228. The Battle of the Bulge
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Now that's pretty good. Learn more at fidelity.com slash baskets. Investing involves risk, including risk of loss. Fidelity Brokers Services LLC. Member NYSC SIPC. Hello and welcome to Battleground 44 with me, Saul David. Patrick is taking the afternoon off, but we're very lucky to have with us today Sir Anthony Beaver.

To discuss an event that took place roughly 80 years ago, and that was when Hitler's backs-to-the-wall army launched Operation Watch on the Rhine, better known as the Battle of the Bulge, which was, of course, eventually, we know now, the last great offensive of the war.

launched by the Germans against weakly held American positions in the Ardennes Forest, which of course just happened to be the site of their original Blitzkrieg success. Well, Antony's written many best-selling and award-winning books, including Stalingrad, Berlin, and most recently Russia, Revolution and Civil War 1917 to 1921. But his title most relevant to our discussion today is, of course, Ardennes 1944, Hitler's Last Gamble, which was published in 2001.

2015, I think. Anthony, that was nine years ago. Welcome back to the podcast. I'm guessing you've had to do a bit of reminding yourself of exactly what happened. So you're absolutely right. It is always rather alarming when one suddenly realizes that a book one's written quite a bit of time ago and how little you remember. But actually, you go back and you reread and you think, well, actually, that's not too bad. And then you think, well, perhaps in another place, well, perhaps I could have put that one better. But anyway,

The important thing is a question of remembering what happened. And of course, it was one of not just the vital last great battle on the Western Front, but it was also, I'm afraid, the occasion for the worst crisis in Anglo-American relations.

And actually, I think that it carries through into the post-war era. I mean, Eisenhower was just so angry that it really did have a long-term effect. But that all goes back to the beginning. And perhaps we should start with really the liberation of Paris in August 1944.

When Eisenhower invited Monty to come and take part in the victory celebrations, but Monty refused in a very curt way, saying that he had a war to get on with, a war to win. And what was terrible was that the British press

Tegly distorted the story and said that this was actually a snub to Monty, that he hadn't been invited, which was technically untrue. The Americans were, of course, now running the show because from the 1st of September, Monty is no longer the overall commander. And the British were very sensitive about this. And this is why Monty was promoted to field marshal, which disgusted Patton and other American commanders because it actually put him technically behind.

With a five-star rank, it put him over Eisenhower, who only had four stars still at that particular point.

Now, this one may seem rather petty, but one must remember Field Marshal Allenbrook, the Chief of the General Staff's remark. He said that, you know, nothing brings out the worst in people on high command. And my goodness, this is what we started to see here. Anyway, Monty was now commanding 21st Army Group. Bradley had now taken command of what was to be called the 12th Army Group. And Eisenhower was the overall commander.

And Monty could no longer claim, therefore, that he was in charge. And this is what frustrated him. And he started to go in for politicking, basically saying, I should lead the attack into Germany through the northern route, through Belgium, Holland on into northern Germany, and then lead the charge to Berlin. Now, Patton and Bradley, on the other hand, and Eisenhower felt it should be a broad front and fast. But then...

But they said it was much better to go into Germany through, if you like, the central route and basically towards Frankfurt and then on from there. And actually, they were right. Patton quite rightly argued the trouble with Monty's route was that he was crossing all the biggest rivers in Europe, as well as all the canals in Holland. And this was going to slow him down. But Monty refused to acknowledge that as a major problem. And he wanted to have

all of the support from Eisenhower, the bulk of the supplies, all the fuel and all the rest of it. And when he heard that Patton was still advancing, he became furious. So he had Patton furious, Bradsey furious, Monty furious. And unfortunately, Eisenhower felt that in the interest of Allied unity, he had to basically concede to Monty or to allow Monty to have his head.

