Russia-Ukraine Negotiations: Outlining a U.S. Strategy with Tom Wright
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Welcome back to Russian Roulette. For this special crossover episode, we wanted to share a fantastic conversation from our sister podcast, The Eurofile. Please subscribe. We were joined by Tom Wright, a senior fellow at Brookings and former senior director of strategic planning for the U.S. National Security Council in the Biden administration. And we're joined by Tom Wright, a senior fellow at Brookings and former senior director of strategic planning for the U.S. National Security Council in the Biden administration.

And we discussed his recent article in Foreign Affairs, outlining a U.S. strategy for Russia-Ukraine negotiations, the current state of peace talks, and the Biden administration's policy towards Ukraine. We hope you enjoy the show and don't forget to check out the full version of this week's episode of The Europhile wherever you get your podcasts.

Welcome back. I'm Max Bergman, director of the Stuart Center and Europe-Russia-Eurasia program at CSIS. And I'm Maria Snegovaya, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia. And you're listening to Russian Roulette, a podcast discussing all things Russia and Eurasia from the Center for Strategic International Studies.

We are thrilled to welcome Tom Wright to The Europhile. Tom is a senior fellow with the Strobe Talbot Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Brookings Institution. He most recently served as special assistant to the president and senior director for strategic planning at the National Security Council in the Biden administration.

At the White House, he worked on a wide range of projects and issues, including the 2022 U.S. national security strategy, the Russia-Ukraine war, U.S.-China relations, European security, and countering the growing alignment between U.S. adversaries and competitors. Tom, welcome to the show. Thanks. It's great to be here. So we should preface at the very beginning with the fact that we are recording this episode where we're going to talk about Ukraine-Russia negotiations on

on the day where information is coming out from those ongoing negotiations and the podcast will be released a couple of days after this conversation. So a lot might change. So, Tom, maybe we could start by talking about the piece that you wrote in Foreign Affairs about the prospects for U.S.-Russia negotiations for Ukraine. How do you see the current state of play? Do you think there is a potential deal to be had?

And how do you see kind of Russia's intentions of this? And maybe you could sort of talk about how you see the broader idea of negotiations and whether that's something you think the Trump administration is right to try to pursue. Thanks, of course. Happy to. I mean, I think there's a lot going on, right? I would start by sort of saying that we always thought that 2025 would be a year of negotiations, whether Trump was elected or Harris or even earlier, you know, Biden had been reelected.

it was almost likely there would be some effort to try to resolve the war this year. Last year, I think it was too difficult because for the first few months there was no supplemental for aid to Ukraine. Then the Russians, I think, had no intention of really negotiating until they saw what happened in the election. So I think last year, you know, was probably just not particularly suited. But this year, there's sort of an opening.

Now, there's multiple sort of problems. There's the territorial question. Of course, this has gotten a lot of attention. But to me, I think, and to many of us, the largest problem was not that, right? And it wasn't Ukraine. The problem was Russia, and it was Russia's objectives, which remain very maximalist.

a desire to sort of dominate Ukraine, to have a neutered Ukraine, not just a neutral Ukraine, one that can't really defend itself, can't really deter a future Russian attack that is sort of under the influence of Moscow to some degree. And that is something that's totally unacceptable to Ukraine and is or was and should be unacceptable to us as well. So the question is, the problem diplomatically that has to be solved is how

How do you convince Putin to accept something in negotiations that he's currently opposed to? So let's set the territorial question aside. I mean, that would be how to persuade him to accept a sovereign and independent Ukraine with the capacity to defend itself and to deter a future attack. So I think that's sort of the starting point.

I don't think that's where the Trump administration is coming from necessarily, but I think objectively that's the problem that needs to be solved. And, you know, with that said, I think Ukraine actually has a decent amount of leverage in this negotiation if the United States stands by Ukraine. And that leverage, I would say, is sort of a few-fold.

First, is that Russia's taking over 1,500 casualties a day, over 700,000 in total since the war began, but 1,500 a day sustained for some time, that I think puts enormous strain on their ability to continue the war indefinitely.

