173. Explaining UK-led training programme for Ukrainian infantry
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Hello and welcome to the Battleground Podcast with me, Saul David and Patrick Bishop. In a packed program, we speak to Colonel James Thurston, who since August 2023 has been commanding Operation Interflex, the UK-led training program for Ukrainian infantry soldiers. But first, the news, which this week has been dominated by the revelation from key Trump advisers that if the Donald becomes president, he might threaten to cut weapons supplies to Ukraine.

as part of a plan to end the war. So much for assurances from Mike Pompeo and others that he will surprise us and support Ukraine to the hilt. Meanwhile in Britain, the Reform Party leader, Nigel Farage, has doubled down on his unhelpful comments earlier this week.

that the, quote, ever-eastern expansion of NATO and the EU had given Vladimir Putin a reason to justify his invasion of Ukraine. He added that he was sceptical that Ukraine could ever win the war and that, as a result, Zelensky should sue for peace before all the country's young men are killed. Better just explain for our non-British listeners who Farage is.

Well, although he's never succeeded in getting elected to Parliament, he has been a major figure in British politics for years. His agitation for Britain to leave the EU was a factor in bringing about the referendum that triggered

He's long been a Putin apologist. He's also a friend of Donald Trump. His party now threatens to split the right-wing vote, thereby ensuring that the ruling Conservative Party will suffer an even more devastating and humiliating defeat in the British general election next week. All in all, I suppose he's the closest British politics has to a right-wing populist leader, a la Le Pen or Viktor Orban.

And like them, he shares a perverse tolerance for Putin and his regime.

Now, how Farage thinks Zelensky should go about seeking peace is not clear, but one assumes it would basically mean accepting the status quo on the battlefield, which would, of course, result in a huge loss of territory for Ukraine and hand Putin something he could spin as a victory and a reward for aggression. Yeah, that's right, Patrick. The sheer naivety of Farage's false narrative, that is the false narrative of NATO causing this war and not Russia, is pretty scary.

And also the naivety of this, let's just all talk and we can finish this war in a moment. You don't negotiate, in my view, from a position of relative weakness with the enemy camped on your territory. And you certainly don't, as you say, reward an aggressor with a huge slice of territory.

if you want to deter future attacks, I mean, just imagine for a moment that Churchill had done something similar in June 1940, which was indeed a possibility. As you know, Patrick, there were people in his war cabinet who thought, well, you know, the writing's clearly on the wall and we need to sue for peace at that point. But he didn't. He carried on going. But imagine if he had to, in Farage's words, save the lives of the British youth. Would we applaud him today? Would it have deterred Germany from future aggression? I don't think so on either account.

It's a bit worrying, sort of, you know, inside this party, you've got all these guys, and it's not just Farage. A lot of the candidates are spouting this kind of revisionist history stuff. There's one of them saying...

you know, Britain would have been in a far better position if it had done a deal with Hitler in 1940, would have kept its empire, would have kept its place on the edge of Europe, you know, dominating the seas and all the rest of it. I mean, they seem to be a fair old number of fruitcakes in the ranks, don't they? Yeah, I mean, that's particularly worrying. I mean, well pointed out, Patrick. I mean, absolutely sort of bizarre argument. The idea that Britain would have been left alone to happily rule the waves while the continent was dominated by a single power. I mean,

That fear and that understanding among the British establishment has basically driven our foreign policy for the last 400 years. But no, no, it's absolutely fine. We can coexist with Germany and forget about the whole moral issues that come into play here, the difference between a liberal democracy and an autocracy, which of course is exactly the same sort of coexistence that these

Putin apologists are hoping for today. So what do you make of the plan? What sort of puts flesh on the bones of the famous Trump utterance that he could end the whole thing in 24 hours? So now we're getting a little bit more detail, aren't we? Yeah, we are. I mean, the possible Trump plan, as I'm going to call it, it's not really Trump's plan yet because it's been suggested to him by his advisors, but the possible Trump plan

to end the war in Ukraine was suggested by two senior advisors, Keith Kellogg, a former Lieutenant General, and Frederick Fleitz, who both served as chiefs of staff in the National Security Council during Trump's presidency from 2017 to 2021.

And they are both apparently now part of an inner circle advising him in the lead up to the presidential election. So they are very close to him. And they're suggesting that a future Trump administration would attempt to coerce President Zelensky into peace talks by refusing to send more weapons if Ukraine continued fighting this sort of blackmail, in other words.

At the same time, they're throwing us a little bit of a bone here. Moscow would be warned that any refusal to negotiate would result in increased U.S. support for Ukraine. But of course, Moscow is not going to refuse to negotiate if the terms are favorable, as I think you're about to explain. Yeah, that's the sort of key point, isn't it? It sounds like they're treating both evenly, but

but they're not really. I mean, it basically tilts the whole thing very much in Putin's favor. And of course, he's completely at odds with the current US position and diametrically opposed to

to the stances of America's main European allies. There was a meeting of the United Nations Security Council last week when the French and British ambassadors reiterated their view that peace could only be found when Russia withdrew from Ukrainian territory, which is, of course, you know, basically reflecting the Kiev-Zelensky position. But, you know, these reports say something very different. What's on the table is that the ceasefire would freeze the front lines of

as they presently stand, which would effectively cede a fifth of Ukraine's total territory to Russia. And of course, as you say, Saul, I mean, Putin would absolutely be delighted with this arrangement. And it's along the lines of what he was saying earlier this month when he was claiming he'd agreed to a ceasefire on that basis.

and saying the talks could begin if Ukraine handed over the four regions the Kremlin declared last year to be part of Russia. And second stipulation is that Ukraine would have to drop its aspirations to join NATO. But the big question, of course, is do these two guys, flights and Kellogg,

speak for Trump. We don't know for sure. Flights was a bit sort of hazy on that particular issue when he said that the former president had responded favorably when presented with the plans. I'm not claiming he agreed with it or agreed with every word of it, he said, but we were pleased to get the feedback from

We did. So what does that mean? I mean, Trump's a pretty mercurial figure. He's very capable of switching his opinion without warning. He's very capable of telling people what he thinks they want to hear. But it does seem curious that the advisers are putting this out, isn't it? They've actually become public with it. So presumably that was with the Donald's knowledge.

