thailand as problematic, while Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore were all rated difficult. Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar are amongst the most repressive media environments globally. All of this comes at a time when the United States has slashed its support for the free press.

In March, the Trump administration announced the U.S. Agency for Global Media, the federal agency that funds Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and Radio Free Europe, amongst others, would cut back funding to the lowest levels authorized by law. That decision halted programming in 49 languages to more than 425 million people around the world.

Since 1996, Radio Free Asia has broadcast in languages like Burmese, Cambodian, Lao, Vietnamese, and Mandarin to a weekly audience of around 60 million listeners. In full disclosure, I was a columnist for Radio Free Asia and its sister site, Binar News, since 2017.

On March 15th, the U.S. Agency for Global Media notified Radio Free Asia that its $60 million grant that financed its entire operations was canceled. Six days later, Radio Free Asia began furloughing three-quarters of its nearly 400 full-time staff and suspended contracts with almost all of its nearly 500 on-the-ground stringers.

Radio Free Asia appeared to have won an important victory in April when federal court judge Royce Lamberth ruled, Actors within the executive branch do not have carte blanche to unilaterally change course, withhold funds that the president and legislature jointly agreed to spend, and functionally dismantle an agency that the president and legislature jointly agreed to support.

Arguing that the White House's order to dismantle the broadcaster was, quote, arbitrary and capricious, the judge ordered that the administration had to reinstate RFA's funds and employees. The Trump administration appealed that ruling, and this past week, a three-member appeals court overturned the temporary restraining order.

While final ruling could still go in favor of Radio Free Asia, the reality is the cash on hand is running out. Last week it shuttered its Lao service. This coming week the Burmese service will be shut down. These are countries that are in dire need of a free media.

Writing in the New York Times on World Press Freedom Day, Radio Free Asia President Beifang poignantly wrote, quote, These brave journalists who have risked everything to speak truth to dictators abroad may be silenced by the very nation whose belief in press freedom inspired them in the first place, end quote.

It is not just a moral failing on the part of the United States, a country that was once a beacon for the free press, but a strategic failing. The Director of National Intelligence's annual report to Congress was clear about the threats posed by China. The report highlighted China's expansive campaign of political warfare.

China is using complex, whole-of-government campaigns featuring coercive military, economic, and influence operations short of war to assert its positions and strength against others, reserving more destructive tools for full-scale conflict."

All of this raises a very serious question. How do you fight an adversary that is engaged in a multi-domain political warfare campaign without the information instrument? Without Radio Free Asia, the United States has ceded the information space throughout Asia to China. This is an act of strategic malpractice. Turning to other news. In a major development to combat the proliferating number of scam centers in Southeast Asia,

The U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, known as FinCEN, issued a finding and notice of a proposed rulemaking on May 1 that identified Cambodia-based WayOne Group as a financial institution of primary money laundering concern and proposed to sever its access to the U.S. financial system.

The Huiwon Group has been at the heart of money laundering for internet scam centers, as well as cyber heists perpetrated by North Korea and transnational criminal organizations across Southeast Asia. The Treasury Department found that the Huiwon Group laundered at least $4 billion worth of illicit proceeds between August 2021 and January 2025.

The Huiwon Group offers a range of money laundering options through a network of businesses, including Huiwon Pay, a payment service institution, Huiwon Crypto, and Haowang Guarantee, an online marketplace that offers illicit goods and services.

Each firm in the Kuiwen network provides a service ranging from an online marketplace selling items useful for carrying out cyber scams, including fake investment platforms used in pig butchering schemes, to payment services, and it recently developed a stablecoin.

The Treasury Department said that Huiwan is, quote, the marketplace of choice for malicious cyber actors like the DPRK and criminal sentinets, end quote. The proposed action could result in Huiwan from accessing correspondent banking in the United States and the West.

Turning to Thailand, we have good news. Thai prosecutors have dropped all charges against U.S. academic Paul Chambers, who had been charged under the country's draconian Article 112 Laissez-Majeste law. The charges were always spurious. The charging document, which was filed by the Royal Thai Army's Internal Security Operations Command,

referenced a blurb on the website of the Singapore-based Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Yusuf Ishak Institute that was falsely attributed to Dr. Chambers. Chambers said he did not write or publish the blurb and argued that he is not an administrator for the site.

Chambers, who has a professional appointment in Thailand, has been studiously careful to avoid anything close to a violation of l'Essai Majeste. But he has long gotten under the skin of the Royal Thai Army through his meticulous research into the promotion patterns and business interests of the elite of the Royal Thai Army. The Internal Security Operations Command said it filed the charges after a complaint by a self-styled academic.

