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cover of episode 225. Berlin, Rommel and Liberating the Netherlands.

225. Berlin, Rommel and Liberating the Netherlands.

2024/12/4
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C
Charles Jewell
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Douglas
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Michael Ritson
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Patrick
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Richard Hastings
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Saul
T
Tom
参与航空教育和培训的播客主持人
T
Tor
Topics
Tom:提问关于盟军从诺曼底到柏林的推进速度是否受到西进红军的恐惧影响,原子弹投向广岛是否是为了针对莫斯科,以及盟军在战争期间处理斯大林是否天真。 Patrick:盟军与苏军的战争策略差异导致了对柏林争夺战的不同节奏。雅尔塔会议上对德国的划分使得苏军占领柏林在战略上是可接受的。罗斯福对战后苏联控制东欧的态度较为宽松。 Saul:尽管雅尔塔协议存在,丘吉尔和蒙哥马利仍希望盟军尽可能向东推进,但艾森豪威尔和美国更倾向于遵守协议,并避免不必要的伤亡。苏联在战争最后阶段的巨大伤亡和其获取柏林的决心形成鲜明对比。盟军对斯大林的处理并非完全天真,但面对苏联的扩张,他们能做的选择有限。盟军与苏联的对抗最终演变成冷战,直到苏联解体才最终解决。即使盟军拥有原子弹,也不一定能改变与苏联对抗的局面。

Deep Dive

Key Insights

Why was the speed of the Allies' advance from Normandy to Berlin influenced by the Red Army's westward movement?

The Allies were more cautious in their approach compared to the Red Army, which was racing to Berlin. The Allies faced logistical challenges and setbacks like the Battle of Normandy and the failure at Arnhem. Politically, Berlin was already designated for Soviet occupation at the Yalta Conference, making the race less critical for the Allies.

Why did the Allies not try to prevent the Soviets from occupying Berlin first?

Berlin was divided into occupation zones at the Yalta Conference, with the Soviet zone including Berlin. The Allies, particularly Eisenhower, accepted this division and were not prepared to incur the high casualties that would have been necessary to fight their way into Berlin ahead of the Soviets.

Why were the Allies hesitant to confront Stalin more aggressively during the war?

The Allies, particularly Roosevelt, were not entirely naive about Stalin's intentions but felt limited in what they could do. Military confrontation with the Soviets was considered but ultimately not pursued. The only viable option was a lengthy Cold War standoff, which lasted until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990s.

What role did the atomic bomb play in the Allies' strategy towards the Soviet Union?

The atomic bomb was not aimed at Moscow, and its early prototypes were not powerful enough to significantly alter the military balance with the Soviets. The bomb's primary purpose was to end the war with Japan, though its existence did create a strategic advantage in the emerging Cold War.

Why was the Battle of Overloon significant during the liberation of the Netherlands?

The Battle of Overloon, fought in late September to mid-October 1944, was a major tank battle that cleared German forces from the southern Netherlands. It was a consequence of the failure of Operation Market Garden and helped secure the region, though it did not change the overall strategic situation.

Why did the film 'A Bridge Too Far' face criticism for its portrayal of the British and American forces in Operation Market Garden?

The film was criticized for inaccuracies, such as portraying British tank crews as stopping for tea, which was seen as a negative depiction of their advance. Additionally, it inaccurately showed American paratroopers failing to take the bridge immediately, whereas they were delayed by orders to secure high ground first.

Why is Rommel considered an enigmatic figure in Nazi Germany?

Rommel was close to Hitler and commanded Hitler's personal security, but he was never an SS officer or a member of the Nazi party. His relationship with Hitler was based on military admiration rather than ideological alignment, making him a unique figure in the Wehrmacht.

Why did the Soviet Union's liberation of Finnmark in Norway receive attention from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

The Soviet liberation of Finnmark in October 1944 was a relatively low-cost operation that removed German forces from the far north of Norway. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlights this as a significant Soviet contribution to the war, though it downplays the role of Allied convoys that supported the operation.