So maybe it's an exercise in testing the waters. What do you make of that, Saul? Yeah, I think exactly right. I mean, what's interesting about Farage's comments, because you could speculate, Patrick, that there's some kind of link between the two. Farage is relatively close to the Trump campaign. He may have had warning that this was coming. He thinks on very similar lines. But what's interesting in the UK, even more than in the US,

is support for Ukraine is very strong here. I mean, it's hovering at about 80% and it hasn't really dropped off that. So if Farage thinks this is going to be a vote winner, he may be sadly mistaken, but it could be part of a more concerted attempt, both here and in the US, to at least suggest to people at the moment that this is going to happen. Now, there has been a bit of a backlash against Farage.

although he has doubled down on his comments. I mean, you know, he's the sort of thick-skinned character that's always likely to do that. But there's certainly been a bit of a backlash here, which is good to see, in my view. But what's particularly frustrating for us, Patrick, trying to talk about this, is that it detracts from other things that are going on that, in my view, are far more important, like the news this week.

that the European Union officially started accession negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova on the 25th of June. So it's going to be a long process, there's no question. There are a lot of ground to cover, a lot of reforms that Ukraine is going to have to perform, and also the EU apparently. But nevertheless, this is a very important milestone on Ukraine joining the European family. And it's important for them to know that this journey is beginning, because

It will be worth, we hope one day, all the blood and treasure that they're spilling to try and make that happen. Well, let's look at the battlefield for a moment. Ukraine is continuing to take a toll on targets inside Russia. There was a drone strike yesterday.

on a Russian ammunition depot in Voronezh oblast on June the 25th and there were more strikes on Pantsir S1 air defense systems in Belgorod oblast just right up on the border and the Ukrainian main military intelligence directorate chief lieutenant general Kirill Budanov

told the Philadelphia Inquirer that Western military assistance is arriving in Ukraine, but probably won't arrive at a scale that will significantly impact the frontline situation until at least mid to late July 2024. So that's not that far away. He also suggested that a sufficient quantity of US-provided long-range Atakams missiles would allow Ukrainian forces to strike the Russian-built base.

Kerch Strait Bridge in occupied Crimea. You know, this is a very important supply line between Crimea and the Russian mainland. It's the main sort of line of communications, basically, between the two places, between Crimea and Russia. This is the sort of thing we want to talk about, Patrick, because Vodanov says they haven't got exactly what they need yet, but they will have it soon. And the situation may begin to tip

in the next two or three months. We've mentioned this before, which is why these comments from the Trump advisors and Farage are so unhelpful. And we also had another bit of good news, or I think it's good news this week, Patrick, from the International Criminal Court and the European Court of Human Rights.

who both announced decisions confirming that Russia had perpetrated war crimes and human rights violations in Ukraine. Why does all this matter? Well, they've actually named a couple of people. In fact, they've issued arrest warrants for two people our listeners will have heard us mention many times on this podcast. And they are, of course, the former Russian defense minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov for Russia.

and I quote, the war crimes of directing attacks at civilian objects in Ukraine, which is deliberately sending missiles and drones and other things to attack military targets, both civilians and also infrastructure in particular power. Of course, as with Putin, this won't lead to an arrest anytime soon, but it will mean that Shoigu and Gerasimov can't travel to any country that is signed up to the ICC. Yeah, you've got all these indicators of what

majority opinion feels about Russia, which you would imagine that Farage and co. would pay a bit more attention to. There's some dissident Russian voices being heard at the moment. He may be deaf to the plight of the Ukrainians, but you think he might listen to those. I'm thinking in particular of a story in The Times this morning, I don't know if you saw it, Saul, about a shadow parliament of former Russian MPs

who I think they met in Warsaw. Now, these are people who've left Russia because I suppose life is probably dangerous for them. Anyway, they met in Warsaw. They called on NATO to support an assassination campaign against figures within Putin's regime. These are 60 exiled politicians. They were once members of the Russian state Duma, and they've come up with something they call a victory plan, a seven-point plan aimed at overthrowing Putin regime.

And it's openly calling on the West to support their program. And this is a pretty extreme project they've got going. And in their statement, they say, it's no longer an option, but simply a duty of the West to encourage revolutionary action within Russia and

which of course NATO leaders have not been doing up until now. They're going to make the proposal formally to the upcoming 75th NATO summit in Washington, which comes up very soon. And the document says the Kremlin has already unleashed a massive bloodshed that is killing hundreds of Russians on the front line every day, as well as numerous Ukrainians, both military and civilian. So here we've got, you know, bona fide Russians saying, you know, Putin and

and his pals have to go. And he actually got these right-wingers, the Trumpists and the Farragists, saying, well, he's not so bad after all, you know, we can do business with him. It is quite astonishing, really. Yeah, I mean, we made this analogy before, Patrick, but it just, I can't help being...

taken back, transported to the 1930s and the appeasers. And there was an interesting book out not that long ago, which dealt with the whole lead up to the Second World War, pointing out that the appeasers had not actually been defeated by Chamberlain's handing over of power to Churchill in May 1940, and actually were still that dangerous element in encouraging peace in

shortly after, of course, of the withdrawal from Dunkirk. And we do seem to have similar elements in the UK today. Yeah, that's a really good point, Saul, because everyone forgets that Churchill had so many problems on his plate in that summer of 1940s. You've got the defeat of Dunkirk.