This has been one of the biggest problems and led to abuse of Article 112. Anyone can make a complaint that the police and prosecutors have to follow up on, regardless of the merits of the case. Calling for the reform of Article 112 is, in itself, a violation of Article 112, which is punishable by up to a 15-year sentence.

Although prosecutors dropped the indictment, Chambers is not out of the woods yet, as the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs has moved to revoke his work visa. The entire case has been a huge setback for academic freedom in the kingdom.

I'm delighted to have Ronald Holmes back here on Straight Talk Southeast Asia. He spoke last year on Philippine politics. I knew the Philippine election was coming. I decided, hey, we've got to have Ronnie back on the show. He's at De La Salle University. He is an expert on political issues in the Philippines. Ronnie, thank you so much for coming on Straight Talk. Thanks for the invite, Bridget, and nice to be back here.

Can you share with our listeners a background on the coming Philippine elections? What are the important races? What's at stake politically? We do have more than 18,200 positions at stake. It's a synchronized local and national election. By local, we refer to municipalities, and there are about 1,500 of them. There are about 150 cities, and then you have the 82 provinces.

So the officials there would be from the governor or the mayor to the vice governor or vice mayor and then their local councils. They're all directly elected. Then we have all the members of the lower house and there are more than 300 of them. Most of them elected in single member districts. About 20% are elected through the party list system.

Finally, you had half of the Senate, 12 positions in the Senate are vacant. You have about, I think, 64 contesting those 12 positions. So the most critical one, of course, will be Congress, because in this sense, it will be Congress that will have to really cooperate.

We've seen this. The executive normally relies on Congress for the passage of important legislation. And if Congress falls in the hands of, let's say, the opposition, which we have not seen since 2007, this would be a problem for this particular administration.

Hope you're enjoying listening to this episode. If you want to find out more about previous episodes, you can reach this on the website, straighttalksoutheastasia.com. The link should also be available in the show notes. If you want to contribute to the production costs of the podcast, you can hit the link, buy me a coffee. Every little penny counts. All that money will not go to me, but go to the producers who are helping me to put the show together. Thanks for listening.

They say that these midterm polls are bellwether for the Marcos administration. When we look at Philippine politics, that there are networks that are connected to different families, including the Marcoses. How has he been doing in the polls? What are the key weaknesses and successes of the administration going into these elections? Well, to a certain extent, yes, the midterm elections would be a referendum of any administration.

But you know, Bridget, in the case of the Philippines, when it comes to the senatorial race, the tendency of the administration is to select candidates that are quite popular. At least for most of the administrations we've had since 1986, since the congressional elections in 1987. The tendency is for the administration to get most of the senatorial seats. Because the candidates are popular, not because the administration itself is popular.

What we've seen so far in three election polls is that about seven to nine of the 11 candidates under the administration's slate are in contention for the top 12 positions. Whether that will remain on actual election day, this May 12, we will have to wait and see.

But they're doing quite well, not because they're allied again with the administration, but because these are familiar names. They've been associated with the Senate or they draw their popularity from being in broadcasting or in some other field for that matter that provided them national prominence. That's how a business is doing.

They've been doing poorly, however, in our polls. We've seen, for example, the lowest approval ratings for the president right now, Bombo Marcos, at least in all of our polls. He has had the highest majority disapproval coming into his midterm, which we have not seen for all prior presidents, at least.

Whether he will recover after the midterms, whether this will have a bearing on the voting disposition of the public, that's something that's not expected. But whether he will recover after the midterms will depend largely on if he can mobilize support, again, as I said, from the members of Congress.

There's been a lot of attention to the Duterte family. I understand that he still remains quite popular in the South, even though his son has not done that well as mayor, but it's looking that he still has a base. Can you unpack for our listeners, what is the difference now in politics? Is this Duterte issue the same or is it fundamentally different? Are families and networks still as important as we think it is?

Do you think the Dutertes are going to be successful? They're the ones that are seen to be challenging Marcos and contributing in part to some of his lower popularity. What do you see this meaning and the dynamic that's taking place for national politics?

First, families, from the perspective of a colleague, for example, in Lasal, July Tehanke, they're the organizing element in Philippine politics. Our political parties do not necessarily differ from one another. So when you want to distinguish political camps, you normally look at the network of families that are connected with one another. There's no permanence with regard to those alliances.

But families definitely will be the organizing block. Studies done by various organizations point out that since 1987, we've had an increasing number of political dynasties in the Philippines. It used to be thin, I mean to say succession from one family member to another, then became fat.

