China's Mideast Strategy in the Trump 2.0 Era
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Hey everyone, Eric here. We have a very special treat for you this week, an extra bonus episode that explores Chinese engagement in the Middle East in the Trump 2.0 era. We teamed up with our friends at the China Med Project to bring together scholars and analysts from both the U.S. and China for what turned out to be an absolutely fascinating discussion that I think you're really going to enjoy.

Now, the timing for this couldn't have been better, given the fact that it came right at the end of Donald Trump's week-long tour of the Persian Gulf. And, of course, we want to hear your feedback. Let me know what you think. Email me directly at eric at chinaglobalsouth.com. Thank you.

Hello everybody and welcome to this final installment of the China and the Middle East from the Cold War to the present. This has been a seminar series that's been going on for the past several months looking at all phases of China's engagement in the Middle East and we're ending at a really unique time.

time when we're looking at what lessons can all stakeholders learn from what Donald Trump did in his first presidency that are now playing out in his second presidency and what lessons can China in particular learn from all of this. And so we're gonna explore a question today about how did Trump's first term policies, the Abraham Accords as we mentioned, the Iran sanctions reshape the Middle East and what lessons is China drawing from it in the Trump 2.0 era.

And so one of the things that we heard today and this week from his trip in the Middle East where he visited three countries, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, is they urged people of the region to quote, "Chart your own destinies in your own way." And what's interesting about his time in the Middle East this week

is that a lot of Trump 2.0 sounds a lot like what Xi Jinping would be telling these countries as well, in terms of focusing on deals and business and trade and commerce and not involving in wars and politics and whatnot. So in order for us to explore this question,

We're thrilled to have four partners behind today's events, the University of Naples, Loriental, the China Med Project, the Torino World Affairs Institute and the China Global South Project. We have two fascinating guests who've been part of our previous discussions and are very well known in this space to join us for this. And then we're gonna bring in two discussants

later on to talk about it. But before we get to our guests, again, I just wanna kind of lay the groundwork for a little bit of what we're gonna talk about, especially the timeliness of this conversation that we're gonna have about China in the Middle East, given the fact that President Donald Trump finished up his tour

in the region. He was accompanied by 30 business leaders representing America's top corporations. Again, the focus was very much on deals and commerce. In his speech, he said he was not going to give lectures on how you live again, really a break from the past where human rights and

and political reforms were very much part of the conversation, remaking the Middle East. And he also said, we're not going to do nation building, a clear reference to his Republican predecessor, George W. Bush, and the adventures that he had in Iraq. Also notably, he met with Syria's new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, on Wednesday, and while he was in Saudi Arabia and

That too was very interesting. So notably, the president did not visit Israel on this first trip of his overseas. That is part of a chill that has set in between Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. That too will factor into some of the discussions. But again, it's very interesting to think about this in the Chinese context because so much of this does seem to mirror the Chinese profile in Israel.

the region as well, where Sino-Israeli relations are also quite frosty, but warming up a little bit. But again, the focus on trade. Now, underlying the president's visit was a determination to challenge China. And this is something that White House officials said over and over again, that these deals are meant to confront China, particularly on issues related to

technology and AI in particular. So we're going to now dive into these issues with two experts who follow these topics very closely. Zhang Chuchu is an associate professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University in Shanghai and is joining us very late today. So, Dr. Zhang, thank you so much for joining us again. It's wonderful to be part of another conversation with you. Thank you for having me.

And we're joined also by Grant Rumley, who's a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the director of the Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation Program on Great Power Competition and the Middle East. Grant, so wonderful to have you join us as well. Thanks for having me, Eric. Well, let's start with the, you know, Chuchu, I'm going to come to you first and then we'll get also...

Grant, I want you to kind of think about what your opening kind of statement is going to be. Let's try and keep our focus today on that China question, because it's very easy for us to get sucked into all of the dynamics that are going on in this very lively region. But Chuchu,

When you see what's been happening over the past three to six months, especially as Trump 2.0 is really ramping up, and you're thinking about China's role in this region and the impact and the lessons that China's learning, tell us a little bit about your thinking about what some of the takeaways are.

Right. In fact, I think much have changed at the moment. Actually, I just arrived from Qatar to Shanghai yesterday. So I think right now a lot of things are happening at the moment. So talking about Trump, of course, everyone is shocked by his predictabilism. But also, I think it's very interesting that Trump 1.0 is very different from Trump 2.0.

2.0, because I think, first of all, if we just talk about Trump himself, then we can see that actually Trump 2.0, he has a lot of even bolder ambitions. And also it's very interesting that we can see he has changed a lot of the internal structures of the United States. For example, right now, I think he has like two sets of political goals.

groups. For instance, on the one hand, there is still the administration, but on the other hand, there is another parallel administration and a group which are not very institutionalized led by Elon Musk. So for instance, when it comes to Iran, an issue is very interesting to note that at the very beginning of Trump's second term,

administration. And actually, there were a lot of rumors talking about Elon Musk's meeting with a high official and representative of Iran to the United Nations. So you see that he's, I think he's trying to leave some leeway for his maneuver. And also he's trying to give himself like more flexibility and so as to gain more transactional benefits. But as for China, I

I would say, well, we can discuss more about that. But I think, in fact, since this is already Trump 2.0, so a lot of things have changed. And at least China has already gotten some experience of dealing with him. So it's not like at the very beginning, it's like, okay, who is Trump? And we know nothing about him. But right now, at least China has already dealt with him before. So at least China has some experiences of, you know, working with him. And right now, when it

comes to the Middle East, I would say it is true that there are competitions between China and the United States, like what happened in Trump's first administration. In his second administration, it's the same thing. And I would expect that there are more competitions between China and the United States in the region. Of course, China does not want to

compete with the United States. But unfortunately, Trump, we can see that he's going to shape the regional order. And at the moment, he aims to shape and form a new regional order favored by Trump. So for instance, right now he's in the Gulf countries. I think more information is going to be covered. But in any case, it is very likely that Trump is going to exert more pressure on the regional powers to say, OK, you should be cautious about

working with China, especially when it comes to high-tech cooperation in sections like 5G or digital economy, etc. But at the same time, I would say contrary to common assumptions, I think the Middle East is not the primary arena of this kind of rivalry.

