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cover of episode Automation, management, and the future of work

Automation, management, and the future of work

2024/12/12
logo of podcast LSE: Public lectures and events

LSE: Public lectures and events

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C
Chrysanthi Avgerou
E
Eric Hurst
N
Noam Yuchtman
Topics
Eric Hurst: 我关注美国就业率的下降趋势,特别是男性就业率和受教育程度较低的男性的就业率下降。制造业就业的下降与自动化和贸易有关,这种下降对美国和英国的就业率和收入都产生了负面影响。技术进步导致的失业并非新现象,经济体通过劳动力重新配置来适应技术变革,但这种调整需要时间,并且可能存在技能错配和政策干预的需求。我们需要思考技术是劳动力的补充还是替代品,如果技术是替代品,那么被取代的工人有多容易被重新分配到增长型行业,以及是否存在阻碍这种调整的障碍。 Chrysanthi Avgerou: 技术对社会经济的影响并非完全由技术本身决定,还受到管理、组织文化和政治等因素的影响。技术成熟和组织调整需要时间,这为减轻负面影响提供了机会。多种技术相互作用,难以仅基于单一技术预测其影响。AI和自动化会取代许多任务,但不会导致大规模失业。组织会重组自身以应对技术变革,新的工作机会也会随之产生。虽然许多现有劳动力可以进行技能再培训,但工作合同的变化,例如零工经济的兴起,会增加个人的再培训成本和风险。 Noam Yuchtman: AI难以取代需要同理心、责任感和表演能力的工作,例如医疗保健、司法和艺术领域的工作。AI可能与其他技术互补,例如帮助老年人延长工作时间。但AI可能加剧财富不平等,并带来政治风险。历史上,技术进步往往伴随着财富集中和市场力量的变化,这可能导致政治紧张和社会动荡。我们需要关注并解决不平等问题,加强民主制度,以应对AI带来的挑战。

Deep Dive

Key Insights

What has been the trend in employment rates for men aged 25 to 55 in the United States since the 1970s?

Employment rates for men aged 25 to 55 in the United States have declined since the 1970s. In the 1970s, about 90% of men in this age range were employed, but the current number is around 86%, representing approximately 2 million fewer men working today compared to 20-25 years ago.

How has the share of men with less than a bachelor's degree reporting zero weeks of work per year changed over time?

The share of men with less than a bachelor's degree reporting zero weeks of work per year has increased significantly. In the mid-1980s, this number was about 8%, but today it is around 14%, meaning roughly one in seven men in this age range with less than a bachelor's degree is idle from the labor force for an entire year.

What has been the impact of automation on manufacturing employment in the United States since the 1970s?

Manufacturing employment in the United States has declined sharply since the 1970s. In the 1970s, there were about 18 million manufacturing jobs, but this number dropped by 2 million in the 1980s and by 6 million between 2000 and 2010. There has been little rebound in manufacturing jobs since then.

What are the two main stories explaining the decline in manufacturing jobs in the United States and the UK?

The two main stories explaining the decline in manufacturing jobs are exposure to trade, particularly with China, and automation. Sectors most exposed to trade with China also automated the most, leading to fewer workers needed for the same level of production.

How has the labor share of income in the manufacturing sector changed since the 1980s?

The labor share of income in the manufacturing sector has declined since the 1980s. Previously, about one-third of income in the manufacturing sector went to workers, but today it is around one-quarter, representing a 7-8 percentage point decline.

What does the historical example of the agricultural sector in the United States tell us about technological displacement?

The historical example of the agricultural sector in the United States shows that technological displacement does not necessarily lead to overall economic destabilization. In 1910, one-third of men worked in agriculture, but by today, only 3% do. Workers displaced by automation in agriculture were reabsorbed into other growing sectors.

What are the three key questions to consider when evaluating the labor market effects of technology?

The three key questions are: 1) Is the technology a complement or substitute with workers? 2) If the technology is a substitute, how easy is it for displaced workers to be reallocated to growing sectors? 3) Are there barriers to the adjustment of workers being reabsorbed into the economy?

What are the potential political risks associated with technological disruption and worker displacement?

Technological disruption and worker displacement can lead to political risks, including increased inequality, concentration of wealth, and the rise of populism. Historical examples show that such disruptions can lead to social and political tensions, including violence and shifts toward authoritarianism.

How can policymakers address the challenges of automation and AI in fostering inclusive economic progress?

Policymakers can address these challenges by investing in workforce retraining, implementing legal and regulatory measures to redistribute wealth, and promoting labor-complementary AI. Additionally, fostering remote work opportunities and encouraging industry-led training initiatives can help mitigate the negative effects of automation.

What are the potential effects of AI, fusion energy, and quantum computing on labor markets in the medium term?

The effects of AI, fusion energy, and quantum computing on labor markets will depend on whether these technologies act as complements or substitutes for workers. The speed of technological change and the ability of workers to adjust to new sectors will be critical factors. While some workers may benefit from increased productivity, others may face displacement, requiring policy interventions to facilitate transitions.

Shownotes Transcript

Contributor(s): Professor Erik Hurst, Professor Chrisanthi Avgerou, Professor Noam Yuchtman | As we move deeper into the 21st century, rapid advancements in automation, robotics, and artificial intelligence continue to reshape industries, raising concerns about the potential impact on workers. Will these innovations lead to widespread job losses? Or, as history suggests, will the labour market adapt? In this insightful lecture, Erik Hurst will explore how recent developments in automation are influencing the labour market. Drawing parallels from the early 20th-century agricultural revolution, where the adoption of tractors and automated farming equipment drastically reduced agricultural employment but did not destabilize overall employment rates, Professor Hurst will examine how current automation trends may produce different effects.