So they're gaining small slivers of territory, very small amount of territory, particularly in Kursk more recently, but in Pokrovsk and in the east, you know, limited amounts at this enormous cost.

We believe that ultimately Putin may face a choice. If he wanted to continue the war, he would have to mobilize general mobilization, which you know he doesn't want to do. So that's like one vector of pressure. The second is like the financial pressure, particularly the recent energy sanctions, which I think have had an impact.

you know, with inflation and interest rates pretty high. These are sanctions that the Trump administration put on Russia. No, that the Biden administration put on, particularly at the end of the administration, Trump administration so far has kept on. But I think that has also had a lot of pressure, maybe not quite as much as a manpower question, but still a lot. And the third was sort of our support for Ukraine's long-range strike campaign and

and sort of a surge of weapons so Ukraine could continue. So I think those are the theory of the case, I guess, for negotiations for me would be that what we need to do is to maximize the vectors of pressure on Russia, have a negotiation. We can talk about the peace to different possible outcomes in terms of Ukraine's future status and try to heighten some dilemmas for Russia while minimizing Ukraine's vulnerabilities.

But it does mean basically taking Ukraine's side in the negotiation and using that leverage to cause Putin to move, because otherwise I think he will just string it out and he'll be happy if the U.S. pulls back on its support for Ukraine to continue to fight. It strikes me that there's sort of different ways of approaching negotiations that the Biden administration or Harris administration versus the Trump administration, that you all were looking at

negotiations more from a Sticks perspective, while the Trump folks are looking at it more from a Karats perspective. The stick, I think, was going to be continued military support for Ukraine, perhaps a Harris administration going and requesting

more military aid for Ukraine, and basically signaling to Putin that this is not a winnable war for Russia, that if Russia is going to win the war on the battlefield, it's going to have to ramp up its efforts. The Trump administration doesn't seem at all focused on going to Congress. That seems sort of off the table of requesting more military aid. In fact, it froze deliveries and froze intelligence support for a brief moment after the Oval Office visit. That

That kind of leaves the carrots, right, where they're holding out the prospects of a better U.S.-Russia relationship to really bring Russia to the table. And the sticks are sort of left for Ukraine, that if you don't agree to something, then there'll be the sticks that I just mentioned, the cutoffs of aid flows and intelligence support. How do you assess the kind of carrots approach that seems to be what the Trump administration is trying? And would you agree with that characterization? And just to add on that, the

the carrots approach, but also are there any sticks in that strategy towards Russia? Because that's a big question mark for me. Yeah, I mean, I don't really disagree, I think, with that characterization. I think it's a mistake, obviously. I don't think...

the carrots are going to be enough. You know, I think Russia will pocket the concessions it gets. It won't reduce its objectives. We certainly have seen no sign that it would reduce its objectives. I mean, after the call between the two presidents, between Trump and Putin, I think last week or the week before, there was a readout from the Russian side which sort of reiterated

in very stark sort of detail, you know, their fairly maximalist objectives. So I don't think we've seen any sign that they are willing to moderate their position based on some carrot. And I think that hoping for a fundamental reset or partnership with Russia strikes me as delusional. You know, like we've had Putin as leader now

since 2000, so for basically a quarter of a century, we know what he's like. You know, we know that he's committed to the partnership with Xi Jinping. We know he has intents on Europe to dismantle the U.S.-led security architecture there. These things aren't going to change.