I think for China at the moment, our core interests lie closer to other issues. First of all, our first concern is our neighbors, for instance, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the Southeast Asia. And also, I think Taiwan is another concern. So actually, I would say that some of

Of course, there are competitions between China and the United States in the Middle East, but that would not be the highest priority of China. Instead, I would say China might be more concerned with Taiwan issue. And also another issue here is the economic issue, because right now there is a trade war. As we can see, there are a lot of, you know, new changes when it comes to the tariff issue. But I would expect that more negotiations will continue in the following, you know,

weeks or months. But I would say also these regions. So as for the United States, I think meanwhile, it directs much of its attention also toward the other issues, toward Europe, the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. So although right now Trump chooses his first state visit to Gulf countries, but I think this is actually...

a concern for economic gains. But at the same time, I would say still in his political agenda, he has a lot more concerns than the Middle East. So I think competing in the Middle East for both big powers offers very limited strategic value.

and very poor cost-effectiveness. Secondly, I would say the two states wield power in fundamentally different ways. So there are competitions, but at the same time, in most of the sectors, you know, we have different preferences of dealing with the region. For example, on the one hand, the United States maintains a robust military and geopolitical footprint with

military bases and troops stationed worldwide. And I think this time during Trump's visit, a key concern, as far as I know, of the Gulf countries are to guarantee more of the security protection from the United States. But as for China, by contrast, China does not have a lot of interest in strengthening its military presence in the region. So by contrast, I think China has a

minimal military presence and instead prioritizes geoeconomic cooperation in the region. And the third point I would like to make is that actually, I would say the real beneficiaries of any Sino-American competition in the Middle East are actually not

the two powers themselves. Because in the past, as a lot of our experts here in our discussion today, I would say are IR scholars. But the IR scholars, traditionally, we often look at issues through the so-called big power politics. But I would say actually at the moment, maybe sometimes the big powers are very arrogant. But instead, right now, the regional powers and even the so-called small and medium states are playing a bigger and bigger role, especially in the Middle

So actually, a very interesting thing is who is interested in talking about the subject of Sino-American competition in the Middle East? And I would say that are the regional powers because they can gain a lot of leverage, resources and opportunities as the global giants vie for influence so they can benefit from this kind of like

big power competition. And last but not least, I would say personally, I am not worried about China-Gulf relations at the moment because I think it is very interesting to note that Trump is a transactional politician. But at the same time, we need also note that his transactional logic is not commercial mutual benefits, but that only he

should make money and he should be the only one that gain benefits. Therefore, the Gulf countries are very clear that interacting with the United States can only make the Gulf countries lose money that cannot make money. We are going to look at what the United States are going to deal with the Gulf countries. But for example, we already know a lot of subjects and more important agenda. And for example, the United States, why does Trump bring so many CEOs along with him during his delegation trip?

And one of the biggest issues here is that he wants to gain a lot of contracts and deals. And obviously, Trump expects that the Gulf countries are going to buy more of the weapons from the United States. Also, he wants to gain more investments from Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, etc. And also, there is still lots of other initiatives, such as the grand initiative of IMEC.

I have done some research about that and I have talked to different parties concerning participants of this IMEC initiative. And interestingly, the United States is the proponent of this initiative, but actually the United States has no interest in investing in IMEC, nor does EU.

nor does India. So who is going to pay for it? Everybody expects that the Gulf countries are going to pay for it. Now, as for the Gulf countries, so in order to make money, I think the Gulf countries must, they know very clearly that they must cooperate with the other countries, including China, but not only China, but also the other countries like Japan, South Korea, EU, etc.

Thank you, Chuchu. Just very quickly, when Chuchu was talking about IMEC, that's the India-Middle East-Europe corridor, one of the new trade corridors that's competing not only with the Belt and Road, but also some of these new corridors like the Middle Corridor that's running from China through Central Asia and through Turkey.

So a lot of competition in that corridor space. Chuchu, very quickly before we move on, just one quick question. You've mentioned that, of course, the near abroad or the neighborhood diplomacy for China is by far the most important. So Southeast Asia, South China Sea, East Sea in Central Asia. But at the same time, Chinese interests in the Middle East are quite substantial. I mean, Saudi Arabia was the largest recipient of Belt and Road money. The Gulf region now is one of collectively the

probably the largest source of energy, of imported energy, second probably to Russia. At the same time, we have seen opportunities for Chinese weapons makers, the Abu Dhabi air show. We saw a lot of the Chinese were the biggest presence there. The J-10Cs were on display in Egypt. This is also a key

area for China to promote its diplomacy and obviously the Iran-Saudi reconciliation. And then at the same time, too, it's been a very important vector for China to be talking about Xinjiang and the issues there as well. So the importance of the region to China is substantial, if not maybe in direct competition with the United States. But I'd be interested to get your take on that.

Sure. I think just several very points. First of all, when it comes to the Xinjiang issue, I don't think that this is a very big issue as the moment when it comes to relations between China and the Gulf countries, because actually when I arrived... Quite the opposite, Chu Chu. In fact, it's been where Wang Yi went to Cairo...

to make his policy statements on Xinjiang. Also, Mahmoud Abbas came back from a tour, you know, very enthusiastic endorsing China's position on Xinjiang. And also Wang Yi in Saudi Arabia has made numerous statements backed by the Saudi governments that have endorsed China's position. So it's not that it's a contentious issue, quite the opposite, that the Arab and Gulf governments have really supported China's stance on this.

Right, exactly. And just one more maybe evidence or stories that I have met some of the Qatari people and officials there and they actually they have just visited the Xinjiang province in China. So they had a trip there and they encouraged the Chinese government to organize more of these trips.

for the officials. And the second issue here is that, yes, obviously, so China has growing presence in the Middle East, and obviously China has a lot of interests there, including both the personnel security and also we are concerned with our commercial interests. But at the same time, I also think

Trump's visits to this region is going to affect China's interests to a great extent because when it comes to the weapons export, as you have mentioned, actually China's proportion is very low. It's minimal in the region. Actually, even South Korea and Turkey, they export more weapons than us to the regional powers. And the second issue here is that I think you have mentioned something, another issue at the very beginning.

The Belt and Road, that Saudi Arabia was the largest recipient of Belt and Road financing. And Huawei, for example, is building the largest battery storage in the world in Meituan, just announced a billion dollar investment in Saudi Arabia. So a number of different engagements on Chinese commercial diplomacy.

Right. Yes, absolutely. So when it comes to infrastructure, I think, of course, the infrastructure cooperation is going to continue. That is for sure, because there are already a lot of a lot of infrastructure projects there and you can't just stop them. And also, I don't think it's Trump's biggest concern to disrupt the infrastructure cooperation between China and the Gulf states. I think his concern is mainly in the sectors of the high tech sector.