Why is Henning von Tresckow significant in the history of the German resistance against Hitler?

Von Tresckow was a key figure in the German resistance, initiating plots against Hitler as early as 1939. He was instrumental in organizing the July 20, 1944, bomb plot and tried other assassination attempts, making him a central figure in the fight against Nazism within the Wehrmacht.

Chapters
This chapter discusses the Allied advance to Berlin in 1944, exploring whether the speed was influenced by the westward movement of the Red Army. It analyzes the differing approaches of the Allies and Soviets, logistical challenges, and the Yalta Conference agreements.
  • The Allies' advance was more cautious than the Soviets', due to factors such as the Battle of Normandy and logistical issues.
  • The Yalta Conference had already divided Germany into occupation zones.
  • Churchill's desire to reach Berlin contrasted with Eisenhower's adherence to the Yalta agreements and concern for casualties.

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Hello and welcome to a special episode of Battleground 44 with me, Saul David, and Patrick Bishop. Well, we've been covering the events of 1944 as closely as we can, but what we haven't managed to do is keep up with all the questions that have been coming in to Battleground 44, so we're devoting an entire episode to deal with the backlog, so to speak. And the first one comes from Tom.

is a retired high school history teacher from Owens Sound, Ontario. And he writes, you touched on Churchill's enmity towards the Soviets today, but it feels like there's much more to examine on the roots of the Cold War as determined by the events and actors in 1944 and 1945. For example, was the speed with which the Allies moved from Normandy to Berlin influenced by fear of the westward moving Red Army?

And he goes on to say, I read somewhere, and I'm paraphrasing, that the atomic bomb may have fallen on Hiroshima, but it was aimed at Moscow. Sounds good, but is it true? And finally, were the Allies naive in their handling of Stalin during the war? His intentions seemed clear, especially after the Warsaw Uprising. Are Stalin's intentions true?

not clear and should the West have handled him a little bit more effectively. What do you think, Patrick? Which one do you want to deal with first? Well, let's just deal with the first one first. Was the speed with which the Allies moved from Normandy to Berlin influenced by fear of the westward moving

Red Army, well, they were both in very different situations. Just to start off with, the British and American Allied attitude generally towards war-making was much more cautious than that of the Red Army. So the Red Army was charging westwards as fast as it possibly could. There was essentially a race to Berlin going on between

the Soviet marshals, Georgi Zhukov and Ivan Konev, about who was going to be the first to get into Berlin. We were proceeding at a much more cautious place. We had to fight through the Battle of Normandy. Then we had the great sort of problem with logistics, which slowed us down. And then there was the balls up at Arnhem, which meant that we didn't cross the Rhine, et cetera, et cetera. But in general, in sort of grand strategic terms, there were

there was no real problem in the Russians getting to Berlin because the area, vast area of Germany around Berlin had already been ceded to them. Uh,

at the great meeting at Yalta between the big three, between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, in which Germany was divided into occupied zones for the British, Americans, Russians, and rather surprisingly, the French as well. So it was already their kind of their manner, if you like. So there were, of course, you know, obvious problems politically for the population of Berlin and that various situation.

People warned of the undesirability of the Russians actually occupying Berlin first. But as it turned out, the city was divided up into these zones of occupation anyway, which kind of mirrored the zones of occupation in Germany first.

Generally. So, yeah, I don't think, of course, they wanted to get there as quickly as they possibly could. But for various reasons, it was kind of inevitable, I think, that the Russians were going to win the race. And that was, by and large, okay with Eisenhower, who was, of course, a supreme ally commander.