And so when the plan for Operation Market Gob, which was Monty's idea to jump the Rhine at Arnhem and get into Germany, if you like, that way, Eisenhower, who was rather out of touch with things, he'd wrecked his leg and he was still back in Normandy, felt that he had to agree to that. But the problem was that what Monty had done was he had failed to secure the entrance to the Schulte estuary and therefore to Antwerp.

because the whole of the advance into Germany depended on resupply. And although the British, in a brilliant coup d'etat, had seized Antwerp before any of the dock facilities could be destroyed by the Germans, they hadn't seized the banks of the Scholt Estuary. And General von Sangen, who was retreating with the 5th Army, controlled both sides of the Scholt Estuary, so ships could not get in.

And this was a major blow. And Monti was particularly irresponsible, I think, in the way that even though Admiral Ramsey, the naval commander-in-chief, and others...

had tried to tell him that if he didn't clear the estuary. But Modki thought, if I manage to jump the Rhine ahead of the Americans, then Eisenhower will have to give me all the support. I can have the American armies under my command again, and we can push on into Germany.

So I'm afraid pride really interfered with sound military strategy. Yeah, it's interesting. It's often forgotten, isn't it, Anthony, in the discussion about the Ardennes or the Battle of the Bulge, I suppose it's better known that there were these major difficulties, fault lines within the Allies. You've mentioned Antwerp. That meant, of course, that

Because it couldn't be used at this stage properly. There were supply difficulties for the Allied armies. They were exhausted. We're coming on to winter, the events we're about to now discuss. But just set the scene a little bit in terms of strategically as far as the Germans are concerned. I mean, ultimately, and try and explain ultimately, Anthony, why they decided to put all their eggs in one basket, in effect, all their strategic resources.

into an attack against the Western allies when, of course, the Soviets are closing in on the Eastern front? Absolutely. Well, the point was that the allies were suffering from victory fever. I mean, as our official historian described it, he said, you know, it was hysterical optimism.

They had made a major mistake because when the bomb plot took place, the attempt to blow up Hitler in July 1944, their assumption was that meant that the German army was in a state of collapse. I mean, if an army is trying to blow up its own commanding chief, there's something rather wrong. What they failed to understand was that because Hitler survived that attack, it meant that actually the war was going to go on until Hitler died and Hitler would have

increasing control through the SS and through the Gestapo and make sure that the army now was totally under his control, which it hadn't really been before. So that was a big mistake. They were looking at it, if you like, with confirmation bias through their own eyes. The other problem was that, you know, they even cancelled Operation Foxley, the plan to assassinate Hitler on the grounds, actually, that knowing that Hitler was in command, you

they were going to win the war much more quickly than if Hitler had been got rid of. Stalin misunderstood this completely. He feared that the Allies would now make a secret deal with Germany. And so he cancelled his own plans to assassinate Hitler in case the British and the Americans did a deal with the successor government. But the Germans were in a really bad state, of course. I mean, there was this

cavalry charge all the way from the River Seine right across Belgium and into Holland, right up to the German frontier opposite Aachen. And they and most German officers believed that the war was about to come to an end. And the British were even sort of thinking and they were even planning for the end of the war in production terms for the end of the year by 31st of December.

And in the United States, they were starting to cancel contracts for more shells and all the rest of it. So this is why Hitler was determined to give them a very nasty shock. And even as early as September, Hitler, when he was sick and ill in the Wolfshanta in East Prussia, suddenly had this vision that he would launch a counterattack from the Ardennes, a major strategic counterattack,

which would sort of charge north towards Antwerp and split the British and the Canadians in the north from the Americans. And he seriously thought that this would be such a shock to the Allies that the Canadians would drop out of the war and that the British could be forced into a Dunkirk-type evacuation across the Channel. Okay, it was a fantasy, a fevered fantasy. And

And his generals were appalled when they were finally told about it in complete secrecy. They knew that, frankly, they didn't have the strength. But the trouble is that, again, the Allies were complacent. And I'm afraid nobody was more complacent than General Bradley, who thought that there was no chance of the Germans fighting back.

But after Arnhem and the bloody nose that the British and also the Americans, I mean, the two American parachute divisions, the 101st and the 82nd, had in the battle around Arnhem and in the Netherlands, there really was a good reason to start to reassess the German determination to fight on.