Nowadays, they are what are referred to as obese political families. They hold members of the family hold positions from anywhere from a member of the local council up to the senate.

In these days, for example, we're probably going to see three members of the same family. Just imagine, three out of 24 belonging to the same family. We already have two stepbrothers there. The probability of one sibling coming back would make the Senate, at least half of them, belonging to a few political families. And this is odd, no? For a country that claims to be democratic for that matter.

Now, going to the Dutertes, their bailiwick, of course, is Dabao City, and we don't expect them to really lose that control of the city. They're competing against a political family also for the city, but the drawback of that political family is that they only have support from one of the three congressional districts. Given how the Dutertes have dominated local politics in Dabao,

With a combination of services delivered as well as intimidation, we don't expect them to lose control of the city, at least in the 2025 election, despite the fact that the patriarch is at the Hague right now. He's not disqualified. He's still considered a candidate for mayor.

I would not bet, I don't gamble, but we're pretty sure that he will win. At the national stage, they're gaining a little bit more ground, largely because of the sympathy that they draw from what they project as the kidnapping of the former president or the extradition of the former president. When actually there was an arrest order coming from the ICC, it was implemented by the administration.

But the way that they project it is that it's a kidnapping. They're supported here by the president's sister, ironically, who has held investigations in the Senate and affirmed that there was a violation of due process. And the patronization in the arrest of the former president, I say the former president did not violate due process. The life due process of many Filipinos who were ex-judicially killed.

We see the Dutertes gaining some ground, and this is indicated also by the fact that a number of their candidates are drawing more support in their areas that their strong widget. For example, in the one region, southern Mindanao, the Davao region, the top 10 candidates in the last survey that we conducted in March all belong to the alliance set up by Duterte.

Some of these candidates are nationally not known, and yet there's some form of block voting happening in one region that constitutes about 5% of the total voting population. Interesting. Do you think that a Duterte victory will be a major obstacle for Marcos? Basically, will be a boost for the Sarah Duterte's candidacy and also underscore and undercut the ICC discussions for Duterte?

What's really the major concern on the part of the administration? There's a pending impeachment case against the vice president, Sada Duterte. So the trial will be held, possibly starting in June 2. That trial itself should be convened as soon as the new Congress is convened. That's sometime in July.

For the vice president to be convicted, of course, you need evidence. But it's more than just evidence. It's a political exercise. You need 16 votes in the Senate. The vice president already has some allies in the Senate right now. So what is required on the part of the administration is to get to elect members of the Senate who are loyal to the administration. And by here, I should emphasize, there's a big question mark.

Their loyalty would really depend on the political climate. Their loyalty would depend on whether the Bombo Marcos would have a majority class or a Pubal. Their loyalty might be secured by evidences that are damning against the vice president. So this is the critical thing. If Salah Duterte is not convicted of the charges leveled against her by the lower house,

When the Senate slides those charges, then that means that Sala Duterte would be a serious contender in the 2028 election. That would propel the popularity of Sala Duterte. That might even lead to a much more lower class rating on the part of Bombo Marcos. We've talked about the Senate. Are there any particular races that you think are pretty interesting? Is there new energy around any of the Senate candidates?

Aside from the Senate, of course, the other races that are interesting would be at the lower house. The outgoing Congress, you have a supermajority on the part of the administration. A while ago, I said that the Dutertes are gaining ground in two areas, Sensel-Desais and Mindanao. Together, those two areas would have about maybe 75 of the more than 300 seats in the lower house. What may happen here is that the opposition, the minority in the lower house, may increase significantly.

Given how transactional Congress would be, this would really impose a burden on the part of the executive and the leadership of the lower house. We don't expect them to lose the majority, the administration to lose the majority, but we may expect the minority in the lower house will gain more seats and they will become a bit more noisy, a bit more vocal with regard to their support of, let's say, the other political clan, the Tutertes.

Let's see what will happen. Now, aside from the lower house, we have local government elections. The only problem we have there is that it's actually the local government that we see more of the dinas dominating.

What's lamentable is that local governments are quite critical in the Philippines because they deliver devolved services from health to social welfare. But what we've seen is that about, I think, 7 out of 10 of the provinces, cities, and the municipalities are actually governed by people who belong to political clans or political dynasties.

So that makes them fail to invest on improvements in terms of services because really there's no competition to begin with. What are the issues for ordinary voters? I saw that the Marcos administration cut rice prices by half. Is this a bread and butter election or is it still about money and loyalty? That's a strategy on the part of the Marcos administration at least to secure some support in one strategic area in the country where they're generating some support right now, the Semisayas.