Yeah, I mean, they had the shorter distance to cover, as you've kind of hinted at, Patrick. It is interesting, there was a bit of a fracturing as far as the Allies were concerned over this. The agreement had been made at Yalta, and yet Churchill was looking post-war. He knew, I mean, he realised there was going to be an iron curtain coming up over Europe, and he wanted to get as far east as possible. So even though Berlin actually came within the Russian zone, he still wanted to get there to sort of put a marker down for the Allies. And so did Monti, actually.

But the problem they both had is that Eisenhower, as you've already pointed out, the Americans more generally were aware of this deal with the Soviets. They wanted to stick to it. And more importantly than that, they weren't prepared to accept the sort of casualties inevitably were going to be incurred by fighting their way into Berlin. The Soviets on the other hand didn't give a monkey's frankly, Patrick, about casualties any more than they do today. So, I mean, the number of casualties the Russians took in the last year or

of the war were absolutely astonishing. I mean, they suffered as many, so did the Germans, in fact, in the last year of the war, particularly the last six months, as they did during the whole of the preceding four or five years. So it's astonishing how, you know, their willingness to sacrifice lives to get their political objective, which was to get to Berlin. It was absolutely, you know, a scene of quid non for the Russians, and they managed it, of course. Yeah, no, you're absolutely right to emphasise that.

points all that Roosevelt was very relaxed about Soviet control of Eastern Europe post-war. I mean, there was a kind of nominal agreement that the Soviets would allow free elections in the territories that liberated from the Germans. But it was, you know, it was

regarded as inevitable that whoever won these elections they would basically have to show friendly posture towards Moscow and that was something that rankled perhaps with Churchill far more than it did with Roosevelt and his successor Harry Truman that

That's right. And finally, the Allies, were they naive in their handling of Stalin? Not really. I mean, I think Churchill absolutely knew what he was dealing with with Stalin. There is a suggestion that Roosevelt was charmed by Stalin a little bit more and didn't really appreciate what was coming. But the reality of all of this, you know, even if they hadn't been naive, is what could they actually have done? The only thing the Allies could have done is that

is by facing up to the Soviets with military force, which is something that Churchill actually advocated. There was a plan in place that, you know, if the Soviets didn't concede certain ground over issues like Poland, then the West may have to go to war with them. Well, they don't do that, of course, but they do begin a long and lengthy standoff with the Cold War.

was only ultimately resolved by the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. So I'm not entirely sure that this naivety argument holds up. I can't really see what they could have done about the inexorable advance of the Soviets. Though it is an interesting conjecture, Saul, isn't it, that we had the bomb and they didn't at that point. We didn't even let them know that we had it. Everyone knew that a nuclear bomb was possible, but the Russians had a pretty good idea of the progress we were making. But

through their spies inside the Manhattan Project. But the fact was they didn't actually know for certain how far we'd got. So it does kind of go back to that question of whether Moscow might potentially have been a target for a nuclear bomb. I don't think it was ever seriously considered, but if it had been,

I don't think it would have changed things too much. I mean, the size of those early proto-nukes wasn't really enough to do anything except take out Moscow itself. It wouldn't have actually reduced the Soviets' ability to carry on fighting against an Allied invasion significantly because just the vastness of the place and the point it had got to in military capacity, its production, etc. Of course, it wouldn't have the Allied power

resources to rely on. But I still think any calculation would conclude that this was not a war winning move and you'd still have to fight mile by mile.

through Russia with the inevitable historical consequences that both Napoleon Bonaparte and Hitler had suffered. Okay, question from Michael Ritson, and I'm assuming he's in Holland, and he writes, September 1944 was an important month for the south of the Netherlands as this brought freedom from German occupation in Limburg and certain areas of Brabant. It also saw fierce fighting near cities of Sittard, Venlo and Overloon where mainly British forces fought very hard

for our freedom and liberation and nearly every village town and city has several monuments to these brave men sadly the rest of the netherlands had to wait longer before they could enjoy the same freedom my question therefore is would you be willing to look at this often overlooked piece of dutch world war ii history during this important month besides operation market garden the netherlands are often a footnote in the largest story but as i mentioned before several important battles took place uh

in this region. Well, you know, it's after the date, so to speak, Patrick. We can't really go back now, but it is worth flagging up, isn't it, the fact that there are these kind of hidden corners of World War II history that are very important to, you know, the countries where they took place and that we rather gloss over because there was one thing in our minds, which was to get into Germany as quickly as possible. And the great tragedy of the Netherlands, of course, which is well known, is that after the failure of

