Rose Gottemoeller on Negotiating with Russia
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Welcome back. I'm Max Bergman, director of the Stuart Center and Europe-Russia-Eurasia program at CSIS. And I'm Maria Snegovaya, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia. And you're listening to Russian Roulette, a podcast discussing all things Russia and Eurasia from the Center for Strategic International Studies.

Hello and welcome back to Russian Roulette. I'm here with my colleague, Maria Snagovaya, and an absolutely tremendous guest, Rose Gottemiller. Rose is currently the William J. Perry Lecturer at the Freeman Spogli Institute and a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University. Previously, Rose served as the Deputy Secretary General of NATO from 2016 to 2019, and before that,

She worked for five years as the Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State, where she had some tremendous staff, some of whom went on to host podcasts such as this one. And Rose, great to see you.

Thank you, Max. Yes, great staff, including podcast hosts in present company. Who knew we would go on to accomplish such great things as hosting podcasts? Rose also served as Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance in 2009 and 2010. She was the chief U.S. negotiator of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, New START, with the Russian Federation.

And what better guests to have with us to talk about negotiating with the Russians when right now we are recording on Tuesday, March 11th. It's 2:07 p.m. Eastern Standard Time here. We are waiting for some news coming out of Saudi Arabia on talks that are taking place with Russia and Ukraine over potential ceasefire in Ukraine.

But Rose, great to have you with us. Thank you so much, Max and Maria. It's great to be here. I've enjoyed this podcast in the past. Rose, maybe let's start with your assessment of the strategic lay of the land, so to speak. How do you understand the prospects for the Trump administration's efforts to broker a lasting peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia? Do you think there's prospects of a lasting peace agreement?

And what do you think the prospects are for maybe just a ceasefire if we can't get anything that comprehensive? Donald Trump absolutely upset the table of all kinds of institutions like the NATO alliance, for example. And he's pretty much upset the table of expectations for these negotiations by driving very hard toward a peace process.

Certainly, he said he wanted to get this piece done in one day, which was not realistic, what he said during his campaign. But he has driven very hard. And so I'm now recollecting that what Donald Trump says he wants to do, he usually does and tries to succeed as hard and fast as he can.

He's running up against, though, the reality that the two other principals, President Zelensky of Kiev of Ukraine and President Putin of Moscow, Russia, they have a little bit different situation. They have both been sustaining their absolutist approaches going into these negotiations at opposite ends of the negotiating spectrum. And so Trump's now in a situation of having to knock both men off their zero-sum approach, winner-take-all.

And he's been, I have to say, rather easier on the Russians so far, although he did threaten Putin last week with additional sanctions if he didn't get to the negotiating table right now.

And he has been pretty tough on Zelensky, as we saw in that terrible Oval Office meeting of a couple of weeks ago. So we will see what these negotiations in Saudi Arabia bring us today. But that's where we are trying to get both the president of Ukraine and the president of Russia to come to the table ready to make some concessions.

Rose, and if I may jump in, a lot of the messaging on the side of this administration has focused on bringing Ukraine to the table. But what about the Russian leadership goals with these negotiations? Do you have a sense that they are actually willing and able to negotiate certain settlement? Because honestly, so far, the messaging that I have personally read on the Russian side has been mixed, to say the least. How willing do you think are they to broker a deal with Ukraine?

We haven't seen much evidence so far that Vladimir Putin's ready to make concessions, but I think, again, that's really what Trump is trying to push him toward now. And this threat of sanctions, although the Russians and Putin himself discount threats of sanctions at this point, they've been sanctioned to the hilt during this three-year war in Ukraine.

So, you know, he's tending to discard sanctions threats. But I do think that Trump is sincere in conveying the message that this cannot be a zero-sum outcome. And frankly, for Vladimir Putin, it can't be a zero-sum outcome on behalf of Russia if he wants a continuing relationship with Donald Trump going forward.