And when we see the way, the pattern, a brilliant commander when it came to a rapid advance right across France,

hit the defenses on the edge of Germany and all the rest of it. Then he started to make big mistakes. And this is quite interesting. You know, the great attacker was not a great general when he came to defense. So, you know, the message should have started to sink in. There was then the great battle for Aachen, which was the first real example of urban warfare in the West. And the

nasty and determined the German defense could be, even though the German forces were totally outnumbered. And they had to basically smash down most of the city with artillery with the 155 millimeter long Toms, firing over open sites of point blank range, just smashing one building after another. The destruction of Aachen also, in a way, slightly invigorated German determination and anger.

The next stage had to be really an advance to the Rhine, because until they could get across the Rhine, then there was going to be no chance really of ending the war. But this meant advancing. They chose, unfortunately, one of the worst areas imaginable, which was the Hürpgen Forest. And this was some of the nastiest fighting that the Americans had ever come across. It was brutal.

really tough conditions with ravines. They couldn't really use their tanks. They couldn't use their air superiority. And the German divisions in the Jutland Forest fought back with savagery, clever tactics, and the American losses and psychological casualties were considerable. This then takes us towards the end of November. And by then,

This is when Hitler, his really planning operation, Watch on the Rhine was the original, Wacht am Rhein was the original name for the operation. But then it started to be called Helpsnabel of Autumn Mist. And for this...

They were assembling an army which the British and American intelligence simply didn't believe could be assembled with all of the tanks, many of them brought back from the Eastern Front. And basically, it was going to be the 6th Panzer Army, the 5th Panzer Armory, and the Manteuffel, General von Manteuffel,

and then supported by the 7th Army. But the point is, Hitler's thinking was that this shock should come on the Western Front rather than the Eastern Front, because he knew perfectly well that a major counterattack on the Eastern Front would be eventually smothered by sheer superiority of numbers in the East. I mean, the Red Army, with at least 4 million men on that Eastern Front,

and a huge superiority in aircraft, but above all in tanks, would be able to sort of fight back. And he thought that it was a far better gamble.

to attack the West, where he thought that their alliance with Stalin was very fragile. How could capitalists ally with a communist leader like Stalin? And he felt if they got a really bloody nose, then they might well drop out of the war and he could focus all of his troops on the Eastern Front. It was, shall we say, very optimistic thinking on his part in this particular way. And certainly none of his generals believed it was going to work. But

He was absolutely determined, and the very fact that the Gestapo and SS now really controlled everything, the generals were too frightened to disagree. Even Field Marshal von Rundstedt just sort of shrugged his shoulders, and he was supposedly put in charge, and it was known as the Rundstedt Offensive.

He found this very irritating when he heard that the Allies were referring to it as a Rundstedt offensive, because as far as he was concerned, he had nothing to do with it, and he didn't want to have anything to do with it.

You mentioned, Anthony, at the start that, you know, there's a certain amount of disarray among the senior Allied commanders. We've also spoken a little bit about supply difficulties, the exhaustion of some of the Americans, particularly after the fighting in the Hürtgen. I mean, for all of those reasons, it was actually quite a good time to launch this offensive, if you're going to launch it at any point, and it achieved complete operational surprise, which might surprise quite a few listeners.

given that we had ultra. So can you explain why, how and why the Germans were able to fool the Americans into not realizing it or the allies generally into not realizing it was coming? Well, once again, it comes to the greatest weakness in intelligence matters, which again is confirmation bias.

If you believe that the enemy is incapable of launching a huge attack at that particular state because you think they're in a state of complete disintegration, then you don't look for the messages. You don't look for the evidence. And this is really what happened. There were fragmentary evidence. But on the whole, the Germans kept their secret and their security very tight indeed.

