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Welcome to The World in 10. In an increasingly uncertain world, this is The Times' daily podcast dedicated to global security. I'm Alex Dibble and I executive produce the podcast. The World in 10 is partnered with Frontline, the interview series from Times Radio, available on YouTube, with expert analysis of the world's conflicts. At the weekend, we bring you Frontline interviews in full. Here's one from this week. I hope you find it interesting.
Hello and welcome to Frontline for Times Radio. I'm Louis Sykes. Today we're joined by Angela Stent, an expert on Russia and foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Angela is also an author of many books on Russia and the Kremlin, including Putin's World, Russia Against the West and With the Rest. Angela, thank you very much for joining us today. I'm very glad to be on your show.
So Russia's foreign spy head issued a warning to NATO that Poland and Baltic states will be targeted in response to any aggression from NATO. How seriously should we take that and other threats that Russia have been making during this war?
Well, it's just one of a number of threats, of course, against NATO. He is the head of the SVR, the foreign spy chief. I think what the Russians are very concerned about now is the specter of Great Britain, France and other European countries, the coalition of the willing,
discussing what they might do to enforce a peace in Ukraine. They're even talking about possibly deploying some forces maybe in the west of Ukraine, sort of after the war. I think there's been some discussion there also about during the war, but I don't think that's very serious. And so I think I would say that this is partly a response to that.
And also, I think to reinforce, obviously, President Trump has been very critical of NATO and has said there'll be no U.S. troops involved in security guarantees for Ukraine. So I would think it would be to sort of exacerbate that U.S.-European rift over all of this.
Well, Steve Witkoff and Marco Rubio are in Europe at the moment. They're in France speaking to the French leadership and other European partners as we speak, actually. Steve Witkoff, Trump's tacit envoy to Russia, claimed Putin was kind of ready for this peace. But when he outlined some of the details that Russia had given him in this call he's had with Putin recently, you know, it's no NATO support. There's demands that they've made over the five oblasts in Ukraine.
That all sounds very similar to the demands Putin has been laying out much earlier in this conflict. I mean, has anything changed?
I think one of the problems we face in evaluating all of this is how much is performative and how much is real. So Mr. Witkoff has met three times with Putin. They've met for many hours. As we know, he has praised President Putin. He has repeated the Russian narrative about how the war began. And now he's saying he talks about five territories. Yes, we assume the five oblasts. But essentially, what he's doing is repeating what Putin's talking points are. And we know that
were the U.S. to present this to Ukraine. There's no way that President Zelensky can accept this. So, again, we don't know what goes on in all of those discussions. I think the other point to make is that Mr. Witkoff has also been meeting with Kirill Dmitriev, the head of the Russian Sovereign Wealth Fund, and who's one of Putin's main negotiators here to try and entice the U.S. side by saying there are all these wonderful economic opportunities in
He was even in the US recently trying to make sure that US companies return to the annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. And so there really are two sets of negotiations going on. And one of them, and the one that Putin really wants to succeed, is the reestablishment of US-Russian relations, US business going back to Russia, Putin ending the isolation that the West imposed on him after the invasion of Ukraine.
The second set of negotiations have to actually do with the Ukraine war and getting a ceasefire. And Putin's much less interested in that. He's just playing along with those because he wants the first set to succeed. And as you said, Steve Witkoff said there are these commercial opportunities. There's this idea floating around that, I mean, they've already started talks on resuming diplomatic relations, right?
But does anything make this attempt to reset relations with the Kremlin different from the last five attempts under every U.S. president pretty much since the 90s? Right. So, you know, one of my previous books was about how every U.S. president since the Soviet collapse, whether Republican or Democrat, has come into office today.
wanting to achieve a reset with Russia and believing they could find the key to improving the relationship. And the reason why all the previous ones failed is because the US and Russia had a fundamentally different understanding of the drivers of world politics. So we now have a president who apparently shares Putin's view of the world in many ways.
has had a fascination with Russia really since the first time he went to the Soviet Union in 1987 and apparently doesn't see Vladimir Putin really as an antagonist. That's the main difference. And in that sense, it could succeed on some level temporarily, you know, until Russia does something again, which he believes goes against U.S. interests. But right now, I think we're in a situation where, you know,
you know, this could very well succeed, even though I would caution that U.S. business is going back to Russia. It's not going to be so easy because Russia has nationalized a lot of the foreign companies that left after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. And I wonder if we can divert just briefly, what is the economic situation like in Russia and are the Kremlin worried about it yet?