Operation Market Garden. We left most of Holland to German occupation and effectively a starvation scenario was set in there, partly by the Germans deliberately to punish the Dutch, but partly because, of course, logistically, they couldn't get enough supplies in to feed the local population. So very tragic story with many civilians dying of starvation. Yeah, just for the record, that Battle of Overloon was

very much a consequence of the failure of Market Garden. So it was fought just afterwards in the end of September, 30th of September to the 18th of October. It was a big tank battle. It was, I think, a joint British and American operation. And it basically did clear the Germans from this area.

south of the sort of Market Garden operational zone. It's right up on the border, just west of the River Meuse, the River Maas, and just opposite the Ruhr area. So very close to Germany. But it was an important victory, but it certainly wasn't a game-changing one. Okay, got one here, which is right up your street, Saul, from Richard Hastings in the East Riding of Yorkshire.

He says, I've just listened to your podcast about Arlo and I would like to raise a couple of thoughts. You mentioned Cornelius Ryan and The Bridge Too Far, A Bridge Too Far, actually, both a book and a film. And he says the film was a great film, but it was flawed. Its portrayal of the British tank crew stopping for cuppa, he says, is a major criticism of the movie. Any squaddie worth his salt would make a cuppa at any break he could. But the film directors added this

as if to criticize the advance, i.e. that they weren't taking their duties seriously. He goes on to say the Dutch historian R.G. Poulsen is highly critical of the American paratroopers not attempting to take the bridge straight away, and contrary to the film, British tanks went across the bridge first.

it goes on in this vein. What would you say to those points, Saul? Yeah, I mean, I think the first most important thing to say is that we may have referenced Cornelius Ryan and A Bridge Too Far, but we certainly weren't, you know, using it as vital source material. I mean, what

Cornelius Ryan did for that book is actually get a lot of interviews with people, which I'm sure I've mentioned before, just 20 years after the events themselves. In fact, not even that, maybe 15, 16, 17 years after the events themselves. And so there's a wonderful sort of collection of firsthand accounts in his, that is the Cornelius Ryan collection at

Ohio State University. And they've all been digitized. So anyone can see all those accounts now. And they are a tremendously useful historical source. But it is also true that writing a book just 15, 20 years after events, a lot of new information won't have come out. I certainly, when I was writing Sky Warriors, which is the British part in Operation Market Garden, wouldn't have relied on a bridge too far. And I'm sure no one would. But of course, it does contain some interesting information.

information. On the specific points that Richard makes, he's absolutely right. One of the key parts of the story and the reason Operation Market Garden fails is because the American paratroopers, 82nd Airborne, do not take Nijmegen Bridge on the first day as they should have done. And one of the reasons they don't is because

they've been given the orders to actually take this tactical high ground, the Grosse Beek Heights, which are considered by the overall plan to be more important. Now, there was a regiment that was then assigned to take the bridge, and it makes a pretty feeble attempt to do it. And they don't finally take it until the 20th. So, yes, he's absolutely right. And the Dutch historian R.G. Paulsen is right to be critical of the American paratroopers. And Richard's also right to point out that the first troops across France