During the Biden administration, Putin made it clear that he wanted a complete defeat of Ukraine. He wanted a complete defeat of Zelensky and the NATO alliance and also Joseph Biden. If Putin now insists he wants a complete defeat of Donald Trump, their relationship going forward

is not going to be the one I hope that Putin wants and that he should want because he needs relief from economic sanctions. And the way to achieve that is to have a good working relationship with Donald Trump into the future. Rose, maybe I could pick on that a little bit. With Vladimir Putin, how do you see his outlook? Because to me, it seems like any sort of settlement to this war

would be a potential defeat for him. Because it seems like his goal, as he set out in the essay that he wrote in the summer of 2021 about Ukraine being part of Russia, that doesn't seem like he's really turned away from his maximalist objectives of subjugating Ukraine, making Ukraine essentially part of Russia. And I kind of view him as being in power now for 25 years and really thinking about his place in history.

And it's hard for me to see someone like that with that outlook sort of being very tactical about his goals here, about sort of saying, okay, well, we'll just accept part of the Donbass and then sort of move on and accept that Ukraine will have its European future. It seems to me that he's got to sort of figure out a way.

with these talks to kind of hopefully they go nowhere the us can blame ukraine but he still seems attached to his maximalist end game of subjugating ukraine do you think he's moved away from those goals

And if not, do you think how would he use these negotiations to advance that? Maybe you could question the premise or where do you think he's really after here? Yes and no. Clearly, as I said, he has been sticking to his end of the negotiating spectrum with a very zero-sum approach. But even within that zero-sum approach, his objectives have changed and they've been forced to change by the war and the way it has unfolded.

He clearly, at the beginning, had the goal of seizing Kiev and toppling the Zelensky government. He's been able to achieve none of those goals, and that was his very first objective going in in February of 2022. So his original strategic objectives have been upended.

And then he insisted for years that he wanted denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine. And, you know, that line out of the Kremlin has softened in the last year. And he's talking now more about a peace process. I don't know what that means that he's dropped denazification. That was code word for, again, regime change in Ukraine and demilitarization, which was code word for

and neutralization of the Ukrainian armed forces. I don't know what exactly they can come to in this negotiating process, but it's notable. And for those of you who are Russian readers, there was a great announcement

analysis of this in Vyorska in the last two weeks that looked very much at this question of how the negotiating line of Putin has changed and particularly softened a bit in 24 and 25. So let's see what that means. But the last thing I'll say, and I find this super amusing from a strategic perspective, a geostrategic perspective,

The first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was all about the fact that the Ukrainians at the time were seeking an association agreement with the European Union and trying to move in that direction. And then the Russians and Putin tried to muscle them out of it. It got upended. That story doesn't need to be told here. But end of the day, we ended up with the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

Now, Putin is accepting membership in the European Union for the Ukrainians. And in fact, Peskov, the Kremlin ambassador, said just last week, oh, we're fine with this.

And they were fine when the Ukrainians started accession talks with the EU last June, in June of 2024. So something has changed in terms of Moscow's views of Ukraine's European slant. And I think that that is a big difference too, which we've taken scant notice of so far. Interesting. So you see sort of a softening of Russia's line of

in terms of talks, and then having sort of hinted at a potential for some concessions, no NATO for Ukraine, but an openness on the European Union side? Yeah, my view is that Ukraine's objectives at the current moment may be that they have to accept a different territorial reality for the time being. But I see that as no different from the situation in Germany during the Cold War years, that

The Federal Republic of Germany never accepted the loss of its eastern provinces, and in fact, the federal law forming the country was very clear about that. So I think Ukraine doesn't need to accept the permanent loss of the Donbass or Crimea, but it may have a different

territorial reality. And by the way, I think the line of control in the Donbass is going to be very much the subject of discussion. Putin's notion that he can say the entire Donbass is ours, I don't think is going to come to fruition in these negotiations.

So let's see what the territorial reality for Ukraine is, but they must never give up the notion of resuming their internationally recognized borders, their territorial integrity and sovereignty. And that's the first point. The second point is that they must never, I think, give up on their aspirations for NATO membership. Now, Putin has tried to insist that

that the 2008 Bucharest summit commitment of NATO must now be reneged on, that NATO must withdraw the promise for Ukraine and, by the way, Georgia to eventually join NATO. So far, I haven't heard the Trump team acceding to that or embracing that notion. So as long as European Union membership continues to be on the table and the accession talks for the EU continue,

everything that Ukraine does to satisfy the requirements of EU accession will prepare it for eventual NATO membership. And that should be the unspoken, perhaps, goal. Just leave it sitting out there. It doesn't need to be on the table right now. And by the way, one last point. People were very discouraged by Pete Hegseth's speech in Brussels on the eve of the Munich Security Conference back in February, when he said that

NATO cannot be part of this war termination package. NATO membership cannot be part of this war termination package for Ukraine. I said to myself, well, of course it can't be part of the war termination package. The process of NATO accession takes time as the process of EU accession is going to take time. So let's just leave it out there and not try to foreclose that membership in any way in future for Ukraine.