And so, yeah, I'm pretty dubious about, I think it's a mistake to look at it in that way. I also think it's based on a false premise, which I think is, we can talk about a little bit more if you like, but is the main problem they saw to be solved is Ukraine, right? So it's like their idea was,

Ukraine doesn't want to give up its territory and wants to keep fighting because it has support from us. But to persuade it to stop, we need to sort of coerce it in some way, right? And the Russians, if we give them the territory or at least give them, but maybe without formal acknowledgement or maybe with formal acknowledgement,

and no NATO, then they should be satisfied. And I think that was sort of wrong in two respects. I think on the Russian side, it fundamentally misread their war objectives, which were much bigger than that. And I think that was obvious for some time. I think they only began to realize that after the election. But before, that was our big question that we'd been spending a lot of time trying to figure out the answer to is how to solve that problem. And on the Ukrainian side, I

I think the Ukrainians were always sort of willing to negotiate, but I think they did sort of suggest that their main focus was security guarantees and a just and lasting peace. And there was a time when I think they got into the mix of that, particularly the Oval Office meeting, you know, where the Trump administration got frustrated and saw them as the obstacle when they weren't. I think the Ukrainians subsequently pivoted

toward a cleaner, simpler, we're in favor of an unconditional ceasefire for 30 days or maybe longer, which became simpler and easier to communicate to Trump. And now we're in a position where Trump says he wants to end the war. Ukraine's saying, okay, we agree, just end up with no conditions. And it's the Russians, it's Vladimir Putin who's saying, I

I can only end it if you do A, B, C, D. And that, I think, will flush out what President Trump's true intentions are here. And we'll see if he's willing to put pressure on Russia or if he will take Russia's side on it. I don't think, honestly, we know the answer on that. I hope, obviously, it's where he puts pressure on Russia and begins to use some of those sticks we were talking about earlier.

One thing I'm trying to understand in the ongoing negotiations, and you touched on the ceasefire, is the sequencing here and what are we likely to get out of a temporary ceasefire. So what came out today is this agreement is just like two separate joint statements on mostly Black Sea activities and use of force in that particular space. That's the first step. I mean, we can all agree, you know, cessation of hostilities is good because it saves lives. But

But what does that allow Ukraine and supposedly its partner, the United States, to do in future phases? Is it your sense that this White House has an idea of that sequencing and an idea of how to use the time we get for the ceasefire for the next step? I'm not sure exactly. I think we all haven't sort of studied the agreement yet that came out today. So I don't know every ins and outs of that. I'm sure when this comes out, people have digested it. But

I think to me what the Ukrainian position should be, and I think to some extent is, given where Trump is at, I mean, given that he's not willing to discuss security guarantees, what they should be saying is we favor an unconditional ceasefire. What does that mean? That means the violence stops. What else does it change? Absolutely nothing.

Right, so no sanctions lifted, no restrictions on troops, no restrictions on North Korean troops coming into Russia, no restrictions on Russia getting ready to invade again, right, no restrictions on a Russian military buildup. Equally, no restrictions on US aid to Ukraine, no restrictions on European troops coming in. Not to say they will, but it says nothing about that, right? It says nothing about anything Ukraine would do itself or with anyone else.

And so basically, it's just a very simple stopping of the war. And that, I think, actually works out to some extent for Ukraine. Now, it is true that Russia will probably prepare for another round. It is true it is not a just and lasting peace. It is also true that a just and lasting peace is not really on offer at the moment because the United States is not willing to think about a U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine, something I sort of favor.

And I think there may be a pathway toward NATO or something like it. We can talk about that too, but I think there's, you know, that is an option, but it's not one they're going to go for. So in the

world that we live in now, you know, I think calling for just an unconditional cessation is something that could work for the Ukrainians and in the negotiation flips the script to an extent, you know, with the Trump administration and could put pressure on Russia. Now, I also agree that Wyckoff and others have said it won't be unconditional, that they're trying to figure out what conditions

that are being insisted upon by Russia that they can accommodate to persuade Russia to stop. And, you know, I think some of those are almost certainly likely to go too far. But I think for those of us, you know, on the outside, I think it's important to point out that these are conditions that Russia is insisting on, that the administration is conceding to them.

to get them to end. And we have to assess whether or not those go too far or not. I think in terms of sanctions relief, you know, very narrow sanctions relief on agriculture, if it's reciprocal, including like more access for Ukraine, that would be one thing, right? If it goes further to include SWIFT or broader financial sanctions, that's a completely different thing. And I think we are still sort of learning about what they have in mind on that.