And yet, what's astonishing is that even though most of the generals involved in the operation hadn't yet been told about this great plan,

Word had got to the German generals in British imprisonment in Kent Park and places where they were being listened to by German Jews who reported the fact that they were talking about a counter-offensive with over 40 divisions. Because 40 divisions seemed so impossible to British intelligence, they therefore ruled it out and said they weren't listening. They even missed sort of one or two key things, which was the

the transfer of ground attack air squadrons from the Eastern Front to the West. That should have warned them that something nasty was being prepared. Now, one or two of their chief intelligence officers, Major General Strong, I'm afraid, the British chief of intelligence in Eisenhower's headquarters, was very complacent indeed. But, for example, Patton's chief of intelligence, he was...

that there was definitely something happening and they should watch out and all the rest of it. But, I mean, they were expecting a diversionary attack of some form to try and break up, you know, or spoil any preparations to attack across the Rhine. But what they were not expecting was a vast, major attack

strategic counter-offensive, planning to go all the way to the English Channel and try and split the British and the American armies. So the attack begins early on the 16th of December 1944. You mentioned the two panzer armies, the 6th and the 5th. The 6th had a lot of SS, Waffen-SS troops in it and actually had the major role in the Operation

I think you make the point, or at least some of the Allied, maybe some of the Allied commanders, German commanders, sorry, Anthony, make the point afterwards, actually, it was the wrong way around. It should have been Manteuffel's army that actually had the major role. But

But tell us a little bit about what happened initially, because they caught the Americans by surprise. And they do make some quite serious inroads to begin with, don't they? Well, they do. The trouble with the 6th Panzer Army, it was commanded by Sepp Dietrich, who was an old Nazi thug. He'd been Hitler's chauffeur at one point, a butcher, I mean, literally a butcher's son and so forth. And Dietrich had no subtlety whatsoever. And...

His spearhead was going to be commanded by Jochen Peiper, who was a brutal SS tank commander.

very energetic and, as I say, very brutal. He was the one who basically was burning down villages all over the Soviet Union during the fighting there. But he thought that, you know, with a panzer punch, they would be able to get through to the River Meuse in something like 24 hours, which was wildly optimistic. I mean, he did tests on how fast you could go. What he underestimated was very, very heavy rain and

And the mud in the Ardennes was simply so deep that as soon as you got tanks churning it up, none of the artillery could follow. Most of the artillery, you have to remember, was horse-drawn and lorries couldn't get through. And you can imagine what it was like for infantry trying to tramp through mud, which was basically knee-deep.

So the idea of a rapid advance was already optimistic before they even started. Anyway, the Allies were very weakly manning that particular area. And again, this was Brad's decision.

He felt it was far more important to keep the troops in the front, and he didn't believe and refused to believe that the rally was a threat of a major breakthrough at all. And here's, I think, I mean, for him, it was actually a great humiliation and the lack of preparation in that particular way.

And one of the divisions, which was newly arrived from America, the 106th, had turned up. I mean, they were even wearing ties. I mean, nobody could believe it. You know, here they were reaching the front line still wearing ties. I mean, the jokes of the front line veterans or whatever you can imagine was pretty scathing, to put it mildly.

But anyway, there they were. They were so strung out that, of course, there was no front line as such. I mean, they were just defending particular villages and crossroads, and that was about it across the whole line of the Ardennes.

And also, German civilians, because of the Ardennes, although it was in Belgium, there was a lot of the German-speaking population. Most of them were not Nazi, but there were quite a few who were Nazi, and they could just wander through, and they came back. And so, as a result, the Germans knew exactly where every single artillery battery was positioned and where many of the fuel dumps and things were.

So this was vital information for them before their attack. Anyway, they brought forward all of their armies, the two and actually the 7th Army to the south, which was going to protect that particular flank.

And they brought them forward bit by bit across the Rhine. And by playing find the lady, they were moving troops all over the front. It was very difficult for the Allies really to track them. And again, another warning should have been that they'd lost sight of where the 5th Panzer Army was. And they thought that the 6th Panzer Army was much further north. And this was where the Germans...

were using the same sort of tactics which the British had used before Normandy with Operation Fortitude. You know, they had fake transmitting stations and all the rest of it, which gave the impression that actually the 6th Panzer Army was much, much further to the north.