The bridge itself are members of 30 Corps, that is, they're part of the Guards Armoured Division. But it's also true to say that the American paratroopers carried out an unbelievably heroic crossing a little bit further up the lower Rhine, and that they then capture the northern end of the bridge, which happens almost simultaneously as the armour is going across. So it's a kind of operation from both ends of the bridge, which, you know, both the paratroopers

and British Armoured, you know, play their part in. But yeah, overall, of course, you're not going to use a single source to base your knowledge

of the history of Operation Market Garden, and I certainly didn't in this case. Yeah, a couple of thoughts that occurred to me, Saul, is I'm always slightly amused when I see military historians looking back and telling the probably long-departed participants how they should have fought the battle. I don't know whether R.G. Poulsen has ever actually been in a battle himself, but it always seems to be slightly impertinent to start criticizing troops for not showing enough

gumption in taking their objectives, etc. But also this business about, you know, first accounts of an event. I take the view that the closer you are to the event, the more valuable your testimony is likely to be. And of course, you know, we both find the real gold dust is when you've got letters and diaries that are written absolutely at the time. So you're getting the pure unadulterated thoughts and observations of the author.

And of course, the further away you are from the event, the more likely recollections are going to be overlaid with how things should have been, how you would like to be presented, etc. So I become less and less convinced by the material the later it is recorded after the event. And often you find that people are saying things when they're giving an interview 30, 40, 50 years later or writing their memoirs.

a considerable time afterwards, that they're actually at odds with what they were saying at the time or what is recorded at the time. So they become increasingly unreliable. And my experience of history is that, you know, the first draft of it is often pretty good. And it's not very often that subsequent, you know, inevitably sort of archival reports that come to light are

really fundamentally change our understanding of a battle or a situation. What do you think? Do you go along with that? Or maybe you've got a more kind of forensic approach to history than me. I think when it comes to oral history, you're absolutely right, Patrick. We must have mentioned this before on the podcast, which is that, you know, when you start interviewing people who are in their 80s, 90s,

and in some cases, even 100 now, you're going to get a version of events, which is partly based on their memory, which is imperfect, and partly based on what they've read since then. So it's not ideal. And I couldn't agree more with you. I mean, in an ideal world, you'll have letters and diaries and immediate memories of what went on. But generally speaking, they don't exist. They certainly don't exist for everyone. And therefore, you are left with these kind of memoirs written many years later. Some of them are very good. I

I think it's partly down to the instincts of the historian, frankly, Patrick, as to who to trust. It just goes to underline the overall point of how imprecise the business of history is in terms of us just trying to recreate the past with sources that are often conflicting and far from perfect. Yeah, you're absolutely right. I mean, there is no absolute truth, is there? And seeking it is a fool's

And of course, you know, history changes the whole time. What we're interested in, what concerns us, what excites us, changes with each generation. So the point of writing, revisiting events and seeing them through the lens of today's is what makes history so fascinating, isn't it? Okay, we'll take a break there. Do join us in a moment when we'll be answering more questions from Battleground 44.

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Don't just take, give. Visit instaxus.com to shop. Welcome back. Okay, moving on to Charles Jewell, and he asked a question about SS Seagroons, and that is, of course, the double flash on the collar. He was watching a documentary in which he saw an SS officer with three Seagroons. That is, in other words, the triple flash on his right collar. What does this signify with three instead of the traditional three?

Two, I know I've seen it before, but it seems to be rare as far as pictures and videos that still exist. Well, I have to say, I wasn't aware that there ever had been an SS unit with the three runes. It's all a bit bizarre, isn't it? I mean, it was invented in the 1930s.

by a graphic artist, apparently. You know, and it does look quite dramatic, doesn't it? You know, this kind of idea that it basically looks like the SS2Ss, but there's also this kind of idea of, you know, the Thunderflash, and this is a kind of unit that's going to, you know, do some serious damage, particularly with regards to the Waffen-SS. I mean, Patrick, have you got any more insight into the SS runes? Well, as you say, Saul, they were invented by a German mystic called Guido Schumann,

fun list and they were based on the original runes you know this is the kind of pre-roman alphabet letters that conveyed not just in a language but also ideas so i think that you know the the lightning bolt symbol of the zeke rune means a victory as well as the sun apparently but as everyone knows there's like two of them on the on the collar of ss you

All I can think is that I've never seen three Sieg Runes. All I can think is it's someone who's particularly keen on the Nazi regime and really, really, really liked Adolf Hitler as a person just really, really liking him.