The Battle of Britain is just starting up. Everything hangs in the balance. And if that wasn't enough for him, he's fighting this sort of internal political battle against the defeatists within, you know, the likes of Halifax. So it's not until the end of the year, really, that he feels completely politically neutral.

I think that's something that people would get is that his position was pretty precarious throughout that summer. Yeah, and it's going to continue to be precarious, actually, Patrick, because there's not a lot of success on the battlefield pretty much until the end of 1942. You know, the initial defeat of Rommel. We've got a question about Rommel, which we'll come to later on, but the Rommel at Alam Halfa and then, of course, the turning of the tide at Alamein.

Okay, well, as promised, we're now going to hear from Colonel James Thurston, the current commander of Operation Interflex, the UK-led training program for Ukrainian infantry soldiers. Colonel, welcome to the podcast. Hi, Saul. Really nice and kind of you to invite me on. Now, before you took over Interflex, you commanded Operation Orbital, the UK's training mission in Ukraine. You took that over in 2021. It had obviously been up and running before then, and it closed down shortly before the full-scale operation.

Russian invasion in February 2022, understandably. Can you tell me a little bit about what Orbital did and the contribution it made in helping the Ukrainians blunt the Russian advance? Yeah, certainly. As you know, Orbital had been in Ukraine since 2015.

And as you quite rightly identified, I became the commander there in 2021. And Orbital was about providing support to the armed forces of Ukraine. It was non-lethal support at the outset. And then as I think it's probably fair to say, as tensions built up,

And it became more and more apparent over time that Russia was going to do something. The Secretary of State, I think you'll recall, I forget the exact date, but I think he stood up in Parliament from what I remember and talked about the delivery and support of lethal aid. And certainly towards the end, shortly before we were withdrawn, we were involved in the delivery of some of the training for the NLAW system that was provided.

But then as you identified, training troops were withdrawn from Ukraine in the sort of days before the invasion. And we went out of Ukraine. And then I found myself as the orbital commander. I went to work at the IDCC, which at that point was in Stuttgart.

And sort of orbital, that was that. And I think what was also really interesting, and it's fascinating for me now, being the Interflex commander, you know, I was pulled back into Northwood to be involved in some of the planning of what Interflex might look like. So I suppose that's a bit of you reap what you sow. Yeah.

Yeah, I mean, we don't want to overdo the contribution made, particularly by the British training programme. But NLAWS certainly was reported at the time apocryphally and, you know, from the people who are actually using them did make a real difference, didn't they? I mean, is it a matter of pride to you and others involved in Orbital that you did play a little bit of a role in preventing the Russians from completely taking over Ukraine? Well, absolutely. It's a huge matter of pride to have been part of that. I certainly recall at the time, you know, there were sort of

Ukrainian t-shirts and icons floating around of Saint-Enlore and Saint-Javelin. I think it was really nice to learn it meant a lot to the people who were involved in the mission at the time to have been a small part of that. So I mentioned in the intro that you took over Interflex in August 2023 as the commander. It's recently, I mean it is just marking its two-year anniversary now and during which time 40,000 Ukrainian troops have been turned into combat-ready soldiers.

But can you give us a little bit of an insight into the type of training they've been given and what you feel the program has achieved so far? Yeah, sure. So in terms of the type of training, the first thing I'd say is we don't have very long to train the soldiers we're training. So one of the first challenges in terms of a balance of time available is

and what it is you're going to train. So, and I recall, actually, if we look back at the very first iterations of Interflex, and part of our thinking, and as I mentioned, I was in the sort of the group that was pulled together to try and work out what a first cut at it might look like, was based on a program we use for reserve infantry. And I think we were kicking around something like the 21 day mark. So basically a three week course.

And the first couple of iterations of the Interflex training ran at three weeks. And in conjunction, working with our Ukrainian partners, we very swiftly realized that just wasn't enough time. And so you're a historian. You'll know that, you know, if you sort of cast back through history and or look at, you know, armies around the world, you know, the amount of time you ideally would have to train soldiers is significantly longer.

But what Interflex was about was training at scale and training at pace to be able to generate lots of soldiers or to help Ukraine generate lots of soldiers and do our part in that.

So there's this fine balance between how long do you train people for, but then the amount of people you train becomes slightly less, clearly, because you're training for longer. So it's that mix of finding the right ratio between quality and quantity. Now, that's a discussion that the Armed Forces of Ukraine general staff guide us on. And we sort of settled at five weeks, which I think historically, if you look at the British Army in World War II, I think

initial basic infantry training, albeit that there was top-up training, then thereafter was about six weeks. So it's kind of in the margin of when a nation goes to war, what you might be required to be, as you described it, sort of basic combat ready.

As a result, you then have to have a sort of a drive of being really ruthless in terms of what is important on the battlefield. And we, and my predecessor in particular, sort of boiled it down to three key principles, which are lethality, you know, your ability to kill. And let's not forget, you know, the role of the infantry is to close with and kill the enemy.