Let's maybe talk about the security guarantees question, because that seems to be where Ukraine, you know, very insistent on security guarantees, particularly U.S. security guarantees. And it strikes me as perhaps this is where the Ukrainians were kind of both misreading the room here in Washington, and maybe that's misreading the room both in this Oval Office, but perhaps in the Biden Oval Office as well. It strikes me as a real struggle for the United States to guarantee Ukraine security when it's either in a temporary ceasefire or, you know, not a

permanent and a lasting peace with Russia, but in kind of a state of active conflict. How do you see the security guarantees question? Is that something that the Biden administration was considering?

How was that conversation going and where do you see it? Yeah, I mean, look, I think they've always been very insistent on NATO and sooner rather than later and in increments if necessary. So an invitation and I know broadly on the external community side and think tanks and others, there was broad support for that. I think we were not in favor of that when we were the Biden administration was in office. I think one reason was

We were in favor of it in the long term, you know, as an objective, but not like to happen right away. And I think it was impossible to do right away because, I mean, ultimately this war would only end when Russia chooses to stop it, right? If Ukraine took back all of its territory, Russia could choose to continue to fight, right? It's not a race with a finish line that then it's over it. They can just choose to continue to fight if they could go back to territory, which would be very difficult.

for Ukraine to do. So you've got to persuade them to stop. So, you know, if we said the minute the war ends, we're going to bring Ukraine into NATO, Russia could choose to continue to fight if we didn't have pressure on them. Right. And if we brought them in anyway, you know, then we will be at war with Russia because Article 5 would apply. And, you know, Russia is bombing Ukraine every day in territory that Ukraine does administer. So it's bombing Ukraine.

you know, not just the areas it occupies, but also the rest of Ukraine, like Kiev and in the west of Ukraine. I think that was sort of the problem. I do think that there were different models broadly for thinking about, like, Ukraine's geopolitical status. Like, one is a security guarantee with NATO.

or a bilateral treaty. Another is what we call the Israel model, what I call in the peace the Israel model, where we would support Ukraine having a national deterrent with external assistance and with our continued cooperation. That would include an offensive capability, not just a porcupine. It would mean they have long-range missiles and the like.

And then there's also other models like a neutrality model I don't think works. And, you know, European troops, which I think will be pretty difficult. So, you know, on security guarantees, to me, had we remained in, I don't know what we would have decided, right? But my view would have been that we should try to go for NATO, right? And I think the way in which we would do that is...

is to point out to the Russians, you know, that, you know, an Israel model where Ukraine is fending for itself and is armed to the teeth,

is a Ukraine that is, you know, is insecure, obviously, because they're on their own, and is also pretty prone to anticipate a reaction, pretty prone to unilateral action, and is constant sort of crisis prone. I mean, the Russians will continue to be aggressive, obviously. And so to the extent that Russians would worry about Ukraine that is like hostile, which

has only happened because they invaded and killed tens of thousands, if not more, Ukrainians, that's not all that stable, right? A Ukraine that is in NATO is potentially like more restrained because it's part of the Western defense, right? And you could do NATO with a combination of West Germany, where it's just the territory administered and not the territory that's occupied. So it excludes the territory that Russia is occupying and the Norway model, whereby the

There were no NATO troops when Norway joined at the beginning. There was no NATO troops in Norway and there was limits on the use of Norwegian ports, right? Very small usage of those ports. And so you could say there's Ukraine and NATO, but no NATO in Ukraine.

And in exchange for accepting that, because that ultimately may be more arguably stable from a Russian point of view, then we could have a bit of a discussion on architecture, reciprocal changes. Now, I think they would have said no to that, right? But I think that would be the conversation that we could have had to try to make them confront the dilemma between living with the type of Ukraine that they have created because of their aggression...

and a Ukraine that is more embedded into the West. And we also, if we defaulted to the Israel model, which I think we probably would have had to do, we could have left that on the table for the longer term for discussion with the future Russian government to say that when they are willing to discuss that or territory and/or territory, we can then look at sanctions, we can then look at a thawing of the relationship in some way.

