Francisco Suárez was a 16th-century Jesuit philosopher from a well-connected Spanish family. His ethical thought was influenced by a combination of Thomist and Scotist traditions, but he was also deeply grounded in legal theory, mastering both civil and canon law. He integrated legal theory with ethics to create a general theory of living the ethical life within the framework of divinely instituted governing bodies, such as the church and state.
Suárez believed that ethical life required the framework of divinely instituted governing bodies because he saw the church and state as essential for negotiating our supernatural destiny in heaven alongside our pursuit of natural happiness on earth. He aimed to create a better understanding of how cooperation between church and state could enable this balance.
Suárez defined an action as a psychological content-bearing event that occurs in the will, rather than as a physical effect caused by prior mental states. For him, the goal of an action was intrinsic to the action itself, and the will, not bodily action, was the locus of action.
Freedom was a crucial power in Suárez's theory of action, allowing individuals to control whether or not they perform an act of the will. This freedom was a form of contingent causation, unique to rational agents, as it allowed for multiple modes of action rather than being necessitated by nature, like the behavior of a brick hitting a window.
Suárez believed that moral obligations required divine legislation because human freedom could be misused, and the force of goodness in the practical sphere was not determining. Divine law provided a directive force that ensured moral standards were followed without removing human freedom, creating a special kind of moral badness for those who transgressed these obligations.
Suárez saw moral obligations under natural law as the primary form of obligation, with human-made laws being derivative. Human laws added reason-giving features to actions, such as traffic rules, which were necessary for social organization and cooperation. These laws generated further moral obligations that attached to the will, but they were parasitic on the natural law.
Suárez viewed both the church and state as coercive authorities essential for human life. The state enabled individuals to respond to the force of reason concerning the welfare of the community, while the church guided individuals toward supernatural happiness. Both institutions used law to guide behavior, with the church having jurisdiction over baptized individuals and the state over all citizens.
Suárez's theory of religious liberty was constrained by the existence of legitimate authorities, such as the church and state, which had ethical and metaphysical guiding functions. Non-Christians, like Jews and Muslims, had the right to practice their religion but were subject to limitations to protect the Christian community, unlike the more individualistic and unconstrained views of modern liberalism.
The core difference between Suárez and Hobbes was their understanding of power. Suárez believed in the existence of freedom and reason as unique powers in rational agents, which could be addressed by law and obligation. In contrast, Hobbes rejected these powers, viewing all actions as effects of ordinary causation driven by passions. This led Hobbes to see the state as a coordination and protection agency rather than a coercive teacher.