Cover of Darkness | CSIS
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This is True Spies, the podcast that takes you deep inside the greatest secret missions of all time. Week by week, you'll hear the true stories behind the operations that have shaped the world we live in. You'll meet the people who live life undercover. What do they know?

What are their skills? And what would you do in their position? I'm Rhianna Needs, and this is True Spies from Spyscape Studios. Let's get back to basics. One high-value source... Who's in a position to provide information regarding the funding and the training of a terrorist organization. An exotic locale... A city in Southeast Asia...

Two teams of highly trained intelligence operatives. These two teams have to work in total coordination. And some reliable hardware. Unattributable communications. Ballistic windows. There's a couple of cold drinks. You're about to hear a compact masterclass in human intelligence tradecraft, earned over a long career in some of the world's most dangerous places.

Specifically, we're talking about the art of the mobile debrief. So in this operation, you're dealing both in a denied operational environment and a dangerous operating environment. This is True Spies: Cover of Darkness. There are stories behind this story. Stories we can't tell you. Exact locations, names and dates are still classified.

But you're about to get a unique glimpse into how one of the world's major democracies collects intelligence on threats to its national security.

Time to meet your guide. I'm Neil Bisson. I'm a retired intelligence officer with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. I've worked as a supervisor and operational desk for CSIS. So supervisor, depending on where you're located, can be anything from a team lead to a coordinator that basically takes the information that's being collected from your little gang of spies and running it up to the managerial and executive levels of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

Neil's 18 years of service have left him with reams of insider knowledge on how Canada goes about its covert business on the world stage. Knowledge that he's all too keen to share during this turbulent period in geopolitics. I'm currently the director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network, and I contribute to the field of national security through analysis and commentary. And I also do a podcast called the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service is a founding member of the Five Eyes Group, the intelligence-sharing agreement between the USA, the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. But unlike its partners in that alliance, CSIS is subject to strict rules about the kind of intelligence it can gather. The second word in its name, security, carries a lot of weight.

Where you differentiate between, say, something like the CIA or MI6 would be that we're not collecting information for the interests of the Canadian government. And when I say that, I mean we're not looking at things that would be of a political, military or economic nature. We are looking at things that relate back to Canada in the way of national security issues. So espionage, terrorism, sabotage, foreign interference.

So if the Canadian government wants to gather intel on, say, an adversary's foreign policy outlook, that information has to be collected

on Canadian soil. So the Canadian Security Intelligence Service is a civilian service and it started in 1984 and it came out of the RCMP Security Service. So at one point we basically had a national policing organization that was also taking care of our intelligence information along the lines of national security. It was decided in 1984 that we would turn that into more of a civilian organization.

And when we did, when all of the documentation and the laws were passed, for some reason, somewhere in there, they decided that they would somewhat hinder the collection of intelligence information by saying the only way that it can be collected outside of Canada in relationship to anything that falls under the interests

of our political, military or economics would be if it was signed off by multiple ministers. And they just thought at that point in time, maybe they could do a better job of collecting that type of information in Canada. So whether they thought that they would be better off trying to solicit sources from embassies as opposed to trying to collect sources outside, I'm not really sure. Now, obviously, there are always ways and means.

We've got the Global Security Reporting Program, which is out of the Global Affairs Canada, but that's not necessarily a clandestine service. It's basically just individuals who go and speak to anyone who's willing to talk to them about what's going on in their own country. And that can provide some political and some economic information.

But it's not a clandestine service. There aren't sources. There's no remuneration. There's no secret meets, nothing like that. And we do have what's called the communication security establishment. So the communication security establishment is essentially Canada's version of the National Security Agency.

CSIS's exclusive focus on national security, counter-terrorism and the like means that over the past couple of decades at least, many of its missions have taken place on dangerous territory. No cocktail circuit for Neil.

When I first started with the service, it was in the early 2000s. So we're talking just off of 9-11. So terrorism obviously was a huge issue for the service. We had basically gone from the point of the Cold War to domestic and international terrorism issues. So that was my main focus. Which brings us to the mission. You've been very patient. Hello, True Spies listeners.

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So for Operation Cover of Darkness, a team of CSIS officers have been sent to either a Middle Eastern or Southeast Asian country to connect with an individual who's involved in that country's military that is providing support and training to a terrorist organization. So we're looking at a country which involves itself in state-sponsored terrorism.

Again, we need to tell you that what you're about to hear, officially, anyway, never happened. Under Canada's Security of Information Act, Neil is sworn to secrecy until his dying day. It's similar to the British Official Secrets Act. And if you've ever wondered why we don't feature more MI6 officers on this podcast, that's why. There is a possibility that someone could come back on me and say, hey, listen...