So, you know, you hear contradictory reports about this. My understanding is that, you know, right now, Russia is still, of course, on a wartime economy. It still had respectable rates of growth and it's producing lots of weapons. But,
Inflation is high. The ruble, even though it's strengthened slightly, you know, has weakened against the dollar. Oil prices are going down, partly because of President Trump's policies. So in the long run, that's really not very good for the Russian economy since it's so dependent on hydrocarbon earnings.
And most of the economists who study this in detail say next year, an economic crunch could really come to Russia. This year, they might make it. So the underlying fundamentals are not good. But at the moment, the Russian, you know, it's not on the verge of collapse, which is what you sometimes read from some experts.
And it was interesting. Clearly, as you say, Russia will need some sort of economic deal with the US if Trump continues to push oil prices down, especially. And yet, at least on the Ukraine talks, Sergei Lavrov seemed to pour cold water on these comments that Witkoff made, saying that a breakthrough is kind of close, just saying it's not easy to agree these exact terms. What
What more do you think Russia are waiting for, seeing as Witkow does seem to want to give them most of what they're demanding? Well, I think what they're waiting for is essentially for the U.S. to blame Ukraine for the failure of these talks to produce a ceasefire.
And on the Ukrainian side, what we've seen the Trump administration do is to keep upping the ante and pressuring Ukraine to sign. We don't call it a minerals deal anymore. It's a broad economic agreement where the U.S. would have a lot of control over Ukraine.
Ukraine's resources, not only the rare earths and minerals, but oil and gas and other resources that Ukraine has. We did have some Ukrainians in town last week negotiating. Apparently, they didn't come to any agreement on this. These negotiations go on, but they're very tricky. And
Zelensky can't sign away Ukraine's patrimony to the United States. I mean, it's already very unpopular at home. If you look at Ukrainian public opinion polls, it would certainly weaken his own domestic position. But we already know now that it's not only Putin who wants to see Zelensky gone, but people in the Trump administration have been explicit about this, J.D. Vance, the vice president and others. So I think what Putin might be waiting for is President Trump
growing frustrated that they haven't achieved a ceasefire, to blame Ukraine for the fact that there is no ceasefire. And he said a couple of days ago in an interview in the Oval Office that Ukraine was responsible for starting the war and President Biden was too.
And that the Ukrainians are also responsible for the fact that even though in principle, let's say an energy infrastructure ceasefire and the Black Sea ceasefire were agreed to, of course, neither of those things have happened.
A lot of this kind of back and forth in these negotiations where, you know, Witkoff or another representative will go over, they'll claim that something there's been, they are close or there has been a breakthrough. They'll come back to America. And then very shortly afterwards, either the person they were speaking to in Russia or another of the officials like Lavrov in this case will suddenly change tack. Uh,
It all seems very reminiscent of the start of this war when Western leaders would go over there. They would return saying, oh, no, Putin said he's not going to attack. And then suddenly the Russians the next day would say, actually, no, there are security issues. We are going to have to take action or something along those lines. I mean, Emmanuel Macron comes to mind pretty strongly. We all remember him sat at the end of this very long table thinking you've got a hold of Putin. I mean...
Is this different this time? Is this a boosterism by the Trump team trying to push towards it? Or is this that same strategy by Moscow? Well, I think it's partly a strategy. I think it's also true that people like Sergey Lavrov, even though they were sent to Riyadh the first time to talk to the US negotiators in February, they're really not in the loop on. They're not the key decision makers here. So in the Russian case, it is President Putin.
Probably, Karel Dimitriev does have some influence over this. We know that Sergei Bassetta, the FSB general, was at the last series of discussions with the US. So they're obviously in Riyadh. So there obviously are people around Putin who are in the loop. But I think it's also deliberate.