So lethality, survivability, and, you know, as everyone who's following the war in Ukraine will know that the modern battlefield is there are a plethora of threats and, you know, the UAS and drones have only served to increase that further. So there are traditional and, you know, emerging threat types. And then finally, offensive spirit, you know, that fighting spirit, which I think we'll all agree, you know, it's been humbling to see how determined Ukraine

And, you know, dogged that Ukrainian will to fight really is. And it's an absolute honor to work alongside them in that regard. But focusing on those three things, lethality, survivability and offensive spirit has been a sort of guiding principles, which we've tried to derive our sort of syllabus around, if that makes sense.

Yeah, I mean, it's a question of needs must, isn't it? And I get it that time is limited. It's not ultimately your decision about how quickly these recruits go into combat. But is it your understanding that some of them will literally go back to Ukraine and be sent to the front line, rather than, as you say, which would have been a kind of Second World War type comparison where they would have had top up training at that point? Yeah, I mean, it's probably not for me to particularly on something like this to sort of go into

too much detail and to a degree I don't have a necessarily a huge understanding of exactly what happens to them next but I think you know in an ideal world they would obviously receive some more top-up training but you know where needs must I guess troops are sent where they need to go so you know we do the very best we can to give the

those Ukrainian commanders who will receive them, a soldier who is as good as they can be to be integrated into whatever unit they find themselves fighting in, you know, who understands the battlefield. And we can come back and talk a bit about inoculation isn't particularly for recruits who may not have had any previous experience of combat, doing everything we can to help prepare them for the shock and realities of combat.

and also deliver them a soldier who is lethal, who is able to get down to the core job that the Ukrainians are trying to do is to defeat and send back the Russian invaders from their own territory. Yeah, I mean, a lot of the focus in the press and indeed on our podcast has been about getting the

sort of kit, that is the weapons that the Ukrainians might need to try and turn the tide against Russia. But of course, it's a lot bigger than that, isn't it? And you are supplying as part of Interflex, I think, clothing and equipment. So can you tell us a little bit about some of the kit that they're going back with, the sort of personal kit they return with? Yeah, absolutely. So when they arrive, they're taken to a

And I won't go into the exact details of where, but they're taken to a hub where there's some logistics and we kit them out with everything they need to train in and to go to war. So they're fully kitted out in Ukrainian pattern uniform. And this kit is donated not just from the British, but from many of the other partner nations as well who are involved with us in Interflex and indeed some others who aren't on Interflex.

But they're kitted out with the equipment in which they'll train and fight. They're kitted out with webbing, boots. And at certain times of year, obviously, so if we're getting sort of through the summer into the autumn, focus more on giving them winter equipment as well for the time they get back, if you see what I mean with

thinking a little bit upstream. There's two parts to that. One, it's really important that they've got that kit and equipment. And secondly, there's a moral component to that as well. For some of the soldiers we received a few weeks before, they were shopkeepers or builders or any number of civilian trades, you name it.

And this is their first experience of being in the military. So we need to sort of build that whole rapport. So they'll arrive at the logistic hub and they're met by members of the training teams who are then going to be looking after them for the next five weeks. And the first thing that happens is that, you know, they're kitted out with all the

kit and equipment. And it's a wonderful thing to see in terms of the huge team effort that goes on there, delivered by mostly Army, but there are some Navy and Air Force personnel in that logistics team, a mixture of regular and reserves. And I would say the British Army Reserve contribution to that logistics effort supporting Interflex has been really significant. And it's a great story for what the Army Reserve can bring.

And then they go with their training teams off to their various locations, wherever they may be dotted around the country. Okay, we're going to take a break there. Do join us in a moment to hear Colonel Thurston's response to criticism that the training provided by Operation Interflex does not always reflect the particular warfare conditions of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

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Welcome back. I think it goes without saying that Interflex's training is intended to reflect the particular warfare conditions that they're going to experience in Ukraine. But in the wake of the relatively minimal gains the Ukrainians made in their counteroffensive last year, there's been a fair amount of criticism, not by us, I might add, but a fair amount of criticism, not just by analysts, journalists, but also by some of the people trained themselves in Ukraine.

along the lines that they're giving the sort of NATO combined arms training that doesn't reflect the reality of what the battlefield has become, whereas we've seen Armour struggles to advance. And of course, crucially, Ukraine doesn't have air superiority. So,

Is there any truth in that? And what's your response to a charge like that? I would offer that the combined arms training question is not part of what Interflex is trying to get after. We are absolutely focused down on the infantry soldier and those basic skills to get them battlefield ready. So that sort of wider, more complicated question set isn't necessarily my part of the ship. So probably it's a bit inappropriate for me to answer that charge. I hope you'll forgive me.

What I would offer is I would say what we try to – we are acutely aware of the dangers or the risks amongst our people of sort of trying to – I don't want to say patronising, but being mindful that our experience and our journey to where we have got to as professional soldiers –

is a different journey to that of the Ukrainians. But we've got to try and work and come together on this. So we mustn't be arrogant and we must be humble. I regularly talk to my training teams about being really mindful of that hubris trap. I think one of the things that actually helps us is the breadth of nations we've got on this mission. We have 12

partner nations working with us in support of Ukraine here. Some of them who have been through that journey themselves in terms of joining NATO. We've got ANZACs on the mission. I mean, I can rattle off the list of all the nations. But what that does with trusted partners and trusted friends is you work together to make sure you're not guilty of an arrogance. And, you

training effectively, both to recruits, but also, as I'm sure you're aware, we also train instructors and junior leadership. And, you know, particularly for those people, those soldiers who are returning to us having been selected to be either Ukrainian instructors or indeed

to go into the junior infantry leadership roles, squad commander, section commander type roles, or platoon commander type roles. Those people will have, you know, perhaps two years, maybe more if you get, you know, going back to 2015 of experience and time fighting under their belt. Then there's some really, really important conversations to be had between those on the training teams. And to my mind, it's, I mean, it's a fascinating journey into a,

the evolution of security force assistance doctrine and, you know, how it's very much about the human angle of how you communicate with the people you're working with.