Rose, on that note, apart from Ukraine, do you see a possibility of some commonality in the interests emerging or deepening between the United States and Russia going forward? It seems that the Trump administration, apart from Ukraine, has repeatedly hinted at the possibility of a new reset and in general sort of pushing forward the relationship between the two countries. Putin hinted at some critical minerals that are based in Russia. There's Arctic discussion. Some mentioned that it's the reverse relationship.

Nixon plot, ultimately trying to pull Russia away from China. What is your sense of that? Is there a possibility for that strategy to succeed if indeed that is the strategy to try and rebuild sort of new relationship with Russia based on this commonality of interest between the United States and Russia?

It's a great question, Maria. And I've been thinking about it a lot myself. Clearly, Trump has continued to embrace his bromance with Vladimir Putin. There's no question about that. He is attracted to the strongman figure that Putin represents. So, you know, we just have to deal with that. But I think there are certain limits there.

on how much he can accomplish. For one thing, the notion of a reverse Nixon is, to my mind, ridiculous, because in the late 1960s and early 1970s,

Russia, the USSR, and China had just been in the midst of a violent crisis. They'd been in a shooting war that almost led to the point of nuclear weapons use. It was a much different point in the USSR-China relationship than in the relationship between Russia and China today when they are famously exploiting a friendship without limits.

I do frankly think there are limits on that friendship, but nevertheless, the relationship between Moscow and Beijing is much, much different than it was during the late 60s and early 70s. So a reverse Nixon is out of the question from my perspective. That said, I do think that the U.S. should be thinking carefully about what our interests are for reopening of our relationship with Russia.

To my mind, the most important thing is in the area of Arctic science, climate science, because the Arctic is rapidly melting and that goes for the United States Arctic as well as the Russian Arctic. We need climate data out of Russia and with scientific cooperation frozen now. Frozen now, I'm sorry, I didn't mean, it's kind of a bad joke, but it is frozen. But we need that data and that's in our national interest.

to be working with the Russians on what is happening in the Arctic. By the way, there's a security angle there too. As the permafrost melts, not only in the northern United States, but also in Siberia, it's affecting the performance of our strategic forces. You know, we're getting flooding in our ICBM silos. And with more wildfires in both Siberia and in the western United States, they're endangering our nuclear facilities.

So I think there are a lot of reasons we should be working together. Some of them have a national security angle for them. The Trump administration isn't going to want to talk about climate change, but they can certainly talk about Arctic science and mitigating the effects of climate disasters on nuclear forces. And those are some important areas I think we should be working.

But the last thing I'll say about this, Trump may think that he can embark on a spree of relieving sanctions against Russia, but he needs two other institutions, two other groupings to do that.

The first is the U.S. Congress. A lot of those sanctions were enshrined in U.S. law. He's going to need the U.S. Congress to forgive them. And he needs the Europeans. He needs the European Union first and foremost, but he's going to need them to come along as well. So I keep reminding the Europeans that they have leverage in this case and they must be prepared to use it to the hilt. Yeah, a situation where the U.S. gets rid of sanctions, even if Congress went along and the

and then there were US businesses doing business in Russia, the EU could probably take action to sanction those US businesses. So it would just create, I think, a lot of uncertainty. But maybe, Rose, we could take a step back

You successfully negotiated with the Russians over the New START Treaty that limited our nuclear arsenals. Maybe you could reflect on that a little bit, on how the Russians approached the negotiations. What were some of the lessons learned about Russia's negotiating tactics? And do you see some similarities now about how the Russians are approaching this negotiations

What are some of the lessons learned and advice that you might provide either the Ukrainians or this administration on how the Russians are going to approach a negotiation? Right. Well, first of all, let's remember that was a much, much different moment in the U.S.-Russian relationship. We had our brief reset during that period. Remember Dmitry Medvedev? He's a bit of a monster now, but in those days, he was a president with a reform leaning bent. And

Barack Obama, the President of the United States, and he really hit it off. They had a decent relationship from the outset when they first met in London in April of 2009.