but that in the interim, it will be more of a frozen sort of peace, you know, not like where, you know, we would have Ukraine integrating into the West and armed, but the major issues would yet to be resolved. So that's how I would sort of think about it. I don't think that would go far enough, you know, because I think for Ukrainians and for some NATO supporters, because they say Russia should have no say and you just decide,

But the problem with that argument is that they effectively do have a say because they're waging a war against Ukraine. Yeah, so they can just continue. So it's not like they have a formal say in negotiation. It's just through their actions they are a factor, you know, because the Article 5 guarantee pertains to Ukraine's security vis-a-vis Russia. And so I think it is something we need to deal with. But that's how some of us were thinking about trying to approach that question, basically. I would say that President Biden was, I think, the

had some skepticism, certainly, about a fast-track tornado for Ukraine. And I think had signed up and supported the language in the communique and at the summits. But I think he had sort of reservations about moving more quickly, which, you know, on the invitation or more generally.

I think that's part of the fact that President Biden was such an avowed transatlanticist and wanted to keep showing support for the alliance. The reason I'm saying this is in your piece, you outline several reasons why Ukraine matters and why we should care about this, what the United States should keep in mind. One of them is the effect that this has on European security as well, including allies that do spend 2% of their GDP on defense. And hopefully that would be an argument for this administration.

I feel like some of the news that have come out in the last few days that have shown a light on how they actually think about European allies, which is not in a particularly positive light, are any of those arguments around the impact of, quote unquote, bad deal on European security.

Is this likely to resonate at all with this administration? And if not, what does that mean for the prospects of any negotiation coming out for Ukraine? The idea that a bad deal could jeopardize broader European stability. I mean, your guess is as good as mine, but my guess would be that, you know, looking at the signal chat, the story that came out yesterday, the Atlantic story,

You know, I think you see like a real antagonism by certain people, particularly the vice president toward Europe. I don't think in general they worry about that too much. I like of European stability. I think that's partly because they think it's Europe's responsibility, partly because they think, as Witkoff said, Russia doesn't want to go any further.

partly because they think it won't really affect the United States. I think all of those things are mistakes. I think that Russia probably does want to go further, not necessarily invading Poland, but I think trying to stoke a crisis that will cause the unraveling of the NATO architecture in Europe is something that's a real risk. That could include aggression towards some NATO members to try to flush out what Trump's true intentions are on Article 5.

I think that Europe is obviously a key trading partner, investment partner of the US and real instability there will have a real impact on US national interest. I think Europe's important, obviously, on China and other issues. I do think the one thing that's sort of a counterforce to some extent is that it seems to me, and I might be wrong about this, but it seems to me that the main ire of

of the Euro skeptics within the Trump administration is directed really at Western European countries, particularly Germany. And they tend to be more friendly, at least rhetorically, with Poland in particular and with some other countries in Eastern Europe.

And of course, what we're really talking about is the security of Eastern Europe, you know, because I think if they could sell out Germany without selling out Poland, that would probably seem quite attractive. But, you know, since Poland's in the middle, the Bols are in the north, that's, you know, it's all sort of linked. And I think my hope is, is that the Eastern Europeans will be able to make the point, and I make this point in the piece too, that these countries, you know, they're not just spending 2%, they're spending between 4% and 5% of GDP.

They've been with the United States constantly on pretty much everything. They're very pro-American. You know, they generally have good relationships or, you know, Poland has generally a positive relationship with the Trump administration. And, you know, it seems funny to me

that someone would make an argument that we should reduce our commitment to an ally that is a sovereign nation because of what some other European nation is doing. I mean, especially if you don't really believe, as I don't think JD Vance believes in European unity or European integration, these are just sovereign countries.

then surely we should base our policy toward Poland or toward Lithuania or Latvia based on their, you know, interactions with us and their defense spending and their needs rather than saying, well, it's going to be contingent on what Spain does. Right. And, you know, it's a little academic, but I think in the current moment where some of it is, it's

veering on the theological in terms of how people see this, you know, Europe should be for the Europeans, or there is a monolith called Europe that should somehow step in. I think it's a little incongruent, but I think how they talk about the world sometimes. So I think when we point out that, you know, the countries on the front line

They're all spending a lot and they're very good partners, very good allies, and not just on this. And I think that should count. And I would like to see them sort of more upfront and center on NATO in Europe here in Washington. Maybe that would have been the case historically.