So there they were hidden in the forest. And of course, these were the same forest where they'd hidden in May 1940 before they suddenly attacked into France. And it's amazing, of course, that the idea that Hitler might want to repeat history in that particular way didn't seem to occur to the Allies. So come 16th of December,

Out of the blue, they suddenly see little flashes of light on the far horizon. And then a few seconds later, the shoals started landing. And this provoked a contrast in behavior where many just panicked and ran for it. But it also provoked a detachment.

determination and an extraordinary bravery amongst many groups who hung on and clung on in key places, little villages like Lanzarote and so forth, where, you know,

In almost Hollywood movie style, you know, a small group of 18 men managed to defend a little nob against the whole of a Fallschirmjäger, a German paratroop regiment, you know, 2,000 strong, and hold it up for 24 hours. In other places at Saint-Vite, you know, they held on for days. And this was enough to wreck the German army.

plan of advance, and the German schedule, if you like. Yeah, it all depended on speed, of course, Anthony, didn't it? I mean, if they can't get through and behind like they did in 1940, the Allies, with their vast superiority in men and material, are going to bring up the forces that are going to prevent this from happening. Tell us a little bit about some of the key moments. I mean, there's a lot of fighting on the Elsenborn Ridge, for example, which was at the northern shoulder of the advance.

And you mentioned the fact that some of the American troops do fight very well because others are criticized, aren't they, for not bringing up a stronger resistance. But they do fight well in places. Oh, gosh, yes. But one thing I should actually add is the way that Hitler made one miscalculation or so.

He had assumed that Eisenhower would react slowly because he would have to consult with his allies and with Washington and all the rest of it. What he got wrong, of course, was that Eisenhower, as Supreme Commander,

And with the complete backing of both Marshall and Roosevelt, did not have to consult. So the decision-making process on the Allied side was actually going to be rather quicker than Hitler thought, even though the Allies were taken totally by surprise.

And in fact, Eisenhower didn't even know about the attack until almost late afternoon, early evening on the 16th of December. So it almost lasted most of a day before reactions started. But anyway, I'll come to that in a second. I'm going back to places like the Elsinborn Ridge. Fortunately, they

They had some veteran divisions, you know, like the first, the first, the big red one, the first U.S. division. They had the second division, which was on that sort of flank. And the Elsenborn Ridge was absolutely key because this was what was going to basically block the 6th Panzer Army and set Dietrich's lot. So he kept flinging the, you know, the 12th SS, Hitler-Jugend Division and others against it.

Meanwhile, Jochen Peiper pushed ahead up the Omblève valley, which is going to take him straight towards the Meuse. And he did get through because there were very few troops along his route.

But the actual Elsenborn Ridge, who proved to be not only a considerable defensive position, but also it had sufficient artillery in the area. And with its commanding height, the American artillery was able to hammer their supply lines and forming up zones and all the rest of it to greater advantage. But to go forward to the decision-making,

in that over the next day or so which was absolutely vital Bradley spent the whole of the day of the 16th on the road to Versailles um to greet Eisenhower and Eisenhower just received the news that he was being promoted to general of the army so finally he had five stars and he this meant that he was certainly at least the level same level as Montgomery which

which, of course, was a great pleasure to the American generals, believing that Montgomery would be able to mess around so much. And he and Brad celebrated together. But then they suddenly got the information of what was happening. Now, Bradley refused to take this attack seriously. Eisenhower showed a much better instinct. He realized this could be much bigger than they were hearing at that particular point. And he immediately got on to Patton.

And Patton was preparing to launch a major offensive in the south. And, of course, Patton started cursing like hell when Eisenhower immediately told him to start sending troops and support north, especially the Tent armor division, the U.S. armor division, and other troops to the north to help for the break troop.

Bradley felt that this was wrong, that Padley Patton should be allowed to carry on with his offensive and all the rest of it. Already, he was completely out of the loop of what was starting to happen. And he drove straight back to Luxembourg, where his headquarters were. And he refused to move his headquarters because he felt that that would completely traumatize the Luxembourgeois because they would regard that as Americans abandoning them and all the rest of it.