And also, there is another very important issue here, that is the oil. Because as you mentioned, China is the largest buyer of oil of Saudi Arabia, that is for sure. And at the moment, I would say that maybe Trump's policy is going to further encourage and promote the relations between China and the region in terms of oil trade. Because as I said, yes, you can see that at the moment, due to the tariff policy right down the

the oil price is going down. So of course, in this kind of context, the Gulf countries, they are eager to gain more of the customers, to sell more of the oil. And also at the same time, as I have already mentioned, the Gulf countries need to invest and pay a lot of bills at the moment. So where does the money come from? So that is why they need to export more. And also they want to cooperate with China in terms of attract China's investment.

Okay, Grant, Chuchu has set the table quite nicely. Thank you for your patience in waiting for us to kind of cover the broad breadth of issues. You're sitting, I think you're in Washington. You're seeing this obviously from a very different perspective than someone sitting in Shanghai. When you look at Trump 2.0 and the dynamics with the Middle East and the Persian Gulf and the China question here, what are you seeing?

You know, having worked in the first Trump administration and the Biden administration, but having spent most of my time in the first Trump administration, I often get this question of trying to explain and suss out the exact nature of the Trump administration policies and

You know, and Choo-Choo's right. There is sort of an unpredictability to it, to say the least. I tend to think that there is, though at times, a predictability to the unpredictability, if that makes sense. Especially when it comes to the Middle East, I think about sort of three main themes. The first one is his relation to military force. It's often a subject of great debate in this town. Is Donald Trump averse to conflict?

How do you square the circle of sometimes engaging, but sometimes not engaging? His second inaugural sort of famously said, we'll be judged not only by the wars we end, but the wars we don't get in. It's been sort of a consistent theme. You know, I think the Middle East has been where we've tested out his relation, his relationship with military force.

I would say he is not averse to actual conflict or the application of military force to achieve a policy objective in the Middle East. We saw that in the first term with two Syria strikes after the chemical weapons usage. We famously saw that with the Soleimani operation. What he is averse to, however, is long sustained protracted periods of conflict in the region in particular, but I think broadly as well. And so, you know, that plays out when

And, you know, the Iranians shot down the MQ-9 in the first administration. You sort of looked at the options and deduced that the response necessarily would be sort of a longer campaign and walked away from it. The Houthi campaign in the second administration is a great example as well. The military planners were accounting for a multi-month operation. He gave them 30 days, right? And so I think from his perspective, it's not that he's against military force, but that he is against long periods of military force.

And that's what a lot of people are saying is the origin of the chill between Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump over whether or not to launch a war against Iran. And Trump is reluctant to do that. And Netanyahu wants to do something. Is that correct?

Yeah, I mean, look, I think I think this is a president that's averse to conflict in general to get an American to war. I mean, there's just been, you know, I think he's the first post global war on terror presidency in a way. There's been a generational change, I think, in American foreign policy, a sort of a view in Washington that you characterize it as adventures in the middle.

Middle East, I think these advisors and people around the president would characterize it as misadventures. It's a view echoed by Vice President Vance, Defense Secretary Hegseth, and I think it speaks to his internal instincts, his view that there isn't a problem in the world that can't be solved through negotiations and deal-making.

and finding some type of commercial, mutually beneficial interest there. And so I think the difference, as Shishu was highlighting, the difference between Trump 1 and Trump 2 is in the first Trump administration, I think his instincts were at times, I wouldn't say constrained, but certainly squeezed a little bit by the people around him. His cabinet looked like a traditional Republican cabinet. It had Pompeo, it had Esper, Mattis, John Bolton for a little while there as well.

The second go around really speaks, I think, more to where his instincts are in foreign policy, which are a little bit more focused on restraint, a little more focused on, I wouldn't call it isolationism, but it's certainly similar in its theme. You know, that's the big difference for him in sort of his approach in the Middle East. I think it bears that out. His focus will be on

finding deals on minimizing U.S. military commitments, on finding sort of some way to move forward and advance our own diplomatic interests without necessarily getting bogged down there. You know, I think another sort of theme that I think of with him in particular is, you know, there is a obviously, you know, a well-documented fascination on finding deals and finding a way to sort of negotiate into a conflict and resolve and promote stability. But there's not

I think sort of an ideological persistence with such an effort. And so he will try to make a deal. His instinct is always to try to make a deal. But when it's met with resistance, he, I think, pivots to other topics or he's,

He's fine sort of putting it in a box, tying a bow on it, moving to the next thing. In the first administration, we focus a lot on the Abraham Accords. But for the first couple of years, it was the deal of the century. The entire focus was on getting the Israelis and the Palestinians together. There was a big rollout in Bahrain that was, you know,

accumulation of years of diplomatic work, and it basically fell flat. It led nowhere. And there was that period between the Bahrain rollout, the end of the deal of the century work and negotiations, and then suddenly the Abraham Accords, where there was just no real concerted American diplomatic effort in the Israeli-Palestinian situation. And so I think we see that play out in particular right now with Ukraine. I think we're kind of seeing it play out a little bit with Gaza, as you highlighted, Eric. I think, you know,

Amen saying I'm going to sign a deal on day one, wasn't able to really do it. I think his interest, his focus has started to shift. And so, you know, I would say it's, you know, the focus on dealmaking is thematic, but I don't necessarily think it's ideological in the sense that he won't push on a closed door repeatedly. He'll look for wins. He'll look to achieve gains.

Grant, let me just read you a quote from an article that was published by Frederick Kempe, who's the president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. And his column this week was, Trump's remarkable Mideast tour is all about striking mega deals and outfoxing China. And he wrote, this is from Kempe,

Trump will also measure success by his ability to outmaneuver China in securing a closer relationship with Gulf monarchies than Chinese have. The contest for Gulf money is also about gaining the upper hand in the Trump administration's ongoing trade standoff and technology contest with Beijing. Can you talk a little bit about the China question in all of these calculations in the Mideast? Again, Chuchu was talking about how,

Maybe it's not so significant because it's not a priority for the Chinese. We hear that also from Jonathan Fulton and other China, Mideast and Persian Gulf scholars. What's your take on this China question that Frederick Kempe talked about?