I often say to my teams, I use the analogy of a boxing match. And Ukrainian is the boxer in the ring, and we are the cornermen. Whether it's the teams behind trying to do the coaching, giving them advice in between the rounds. Do you know what I mean? It's not a perfect analogy, but it kind of gives you that mindset. That's also quite difficult. For us, it's sort of what I would describe as a warrior tribe. It's hard that when you...

you know, you're not in the fight yourself, but, you know, our role is very much not to be. Our role is to be as those training advisors. But, you know, working on that, I've taken you on a fairly long answer there to your original question, but hopefully that...

brings to life some of the things we're working through. Finally, you know, how do I know how good it is? We get feedback from the Armed Forces of Ukraine general staff, and they're ultimately the people we need to be sure that they are content with what we are doing. And of course, you know, when you've trained, you know, north of 40,000 people, there are going to be some people who perhaps aren't necessarily happy with what they've received. But the vast majority, we believe, are.

But it's really difficult if you, you know, the Euros is on at the moment, if you sort of use the analogy of a football coach. Until the match is played, you don't really know how good your coaching strategy has been. So we work with the general staff and, you know, the Ukrainians. And we have some Ukrainians here from the sort of permanent staff working with us on the mission to help enable that communication and really look at that.

trying to make sure we are doing as best as we can. Yeah, no, you've made the most insightful comment you made, actually, was close to the beginning. And I don't mean to say that everything else you said wasn't interesting. But the idea that, you know, there was a lot of sort of general comment in the press that, you know, they were given NATO type training. But what you actually pointed out to me is that

three weeks or five weeks as it became, that's not enough time to get into all of that sort of stuff. It's just about surviving on the battlefield and being as effective as you can. And that is obviously a principle of war that probably hasn't changed that much. I know the kit has changed and the weapons have changed, but the basic principle hasn't changed. And in that sense, you can absolutely see that what you are doing has real value. But just following on from the previous question, I mean,

The battlefield is evolving all the time in Ukraine. And of course, this is going to affect all warfare as we move forward. It's fascinating for me as a military historian to sort of see it in real time. Normally, I'm looking back. But with that in mind, I mean, is the training that you're giving these soldiers in the relatively limited time they're with you,

adapting and evolving to what is happening on the battlefield? I mean, the obvious example is the effectiveness of drones or the fact that drones are playing an increasingly important role. Is that affecting the way an infantryman would be trained?

Yes, it absolutely is. And the Ukrainians have asked us to try and do more with drones in our training. And it's a really important part. And we have what we call our G7 branch up here in the Interflex headquarters. So the team who look at that, the training, the syllabus, we work with the Ukrainians on it. And of course, they've got tremendous experience in drones. And my observation in terms of what we are doing and what we can do in the time available on the courses we run here on Interflex

We're not trying to train drone pilots or anything like that. It's more, I would align the work we do with drones towards the survivability angle. You know, the modern battlefield, it's very, very hard to hide. And drones are a really, really important part of your ability as an army who's trying to find people to find people, or indeed your ability as an army when you're in the defensive posture to not be found. So making the soldier aware of how you can be found

And what to do, you know, take yourself through that, those layers of the survivability onion, trying to do everything you can not to be found in the first place is really, really key. And we've been really well supported both from a UK side. And, you know, there's a lot of good work going on in the UK in terms of sort of driving forward what we can do with drones. And the Interflex teams are right at the heart. I work really closely with the Land Warfare Centre and the people involved in that. You know, we're all on the same team sheet.

here. But equally, our partners have been really, really helpful as well. And some of the drones that we've and the expertise from other nations working with us has been superb. I'd give a great shout out to the Netherlands who have showed us a lot of good stuff and brought some extra troops. So

We try and design training programs both in the day and the night that can then demonstrate to the trainees, this is what your position looked like from the sky. This is where we could see you. And you can see that they'll show them on the screens how they're picked up by the thermal cameras or not.

how if their camouflage is good, they can hide the sort of things that get you caught, the sort of things that don't get you caught. So all those things are really, really important. And we're learning a great deal from that in terms of ideas of how we can take forward our own training

The other thing we're also thinking about, and I talked a bit about, you know, the use of trenches. And as I'm sure you know, some of the, you know, the newest FPV drones are out there that can be incredibly accurate. And so taking ideas that come back to us.

particularly, you know, those guys coming back on instructor courses or leadership courses who have been at the front, who have firsthand experience of how the Ukrainians are dealing with these drones, to be able to try and get some of those tactics, techniques and procedures into our training. So you're starting to put sort of defensive mechanisms around our trenches. There's also an electronic warfare angle to it. Again, one of the things that we're trying to do is to try and get some of those tactics, techniques and procedures into our training.

we don't necessarily have the time to go into that, but there is this sort of symbiosis between unmanned aerial systems and electronic warfare, where at least we're trying to start thinking about simulating some of that in our training. So importantly for the Ukrainian soldier in a squad or a section, he or she is aware of the other sort of factors that are at play, the other bits of equipment they might find themselves coming across, that sort of thing. Does that give you a sort of feel for the question set we're wrestling with?