Yeah, I think that's a good point. As much as the Trump administration sort of despises, apparently, the European Union, they do seem to flatten all Europeans together into just one Europe, which, you know, I'm somewhat empathetic. You would like that to happen. Yeah, I sort of think it makes sense. But I guess, to sort of fast forward, let's spit out the negotiations. Let's just assume they don't really go anywhere. It does seem to me that the Trump administration

is not that interested in supporting Ukraine in a lot of the writings and other work that were done by many of the people that are coming into the Trump administration or there now, sort of prioritizing China and Asia, and really sort of wanting to wash their hands of this war, leave it to the Europeans. I guess, how do you see this going forward if, let's just say, the United States pulls back? And it's basically Ukraine has to fight on its own with whatever Europe can muster.

Do you think Ukraine can hold out? Because, you know, if I was Putin, I would say, okay, you know, America is going to walk away. They'll be sidelined. We can win this war. There's a light at the end of the tunnel. Let's just keep going. How do you see the prospects for Ukraine should talks fail?

So a few points on that. First, I think if you want the war to end quickly, if the administration wants the war to end quickly, they have to convince Putin that they could go on for a long time. Right? It's like a paradox. If you say, "I want it to end quickly and therefore I'm going to stop supporting Ukraine soon," the

the war will go on for a very long time. Because the main pressure on Putin is his cost that he would need to pay, particularly on any type of mobilization, to continue the war indefinitely. And so I think it's important that they send that signal

And I worry that they've never really talked about that, right? They focused on tariffs, which of course don't apply at all in the case of Russia, or on sanctions, which are helpful to some extent, but are not the main point of pressure. So I worry about that. Now, if they pull back anyway, right? So

Trump could say, when it becomes clear that Putin is the problem, he could say, well, we're going to help Ukraine, right? And it is actually sustainable to do so, especially now, right? Because we had a couple of problems on helping Ukraine, not to be too retrospective about it, but just on this narrow question. They didn't, for a while, have a really sophisticated defense industrial base. They weren't producing a lot of drones and other things. So

So they were relying on our stuff, right? Now they have a lot of their own stuff. So they rely on us for certain things, especially air defense and gimlers, but they have a lot of their own stuff with substitutes in, and sometimes the drones for artillery or for other long-range strike, they can do that with their own indigenous capability. So

So that helps. The other thing that we had as an issue was that the Ukrainians never really wanted to hunker down and fight a defensive war. We'd sort of had two different theories of the case at a certain point after the counteroffensive of 23. We thought, have moments, opportunistic moments to take back territory, limited targeted, you know, attacks. But ultimately, it's about putting pressure on Russia to make it unsustainable for them and

and to have, you know, when the time is right, a negotiation to do that, right? And the Ukrainians were frustrated with you guys because they were hoping for kind of a grand strategy for victory. Well, we thought that was a strategy for victory, actually, because they, especially, you know, we got 700,000 rounds of 155 munitions for the counteroffensive and it didn't work. And so if we were going to do the counteroffensive again...

We didn't have, so the 700,000 rounds don't exist, right? And we wouldn't be able to produce them sort of in time. Some of the things they would ask for in the victory plan, we just didn't have, you know? So I think they thought we had

just gargantuan amounts of all of this. And even when we'd explain that it was more limited, you know, that was just, you know, we're broadly aligned and pretty much on most things. But I think they thought we had more stuff to give than we were able to give. But anyway, the point I'm making is that we had sort of two slightly different versions of

a theory is a victory, right? Our version was, you know, we helped them, including going on the offensive, but it's really about putting enough pressure on Russia so that the Russians will see that this isn't really sustainable. It won't work.