And there, I think you're right in terms of a strategy that Putin at the moment is playing the good cop, right? We haven't heard him, you know, threaten to use nuclear weapons, criticize the US for what it's doing. Plenty of criticism for Europe, but not for the US. And then you have Sergei Lavrov. Obviously, you have Dmitry Medvedev and others come out and just blasting the Western state. And also Dmitry Peskov, the press secretary, also a very influential person.
in this saying, you know, this is going to take a very long time. And the reason they're doing this is because they do want to drag it out. I mean, I think, you know, your viewers and listeners need to remember Putin doesn't want a ceasefire. He doesn't want the war to end at the moment because he believes that Russia is doing better. It has incrementally taken some more territory. We know there was a brutal attack
Last week at Sumi, you know, that killed, I think, more than 32 people. In other words, every time you have a U.S. envoy go there and come back, the Russians attack even more because he believes he can really wear the Ukrainians down and he can wear the U.S. down.
And at some point, he believes that the Trump administration will say, you know, enough of this. We need to cease fire. And Ukraine, you have to do this. And then the question will be, to what extent Europe can fill the void, really, for what the U.S. isn't supplying anymore. But I do think that, you know, this is a
old Putin tactic, Kremlin tactic, you keep everybody off balance and on their toes and you're not quite sure, you know, who should I listen to? And of course, there's some of that in the Trump administration too. So that sort of amplifies this uncertainty. And that's why I said in the beginning, we just don't know how much of this is real and how much of it is performative.
How far can Putin take that? I mean, what does it mean for the Russians if there isn't a ceasefire? If Ukraine says no, Europe fills in that void as they claim they want to. You know, even some of the best estimates show that there are actually still years left in this conflict if Russia wants to seize the Donbass alone. Is perpetual war a realistic aim for Putin?
I don't think it's a perpetual war. I think that Putin definitely wants to seize all of the Donbas and he doesn't control all of the Donbas yet. And that would be a sticking point with the Ukrainians if they were to say, we recognize temporarily that Russia is occupying these territories, but why would they want to recognize Ukraine?
you know, the whole of Zaporizhzhia or something like that, if the Russians don't actually occupy all of it. I don't think Putin wants a permanent war. I think he believes that if he continues like this for some time, he can achieve the defeat of Ukraine. And that comes back to what Mr. Witkow said and what Putin's been saying, which is that Ukraine has to recognize the permanent loss of these territories and
It has to demilitarize. We're not quite sure to what degree, but it has to demilitarize. It has to say no to NATO ever, permanent neutrality. And then it has to, you know, denazify, which at this point means that Zelensky would no longer be president. Or if there were an election, I mean, whoever might succeed him is not going to be pro-Russian. So this also means that the Russian, you know, the Russian government wants a pro-Russian democracy.
leader in Kyiv. So I think if Putin still believes that he might be able to achieve those demands, then he'll go on fighting for a while. And I think they're obviously working on Steve Witkoff to pressure the Trump administration and the Ukrainians to accept these maximalist terms without, of course, any security guarantees for Ukraine.
So what does happen then, though, if if Putin doesn't achieve those objectives, you know, if Ukraine is able to keep fighting on even without U.S. support?
I mean, so I think I don't think anyone knows that. I don't think that Ukraine can continue fighting a forever war. Most people believe that the Ukrainians continue can continue fighting in 2025, but that in 2026 things might change again, depending on assuming that the absence of U.S. assistance anymore and the limits of what Europe can provide, although
Many Europeans have stepped up now and are providing more weapons. It'll be interesting to see once Friedrich Merz is fully in office with his cabinet what Germany does, because I think he has now said that they might provide Ukraine with Taurus missiles, which of course Ukrainians have wanted.
So I think it will partly depend on that. And if there isn't enough European support, then probably there will have to be some termination of the war. And the Ukrainians will have to at least temporarily recognize the loss of these territories, which I think they're willing to do now, but only in return for security guarantees that are as watertight as they can be in the absence of NATO membership.