It's a great question. You know, I think what Trump has brought to bear in Washington is move the Overton window. There's a bipartisan consensus that started in his first administration and continued into the Biden administration. And if there is one sort of area in this town where both Republicans and Democrats can agree, it is on sort of the need to compete with China and the need to not only think about that competition in terms of military to military and

a potential conflict over Taiwan. But think about that in sort of a holistic range of statecraft issues when it comes to U.S. engagement around the world. You know, I think that that theme was echoed in the focus on Panama early on, Secretary Rubio and then Secretary Exeth going down there. I think in the Middle East,

It's been a topic of debate for many years here on sort of how we compete with China, what we're willing to accept in terms of a country's relationship with China, what we're willing to accept in terms of our own risk. You know, I think the U.S., Washington, we tend to at times be a bit simplistic and, you know, sort of look at a country and say, well, if you have a relationship with China,

and a relationship with the US, inherently we won't be able to cooperate on a full range of options and interests and whatnot. You know, I think that view is starting to change in large part because, you know, I think we're recognizing that China's economic ties with countries around the world is deep and diverse and it can spill over into a lot of other realms. What we are, I think, focused on, I think what this administration is focused on as well is sort of identifying red lines

for us in terms of what we're comfortable with another country doing with China and also increasing what we're willing to share. And so for the longest time, this was sort of focused primarily on the military aspect of it. But I think now, especially with this trip and this administration, it's starting to really bleed over into the technological realm and the economic realm. I think the Middle East is sort of the perfect marriage between Trump's own internal desire to maximize deals and increase commercial connectivity and

the China hawks in his administration and in his party and around him who want to see the U.S. compete in a space that's primarily benefited China. I mean, China's economic and technological ties to the region, I think, are one of Beijing's key strengths in the region, is certainly what the region looks to Beijing for. And so the U.S. not competing in that space, not offering advanced technology, not offering investment in critical infrastructure projects, has been almost sort of competing with the hand tied behind our back.

And so I expect to see a lot more of this. What I think what Fred was getting at in his piece is sort of the underlying theme that a lot of these investments, especially, you know, the access to the advanced chips, the access to the advanced technologies, is going to come with second and third order investments.

restrictions, guidance that sort of limit partner countries in the region's ties to China in order to move these countries a little bit closer to the US geopolitical movement. Yes and no, but let's not forget that these countries also have quite a bit of agency. They have leverage. So when we talk to use Trump's language, they have cards and

And the United Arab Emirates, when told, you know, about the F-35, told the Americans to go stuff it. And they said, we're not going to take your F-35, in part because there was concerns that F-35 technology would fall into the hands of the Chinese. I think if the Americans started to pressure the crown prince in Saudi Arabia, he would probably push back quite forcefully as well. When we saw, for example, the Saudi-Iran diplomatic engagement a couple of years ago, they leaned heavily into the Chinese on

And this was a space that was traditionally done by the Americans in terms of mediating conflicts. Obviously, the Americans don't have any standing with the Iranians to do something like that. But the way that the Gulf sees the Chinese, I think, is quite different in the sense of the way we see the Gulf countries with the Chinese. G42 is a good example, too, where American pressure on this AI company in the United Arab Emirates paid off.

And they forced the divestiture of Chinese investment. Again, very interesting dynamics. What I can say there is I think the G42 is a great example of American leverage. We have leverage with the chips. And the thing about the F-35, you know, the F-35 deal was also part of a deal that included the MQ-9s. And it would have made the UAE the first country to fly the MQ-9s, the first Arab country to fly the MQ-9s. Guess which country in the region is going to be the first Arab country to fly the MQ-9s?

that's Qatar in large part because the concerns on Qatar's relationship with China don't reach the concerns the U.S. has with regards to the UAE's relationship with China. And so, yes, it's one thing to walk away from the F-35, but I think in their heart of hearts, the UAE Air Force would prefer to have the most advanced fifth gen fighter jet on the market in their arsenal. And so I think there are areas where we do have some leverage. The military and the technological are certain

But don't forget that the UAE is also one of the largest buyers of CH4s in the world, and they're shipping those CH4s to Libya, to Sudan, to Ethiopia. So that military relationship between UAE and the Chinese is getting stronger, it seems like. But Chuchu, let's hear from you some responses to what you heard from Grant.

Right. Actually, I think I agree with a lot of his points. And yes, I think he's right, because from what I have observed in the Gulf countries, I can see that at the moment, indeed, the military leverage and also the high-tech leverage are the most important parts of the United States in the region. And at the same time, I don't think China is going to compete with the United States in terms of the military domain. But as we have already discussed, there are going to be some kinds of competition in the high-tech domain.

But at the same time, I think another interesting issue here is what you have mentioned about, for instance, China's mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. So I would say that for the Gulf regions, of course, China has its role. And I think the regional powers' expectations for China is that, first of all, China is very different from the United States because it is a big power, but it's a neutral power. So it doesn't want to pick sides. And so for the regional powers, I think they think China is a very good power.

bargaining tour in the deals with the United States. So it's not that they love China, but that's when the United States says, OK, I'm not going to give you this and that, they are going to say, OK, then I'm going to turn to China. So you see, for them, China is like a bargaining tour. And the second issue for them also, they are seeking more partnership as alternatives, and China is one of them. So I think that is the expectations for China's

Okay, well, we're going to make sure we open this conversation up for more voices. We want to hear all of you in the audience. If you've got a question, some are already coming in, please put them in the chat. We also want to hear from two of our discussants who've been with this seminar series from the beginning back in March and have helped to organize all of this. Enrico Ferdela is the director of the China Med Project and an associate professor at the Department of Human and Social Sciences there.

at the University of Naples, Loriental. And we're also joined by Andrea Giselli, who is head of research at the China Med Project and a lecturer in international politics in the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Exeter. Enrico, we've had a very robust discussion already here. Let's get your thoughts, particularly on these China questions related to Trump and the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

Thank you very much, Eric. And thank you, Grant and Chuchu. I mean, yeah, it was robust indeed to the extent that I don't really have much to say. I mean, I was taking notes and then you were actually, you know, thanking my points. So now I thank Eric for giving me the possibility actually to look more at the China angle. Let me go first back to what Chuchu said about interesting word unpredictabilitism.

It's true that, you know, we always say that Trump is unpredictable, but I think it's more the execution that is unpredictable. I'm not sure that, I don't think that Trump is unpredictable in terms of goals. I mean, I think the goal of the Trump administration is very clear. The goal is like has a domestic origin, which means like reforming US economy, addressing the deficit. And this has a spillover effect in foreign policy, which means like addressing like the commercial and financial role that China plays into this framework.

