2024 analysed: Xi Jinping's year
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Welcome to The World in 10. In an increasingly uncertain world, this is The Times' daily podcast dedicated to global security. Today with me, Stuart Willey. As the year draws to a close, we're bringing you a series of episodes that analyse 2024 from a security perspective and from the perspective of individual world leaders. Yesterday, we discussed the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un. Today, we're focusing on Xi Jinping.

It's been an eventful 12 months for the Chinese president. He's ramped up military exercises in the South China Sea near Taiwan. He made a much-touted trip to Europe in May, visiting France, Hungary and Serbia. And he's also found his country in the middle of an escalating trade war with the United States, something that's only likely to increase once Donald Trump returns to the White House in the new year.

Our guest today is Professor Steve Tsang, Director of the China Institute at SOAS University of London. Steve, does Xi Jinping end 2024 stronger or weaker than when he started it? From Xi Jinping's perspective, he would not see himself ending 2024 weaker than before. 2024 was challenging, not least because of the problems that happened in the Middle East and

Now Syria falling to the rebels and all that. But China also took advantage of the Gaza war to enhance its reach to the global south. It did so effectively by abandoning Israel, a longstanding strategic partner which had supplied weapon technologies to China.

But by standing very firmly with the Palestinian people and Hamas, China was able to reach out to the global south. And that is something which matters hugely. The US election was in some ways disappointing to China because the prospect of a Trump administration again is not particularly appealing. But on the other hand, from Beijing's perspective, things could have been much worse.

If the U.S. elections had resulted in a Harris administration with the Democratic Party controlling both houses in Congress, then it would have been a much worse outcome for Beijing.

So in that sense, things aren't really going all that badly. And of course, you can add this to the reality of the war in Ukraine turning more in favor of Russia, which is something that China would have liked to see.

You touched on perhaps that sense of relief that it wasn't a Harris presidency. But even with a Trump one, the trade war between China and the US doesn't look like it's slowing down. We've also seen the EU putting big tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. How is that hitting the Chinese economy? And just how worried will Xi Jinping be about stagnation?

Well, the economy was certainly something that Xi Jinping is beginning to pay attention to. The very fact that there were two packages released in September and then in November to help the economy would represent his recognition of the existence of a problem. But the challenges that the Chinese economy face are more domestic than they are economic.

a result of existing tension between China and the democratic Western industrial countries. And therefore, the prospect of the trade war with the United States is a serious concern, but not one that is going to be seen as potentially equivalent to China. Well, unless Trump is going to do exactly what he said, which is that tariff against China would be raised to 60%. I mean, that would be pretty horrific.

I don't think they believe that Trump is going to go quite to that level of extreme.

And of course, with the Trumpian tariffs being applied not only against China, but against the EU and others, the Chinese are already working very hard to try to cultivate the European Union and others to say that we need to work together because we are all going to be victims of Donald Trump's new regime of tariffs.

So things are not, from his perspective, looking quite that bad. If it were, he would have come up with a much more effective stimulus package in China itself, and he hasn't done so. Many of the justifications for those tariffs comes from questions about China's defence industry in some ways. And the world obviously looks to a potential invasion of Taiwan. We've seen naval exercises in the South China Sea and that

intercontinental ballistic missile test by China. Is this all just posturing by the country, or is it your sense that China is preparing for something bigger? Well, China under Xi Jinping has effectively changed its paradigm about Taiwan. Before Xi Jinping, all Chinese leaders saw Taiwan as effectively an unfinished business of the Chinese civil war of the late 1940s.

It's something that would need to be concluded, but none of them provide a timeframe for it to be accomplished. Xi Jinping saw the taking of Taiwan as an integral part of his China dream of national rejuvenation, and he set a timeframe for this to be achieved, which is 2050 at the absolute latest.

And so, yes, I think he is taking the preparation to invade Taiwan much more seriously. And a lot of those military intimidations are also preparations and training. But it doesn't mean that he is planning to do that anytime soon in the next few years. The simple reason is that the PLA is not quite ready yet.

for confronting the United States and seizing Taiwan, even in the duration of the Trump administration. And Xi Jinping will not want to take a risk on that. He has, in his 12 years of leadership in China, demonstrated himself to be a bit of a risk-taker, but never reckless. Invading Taiwan before the PLA is ready is reckless.

And of course, if he were preparing to invade Taiwan in the next year or two, he would not be making substantial changes to the military leadership just as he is about to invade. So I think all the indications is that in the longer term, yes, absolutely, the risk is substantially increased under Xi, but in the short term, it hasn't changed.

President Xi has been notably absent from the world stage for a few years now, but he made a rare trip to Europe back in May, visiting France, Hungary and Serbia. He also welcomed Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orban to Beijing. Does he end this year with more allies than he had last year? Well, what I think we need to recognise is that from Xi Jinping's perspective, the global south matters even more.

than the democratic West. Global South is where he actually wants to cultivate friendships and support and partnerships. The democratic West is mostly a complicated relationship of competition, rivalry, and cooperation. And from Xi Jinping's perspective, the engagement with the global South has been more successful, and that's what really matters.

In terms of his European visit, he really was going to the countries in Europe that were more willing to engage with China. Hungary is China's best friend within the European Union. And that explains why he went there. What's your sense of what President Xi's main priorities will be for 2025? I think he would certainly like to stabilise the economy.

revitalize it, as well as to form a grand coalition with other countries to counter the trade war that Donald Trump is likely to launch in the course of 2025.

There will be elements of internal consolidation that he will continue to want to do. There will be more anti-corruption operations. But those sort of things are now practically regular, if you like, maintenance work that Xi Jinping would be doing.

Steve, thank you. That's Professor Steve Tsang, Director of the China Institute at SOAS, University of London. Tomorrow, we'll be looking ahead to what 2025 has in store from a global security perspective with Marina Miron from King's College London. But until then, that's it from us. Thank you for taking 10 minutes to stay on top of the world with the help of The Times. See you tomorrow.