But by insisting on staying in Luxembourg, he was going to be cut off from the whole of the battle because the German attack and the German bulge was going to be just north of Luxembourg. And so he was going to lose contact with two of his armies, with the 1st Army and the 9th Army to the north. And this was going to be, if you like, the basis of all of his troubles.

When he finally got back on the 17th to his headquarters and he ran into the operations room, his only reaction was, where the hell has this son of a bitch got all these troops from? I mean, he still couldn't believe, you know, that the whole thing really was going through. Eisenhower, meanwhile, was not wasting any time at all. He ordered his immediate reserve, which was the two parachute divisions, the 101st and the 82nd.

who were, if you like, licking their wounds after the Operation Market Garden. He got them to stand by. Many of them were, of course, in Paris, so they were having to send NPs all around Paris, around every brothel and cabaret and all the rest of it, getting the paratroopers back onto lorries and back to their camp, where they were just grabbing ammunition and weapons. He was also getting ComZ, Communications Z,

to stand by and get together every single Tentron truck they could to transport the paratroopers back forward to the battle lines. And on the following day, then they had this great meeting conference at Verdun, which was actually Bradley's rear headquarters in this sort of barracks there.

And this is where Eisenhower said to Patton, you've got to be able to move and redeploy the whole of Third Army so that you can attack the southern flank of the German attack. Now, Patton, and this is where, if you like, it was a mark of his genius, if you want to say it, had guessed immediately what was happening. He already had troops on the move. He'd given the orders even before the conference, knowing that this is bound to be what the case was.

And Bradley, to everybody's astonishment, was still trying to sort of counter-marm this and say, no, no, we don't need to do this. So, as I say, in a way, it was Eisenhower's finest hour as a field commander. And it was very definitely Bradley's worst moment. And it was going to get worse in a way very soon afterwards. Okay, we'll take a break there. Do join us in a moment when we'll hear more from Anthony about the Ardennes Offensive.

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Welcome back. We spoke at the beginning, Anthony, about Monty's role and the cause of bad feeling among the senior Allied commanders. And yet he does perform, at least while the battle is underway, pretty effectively, doesn't he? He does. He does. But Monty was there up to the north. He was at Zonhoven in the Netherlands as commander of 21st Army Group.

And he had no information at all about what was going on. So Monty immediately sends out his gallopers. Now, these were, you know, bright young officers who he sent out in jeeps to find out with radios and so forth, but to find out exactly what's going on. He also had the SAS and he had the Phantom squadrons. And those were immediately ordered to swan forward to find out exactly the position.

And they got to First Army headquarters at Spa, where General Hodges had suddenly decided to pull out because, of course, Piper's camp grouper, his battle group, was heading towards Spa. They'd pulled out. He was in no touch with Bradley. And so, I mean, on the northern flank, there was total chaos. The Americans were not in charge of their own troops.

And this is where Eisenhower, with one can imagine a large degree of reluctance, when he was approached by some of his staff officers who said, however much we dislike Monty, and this were British staff officers too, the only thing surely here is for Monty to be given command of the northern flag, which meant the Knights Army and the First US Army, as well as obviously his own troops.

Now, Monty did not waste time. He got Horrocks with the 30th Corps to start moving towards the Moors to guard those bridges, so as to make sure that there was no question of the Germans ever getting across the River Moors.

You know, they started to know within about two days from ultra intercepts that Antwerp was the target, the real target of this whole operation. Many others were sort of panicking, thinking that the Germans were heading for Paris. This was not the case at all.

But anyway, the British started to move. Monty, I'm afraid, with his characteristic lack of tact, arrived at Hodges' headquarters and found that Hodges had actually frozen. I mean, he was in a state of almost... He was almost in a catatonic state, not knowing what to do or anything like that. And his chief of staff was trying to run things, a pretty aggressive man. But there was Monty who arrived

in his Rolls Royce with Outriders and all the rest of it, coming, as one American scarf officer described it, like Christ to cleanse the temple. And he insulted the American officers appallingly by refusing to listen to their briefing and summoning his own gallopers to tell him exactly where the Germans were and what the situation was. So, I mean, talk about, I mean, the lack of diplomacy was mind-blowing.