During our preliminary research, he made it clear that the details of this operation are a composite of several similar assignments. Nonetheless, the story he shared gives us an accurate representation of the tradecraft that he and his colleagues employed during their various postings abroad. So, without further ado... Southeast Asia, a bustling capital city.

Operating status? Denied and dangerous. The denied operating environment would be one in which there is no...

specific relationship with the government that would allow the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service to basically say that they have operatives in the area. A dangerous operating environment would be one in which the physical threats coexist with the operational ones. So you're looking at anywhere where there's potentially armed conflict, instability, demonstrations, anything that can be of physical harm to either the officers or the sources.

Two teams of CSIS operators have arrived in-country. Where? Well, that depends on the source. There have been times, depending on what part of the world we're talking about, where there has been a presence of service employees, but maybe you're meeting in a third country. Maybe it's easier to meet in a third country because you're taking the source out of

their own country where they could more easily be monitored by let's say the employers that they're working for and the case that we provided the military maybe they have a two-week vacation and maybe they decide that they're going to spend a week of that vacation outside of the country now that might not necessarily cause any concern for the military that they're working for

If you can bring them to a third country, it might be easier for the Canadian security intelligence officers to figure something out and do it there. An operation like this can take weeks or months of planning before Canadian boots touch foreign soil. You're working in someone else's environment.

So what you see as a normal situation might not necessarily be that way unless you have the area of familiarization and a little bit of the background. So you've got to do as much due diligence before the operation happens as possible. When you're talking about a source like this one, that's essential. We have a high value resource.

But why tell Canada?

Respectfully, why not a heavier hitter? So once they found out that their military was actually backing a terrorist organization, then they felt that they needed to speak to someone. And maybe they knew through someone else of Canadians, or maybe they just felt that they didn't want... And this has happened. I mean...

The United States has a reputation around the world as being a premier intelligence organization, but unfortunately sometimes American politics is so omnipotent that they don't necessarily want to speak to an American just because it comes across as being almost treasonous. So there's the ideology side of things.

And of course, sometimes things depend on which intelligence service makes the best and earliest bid. And there is also definitely the money. So, you know, if there's an opportunity, some of these countries that we're dealing with here, a living wage is probably less than $7 a day. So anytime that they can see large amounts of money, it might actually be enough to entice them to say, OK, this is this is worth doing.

Officially, these CSIS officers are not here. That means no safe houses, no cushy secondary location in which to drink mint tea and talk shop. So the exchange of information between CSIS and their source has to happen quickly, on four wheels. A mobile debrief. So using the cover of darkness and mobile pickups, it gives us an opportunity to go in, debrief the source...

and leave without hopefully leaving a trace. So for this one, we'd have to make sure that we have at least two sets of teams. We have the human source team. The source team is tasked with collecting the source and extracting the potentially life-saving information that he's willing to share. And then we also have the cover team.

Their second team on the field is the cover team. They're keeping tabs on the source from a discreet distance, making sure that nobody gets any nasty surprises. These two teams have to work in total coordination. They have to have the area of familiarization in order to see where the marquises are, which are located typically in every neighborhood. You need your source to be as inconspicuous as possible.

A bustling urban environment, like a market, is a common-sense choice. To paraphrase Sartre, camouflage is other people. So that would allow for the cover team to set up where the source team has the opportunity to walk around

the source through various locations so that we can identify if they've been cleansed, if they're being followed, if there's some other sort of compromise. If you're a long-time listener to True Spies, you'll already know about Surveillance Detection Routes, or SDRs. One of the reasons why you're doing this surveillance detection run is to ensure that there is no compromise. So in order to keep that at the highest level possible,

the source will be told you will start at this area we want you to be here at this time and once you're there I want you to contact me to let me know that you're there

Now at this time, we'll always have the cover team set up in another area to be able to observe whether or not the source is at the location that they say that they're at, or if they may be providing information that's not true. So once the source reaches their starting point, they'll contact the handler to let them know that they are where they should be, and the handler will then put them through a series of areas, both busy and not,

to try to identify if they're being followed or if there's any reason for concern. At this point, you might be wondering how everybody's staying in touch with one another.

For the most part, they're going to try to use some form of un-attributable communications. In many parts of the world, it's becoming more and more difficult to get your hands on cell phones and SIM cards that aren't attributed to other people or not somehow run through some government identification. At the time of this operation, luckily that wasn't the issue. If you had the money, you could buy a phone. If you had the money, you could buy a SIM card and no one was the wiser.

So you would use that information. You would change the SIM cards out from different unattributable cellular phones and use coded information when in contact with one another. What sort of code are we talking about? So having that conversation before gives the teams an opportunity to realize what they're talking about. So you may come up with a precursor talking about a sporting event. And you could say, well, you know what?