Yeah, absolutely. Just to conclude, thank you so much for coming on. We've mentioned Orbital many times. We've had a couple of people who've observed it, you know, and they've spoken to people who've gone through it. And generally speaking, the response has been incredibly positive. And we feel on the podcast that

The British Army, the British Armed Forces generally have done tremendous work, both in providing lethal equipment and also in training. And we really have led Europe from the start. So although we're not a flag waving podcast per se, I think we can all be pretty proud of what Britain's done thus far. So, you know, well done you and all power to your elbow moving forward, because we're all in this for the long run, I think.

Thank you. That's very kind words. And I'll make sure I do pass those on to the teams. But it is a team effort. There are 12 nations here behind, you know, working, you know, it's a UK led headquarters. But all of us, all of those 13 nations in total in support of Ukraine, who are at the heart of everything we do.

Thanks so much, Colonel. Well, that was fascinating. And I must admit, he's filled in a lot of the gaps, the stuff we didn't really know. The amount of ground they're covering in five weeks is pretty astonishing. But he also responded pretty robustly, I thought, to the idea that a lot of people in the press have criticised Interflex 4, and that is that it's giving them sort of all arms NATO training. And Colonel Thurston's response to that is we don't have time to give all arms NATO training. We're just getting these guys to a point where they can survive on the battlefield. And what

post-training they get from the Ukrainian army is, of course, up to Ukrainians. But they're doing a tremendous job. So, you know, as I said to Colonel Thurston, keep up the good work. Okay, first question from Susie in Vancouver, Canada. She says she's been listening to our World War II podcast, that's Battleground 44, which goes out on Wednesdays, and saying she enjoys them very much. Now, her question really concerns Rommel, the Desert Fox, the most popular

I suppose, well-known general in sort of Western consciousness of the Second World War, if you like, you know, regarded as a good German, etc. But she asks whether we can shed any light on a story she saw in a documentary about how the Germans had broken the American codes. And this was really the reason why Rommel was so successful in North Africa.

So Susie asks, was Rommel a genius commander or just lucky? And she'd love to hear your thoughts. Well, she won't hear my thoughts, but I think you probably got some, haven't you, Saul? Yeah, I mean, Rommel looms large in my forthcoming book, Tunisgrad, which is the story of the Tunisia campaign, which is really the end game for Rommel in North Africa. But, you know, I needed to

look long and hard at what he'd done prior to then. And the specific question of the American code and the reason he was so successful in North Africa, I'm not entirely sure what she's referring to then, but it may be that Rommel had very good signals intelligence and they were listening in on some of the Allied traffic.

all the way through the North African campaign, actually. Breaking the American code, I hadn't heard about specifically. I'm not entirely sure that they were able to do that. All military commanders want to know what's happening on the other side of the hill. So intelligence is very important. And he did have a certain amount of information. But his real talent as a commander was fighting battles in which he would infiltrate. He'd find a weak point, he'd infiltrate, and then he would drive troops

deep into the rear. And it's interesting if you look at Rommel's career, I mean, he starts out as, you know, a very heavy Hitler apologist. He commands his bodyguard, I don't know if you knew this, Patrick, in Poland. And he has a number of really quite deep conversations on military matters with Hitler. And he is at that point quite an admirer. You know, he thinks there's really something to this Bavarian corporal. He is, you know, something of a strategic genius. But back to Rommel, I mean, Rommel having really not

had a combat role in Poland, then asked for a Panzer Division and fought with it brilliantly, the so-called Ghost Division, the 7th Panzer Division, during the second half of the Dunkirk campaign, in which he kind of drove all the way to the coast.

deep through enemy lines, crossed the Mers and all the way to the coast and trapped the 51st Highland Division, subject to one of my books. But just to summarise really what I think Rommel was very good at in North Africa was fighting these battles in which he'd find the weak point, as I say. He does exactly the same in his final battle at North Africa

Kasserine. But what Rommel could never really get his head around is that if you've got an enemy who is not going to panic when you're deep into their rear and is actually going to calmly use the resources at its disposal to stop your attack and then eventually turn it around, then he faces a bit of a problem. And that's exactly what happens at Kasserine. So although it's a terrible or perceived to be quite a serious American defeat,

They rally pretty quickly and so do the British. And what Rommel hoped would be a kind of game changing campaign to get deep into the Allied rear and possibly even reach the North African coast. They don't get anywhere near that. And in the meantime, they fritter away a lot of their vital resources, which were, of course, panzers and...

and motorized troops. So the other thing I would say about Rommel is that the other criticism you could lay against him, and it's linked really to what I'm talking about here, is that this tactic of getting deep into the enemy rear requires very good logistics inevitably because you've got to have fuel to keep the panzers going. And if you can't find it on the way, you've got another problem. So, you know, some historians, myself included, would criticize him for thinking, well, the logistics are going to catch up, aren't they? It's really about the fighting at the front. And that is actually wrong.

not always the best way to fight war. Yeah, that's right. That's come up a few times, hasn't it, in questions about the way that Rommel often didn't think the thing through from beginning to end, particularly on the question of logistics. Now,

Now, we've got a couple of queries here, one from Pavel in Aurora, Ontario, and another from Richard McMahon about possible subjects we're going to address in Battleground 44 in the coming months. So Pavel asks, would you consider the subject of the Warsaw uprising? And I think the answer to that is very strongly yes, isn't it, Saul? We've got several possibilities about who's going to talk about it. Is Roger going to talk about it, Roger Morehouse, or did we have someone else in mind as well?