The major issues would be prices of commodities, the pay of workers, jobs, for example. Those are the top three bread and butter issues. But we also have two governance concerns, fighting criminality and fighting ground corruption.

Unfortunately, Bridget, in the elections, those do not figure in as issues that basically affect the voting preferences of the public. We see them voting for candidates who are actually known to be corrupt. We see them voting for candidates who may even be linked to certain illicit activities.

While people are saying that these are the issues that the national administration should immediately attend to or address, they are not the issues that would come in as the basis of the voting decision of any of the voters. Are there other issues like the external environment? We've seen the Trump effect in Canada and Australia. Do you see this as something that might affect the dynamics in the Philippines?

Not so much in the Philippines. There are areas we're in, for example, closer to the West Philippine Sea, where the issue of our territorial dispute and maritime dispute with China will be factored in. But with regard to, let's say, what's happening, the tariff issue on the part of Donald Trump, it doesn't resonate with the public. At the local government level, people

People tend to hold their local government officials more accountable, but only at a certain level. The expectation is that local government officials would be able to deliver some services. But always the local government officials would excuse themselves and say, no, we cannot secure stable energy supply because that's not the purview of the local government. They will say that we've been trying hard to work with the national government in trying to regulate this electric cooperative system.

So they will find every excuse for their deficiencies, but eventually promise, okay, we'll try to make sure that there's a stable supply of electricity or potable water for that matter. But those excuses have been going on for decades. So the expectation there is that they will do something, they will scale up a little. But as I said, since for most local governments, there is not much competition, eventually the people are left with no choice but just to select

those who are already in positions of power, because those who can oppose them are either too afraid or do not have that much resource to really mount a serious campaign against incompetent elective officials, the local government. What should we be watching now? What are the predictions that you think? The people look back at this election and say, hey, this midterm election, the big things should be paying attention to.

In the post-election stage, what we will be watching more carefully will be the political alignments that will come about, largely in the upper house, because this is where the battle between the two highest officials of the land, the president and the vice president, will be waged in that impeachment trial that will begin against the Duterte.

Right now, the administration is not sure of whether they will get those nine seats. The prediction that one can make, at least based on not only our polls but other polls, is that the administration can get anywhere from seven to nine seats.

So if they only get seven, that means that they're not so sure of getting the 16 votes that was necessary to convict Sala Duterte. It would be easier for the Dutertes to be able to wing their way towards an April. When you have more of the Senate, at least the remaining half of the Senate, would be more concerned about their own political future.

since they will be re-elected in three years' time, or they might be aspiring for a higher position in three years' time. So that's the reality, but it's something that we cannot in any way say right now, what those realignments will be after the elections. It really depends. That's why the most critical race will be the race of the Senate.

Because that will eventually determine what will happen in 2028. Or that would be determined by alignments that are more or less oriented towards 2028 that would eventually impact on the impeachment trial and the disposition or inclination of the senators who will serve as judges in that impeachment trial.

And a poorer outcome for Marcos and his allies could lead to undercutting his administration further in terms of being able to have outputs. The last poll that we have, it seems that too early he's gone into a lame, darkly position.

When you have approval rating and approval of 35%, a trust rating of 25%, just before you reach your midterm, I don't think any chief executive in any country would be happy with that particular rating. The last time we saw it,

It was with Gloria Macapagal-Loyo in 2007 that that was because GMA or Gloria Macapagal-Loyo, there were questions of legitimacy and there were allegations that she engaged in wholesale cheating in the 2004 election. So Bobo Marcos is saddled with low approval and low trust. And that's why they have come up with all sorts of populist things.

expanding what are referred to as a retail program that he basically resurrected, a retail program of goods. It was a program of his father. And then right now, selling rice at 20 pesos and subsidizing half of the price.

Whether that can be sustained is something else. But eventually, that would mean that some resources that should have been allocated for some other programs are now being re-channeled simply for political or electoral purposes. And that's sad.

Populism, popularity, and power. These are the toxic mix that we see in Southeast Asian politics. This has been Professor Ronald Holmes of De La Salle University sharing his insights on the Philippine elections that are scheduled for May 12th. People will be watching and people care about what's happening in the Philippines, that they're going to influence a lot of power positions from the local level to the Senate. Thank you so much, Ronnie, for being on Straight Talk.

Thank you for listening to the episode. Subscribe to the show on your favorite podcast listening app. If you'd like to keep up to date on current Southeast Asian political affairs, just keep following. This is Bridget Welsh, and I look forward to connecting to you in the next episode. Straight Talk Southeast Asia is produced by Norman Chella, aka Norm, and you can find him at thatsthenorm.com. Thanks so much for listening.