Well, I want to come on to Europe now. I mean, as we mentioned before, Witkoff is in France meeting Ukraine's European allies. He's also spoken to a delegation from Ukraine. Interestingly, Moscow's put out this statement welcoming those talks, but then also, of course, blaming Europe for continued fighting. I mean, is there a sign there actually that Kremlin might hope the U.S. is going to try and reel in Europe?
I think definitely. And the Trump administration in the past couple of days, at least there are articles in our media saying that the Trump administration is now criticizing Europe for its support for Ukraine and blaming Europe partly for the continuation of this war, saying if you weren't supplying Ukraine with these things, the Ukrainians would have to sit down and sign the ceasefire. I mean, President Trump really wants a ceasefire.
He said that from the beginning. He wants to say that he was a peacemaker. We know that he would like to win a Nobel Peace Prize. So I think in that sense, the Russians are hoping that the U.S. will put pressure on the Europeans not to continue supporting Ukraine in the way that they have.
And do you think it strikes me that there's two sides to Europe's increased support for Ukraine and the coalition of the willing proposals? You know, is Putin going to be on the one side? Presumably Putin is worried about the idea of European troops possibly being sent to Ukraine. On the other side, that's a very different message from Ukraine.
of what is coming out of Europe versus what is coming out of Washington. I mean, is he actually going to be looking at this and being quite pleased that he really has effectively decoupled Europe and the US, at least in terms of policy approach? I mean, I think the Kremlin can't believe it's good luck.
Right. The Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia, at least after Yeltsin, then one of their major goals was also was always fissures within the Atlantic alliance, rupture it, separate Europe from the US. Of course, when under the Biden administration, there was a rapprochement in many ways between Europe and the US and an ally to support Europe.
Now he's just looking at this and thinking, you know, the separation of the U.S. and Europe is occurring under his nose. But really, Russia had something to do with it, but not directly. So I think he's I mean, he's looking upon this. And, you know, Trump has made clear,
He doesn't like allies. He thinks that allies exploit the US. He believes that the Europeans haven't been paying their share in NATO or in general, and that it's time for them to stand on their own. And Putin, in many ways, doesn't really want allies either.
unless they're completely subordinate to him, like Belarus, for instance. So I think there's a meeting of minds there. And the Trump worldview is to jettison alliances and its great power politics and spheres of influence. And that's what Putin wants, too. And Russia isn't without allies in this conflict, though, either. I mean, what does the discovery of Chinese nationals fighting in Ukraine tell us about Russia and China's relationship?
Well, I think we've understood that this is an increasingly close relationship. Russia wouldn't have invaded Ukraine in 2022 if it wouldn't have known that China would support it. The Chinese may not have supplied lethal weapons to Russia, but they've certainly been supplying the components of things that go into weaponry. Now we understand from the Ukrainians that there are
Chinese mercenaries. They're probably not official PLA soldiers, but these are people who haven't been prevented from doing this. And given the kind of society China is, presumably the leadership there knows that. And I think one of the things that is...
a fallacy for the Trump administration is they will say that they're partly pursuing this rapprochement with Russia because they want to separate Russia from China. They want to do a quote unquote reverse Kissinger. I think that's highly unlikely, as I think do most experts who understand the Chinese-Russian relationship, because China is a very important strategic partner for Russia. And from Putin's point of view, who knows who will be in power in the US in four years? And if Russia were to sort of
separate itself from China and move closer to the US, you know, that might last for a few years, but it might be completely different going forward. So I think China is, I mean, it's the single most important partner that Russia has. And the Chinese do not want Russia
Russia to lose the war, because if Russia lost the war in their mind, and a leader came to power after Putin, who wanted to rethink Russia's relations with China and the US, that could be very detrimental to China's interests. And I remind you that Putin and Xi have met over 40 times since Xi's come to power. So this really is a very strategic relationship.
And then there's also that alliance with North Korea. I mean, almost all of Russia's munitions are now coming from the DPRK. Ukraine claims now that North Korean troops are likely to deploy inside Ukraine, having moved from Kursk. How significant is it that Russia has brought North Korea into this war, its first in 70 years, with
I mean, almost no notice even from the rest of the world. Right. So this is a very important and significant, you know, development. I would say after China, North Korea is certainly Russia's most important ally in Asia. Uh,
maybe anywhere, even the alliance with Iran, which is there, the treaty that Russia and Iran have signed is not nearly as robust as the one that signed a mutual defense treaty with the North Koreans. So they've been key in this, supplying the soldiers, supplying ammunition,
and supplying weaponry to Russia as well. So, I mean, Putin has elevated Kim Jong-un from almost a pariah status internationally to now a major player in this new axis, if we want to call it an axis, of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. But it's playing really an outsized role given the size of its economy.