Yeah, Roger and Claire. I mean, we had Claire Mullion talking about Agent Zoe. And Agent Zoe, you know, one of the bravest women in the Second World War, and there was some competition, of course, goes back to Poland, parachutes into Poland, and takes part in the Warsaw Uprising. So we're going to hear about the Warsaw Uprising from Claire from the specific perspective of Agent Zoe. But also Roger's going to tell us the big picture. And I've just been reading up about this, actually.

Patrick, because in a future book, I'm going to be covering the Warsaw Uprising, although not in any extraordinary detail. And it was the most unbelievably brave, but also foolhardy action by effectively the Democrats in Poland, the people who, their home army, it was called their underground army, which was in effect to lay down a marker and liberate a country, which is about to be liberated by the Soviets anyway, but they wanted to get in there first.

so that they would have some say in the post-war political settlement in Poland. And of course, what they wanted was an elected government and not a Soviet-imposed communist dictatorship, which of course is exactly what they got. Why? Because, you know, might is right. And the Soviet armies arrived and they ultimately set the scene. And there were some shenanigans further down the line during the Tehran conference and also at Yalta, where both Churchill and Roosevelt, but particularly Roosevelt, effectively sell the Poles down the river.

But you could ask the question, what else could they do? Yeah, and it was put down with unbelievable ferocity. I say unbelievable, of course it was believable by that stage.

given the record of the German army. I don't say the Nazis, the German army in general, including, of course, the SS, but everyone had blood on their hands. But yeah, a really horrific episode of the war, which I think is a bit sort of underappreciated, just how ghastly it was in the West. And of course, this was a big consideration in the liberation of Paris. So when the resistance started launching the idea of an uprising, a proper uprising in

They were getting news from Warsaw about what happened when you actually did that, how the Germans might respond. The moderate voices, the Gaullist voices were trying to rein in the communists by saying, look, you know, we might do a bit of token, a formative, if you like, uprising. But, you know, we can't go too far otherwise. We risk death.

turning the city into a charnel house. You know, the Germans have shown what they're capable of in Warsaw. So we've got to be very wary. The communists ignored that, went ahead, and the Germans took a very different approach in Paris than they did in Warsaw. And there's got lots of reasons for that, which I go into in my new book, Paris 44, coming out any...

week soon. Yeah, and we should mention to listeners, Patrick, that just 24 hours from now, roughly 24 hours from now, we're going to be speaking about all of this at the Chalk Valley History Festival, giving our first Battleground live performance, which is going to be recorded and then put out on a future Battleground 44 episode for listeners to enjoy. But if anyone is in the vicinity, that is the beautiful southwest of England, especially

specifically Chalk Valley in Wiltshire, then do come along and say hi, and it would be great to meet you there. Yeah, absolutely. No, it's a great event, really fantastic. You get great history, but there's all sorts of other fun things to do. So it's almost a kind of family event

occasion now, isn't it, Saul? It's expanded over the years and there's something for everyone there. I mentioned Richard McMahon, so I better just make his point. He says, hi, Patrick and Saul. I'm loving Battleground 44, especially the biography of the leaders. Please, could you do one on Admiral Wilhelm Canaris and the role he played in the Nazi resistance? He, of course, was the head of the Abwehr, the German military intelligence agency.

and is credited with being a major figure in the opposition to Hitler. I hadn't thought of that. Saul, do you think that would be a worthwhile topic? Yeah, I mean, he's not quite on the scale of our great war leaders, is he? But certainly something on the resistance, I think, would be interesting. I mean, we're already planning to do something on the July bomb plot. Again, we might rope Roger in to do that.

because he's written about it. But it is interesting, I think, talking about resistance more generally, and we've probably made this point before, so forgive me if I have, but it is interesting how many people come out of the woodwork to actively support resistance only at a point when it's clear to them that the war is lost. And you could include Stavnberg, of course, who's the great hero in modern Germany today for obvious reasons.

having attempted to kill Hitler in that group too. You know, it would have been nice if there'd been more active support within the military before things got as bad as they actually did. Yeah, and, you know, Canaris himself was originally a supporter of Hitler. He turned against him fairly early on, I think after the invasion of Poland and was kind of, you know, actively or passively involved

committed to the resistance after that. And we were talking about Rommel. He's another one who only became a resistor, if you like, when it became clear to him that the war was doomed to failure. So yeah, it's a fascinating subject.

Okay, question from Matt Denton from Melbourne, Australia. And we're moving back to Ukraine now. And it's headed mines, exclamation mark. And he makes a very good point, actually, and upbraids us for not mentioning this enough. And that is the issue of mines. Well, we have dealt with mines, and we've spoken about mines many times. But his broader point is that the huge area of mines that a Ukrainian offensive would have to navigate through needs to be spoken about.

The frontline areas, he said, are the most heavily mined territory in history. That and the use of drones for surveillance make any maneuvering visible immediately. And FPV drones carrying considerable punch make doing thunder runs into the rear of the Russian lines very difficult. Mine clearing through the frontline is slow and concentrates forces, making them easy targets for artillery and drones. Electronic warfare measures to minimize the effectiveness of drones are

will need to go to another level, say, like the growlers of the US Navy. I'm not quite sure what the growlers of the US Navy are, but obviously sophisticated electronic warfare measures. Anyway, don't forget the mines in future discussions. Well, we won't, and I don't think we entirely have, to be fair. I mean, it's been a while, Patrick, since you and I discussed the likelihood that Ukrainians might make any serious breakthrough into the Russian lines for obvious reasons. They've been on the back foot for...

a fair period and things might change in the future. But my suspicion, as I've mentioned before, is that actually what the Ukrainians are going to keep doing is hold their position. And we'll get on to a suggestion of a Russia strategy in a minute question about that. But I think the Ukrainians on the whole are happy to hold their position for the moment and degrade the Russian ability to fight much deeper behind their lines.