Everything looks good. You know, our team looks like they're doing really well. Hopefully things keep going the way they go. If something goes wrong, you could say, oh, looks like there's a yellow card. And if something is going to be called off, oh, there's a red card. Someone's just got penalized. Simple, right? But on this operation, there's more than enough complexity to go around. Now, both CSIS teams are in position. It's time for the source to begin his route.

So the source is contacted by their handler to give them an idea of when they're going to start their route and where they're going to go from one point to the next. The source is never told the final destination, where they're going to be picked up or where they're going to be dropped off, just in case there's any reason to believe that there's compromise along the way. Code words are all well and good between friends, but sometimes subtler methods are employed.

Telecommunications, however carefully obscured, are always vulnerable. But a visual never lies. Let's say you tell the source ahead of time, I want you to carry with you a red fabric bag.

go into a store, purchase something. If you feel that you're not being followed and if you feel comfortable going ahead with our meeting tonight, then I want you to just use the bag that they provide you. If you're concerned about it, I want you to take whatever you purchased at that store and I want you to put it in the red bag and then step out with that. And at that point, the cover team could say, we have a red flag on the field. As the source progresses to the meeting point, everybody involved is on the highest possible alert.

If anything is going to go wrong, this is the time. There could be a multitude of things. It could be something as simple as one of the team members has come down with an illness that can't be dealt with. There could have been some sort of an attack that happened either in the Marquess or somewhere else in the area that has basically sent a large number of military or police vehicles that would disrupt things.

And it could get to the point where there is so much concern in relationship to who the source has talked to or met along the route that it has to be called off. And there have been times when that has happened. That an individual that they've been in contact with more than once along that route leads you to believe that that person is either following them

or in some way in contact with this individual so that they can provide information back to a third party, potentially the government or the terrorist organization, all of which means that this is a no-go situation. And the source isn't the only focus of the CSIS team's attention. Potential threats to their own safety could come from any angle. You have to look at it as almost like a symphony.

The team, the cover team, is not only looking to see whether or not the source is being followed or there's any compromise there, but they also have to be aware of their own environment. They have to be aware of whether or not people are watching them. And they have to coordinate that with the source team, who's also doing the same thing while they're trying to coordinate having the source go from one area to the next. So...

at any one time you have at least two teams and a source who have to be aware of their environment and ensure that any of them is being compromised in any way shape or form. So in order to do that you have to have clear understanding of the communication between the source and the handler, the handler and the handling team, the handler and the cover team, the cover team and the handler, and the handler back to the source.

So when we're getting to the point that the cover team and the source team feel that the source is clean and there's no issues and that they can go ahead, the handler will contact the source and let them know that they need to head in a certain direction and that there will be a vehicle that will either pull up beside them or will be coming in the opposite direction and they'll be able to stop, get in that vehicle.

The time and place of this meeting, like everything else, has been carefully chosen. In a lot of countries that we're talking about here, the infrastructure isn't that strong. They don't have street lights on every street. They don't have video cameras that are outside of the Marquess. So it provides that opportunity of darkness, helps to obfuscate the individual and the driver and the handler so that...

When the source is walking down the street, they're not going to be easily identified by anyone else. It also helps that to the casual observer, there's nothing special about the pickup vehicle. They're basically made to blend in with all of the other vehicles that would probably be used in that area, whether they're being used by individuals who have enough money that they can afford something that's a little better protected or they have no profile other than the ones that are there.

And they'll also try to ensure that the license plates that are on these vehicles are purchased at a local market so that they can blend in as well. They don't identify themselves as being a diplomatic plate. Of course, this being true spies, some modifications are a given. Ballistic windows, the types of things that would make sure that if there was an IED, it would provide as much protection as possible.

It should also go without saying that a nondescript vehicle, freshly bought and modified, will be more difficult for the enemy to bug than a hotel room. At long last, the source enters the vehicle. Rated T for Teen. Each year, thousands of adults lose their shred.

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It's the source team's time to shine. Once the package has been handed off to the source team and the debrief is underway, the cover team may possibly just sit back and wait for it all clear. At this point, you might imagine those tinted bulletproof windows concealing banks of beeping monitors and a cadre of hard-eyed men in headsets.

Not quite. No, we're talking pretty much old school at this point. Remember, the most important tools in a handler's arsenal are a friendly face and an instinct for hospitality. Hopefully there's a couple of cold drinks in there because they've probably been walking around for some time. If we're talking about our military officer, I'm sure they're probably used to the heat, but at the same time it's always nice to have something refreshing and cold for them to enjoy.