Now, everyone's always fascinated by Irvin Rommel, aren't they? And we had a very entertaining, or I enjoyed it anyway, that podcast we did on Rommel together. So Eric Callaghan from Greenfield, Massachusetts in the States, who says, Greetings, gents. Very fascinating discussion on the latest Battleground 44 episode, the exploration of whether the Desert Fox was one of the good ones.

He says it's a vexatious question at best, but worthy of consideration. And there's two things that struck. Eric, he says he noted Rommel was in charge of Hitler's personal security in the Polish campaign. Surely that was the job of the SS. Did Rommel interact with or command Zep-2?

Dietrich, who of course was actually in charge of the, I think it was the Liebstandard, wasn't it? Liebstandard unit that was meant to be doing Hitler's security. And then he goes on to say, I'm also wondering, was Rommel a Nazi party man? Did he ever join the Nazi party? He's heard that Rommel didn't join the party. And even though he was very close to Hitler, it seems he was never involved.

actually compelled to join the party itself. He wonders about that. A final point, which you may be able to answer specifically, Saul, was he read in a book that in Robert's First World War service, he may have directly faced off against his direct counterpart of a hard-charging British junior officer, that is Bernard Montgomery. I seem to remember reading that somewhere recently.

But let's go into this business of his first job really in the war, wasn't it? Rommel was to indeed command, I think the units called the Führerbegleitbataillon. And it

if I remember rightly, Saul, he was actually, Rommel was commanding that at Hitler's field headquarters during the invasion of Poland. Well, no, there's a little bit of confusion here. I mean, he did command the Führerbegeit Battalion, which is not an SS unit, but it is for Hitler's personal security reasons.

I think in the late 30s. But by the time the war begins proper, he's actually in command of Hitler's headquarters. And neither of those appointments, by the way, Patrick, and this is answering Eric's question, are SS appointments. So Rommel was never an SS officer.

I don't think Eric's directly answering that, but he is kind of implying that he was in charge of SS personnel. Well, that wasn't the case either. The second job is pretty straightforward, really. I mean, he's a major general in overall command of Hitler's Fuhrer headquarters. And again, that is a non-SS post.

The question of whether Roel ever joined the party, I think is also fairly straightforward. He didn't. Uh, there's absolutely no evidence that he did. He's not in any of the lists of being a member of the party. How was that possible? Well, again, because he wasn't, uh, in one of these, you know, fanatical organizations like the SS, which would have made it almost impossible not to join the party. He was a Wehrmacht officer who was close to Hitler, admired Hitler, uh,

and was ultimately Hitler's favorite, but that didn't mean that he actually had to be a member of the Nazi party. And the last point, yeah, I've also heard that that's true, but if it was true, the connection with Montgomery, and it was possibly in 1914, 1915, by 1916, he was in a mountain battalion and mainly fighting Nazis.

in the alps in italy so that's clearly well away from monte but in 1914 and 1915 they may well have been on opposite sides in the same action i can't remember exactly which one it was but let's face it an awful lot of platoon commanders people of their sort of rank lieutenant second lieutenant would have been facing off each other in these big battles at

and to imply that they got, you know, personally that close to each other. I think it's a bit optimistic, to be truthful, Patrick. But yes, they were, of course, both World War I veterans and fought in the same battle. I think that's the most you can say about it. Yeah, just to go back to that business of Hitler's personal history,

military security. It was the rule that the SS, but the SS was one of the SS's first duties. And indeed, when the war began, the Diebstandard SS Adolf Hitler unit under the command of Sepp Dietrich was sent off to actually, Hitler said, you know, go off and fight in the Polish campaign. And that's why the Wehrmacht unit commanded by Rommel was in charge of his field head, security of his field headquarters in