Yeah, I think that's absolutely right. So I don't think they've really got much choice. Have they given their manpower situation? So they've got to, if they want to continue the war, they've got to preserve their soldiers' lives as much as possible. And of course, you know, an offensive situation.

strategy at this point is just really not an option. No. Okay, we've got a question from Ivarus Gulbinus, who I think has written to us before, pretty sure he has, and he's from Lithuania. And his question is, Putin has just strengthened his relationship with North Korea openly. South Korea, on the other hand, is one of the world's largest weapon producers. Can this move of Putin somehow be an advantage to Ukraine? And

The answer for me is without question, because what South Korea has already done since it witnessed this cozying up of Putin with the leader of North Korea is now remove the ban from giving its weapons to a combatant in a war. It's basically said it is going to give its weapons away.

straight to Ukraine. What was happening prior to this is that South Korea was happy to sell to a third party who would then move the stuff on to Ukraine. And now it's going to go directly. And given, as Ivarus says, South Korea is a huge producer of weapons, particularly shells, the 155 millimeter shells that are so required.

in Ukraine. This is not good news for Putin and will be considered in my view, a bit like the Kharkiv invasion, another misstep that historians are going to be identifying on his long road to eventual perdition. I'm just going to read out one from Dave here who says, "Hi Saul, great interview with Tom Petsch.

Always interesting to get the take of an experienced soldier on the historical peer group. Now, this was your interview the other week about the SAS, wasn't it, in the Second World War? And Dave says you mentioned an excellent lecture about SLIM, about General SLIM. Is this recorded somewhere? Do you know if that's the case?

It is recorded somewhere, Dave. But the bad news is it's recorded behind the paywall of my Military History Club. So if you would like to join my Military History Club, which I haven't mentioned that much on the podcast, I should have done a little bit more marketing of it. But it's basically a private members club and you can buy into a series of different levels. And the most basic is bronze. And that allows you to get all the recorded information, the newsletter that will give you recommendations on military history.

books that are new out and lectures by me and also a monthly podcast. And all of that is for £100 a year, which is pretty good value in my view. And Dave,

As and when you do join the Military History Club, you will then be sent a link to that lecture. But of course, because it's a private Military History Club, think history hit, but in a bit more intimate surroundings. We have dinners and listen to lectures, but you have to pay a little bit more for that. Then obviously we can't release all this information to the general public immediately. But it was a fascinating lecture by Robert Lyman on Slim, and it is available to members of the Military History Club.

So that sounds like your birthday present is sorted this year, Dave. All Christmas. All Christmas, yeah. He goes on, I very much enjoy listening to you and Patrick analysing the current historical events using your broad range of experience as researchers, journalists and writers.

Now David says, "I'm a detective by trade and sometimes I find myself wincing when you seem to take the opinions and facts presented by your sources at face value, something I'm professionally averse to, but that's my baggage, not yours." And then he asks, "Could you help me understand your views on assessing sources and your decision-making processes about how you weigh up their value and veracity?"

Well, that's what we do, isn't it, Saul? That's, you know, we never take anything at face value. You wouldn't be much of a historian or much of a journalist if you did that. You'd be basically a dupe for anyone who said anything. So a lot of the work is weighing on.

the veracity of information, of utterances, private or public, matching what's said against what's known from other sources, etc. So, yeah, I mean, I think we're both pretty rigorous on that front. And I don't know

any historian who's not making a specific case or trying to pursue a particular thesis that doesn't take that approach. So for that reason, I am usually wary when I see a book that purports to make us think completely differently about some historical event. I usually find that there's a certain amount of selection that goes on with the sources to present the case, if you see what I mean. But that's not our bag because we don't do that.

No, I mean, I think Dave was also making the point, he's asked how we do it as historians, Patrick, but he's also making the point that for the podcast, which in the end is our commentary, you know, we're not objective journalists per se, we've addressed this issue before, but our commentary on the war

We are occasionally going to get information coming in that we have to make a judgment on. And we are not necessarily going to have all the information we need. So it is a judgment call. I mean, I'm guessing there was an element of that with you as a journalist, Patrick. I know things had to be quite strict in terms of checking up on your sources, but occasionally you are duped, I'm afraid. That is the reality. And no doubt we have been once or twice on the podcast.

day. But to suggest it happens all the time, I think we would reject that charge. But of course, it is possible. You know, information is coming in. It's coming in from all different directions. The Russians almost certainly are trying to send us information, which on the whole we're rejecting. But I'm sure the odd bit gets through.

Just should say, Dave finishes, I'm looking forward to Sky Warriors this Christmas. So it sounds like he's already got his Christmas present sorted. So he may not be getting another subscriber. But you really should think about it, Dave, because it's well worth it. And he goes on, I was a TA, i.e. Territorial Army officer.

para in the 10th battalion of the parachute regiment many moons ago so a man of many parts is dave okay well that's it for this week from us do join us next wednesday for battleground 44 and of course on friday for the next ukraine episode and if you are in the mood and in the area do come and see us at the chalk valley history festival where we'll be performing on saturday afternoon goodbye