The mobile briefing has begun. Pleasantries are always exchanged. In some cases, this relationship is long established, a catch-up between old friends. Or it could be someone who's come up on the radar who has volunteered information and wants to speak to somebody about what's happening. In the latter case, you're starting from scratch, building trust at 30 miles per hour.

So comfort is key. The source, of course, has enough room, is obviously air-conditioned, because when you're dealing with some of these countries, you don't want to be in a situation where you're so hot that you can't even have a conversation with someone. Once everyone's settled, it's time to get down to the matter at hand. And then from that point, you have the driver who has to ensure that

pretty much a predetermined route that allows them to be outside of the eyes of most onlookers, which means you'll probably be headed out to more of a rural area. But again, you have to constantly be aware of potential checkpoints, potential dangers from IEDs in the road, abandoned vehicles, demonstrations, individuals who may possibly want to cause you harm.

Any one of these eventualities will bring a swift end to the briefing, voluntarily or otherwise. So while the driver is taking all of that in consideration, the handler is going through all of the information that the source has to provide in relationship to, in this case, the terrorist organization that's being funded and how it's being funded by that government.

The mobile briefing is a delicate art. There's going to be the rapport building. There's going to be ensuring that any concerns that they may have going forward or any concerns that they have about anything that's happened up until that point, any specific and important information that the source feels they need to share. This requires a skilled handler, one who's able to get what they need quickly without losing their cool.

So a debrief that would happen, let's say in a hotel room or in a safe house, it's a lot easier to make that more comfortable. You don't have to worry about what roads you're going to go down, how bumpy the ride's going to be.

You're seated typically across from one another, depending on how long the debrief is, you can get up and move around. All of those things come off the table when you're doing a mobile brief. And depending on what background noise there is, what else is going on, it's easy to get distracted. And you're also dealing with a limited amount of time. Some debriefs, if you're, depending on the type of information that you're trying to get,

could potentially go hours or days. But when you're dealing with this type of a situation, you have to be very succinct. You have to ensure that this is what I want to find out from you, this is what I want to tell you we need to work on the next time, and this is what we need to worry about. This is a deeply abnormal situation. It takes someone special to put the source at ease. So all of those things means that

rapport can be affected in a negative way. Because essentially you're asking someone to jump into a moving vehicle, spew information that they have, take information that they need to for the next meeting, and then essentially get out of the vehicle and head home. And all of that has to happen typically within like an hour, an hour and a half.

No time at all, really. And in our anonymous CSIS vehicle, that time is coming to an end. Information, all being well, has been exchanged. Assurances have been made. CSIS and their source can think about next time.

And then the handler will provide tasking for the next meeting. So basically, this is what I want you to find out. I will be in contact within the next little while. If there's any emergency that you have that you need to contact me, this is how you contact me. Time to say goodbye. And then essentially, the driver will find a place that's probably predetermined.

to be able to drop off that source so that they will be able to work their way to an area that they can find public transportation to hopefully return home or return to another location where their vehicle may be parked. This is the best case scenario. But the job's not over yet. Another surveillance detection route takes the source back to safety. The Canadians, with a similar level of care, extract themselves from the field. A job well done.

For Neil, the work CSIS does abroad is a source of personal pride. During my time with the service, we're always told that we punched way above our weight, which meant that for the amount of resources that we had, we were providing some pretty important information. And I think that speaks volumes. But I also think that, like we touched on earlier today, is that it's not that the Canadian government doesn't believe that they're capable of doing it. The question is whether or not we needed to.

In decades gone by, Canada simply hasn't needed to invest too heavily in its intelligence-gathering apparatus.

That's changing. For a long period of time, because of our reliance on American intelligence, we are more of a consumer than a producer. We didn't have to really worry about that because they were taking the lion's share of the burden. But now that things have changed, Canada needs to reassess and say, we have the capability, we've proven that we can do it, now we just have to start working on it.

Spyscape Plus subscribers should look out for our debrief episode with Neil, in which we'll be discussing the past, present and future of Canadian intelligence in more depth. But for now, thanks for listening. We'll be back next time for another secret rendezvous with true spies. Disclaimer. The views expressed in this podcast are those of the subject. These stories are told from their perspective and their authenticity should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

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What did your research into bipolar disorder reveal about the role of moral strain on the manifestation of the disease? In the 1950s, there were kind of a lot of armchair psychiatrists within the CIA, colleagues of Wisner's, who believed that he was a victim of the Cold War. He saw the Americans falling behind and it ate away with him and basically drove him crazy.

That really won the case. Wisner was a victim of a disease. That was a belief back then that he was a battle casualty when he really wasn't. He was he was a patient. True spies. The debrief from Spyscape Studios. Search for true spies wherever you get your podcasts.