And that's actually the logic of tariffs. You know, maybe the execution of tariffs is unpredictable because maybe the mathematics was not like the best is being fixed. Probably we'll see. But I think that we should look at what U.S. or, you know, the Trump trip to the Middle East from a Chinese perspective within this framework, namely, you know, to what extent like, you know, U.S., like China,

productivity in the Middle East coming from this trip is going to somehow try to fix like the previous uncertainties of US Middle Eastern policies and somehow trying to push back Chinese strategic debt that has been acquired like the last few years. Like, you know, the support of like the sort of the pro-Islamic front.

which actually was meant to generate a sort of dialogue between Iran and Saudi and therefore push back the logic of Abraham Accords. To what extent this initiative of Trump that is trying to learn from the errors of the past

is going to provide a new space for U.S. influence in the region. Yes, I know that there was a recent report, as you may know, Eric, I'm sure you know, of INSS talking about China's role in the Middle East. And one of the points that we always hear is that, as Chuchu said,

the Middle East is not crucial in a strategic region for China. It's a sort of secondary layer of Chinese foreign policy. Of course, we know the first focus is Asia. And so for China, somehow having the U.S. more committed to the Middle East, as much as Latin America, as we're seeing Chinese initiative in Latin America that probably are trying to drag the U.S.,

into the dairy as well. You know, this is going to be keep US focus away, you know, from area, from the strategic area of China. I think it's partially true. Yeah, to a certain extent, it's true. But at the same time, the US may actually gain or actually the upper hand in a region without over committing, you know, militarily, as you say, Derek, but just having like somehow, especially look at the relationship with Syria, I think it's very important how the whole picture has changed. So I close with a

question, I would like to ask our speakers, if you allow me, how they see, comparatively speaking, like one year ago, we were actually having a completely different outlook in the region. To a certain extent, you know, the Trump initiatives, you know, may actually ride this new wave that could bring benefits to U.S. regional posture. So my question would be, how do you foresee the evolution of this trend?

Okay, before we get to that question, I'd also like to bring in now Andrea Giselli for your reflections. And again, what is this, you know, if you could focus specifically on this China question that Chuchu and Grant have been focusing on and what your response is to the discussion so far.

So first of all, thanks a lot to you, Eric, for hosting this. Of course, for Chuchu and Grant for the great insight. I have to share the comments made by Rico that he has said already a lot of things that I've been thinking for a while. I prepared some notes and then, okay, you said that, you said that, you said so. But the kind of exchange between you, Eric, and Chuchu about the importance about the region of

for Chinese foreign policy and then the debate about what Trump wants from the region when it comes to interventionism, where we call about avoiding misadventures and so far and so on. I think we can try to reframe it in different ways, especially when we try to compare the importance of the region for the two countries and therefore, based on that, right, extrapolate what they want and how they approach them. I think there is a bit of

And like, as you say, there's a lot of truth in saying, well, China has a lot of interest there, right? You can talk about oil, you can talk about Islam and the Uyghurs, you can talk about, you can add, of course, the importance of the region for the Security Council of the United Nations, right? It's often discussed there. There are a lot of things going on that are of interest for China.

China broadly defined, right? But I think if we try to kind of speculate a bit and we try to kind of speculate what's going on inside the black box in China, and this is part of some thoughts that Enrico and I and the other people at the ChinaMed team have been, you know, some brainstorming for a while, the issue of constituencies. Who are the Middle East constituencies within China? I don't think you can really include among them like the top policymakers.

I think for that, you have mostly, I think, Xi Jinping and Wang Yi, for example, and the other people in the top leadership, again, like you two have said, are mostly focused on bilateral relations with the United States and what's going on in Asia, really. And then you have all the other people at, say, the central committee level or globe or like business leaders, right? They instead have a lot of interest in the Middle East. And despite these differences,

Gigantic. There's a very big group of people that are interested in what's going on there. Like they're growing in terms of investment, their presence, engagement. Like Chinese university have been doing a lot of engagement as well as so on. I don't think we have reached the point where the top leadership considers the Middle East as a priority.

If something happens, of course, they probably are more willing to travel to the region and include it in their strategic thinking. This, I don't think, is comparable with what is still the case in Washington, for example. The thought about the region might have changed. Less interest in human rights, democratization, and so forth and so on. But the Middle East remains much more central to American foreign policy than it has been before.

where China's foreign policy so far. So I think in a way, it's not just about scale of interest, but also who cares about it and therefore where it's placed in the country. Andrea, can I just stop you right there? Grant, let's pick up that because there's been a narrative in the U.S. for quite some time after the Iraq war that there was a Mideast fatigue. And Trump even spoke to that in his speech in Saudi Arabia, in Riyadh, where he said nation building is not what we're going to do anymore.

That was a vacuum when the United States kind of pulled out that China did step in to some extent, not one for one, but definitely gave them more room to maneuver. Do you get a sense today when you look out at the broader geopolitical priorities that the United States is looking at in the Trump foreign policy doctrine in the 2.0 era, which is, as you point out, still in very much in development, that the Mideast plays as important role as Andrea is suggesting to the United States?

Well, that's a great question, Eric. You know, I was definitely given a lot to think about by Enrico and Andrea there. I think especially that question of influence. To Enrico's point earlier, you know, I think we saw what it looks like when the U.S. is perhaps not as engaged in the Middle East as it has been in the past. To my mind, it was between the...

Afghanistan pullout in 2021 and October 7th, 2023. The US troop presence in the region went to about 30% of what it was at the start of the Biden administration. Cabinet officials were going to Europe for Ukraine, to the Indo-Pacific to deal with China.

trips to the Middle East were way down. It was a contributing factor, to my mind, to China's ability to facilitate that agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, sort of taking advantage of just sort of the lack of consistent investment that we used to see in the past from U.S. policymakers into the Middle East. In this new Trump world, certainly, you know, with the looking at it this week, it certainly seems as if the Middle East is going to be a top priority for this administration.

I tend to think the focus is a little more narrow and a little more constrained. It is on China, but it's primarily Western Hemisphere borders, immigration, domestic policies. And then to the extent that there's, you know, an international engagement, it's really focused on burden sharing, increasing contributions from partners to joint interests.