And then when there is a negotiation, we can use the considerable leverage that we have together to force them in or to push them into a deal that will guarantee a free and independent Ukraine, sovereign Ukraine with the ability to deter and to defend. The Ukrainian theory of victory was sort of the knockout blow theory, right? We do something big like Kursk or some big sort of strike somewhere.

And that will, you know, create this cascading effect that will cause like Russia's collapse, right? It will lead to a broader victory. We deferred to them on a decent amount of that, including on Kursk, right? But we always were skeptical that that was going to be a game changer. And I think that desire for a game changer came out of their frustration, obviously, about fighting a very long war and paying the cost of that, right? But there's also an objective reality, which is like, will that work?

I think now we're out of that because, you know, it's more of a question because of sort of the limit of support the Trump administration is giving. I think it is more by necessity just about doing the defensive thing. And that, I think, it's still difficult to resource, but it's doable to resource, you know.

if you're trying to show that there's an asymmetrical attrition strategy to impose a cost on Russia that's far greater than anything they will gain. So the question, sorry, it's a bit of a convoluted answer, but the point is...

that it is sustainable from a U.S. national interest point of view, financially and militarily, to do that. That is not unsustainable. Like, that is something that we can do if we choose to do it. And so the Trump administration could choose to do that. But let's say they don't. Can the Europeans do that?

No, probably not. I mean, it would be hard on certain things. Like, they can make a difference and they should do everything they can. But if you think about things like air defense, interceptors and systems, or Gimlers or other things,

I think there are certain capabilities that I think they would need to buy from us and the administration could just refuse to sell them or sell them under USAI rather than through drawdown and put Europe and Ukraine at the back of the line. Not, you know, just where they come in on the line, which is probably about two years or three years wait. I think to answer, not to dodge because I think to answer directly, what will the effect of that be?

I don't think Ukraine will collapse. I do think more Ukrainians will die and there'll be a higher cost. So there'll be more pain, there'll be more marginal Russian gains. It won't be enough for Russia to get a victory, at least not, I think, in 2025. I think, you know, European support will help.

I do think there are some things the Trump administration could do to really cut off any cooperation on Starlink and all of that that would have a big impact. I hope they wouldn't do that. So I think what we're talking about would be just no more supplementals or no more assistance. So I do think Ukraine will survive that, but I think it will be very high cost. I think it will also reduce the pressure on Russia to end the war. So it makes it a lot less likely, you know, that the war will come to an end.

This is where for Europe, I would say they should test the Trump administration's intentions that if you want Europe to pick up the tab in the bag for supporting Ukraine and for Europe, they should swallow some pride.

buy some of our 155 production or other assets and then to test to see whether the Trump administration is willing to. Yeah, I look, I agree. I mean, I think the money is there too. Like I think I worry less about the money piece and I worry more about the supplies piece, right? Like, so I think it's less about like, would Europe have the money to do this? I think it's more, is there the military equipment and assistance there to meet this? And I think that probably has to come from here.

If I was a European leader and I was trying to figure out how to solve this puzzle,

I would probably, if they're negotiating with Trump, sort of say, "Look, you don't want Ukraine to collapse because they don't have enough stuff. You've acknowledged that this is Putin's fault that this is continuing. So we will pay you either from European funds or from the sovereign assets," which, by the way, we believed they could do that legally and justifiably take the principle. I still think they can do that if they want to.

and say that we need certain things and to lay it out like 155 and maybe air defense and some other stuff and

and have him basically instruct the Pentagon to agree to sell that immediately to, you know, through drawdown to Ukraine. So I think that's how in the break glass scenario, right, that will be one way to do it. I do think that the United States will probably have to confront the reality that U.S. support is to some extent indispensable.

to Ukraine, you know, to some degree. Not on everything, but in certain key sort of areas.