etc. I think the question that was being asked here raises a bigger point about Nazism's relationship with the Wehrmacht, which is a very fascinating one, isn't it? It's been the subject of a lot of myths which have been very much encouraged, cultivated by the Wehrmacht survivors themselves. The story they were spinning was that they were the kind of professional military as opposed to the SS

and therefore much more principled than their Nazi Party counterparts. And extrapolating that, they go on to kind of make the case they had limited knowledge

of all responsibility for the Holocaust and all the other ghastly crimes committed by the Germans in World War II. And that sort of lingers on to this day, doesn't it? This myth, and that's exactly what it was, a myth. If you were a senior army officer, you didn't have to be a Nazi party member at all. But...

One very prominent British historian, Richard J. Evans, wrote that junior officers in the army were inclined to be especially zealous Nazis, whether they were party members or not. And he reckons a third of them had actually joined the Nazi party by 1941. You also got to remember this business of the Hitler Oath. Now, this was something that was, people assumed that Hitler insisted on this oath being taken by the armed forces.

But in fact, it was an initiative by the army itself long before the war began in order to try and bind its fortress to those of the Nazi party. And then by doing so, to exercise some control over it and to maintain, strangely enough, to maintain its own sort of internal integrity, if you like, which is a major aim of the German military from the very beginning, even in the days of the empire.

So you've got this thing where they're actually swearing not to the German state and not to God even, but to Hitler himself that they will do what he wants of them. A personal oath of loyalty, quite extraordinary. And it does actually, I say it's extraordinary, but there is a tradition of that in Germany.

German history of soldiers taking an oath of personal loyalty to their king or whoever controls their principality, etc. So it wasn't absolutely unprecedented. But the long and the short of it is...

that the Wehrmacht was quite happy with most of the Nazi agenda, that it was only when things started going wrong for them that they, the people at the top anyway, had second thoughts about Hitler and then decided, in the case of Stauffenberg and Kuhn,

von Tresckow and the like to turn against him. Question here from Tor. He's in Oslo, Norway. On the day of your next Battleground 44 episode, it will be 80 years since the Soviet Union started the liberation of Finnmark in the north of Norway. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been quite keen to tell everyone about this, especially the Norwegians.

as quite a few in the north still harbour goodwill against those two who pushed the Nazis out, at a human cost of approximately two days of fighting in Ukraine. I would not blame my countrymen too much, says Tor. Our relationship with our neighbours in the east have not always been this strained, although treating Russia like a normal country after 1991 was perhaps a mistake. However, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs fails to mention that a large proportion

part of the reason for why they were able to push the Nazis out with the convoys from the UK that delivered an incredible amount of material in which a significant number of Norwegians took part. But never mind these minor inconvenience facts. Let us thank the Soviets for their sacrifice in the North while conveniently also ignoring the fact that they continued their occupation of Europe for another 40 or 50 years."

What do you think about that, Patrick? Have you got anything to add? Tor is referring this as, he was obviously listening to our episode around the end of October because the

Liberation of Finnmark lasted, well, it began, I think, the 23rd of October 1944 with this Soviet intervention. Now, this is right up in the far north of Scandinavia, this sort of complicated geography where Norway, Finland and Russia, their borders were.

meet. And it began, this operation began with a Soviet offensive that liberated the town of Kirkenes, which is, I think that's how you say it, up in the very north of Norway. Now, I think this makes a very interesting point here, which is that there were at least a couple of divisions, Soviet divisions, together with a tank unit in

etc. And so they went in there, they drove the Germans out, and the total cost was, in terms of lives lost to the Red Army, was 2,900, which, as he points out, he says, Tories says two days in Ukraine, but that actually these days, I suppose that'd be about right, 2,900 dead,