U.S. partner interests and then really focusing on deterring China vis-a-vis Taiwan. That, I think, will be the focus on paper. Whether or not that's the focus in practice of this administration, of course, we in Washington, every time something goes sideways in the Middle East, but anywhere around the world, we tend to find ourselves getting involved. And so I think it's very easy to sort of

say that the focus will be a little bit more honed in and constrained in theory, but in practice, I think there's a number of ways in which the US can get more involved in the Middle East. And to Enrico's point earlier, that's not just, I think, perhaps a strategic assumption on China's front. I think that's a concern within Washington

from those within this administration who want to focus more on China and focus more on deterring any potential conflict. There's always a sort of constant refrain that getting bogged down in the Middle East and elsewhere detracts from that ability. And so I think there'll just be this inherent structural tension in this administration.

I'd like to shift our attention to Iran because that is the topic of big discussion going on today. And let's remember what Grant mentioned at the beginning of the discussion was that the Abraham Accords is one of the key milestones of the first Trump administration. We heard in one of our earlier seminars back in April that Iran and the United States are both poised to be well positioned to reach some kind of nuclear deal that

that the Iranian government is facing regime survival questions, they are facing a desperate economy. Trump has already made it clear that he's willing to put some distance between him and Israel in order to forge ahead with an Iran deal. I'd like to get both of your takes on the China question here. And Amanda, in our audience, she asks a really timely question. Chuchu, I'm going to come to you first with this. How do you think a U.S.-Iran nuclear deal will affect the Chinese position

and how will it be received by China? And I just wanna add a footnote to that is that just this week, the United States put new sanctions on Chinese and Hong Kong companies for apparently being affiliated and supporting Iran's missile development program. So the Americans are keeping up the pressure on the Chinese related to this missile development program. But Chuchu, what's your take on a potential US-Iran deal on their weapons program and what impact could it have on China?

So I have several points. Very quickly, the first one is before coming to the Iranian issue, I would say that the Trump administration is not that, okay, his first administration focused on the Abraham Accords. And right now it's like he's changing his focus and now he focuses more on the Iranian nuclear deal.

I don't think so, because I think the Abraham Accords is still continuing. Let's say what has just happened regarding Syria. Actually, Trump has already announced his kind of like a plan to lift the sanctions on Syria. But one condition is that he would encourage Syria to normalize its ties with Israel. So I think these are all undergoing under this framework of the Abraham Accords. So I think it's going to continue.

And the second issue here is that we are zero right that there is going to be the Iranian nuclear negotiation. And it's very likely that there is going to be some kind of like a new deal to a certain extent. But I think as for China, there was a nuclear deal, right? In 2015, there was a

Iranian nuclear deal. And China welcomed it. And actually, if we still remember it clearly at that time, China was a very active participant in the P5 plus one mechanism. But right now, actually, one big change is that I would say not only China's role is like

A lot of people are saying, okay, that China's role is declining. But actually, I would say in Trump's administration, he's trying to not only marginalize China, but also the other big powers' role in the Middle East, because what he loves is bilateral deals instead of placing everything under the multilateral mechanism. So, for instance, this time, regarding the Iranian nuclear deal, there is not a lot of role of the EU or Russia or whatever, but

It's like a bilateral negotiation. And the third issue here is that I would say China's diplomacy actually is always, I would say China is an inward-looking country. So I say China is a country that prioritizes its own domestic interests. So a lot of people were saying that China is

coming very close to Iran. But actually, in terms of the Middle East, China always tries to balance its relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. And also, at the same time, why does China criticize a lot of United States sanctions on Iran? One of the biggest issues here is that China has a lot of economic interest there. So if, let's say, there is an Iranian nuclear deal, and if, let's say, the United States lifts some sanctions on Iran's economic

then it means that maybe China can have more deals with Iran more freely. And last but not least, actually, China is also respecting non-proliferation of nuclear. That is my feedback to this question. Okay, Grant, let's get your take on this, particularly try to give us a China angle on this. How do you think China would factor into an Iran-U.S. nuclear deal?

Well, I think a fun way to answer this question is to take a bit of a riff on what Enrico was saying earlier, thinking about Trump a year from now, how the Middle East looks. As a thought experiment, let's picture the Middle East at the end of the Trump administration in an ideal Donald J. Trump world. I think when he looks at it, he would love to see...

and Iran with a nuclear program that is in some type of box that is not fully weaponized, that they don't have a nuclear weapon. The contours of that are a heated debate in Washington at the moment, but from his mind, it's no nuclear weapon. It's free flow of commerce in the Gulf. The Bab el-Mandeb isn't constrained. Straits of Hormuz isn't constrained. Everyone's able to benefit.

There are Abraham Accords agreements between Saudi Arabia and Israel, perhaps other states and Israel building off the success of the first round of Abraham Accords. He perhaps has a Nobel Prize because of it. I think he definitely wants one. There's a Trump Tower in Damascus and a Syria that is geopolitically aligned more broadly with the West.

And there is, I think, a requisite amount of progress on the Palestinian front so as to facilitate the Abraham Accords agreements that he wants to do. I think Trump is willing to basically move as far as needed to make MBS and the Gulfies happy on the Palestinian front so as to facilitate more deals. And to Fred Kempe's point, to push the Chinese out. I mean, that would be an idea. If you're looking in this kind of ideal wishful thinking mode, he'd like to see less Chinese engagement in the Gulf, right?

I think his advisors, the people around him would certainly share that. I'm not necessarily certain. This one is just a Donald J. Trump. Okay. And I think if we accept that as sort of the broad contours of, you know, his ideal Middle East by the end of his administration, there's,

plenty of areas of agreement there with China. I think China, you know, to Chushu's point, China wants to balance its own ties. China wants to be able to maintain its economic connections to the region to add that stability and the free flow of commerce. They do not want to see an Iran with a nuclear weapon, at least that's the stated position. And so I think there's plenty of middle ground there for both the U.S. and China. You know, there used to be this old view that

The Middle East was perhaps a theater of competition, but not the primary theater of competition. And there were plenty of overlapping interests between China and the Middle East. Neither one to see violent non-state extremists take control of territories.

the free flow of commerce, they wanted to see non-proliferation. You know, I think Trump could almost in a way be a reversion to that, whereas perhaps the people around him, his staff, the pressures in D.C., the China hawks in town, the folks that want to focus on, perhaps want to maximize some of the gains in the region. I don't get the sense that there's going to be any great pushback from Beijing.

on the current efforts to sign a deal with Iran over the nuclear program. If anything, the most exposed flank for the president right now is from within his own party, from the Republican hawks on Iran who look at this deal and see a JCPOA light, basically.