And at that time, they agreed some very clear instructions for the negotiating teams. They agreed that we needed to replace the first strategic arms reduction treaty, START I, within eight months by December of 2009. They agreed that we needed to go for further reductions. And they agreed also that the negotiations would be about strategic offensive forces. They would not relate to strategic defenses.

And so with those very clear instructions from both presidents, the two delegations actually were in pretty good shape to start the negotiations. Now we're in a circumstance where the United States and Russia have been at deep loggerheads over the last several years. The relationship has constantly gotten worse. Now Trump is trying to remedy that. But nevertheless, the two governments are at a much different place, and it's going to take

I think, some time to get to a kind of trusted negotiating relationship. And that's an important thing. Mutual confidence is very important and some mutual predictability at the negotiating table. If Mr. Trump stands for anything, he stands for unpredictability. So that's going to be an issue for the Russians to confront as well as the Ukrainians.

So long story short, we're at a different point now than we were in 2009. But nevertheless, a couple, I think, things to bear in mind. First of all, the United States and USSR, now Russia, have over 50 years of experience negotiating on strategic arms reduction, strategic arms limitation. And so we are very accustomed to working with each other at the negotiating table on highly technical topics.

And I think that that will pay dividends. We both have many experienced experts in our government, diplomats as well as technical experts. And I do think that that will be an advantage. The Ukrainians as well. Interestingly, the Ukrainians, you know, came out of the Soviet tradition of diplomacy. They actually had a seat at the UN. They were considered a separate country even during that Soviet era. They and the Belarusians both had ambassadors at the UN and they had their own very good ranks of diplomats trained at the Soviet Diplomatic Academy.

So the other point I wanted to make is there are some really well-trained and experienced negotiators on all three sides.

And so I do think that this is going to be a tough negotiation. No two ways about it. But I do think there are people who know how to get to yes on all three sides. Once the presidents give the go-go, President Putin, President Zelensky, that they're ready to start thinking about concessions, move off their zero-sum positions. And once the United States gets its own objectives at the negotiating table clear,

I'll just say as a last order of business, I always said that in order to come out right in a negotiation, you have to have your national security objectives and interests clearly in focus, and you have to stick with them as the priorities that you need to accomplish at the negotiating table.

I'm not 100% certain at this moment that Mr. Trump and his team have their objectives, their national security interests and objectives absolutely clear. But if there's any work to be done in Washington, I'd urge it to be in that area. Thank you, Rose. A very important point. And precisely on that note, at the time of recording, we learned that Kiev just expressed readiness to accept the U.S. proposal to enact an immediate interim 30 days ceasefire.

So it seems like Kyiv is going with the pressure that's been imposed on it. But do you have any advice to the Zelensky government in Kyiv, especially given the latest developments and, of course, the memorable Oval Office meeting, as to how to handle these negotiations with the United States, but, of course, also with Moscow in light of your experience? Shall they maybe mirror? Shall they stand their ground? Shall they maybe be more flexible? What would you recommend?

Kiev has made some creative proposals throughout. And let me just say that this proposal for a ceasefire, particularly in long-range missile attacks, this has been worked quietly behind the scenes for some time now between Moscow and Kiev. And as far as I know, the Ukrainians were pushing it very hard to try to get a ceasefire in terms of the long-range missile duel.

They've added in the Black Sea and operations in the Black Sea to continue to facilitate commercial shipments out of the Black Sea. Clearly, their economy is very dependent on getting their foodstuffs, their grain, their food oil and other foodstuffs out of the Black Sea and into international markets. So I think it's very canny.

that the Ukrainians, the Zelenskyy government have now bolstered this essentially long-standing proposal for a ceasefire and brought it to the table with the Americans because that gives it an extra boost

So it gets back to what I was saying a few moments ago, that Ukrainians have their own very experienced negotiators and are very, I think, very astute about representing their own interests at the negotiating table. It's an entirely different example, but let me just bring you back to the grain deal.