And, you know, how concerned should we be about what North Korea will want in return for that for that alliance? And for that matter, Iran as well. Those are both countries that that have been very clear they won't give up on their nuclear programs.
How much should we be worried about them getting nuclear technology from Russia? I think we should be quite worried. We don't know what Russia is giving either of these countries in return for their support. In the Iranian case, of course, the drones. But we suspect that in the North Korean case, obviously it already has nuclear weapons, but the Russians supplying them with satellite technology and other technology that could enhance North Korea's nuclear program and make it more of a threat
not only to South Korea, but to Japan, I mean, other countries in the region. And in the Iranian case, we know that the Iranians are, you know, not very far away from being able to weaponize the uranium that they're enriching. Now, at the moment, this is another thing Putin's, you know, has reached out to President Trump and said Russia is willing to be an intermediary. And we've had Mr. Witkoff also in Oman and these indirect talks
uh with the iranians um and so that might you know that might change things um but i think we should you know we realize that in return for everything that they've given russia both of these countries want high technology from russia but also things that are part of russia's nuclear program and you
nuclear proliferation, bringing in these allies who can, I suppose, in Putin's mind, show military strength. Is that all just a symptom of this multipolar order that China and Russia claim, at least, they want to establish? Yeah, I think it is. I mean, the Russians used to be very concerned about nuclear proliferation. They seem to be less concerned now. And many people are worried that if this kind of new global order, which the Russians and the Chinese have sought,
for some time comes into being, then the world will be much less safe because there'll be much more proliferation. So I think what you have coming now is a global, it's multipolar, but it's also, you know, what Putin has been advocating at least since 2015, it's a return to a tripartite Yalta. In other words, it's a world where China, Russia and the US have their spheres of influence.
They don't interfere in anyone else's sphere of influence. And the U.S., as we know, has been talking about taking over Greenland, taking over Canada, the Panama Canal. Well, the Russians haven't criticized the U.S. for saying that. In fact, Putin
He said he understands why America might want to take over Greenland. So this is a brave new world, if you like, where these three great powers can more or less do what they want. And the whole premise of criticizing Russia for what it's done in Ukraine, which is in an unprovoked way invading a sovereign country and taking territory, that will all come into question, too.
Well, just to finish, Angela, and this really follows on from your answer there. I mean, ultimately, is Trump and the American first movement exactly the sort of foreign policy that fits into that idea of a multipolar world then? I mean, is Trump already pretty much just playing to Putin and Xi's tune on how the world should run?
I mean, I think so. I think another essential element in Putin's worldview is that, and he said this many times, that there are really only three truly sovereign countries in the world. Russia, China, and the US, you know, maybe India down the road. And all other countries have limited sovereignty. And I think that's something not only that Putin and Xi Jinping believe, but I think it's something that President Trump believes too. And so in that sense, yes, he is...
adopting many in many ways although apparently he's believed these things for many years a world view that's now much more acceptable in Moscow and Beijing than it is you know in Brussels or London or Berlin well Angela Sten thank you very much for joining us today on Frontline thank you
You want work to be less hard work. You hear an ad for MHR, so you reach out. We connect your department systems, which leads to real-time data sharing that uncovers new insights, which empower your decision makers and triple monthly sales, which leads to high fives and awkward hugs. You say a big thank you. We say you're welcome.
M-H-R, the science behind HR, payroll, and finance. The science behind a new world of work. Discover more at mhrglobal.com. This episode is brought to you by Progressive Insurance. Do you ever think about switching insurance companies to see if you could save some cash? Progressive makes it easy to see if you could save when you bundle your home and auto policies. Try it at progressive.com. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company and Affiliates. Potential savings will vary. Not available in all states.