The book focuses on developing a precautionary framework to make ethically sound, evidence-based decisions in cases of uncertainty about sentience in humans, other animals, and AI. It addresses questions like whether octopuses, crabs, or AI can feel pain or pleasure and how to manage these risks responsibly.
Birch prefers 'sentience' because it captures the capacity to have feelings that feel good or bad, such as pain, pleasure, boredom, or joy. 'Consciousness' can refer to more complex cognitive overlays, while 'sentience' focuses on the immediate raw experiences, which are more relevant to ethical considerations.
Experiments like the conditioned place avoidance test show octopuses exhibit behaviors similar to mammals in response to pain. For example, octopuses avoid chambers where they experienced pain and prefer chambers where they received pain relief, indicating a realistic possibility of sentience.
Octopuses are solitary and aggressive in close confinement, leading to injuries and stress in farming conditions. Intensive farming raises significant welfare concerns, and Birch advocates for preemptive bans on octopus farming and imports of farmed octopus to prevent unnecessary suffering.
Birch suggests treating AI systems as sentience candidates if there is a realistic possibility they could feel pain or pleasure. He advocates for a precautionary principle, looking for computational markers or behavioral experiments that could indicate sentience, rather than dismissing the possibility outright.
The Act extended protections to include cephalopod mollusks and decapod crustaceans, such as octopuses, crabs, and lobsters, recognizing them as sentient beings. This change was influenced by Birch's research and aims to improve their welfare in practices like farming and slaughter.
Citizens' assemblies are proposed as democratic mechanisms to debate and decide on proportionate responses to sentience risks. They allow the public to weigh in on ethical and policy decisions, ensuring that expert assessments of risks are balanced with public values and preferences.
Overconfidence in denying sentience, such as in the case of unresponsive brain injury patients or invertebrates, can lead to neglect and suffering. Birch highlights historical examples, like surgery on newborns without anesthesia, to show the dangers of assuming sentience is absent without evidence.
Contributor(s): Professor Jonathan Birch | Can octopuses feel pain and pleasure? What about crabs, shrimps, insects or spiders? How do we tell whether a person unresponsive after severe brain injury might be suffering? When does a fetus in the womb start to have conscious experiences? Could there even be rudimentary feelings in miniature models of the human brain, grown from human stem cells? And what about AI? These are questions about the "edge of sentience", and they are subject to enormous, disorienting uncertainty. The stakes are immense, and neglecting the risks can have terrible costs. We need to err on the side of caution in these cases, yet it’s often far from clear what ‘erring on the side of caution’ should mean in practice. When are we going too far? When are we not doing enough? Birch's new book, The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI, constructs a precautionary framework designed to help us reach ethically sound, evidence-based decisions despite our uncertainty. This talk will introduce some of the main themes of the book.