Ofra Magidor on Epistemicism and Moral Vagueness
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Deep Dive
What is epistemicism, and how does it relate to vagueness?
Epistemicism is a theory of vagueness that maintains classical logic and mathematics, asserting that even in cases of vagueness, there is a fact of the matter. For example, in borderline cases like determining if someone is 'tall,' epistemicism claims there is a precise cutoff point, but we are ignorant of it. This ignorance is a distinctive feature of vagueness, not a lack of truth value.
Why does epistemicism face challenges when applied to moral concepts?
Epistemicism faces challenges in moral contexts because it posits sharp cutoff points for moral truths that are unknowable. This creates a problem for moral guidance, as individuals cannot act on truths they cannot know. Additionally, moral terms like 'permissible' are highly sensitive to usage, leading to semantic plasticity, which complicates the idea of objective moral facts.
How does semantic plasticity explain our ignorance of sharp cutoff points in vague terms?
Semantic plasticity refers to the high sensitivity of vague terms to slight differences in usage across communities. For example, the word 'tall' might have slightly different meanings in different contexts, leading to different cutoff points. This plasticity makes it impossible for us to know the precise cutoff points, as our beliefs cannot track these subtle differences in usage.
What is the relationship between moral realism and epistemicism?
Moral realism, which posits objective moral facts, aligns well with epistemicism's claim that there are sharp cutoff points for moral truths. However, epistemicism's requirement of semantic plasticity for moral terms complicates this alignment, as it suggests that moral terms might pick out slightly different properties in different communities, challenging the idea of a single, objective moral reality.
How does epistemicism address the 'ought implies can' problem in moral vagueness?
Epistemicism acknowledges that in borderline moral cases, we cannot know the precise cutoff points for what we ought to do. This creates a tension with the 'ought implies can' principle, which suggests that if we ought to do something, we must be able to know it. However, epistemicism argues that this problem is not unique to it, as any theory of vagueness faces similar challenges in guiding action in borderline cases.
What is the alternative to viewing moral vagueness as a result of epistemicism?
An alternative view is that moral vagueness is not due to vagueness at all but rather to the difficulty of moral questions. Just as in mathematics, where some questions remain unresolved despite precise language, moral questions may be hard to answer without implying that the concepts themselves are vague. This perspective suggests that moral facts exist, but our ignorance stems from the complexity of the issues, not from vagueness.
- Vagueness in philosophy is exemplified by words like "tall," which lack precise definitions.
- Epistemicism proposes that vague concepts have sharp boundaries, but we lack knowledge of their precise location.
- This approach avoids altering classical logic's principle of bivalence (every statement is either true or false).
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