We're hearing they're losing, or they have been losing, 3,100 was one figure, total casualties in a day. So that might well equate to 2,900 dead Soviets in this particular liberation of the Finnmark operation. Okay, moving on to Douglas in County Tipperary, Ireland. He says, first off, big fan of the pod, been listening since episode one of the Falklands War series. Now that's going back a bit, isn't it, Saul? We've had several. Yeah.

listeners saying they've been following us since then, so that's nice to hear. Anyway, Douglas says, a few days ago I was on a bus in Soltau, Germany, on my way to the Panzermuseum in Münster. Obviously, very keen military history fan of Douglas. And there he noticed a laneway called Graf von Stauffenberg Allee. Nothing too unusual about this, he says, since there are many memorials to Stauffenberg around Germany. But he says 50 meters down

From the Stauffenberg Allee, I noticed the next lane was called Henning von Tresckau Allee. I recall that Roger, that's Roger Morehouse, our friend and collaborator, mentioned that von Tresckau doesn't get the recognition he deserves, but you can assure Roger that the people of Soltau recognize him. Well, I think that's right, isn't it? I mentioned von Tresckau earlier. I think...

That's true that he doesn't get the recognition he deserves. I mean, partly because he wasn't directly, he wasn't at the Wolfshansa. He didn't actually plant the bomb. And therefore, that was Stauffenberg. And so Stauffenberg gets the kind of lead role, I suppose, and I think he's the most recognizable name in Operation Valkyrie. But Tresckow had been a very early, I mean, although like, as we were saying earlier, a lot of the kind of officer class, the old Junker, Prussian military caste,

he was actually quite keen on Hitler in the early days. His eyes were soon opened and even before the war began, he was very aware of where this was taking Germany and horrified and appalled by it.

begins plotting seriously. As early as 1939, he's telling friends that to honor a duty demand of us, that we should do our best to bring about the downfall of Hitler and National Socialism to save Germany and Europe from barbarism. So he had no illusions about what was happening

and begins sort of plotting straight away. There's some pretty serious plots. In March 1943, there's a well-developed assassination plot, etc. But he wasn't actually there for the July plot. He was serving on the Eastern Front. When he heard that it failed, he committed suicide. But it's good that he is recognized as

and that it's not just Jochenberg that sticks in people's minds, in Germany at least. No, and von Tresckow, as you point out, Patrick, really is one of the good guys. I mean, he's an early adopter of opposition to the Führer and plays an absolutely key role in getting together a group of

people, mainly his juniors in army group centre. So he's chief of staff to the commander in chief, eventually Von Kluge. And Von Kluge, of course, eventually takes over from Rommel in the West. And although he's not directly implicated in the bomb plot, he was aware of it. He's certainly one of these people who, like Rommel, who

who we mentioned in the earlier episode, very much felt that the war was lost and they needed to begin negotiations with the Allies. And he realized that his awareness of the plot was going to be his downfall and Kluger commits suicide himself. But Vontresco has got together this group of general staff officers, junior people to him, including Vontresco,

Stauffenberg who you know are very much led by him I mean he's absolutely key in getting the explosives that are eventually used and in in the operation to kill Hitler and he also tries that you know the famous attempt to put I think it's champagne or brandy on Hitler's plane this actually happens they put this bomb on Hitler's plane as he's flying away from army group center but

for some reason, maybe something to do with the pressure in the hold of the plane, the bomb doesn't go off. So it's extraordinary how close Hitler came to being assassinated. And Von Tresckow plays an absolute key role in all of this. Okay, well, that was all fascinating. Thanks very much for all your thoughts and your questions. Do keep them coming. We'll have another special episode sometime down the line to try and do our best to answer them.

Okay, do join us on Friday for Battleground Ukraine, when we'll be looking into everything that's developed in the preceding week. And also, of course, the following Wednesday for another episode of Battleground 44. Goodbye.