in the first year of this war, with the Russians pulled the plug on in July of 2023. This was the deal that enabled both Russian and Ukrainian shipments of grain to get out of the Black Sea. Well, the Russians pulled the plug on it. They didn't like it for various reasons. And so the Ukrainians proceeded then, again, with their own series of negotiations, including with the insurance companies,

to say, look, we will indemnify shipments of Ukrainian grain and food out of the Black Sea. You, the insurance company, give us special wartime rates and give the companies that are shipping this stuff better wartime rates and we'll make it all happen. We will defend the sea lines of communication. They did it and they have been successful in insuring commercial shipments out of the Black Sea. So I'm just using this as an example to say, don't shortchange the Ukrainians. They are very canny negotiators.

Rose, maybe we could talk a little bit about the role of Europe in these negotiations or the lack of Europe's role in these negotiations. Do you see that as a problem? The New START negotiations, there were complaints from Europeans that they weren't at the table. But of course, there was a lot of consultations. What should Europe's role be in these negotiations? And how should that be approached by the Trump administration or by the Europeans?

Max, au contraire, the Europeans didn't want to be at the table for the New START negotiations, particularly the European nuclear weapons states, France and the UK. They've always and constantly been worried about being dragged into negotiations to reduce and eliminate their forces. Their forces are really so much smaller than the United States and Russian Federation. Just recollect, we have 1,550 deployed warheads each year.

And they have a total of about, well, 200 to 300 warheads each. So very different force structure, very different force numbers. So the Europeans avoided being in the New START talks. But yes, we did talk to them. We kept them up to speed. I went to NATO repeatedly to brief the NATO allies on the process of the negotiation. So it is important to keep the Europeans in the loop on those things. No question about it.

My view at the current moment is this is an important negotiation, first and foremost, between the Ukrainians and the Russians and if the United States and, by the way, the Saudis and the Turks have stepped forward and said they've played a facilitating role in the past. I don't think everybody needs to be at the table right now. And in fact, I think it would slow and complicate the negotiations. We need to have people keeping their eye on the prize.

And if there are particular catalytic capitals who need to step in and make something happen, that should be quite possible. But for example, to have the EU or NATO sitting at the table, to me, does not make any sense right at this moment. But that said, Europe has an important role to play. And I think one of the biggest...

outcomes for Russia and for Vladimir Putin is going to be an economic normalization. And that means, again, forgiveness of all the sanctions against Russia. It is going to mean readmitting them to major financial systems like the swift banking system.

And for all of those steps, the European Union and the European nations are going to have to be closely engaged and involved. So it may not be at this immediate moment that their presence is required, but they should be thinking now.

about how they are going to extract their maximum needs from any negotiation on relieving sanctions on Russia and admitting them back into the world banking and finance system. And oh, by the way, perhaps releasing their reserves that have been held and which are now being used, at least the interest from those reserves,

That is being used to support loans going to the Ukrainians. So there's a lot of issues for the Europeans to exert their influence, I'll put it that way. And they should be thinking now about how to be most effective in doing that. One concern that I've heard from Europeans is that they see, in some ways, little to entice Moscow to agree to these negotiations.

and are worried that when they look back at the instigation of this war by Russia, and they look at the December 2021 letter that Vladimir Putin sent to President Biden, and part of the Russian demands involved NATO, you were Deputy Secretary General of NATO, but it involved pushing back or NATO sort of retreating back to the 1997 borders.

And I think they're worried that the Trump administration plans to do major or perhaps massive troop withdrawals from Europe, as Pete Hexeth, when he went to Europe, kind of signaled. And that perhaps there'll be a negotiation with the Russians between the U.S. and between Washington and Moscow over the U.S.

military presence in Europe that involves NATO. How concerned do you think Europeans should be? Do you think there's a prospect for kind of the broader U.S. security presence in Europe to be brought up by the Russians and be discussed by the Trump administration? What do you think about those concerns?