Maybe just one final question to kind of reflect on where Europe is and the Biden administration's approach to Europe. It was a major part of the administration's legacy about strengthening NATO, about making NATO stronger, NATO expanded, Sweden and Finland. But it strikes me NATO is in a very precarious moment given where the Trump administration is. I mean, how do you sort of reflect back on kind of the administration's approach to Europe, its engagement with the European Union, its focus on NATO? How do you sort of reflect back?

Yeah, I mean, I need to probably take some time to truly reflect on it. But I would say, you know, it wouldn't surprise you to hear me say I think we did reasonably or fairly well on it. I'm trying to think about it to be self-critical and say, like, knowing what was coming next, what could we have done differently?

But if you look at the amount that Europeans spend in defense, the increase in European defense spending was greater in the Biden administration by a long way, a significant amount, than it was in the first Trump administration.

The numbers, you know, also were better. Like there were nine at 2% at the start, there were 23 at 2% at the end. You know, Europe, despite what President Trump says, spent more on Ukraine than the United States did. So there was real sort of burden sharing there. The gaps on military assistance in particular, where we did more, were more because the Europeans just ran out of stuff, right, which I think they are trying to fix.

They did a little bit more on the economic side just because they didn't have enough military equipment, which is a problem. But that's a problem that's gone back some time. And I think Europe was pretty strongly supportive of our position on China. There were differences, there were issues, but

I think there was general sort of alignment, including on, I think, the high-end tech competition and not necessarily through the EU. You know, individual European countries were critically important on key aspects of that. I think the EU also was broadly supportive

Vanderlijn obviously was broadly supportive. So to me, I think what was sort of happening over the last four years was we were seeing more cooperation between like our adversaries and competitors. And we were trying to limit that, trying to push back in that, but also building up our situation of strength holistically and growing the connective tissue between our allies in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe to

to have sort of a shared sort of agenda to shape the international order after it sort of, I think the post-Columbia war order basically ended, you know, over the last sort of 10 years or so, maybe seven or eight years or so.

And so I think we did that. What I worry we're doing now is thinking that we can maybe split up our adversaries and competitors, which I don't think is doable, while going after our own allies and partners, you know, and making that block weaker in ways that I think we don't fully anticipate the effect. You know, so I

I think they don't fully get like, well, if Europe's not fully there on China or not really aligned, like what impact could that have? What impact would it have on our semiconductor controls on China if the deal with the Netherlands and Japan fell apart, for example, or if the EU began to be a lot less cooperative on some of that stuff? So I worry about it, but I think that's the big question. Yeah.

For those in Washington thinking they can sort of split Russia and China, it strikes me that many in Beijing are probably thinking they can split Europe and the US and they may be more onto something than the other way. Yeah, I mean, I do think Europe will be fairly responsible and strong on China for its own reasons, right? I also think that there is no real prospect of Russia-China split, certainly under Putin and Xi Jinping.

I think anyone who thinks that, it's, I think, completely delusional that that will be possible. I think Russia may pocket some of the gains. I also think, by the way, that if you try for a real thaw between Russia and the US, you could really accelerate Russia-China cooperation. I'll give you one specific example.

Like we have sanctions at the moment in Russia, obviously very significant financial sanctions. That I think inhibits China from cooperating more with Russia because they worry about being affected by secondary sanctions and being caught up in our sanctions web and they want some distance. They're obviously doing a decent amount, but they've been on the military industrial base piece. But I think they've been broadly, more financially, a little bit more distant. If we remove that,

it will basically send the green light that this is something that's sort of very safe to do and they will take full advantage of that. And so I think we're running the risk of actually providing more fertile ground for that alignment to happen in ways that I think will really come back to haunt us because this alignment is really about a deep military integration between these countries in ways that is benefiting them considerably at our expense.

I think we were trying to figure out ways to try to limit that or impede that and work with others to do it. And I think if we basically act as if it's not really happening, I think it will just cause it to grow and become stronger. Well, unfortunately, we're going to have to leave it there. Tom, I have a lot more questions, a lot more to talk about. We'll have to have you back. Thanks so much for joining us and for your service for the last few years. Thank you. You've been listening to Russian Roulette. We hope you enjoyed this episode and tune in again soon.

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