Yeah, yeah. There's a lot of support for Israel, too, on Capitol Hill, and they're not thrilled necessarily with the way that Donald Trump is handling the Iran negotiations. Andrea, let's get your take on Iran-China-U.S. I find myself totally agreeing with Grant. I mean, I cannot read Trump's mind, of course, but I wouldn't be surprised if he himself is not opposed to China, some kind of

China factor in the deal. I think one of the big questions that we and I say China watchers, I am not a Middle East watcher, but what kind of China watchers have been discussing is there are different factions, right, within the Trump administration. Some of them are China hawks, some of them are Middle East hawks, some of them are pro-trade. And I think the battle is still on. We see changes, right, over time with the tariffs. China in the beginning tried to frame it as a general thing, then as a China thing. And I think we will see this constant change

reframing not just of retirees but also over the Middle East, right, depending on who gets the president here in that moment, very likely. I wouldn't be surprised if we see some surprising openings or at least surprising not closure to China in the Middle East, including over Iran. And by the way, just a few things, and then maybe Chuchi will contradict me, but my impression is that even in China there is a bit of Iran fatigue in terms of how bad the situation within Iran got.

If you look at what people have been writing in the media, I think there are quite strong and clear calls for some kind of change in the country. Of course, it's not talking about changing, but some change for sure. Even China probably doesn't want to be overly dependent, without the way to have Iran so overly dependent on it. And so a change, an opening of some sort in Iran is also good for China. It frees up a bit of resources, right? And so, yeah, I will stop here, but I'm happy to hear what you two and others have to say about this, of course.

Chuchu, is there Iran fatigue in some policy circles in Beijing? Well, in fact, I would not say it's an Iran fatigue. I would say that, in fact, China has always been neutral in the region and is like a balancer in the region in order to maximize its interest in the region and to balance its relations with different powers in the region.

at the same time, as Andrea has mentioned, I think interesting that over the past year, you see that there are confrontations between Iran and Israel, right? And I think a lot of scholars, they are just frank to say, okay, so of course there are problems faced by Iran. But at the same time, if you look at articles on the Gulf countries, they are also going to criticize the issues such as the re-enterism, etc. So it's like, I think they are just frank about what is going on because they are not saying, okay, I am like an

ally of anybody here. And last but not least, I think also China just want to be very clear about its principles in the region. So sometimes you see that maybe some of the diplomats or the scholars, they criticize the United States for the sake of Iran. People are thinking that, okay, that is why, because you are a good friend of it.

But I would say actually a lot of this kind of criticism comes more from China's concerns with its own interests. For instance, when United States is trying to exert and impose sanctions on Iran, our own economic interests, including Huawei, for instance, our big companies are affected. So China is very frustrated about it.

And at the same time, China wants to keep talking about the principles such as sovereignty, etc., non-interference, for instance. So it's just trying to explain and repeat its principles on different issues, including the Iranian issue. Enrico, we're going to give you the last word on this Iran topic before we move on.

Yeah, just my two cents here. You know, Grant mentioned about Trump's dream of having a Trump Tower in Damascus. I think he wouldn't mind to have one or maybe even with a golden statue on top in Tehran. And I think that here the thing is that, you know, Iran is geopolitical, as I said before, has always been fundamental for China, you know, in order to acquire strategic depth at the regional level.

So for the action, the maneuver that Trump is trying to make, again, learning from the errors of the past, so without too much military commitment on the ground, without too much emphasis of nation building, but mostly focused on business and security, this may actually create a situation which this pressure over Iran may actually achieve something. I don't know.

wait and see. But paradoxically, as we said before, it would be also convenient in a sort of new... If we imagine a sort of new Plaza Accord with China, which is actually the most important issue, which is I think the core issue of the day is not China-US in the Middle East, but it's actually China-US economic relations and the kind of agreement they achieve. But if we envision a new

a successful agreement between the two sides, which implies China more focusing on domestic consumption and less on supply. This situation actually may also involve the Middle East and the case of Iran. Because if Iran gets reconnected as much as Syria is being now, and maybe tomorrow Ukraine is being somehow reconnected

and new demand is being generated in this country. This is going to be very much beneficial for China as well, because what China is looking for is finding alternative markets, alternative demand that the US is not willing to provide anymore. This is, in my opinion, a key point.

Okay, I just want to very quickly move on to one last topic before we wrap up with some final comments. One of the key takeaways from our discussion today is that the Persian Gulf and the Middle East regions are not the top priority for either China or the United States. And Andrew brings up a very interesting question. He says, to what extent does the U.S. want to secure its relations with Middle Eastern countries and stabilize the region? What

Grant was talking about in terms of this future. By the way, it sounds great, that future. I really, if that's what happened, Grant, we're in good shape. So to what extent if the Donald J. Trump dream comes true so that it can focus more attention on the Indo-Pacific? And that, of course, means China. One of the key things that we've talked about early on, Grant alluded to, was that while the United States has been pressuring Europe

and also Canada, its traditional allies, particularly to pay more for its defense, and has been very hostile in its tone, a very different tone when Secretary of Defense Pete Hexeth came out to the Philippines and Japan, much more focused on the alliances, an ironclad relationship, and in part because of that focus on China. So, Choo Choo, very quickly to Andrew's question here,

How much is it that they want to clean up the mess in the Middle East so they can focus more on the Indo-Pacific? What do you think China's response to that might be?

Actually, I would say whatever happens in the Middle East, I think, as we have already discussed, both Trump and both the Republicans and the Democrats in the United States have a certain consensus that is they are going to compete with China. So China is the biggest concern of the United States. So you see that Trump has already had this kind of like tariff policies and whatever is going on in the Middle East. I don't think what is going on in

the Middle East affects his decisions on China. And the second issue here is that, yes, actually, Trump has focused a lot and has placed a lot of his energies and his concerns on the Indo-Pacific. And I would say that maybe he's going to put more pressure on this issue. But here, I still think that

the issue here is that to what extent would Trump like to make investments both in terms of military investments and also economic investments right if he just wants to shape a new order in the Middle East and also in Indo-Pacific but it's

he doesn't want to put money into it and he doesn't want to put military into it, then what is the result he expects to see? And last but not least, actually, there are already a lot of... I would say that I don't think we should separate the Indo-Pacific strategy and the Middle East strategy because actually, from my own observation, there is an expansion of the Indo-Pacific strategy and that is moving westward because as we see, there is already the I2U2, also as a lot of...

our colleagues here have already discussed the United States is trying to

to bring in more partners to marginalize China's role in the region of the Middle East. And one of them is India. And that is why there is the big initiative of IMEC. But although there are already a lot of the mechanism here, but the issue here is that it has not been institutionalized so far. And one of the biggest issues here is who is to the real investment. That is the big question. Grant, we're going to give you the last word before we wrap up.