I think those worries deserve attention. I think those worries deserve an open consultation and constant discussion with Washington to see exactly what their plans are. Because what alarmed me was when the orders went out about budget cutting across the government, including in DOD, INDOPACOM got off scot-free, but EUCOM, the European Command, which of course supports NATO operations, was told that it had to plan to cut. So it was not absolved

from making budget cuts. So yeah, these worries are real and we need to have a constant open dialogue and consultation between the United States and the European allies and Canada. The European allies have gotten the message. I saw again, Ursula von der Leyen, the head of the European Commission saying today, we need to be ready to build up and we need to be building up our military forces now and renewing and restoring our defense industry so we can support that buildup. All of those are good things.

We also, though, have some countervailing trends, and I think they can and will be nurtured. For example, the president of Poland, Duda, was in the Oval Office not so very long ago and was talking to the president about building up forces in Poland once again and restoring so-called Fort Trump in Poland. So

There's a countervailing trend among certain NATO allies to encourage further forward deployments by U.S. troops, and I think there could be some responsiveness to those proposals by the Poles, for example, and perhaps by others.

So let's watch this space and see what happens. Yes, it's clear that the Trump administration finally does want to accomplish this pivot to Asia in order to confront a rising China. But it's not clear to me how much that is going to be related to a downswing in U.S. troop deployments in Europe or the removal of famous so-called enablers by the United States from Europe, enabling capabilities, things like intelligence surveillance and warning capabilities.

tanking capabilities for providing refueling for fighter jets, those kinds of things, all been provided by the United States and intelligence support. So far, we haven't seen any of that. So we'll just have to remain alert to it. But I think at the same time, maintaining open lines of communication is going to be really important with Washington. And

And Rose, perhaps a little bit of a provocative question. At the start of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia, I've been personally promised by one high-level European official that there will be no another Minsk agreement with Russia. I hope not. That was a disaster. And, you know, I lay part of the blame at the feet of the Obama administration. They refused to be engaged in that process, leaving the Europeans to their own devices.

And as a result, it never worked. The ceasefire never was. And it was constantly being broken. And it collapsed finally with, again, the second invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022. So I do think that the United States has to be involved and be engaged in this process of peace between Ukraine

Russia and Ukraine. That's one reason, frankly, why I welcome the Trump administration's intense engagement and involvement, because in the Obama administration, essentially, the message from the White House said, well, you Europeans do it yourselves. It's not our business. And it failed. So we can't have that happen this time. The ceasefire that never was, I think, is a very good way of describing the Minsk process.

Last and final question. Do you think that that's sort of what we're headed to now, a ceasefire that never was? What do you think the odds are that we're going to get either a lasting peace agreement or a lasting ceasefire out of these talks?

Well, it has to be a lasting ceasefire or the war is not going to end. I think if the ceasefire collapses, we'll be back at it. The Ukrainians and the Russians will be back at it on the battlefield and in the air and at sea. So I think President Trump's going to be absolutely insistent that this be a ceasefire that sticks, I think, and that the process succeeds. It's going to be touchy and it's going to be very difficult. But I do think that that will be a basic point.

And by the way, Max will smile, but I do think that this is a moment to be thinking about conventional predictability and confidence measures and that a renewal and restoration of conventional arms control, we might call it arms control policy, in Europe will be all important. But it is partially to ensure that there is an effective ceasefire.

that is sustained and maintained, and that our so-called implementation force or whatever this peacekeeping body made up of NATO countries is going to be going forward,

that they and the Russians are successfully, and the Ukrainians are successfully separated, and that there is essentially a set of predictability and confidence measures in place, as well as transparency to ensure that the forces are implementing the ceasefire. So that's an important point, too, for policy. We have to get back to that realm of conventional predictability and confidence measures that have been forgotten and essentially ditched.

in the three years of this war. Indeed, and I think that's going to be central to any lasting agreement has to have the conventional arms control part. So arms control is dead until it suddenly isn't, and hopefully you'll come back here with Russia and Ukraine. Unfortunately, we're going to have to end it there. Rose, thank you again so much for joining us today and sharing your immense expertise. Oh, thank you so much. I'm going to remember that as my slogan, Max.

Arms control is not useful until it suddenly is again. As usual, massive thanks to all our listeners for tuning in. If you haven't already, please be sure to subscribe to our show and give us a five-star rating. Also, be sure to check out our sister podcast, The Europhile, and you can get that wherever you get your podcasts. Thanks so much. You've been listening to Russian Roulette. We hope you enjoyed this episode and tune in again soon.

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