To what extent does the U.S. want to stabilize the Middle East to focus on China? To a great extent, I think. In the ideal world for U.S. military planners and strategic thinkers, the Middle East is

free, stable, secure, and not a drain on what we in the Pentagon would consider sort of these high-demand, low-density platforms. Things like aircraft carriers, air defenses, advanced munitions, advanced fighter jets, et cetera, et cetera. I think what you saw was a brief window, as I mentioned earlier, between the Afghanistan pullout and October 7th, where you saw

sort of saw an agreed upon Middle East posture for the U.S. in a time of competition with China. There was no aircraft carriers, there was a decreased footprint, and the focus was on getting those high demand assets elsewhere. They'd get back, get trained, get the readiness up, and then go and focus on posturing in the Indo-Pacific. What the trouble for the U.S. is, the balance here is that the demand from the Middle East most oftentimes pulls us in. The sort of the double-edged sword of

Us being, to my mind, especially after Russia and Ukraine, really the only external actor that can influence events on the ground in the Middle East. And even then, you know, we can't influence them completely. I am not one of those who believes that the U.S. can do whatever it wants and change the effects on the ground in a very complicated region. But we can certainly influence events in some way, for better or for worse. The double-edged side of that sword is that we sort of get pulled into it.

And then we also have this belief in Washington that if we were to abandon a partner or to walk away from a previous commitment, that it could have second and third order effects for our own perception in the Indo-Pacific with our partners and allies there as well. And so it's a

constant push and pull between strategic thinkers and planners in DC who recognize that, you know, for the past 20, 25 years, we've really been bogged down in the Middle East. And that has sucked a lot of our attention and resources. And that the time is now to really pull that out and shift its focus towards the Indo-Pacific with sort of this understanding that we are still called upon often in the Middle East and other parts of the world.

Okay, well, thank you all for those insights. I wanna close this discussion because we've covered a lot of ground and at some point it becomes too much for everybody to process. So I'd like each of you to kind of give us the one thing that you want listeners and participants in this discussion to walk away with when going back to the fundamental question of,

What is China learning from Trump 2.0 in the Middle East? What do you think that they're looking at? What are the takeaways? And again, that gives us an insight about what we should be focusing on when we think about China in this region. I'm going to come to all four of you. Chuchu, I'm going to start with you.

Okay, I think just three points. The first one is that China knows that Trump is unpredictable. So instead of focusing on what he's doing, China needs to make more clear about his own strategies in the region, for instance. And my second point is that actually, we talk a lot about China-U.S. competition, but I don't think China wants to compete with the United States. And China never wants to challenge the existing regional order in the region.

In fact, China only wants to squeeze its own space to continue its economic interactions with regional powers. And the third issue here is that we have talked a lot about what China wants. But actually, I think a more interesting and important issue here is not just what China intends to do, but to what extent is China allowed to operate. One example is, for instance, about China's role in mediating Palestinian-Israeli issues, etc.,

So it's not that China wants or does not want, but the issue here is sometimes it might not be allowed to play a role in this region. And maybe I will add a fourth issue here is that, yes, although I would say that the Middle East is not the core interest of China or the United States, but absolutely, I think the Middle East is at a higher importance for the United States than for China. Grant, what are your closing thoughts on this discussion?

What lessons for China in the Middle East and the Trump era probably buckle up because anything can happen. There is going to be, I think, a lot of mixed messaging at times. You know, I sort of go by the old adage, take him seriously, but perhaps don't take him literally. I do think we are going to find that the U.S. is going to be more heavily engaged in the Middle East.

and playing on the terms that the Middle East, in particular the Gulf states, want to play on, focused on the economic, focused on the commercial. If I was China, I would perhaps be a bit concerned because the advantage for many years has been the economic investment and ties with the region. And now the U.S. really wants to deepen that. With that deepening comes, I think, inherent conditions and constraints on recipients of U.S. investment.

And so, you know, I would say it's to paraphrase Trotsky, you know, China may not be interested in competition with the U.S. and the Middle East, but I think the U.S. is interested in competition with China and the Middle East. I think that'll be the tenor and tone of the remaining years of the Trump administration.

We got a Trotsky quote in there. Okay, Enrico, you are going to get the last word of this seminar. And the last word of this series, in fact, is going to go to you. Go ahead. The main takeaway, in my view, is that China's looking at the U.S. trying to regain ground in the region. And so given very superficial psychological analysis of Trump, narcissism, and difficulty in handling defeat. So I think that they're going to try to use the Middle East more and more as a hedging

region and trying to rise the cost of this new commitment of the United States. And therefore, in order to generate higher and higher prices for the U.S. new commitment in the region, trying to bog down the U.S. in the region. And I think here the role of Iran is going to be key. Well, I want to thank all four of you for your insights and for this very lively discussion. Zhang Tutu from Fudan University in Shanghai, especially you for staying up so late with us tonight. We really appreciate it. Grant Rumley from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

No pity for you. It's nine o'clock in the morning. So we appreciate that. And of course, Enrico and Andrea for putting together this series. Also just want to encourage everybody, if you're interested in following these topics, both the China Med Project and the China Global South Project provide truly unique insights and coverage. The China Med Project does these four-parts

fantastic media analyses looking at both Chinese and regional media. And we of course provide daily insights and analysis on everything that's going on in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf in both English and in Arabic. So I'd like to kind of put that out there. So once again, thank you all. And thank you again to the University of Naples, Loriental, the China Med Project, the Torino World Affairs Institute,

and of course my team at the China Global South Project for putting this together. This is the end of the series, so I won't say that we'll be back again, but we have appreciated everybody who's participated in all of these discussions going back all the way to March. We've learned so much. If you want to see more of this, go to the China Med Project's website, and there are recordings and transcripts and all sorts of great things that are there. So thanks so much, and thank you all for joining us today. The discussion continues online.

Follow the China Global South project on Blue Sky and X at ChinaGS Project or on YouTube at China Global South and share your thoughts on today's show or head over to our website at ChinaGlobalSouth.com where you can subscribe to receive full access to more than 5,000 articles and podcasts. Once again, that's ChinaGlobalSouth.com.