I'm afraid to say, I mean, well, as a result of the Ardennes book, I came to the conclusion that Monty probably suffered from, you know, high-functioning Asperger's. I mean, he had no idea of how people saw him. He was so wrapped up in his own sort of psychic power.

And funny enough, although this was, should we say, unpopular with certain people, I was intrigued. I mean, I put it forward just purely as a theory, but his stepson who'd lived with Monty said as far as he was concerned, it was the best explanation of Monty's very strange character.

And then I found afterwards that there was a professor of psychiatry at Trinity College Dublin who'd written a long paper on Monty and high-functioning Asperger's. So anyway, there we go. But this was going to be an even greater problem as the battle wore on. But he did handle things extremely well.

Yeah, I mean, one of the most shocking aspects of the battle, and maybe we shouldn't be that surprised given, you know, given what's happened on the Eastern Front, that as you say, some of the Germans had come from that area, was some of the brutality. And this was on both sides, ultimately, wasn't it? Although, of course, for the Americans, I suppose it was a reaction to some of the atrocities. So tell us a little bit about that. And also the role played by Otto Skorzeny's SS commandos who went behind lines dressed as Americans.

Right. Well, you're quite right. Let's first of all, Otto Skorzeny and his lot. I mean, he was admired by his SS followers as sort of the pirate king. And their idea was to, in contravention of all the rules of war, infiltrate American lines using captured Jeeps and American uniforms with American speakers.

who had all been trained on, you know, how to smoke a cigarette in the American fashion and how to use your knife and fork just in case. I mean, some of it went to a ridiculous degree. And this, of course, when as soon as people start to realize that there were German units roaming behind the American line, this increased American paranoia. So when news of the Malmedy massacre, because Piper's lot,

were not just brutal in their attack. There was a desire for vengeance of all the bombing of German cities and all of their resentment that the SS had failed to win the war. So they were shooting Belgian civilians as well as American prisoners of war. And they massacred 82 prisoners of war, Americans, who they captured who just...

unarmed and arrived not knowing that Piper and his spearhead had broken through so far. So they were surrounded, lined up in a field and gunned down. So once word of that got around, the Americans were swearing they were not going to take any more prisoners. And every time Germans came forward with white flags or raising their hands, in many cases, they too were gunned down.

Now, the other diversion which the Germans had planned was Colonel von der Haighta, the commander of the 6th Parachute Regiment, who had been in the parachute drop on Crete and all the rest of it.

He'd been ordered to drop behind American lines. And I mean, the whole thing was so chaotic and so badly organized. None of the pilots dropping these paratroopers had ever dropped paratroopers before. They were ordered to go ahead, even though the wind speed was up to 58 kilometers an hour, when the maximum allowed, or in theory, the maximum should be 20 kilometers an hour.

And many of the paratroopers that he jumped out were just blown onto the propellers of following aircraft. I mean, it was an absolute mess. And in the end, even when the stragglers came together, I mean, out of 1,200 who were dropped, only about 300 died.

came together, Haida broke his leg, and that all turned out to be an absolute mess. But he did mean that the paratroopers plus the Scorzeny commanders operating behind American lines did contribute to this sort of paranoia. There's a wonderful moment, of course, typical David Niven, who was one of the Phantom Squadron officers,

terribly elegant in his rifle brigade uniform, was stopped by one lot of suspicious Americans. And they demanded, you know, who won the World Series in 1940? And Niven replied, well, I can tell you that, I don't know, I haven't got a clue, I haven't got the foggiest idea, but I can tell you that I did make a film with Ginger Rogers in 1938. Well, of course, they recognized it from the movie and they said, all right, Dave, beat it.

So we've spoken about the good early start that Germans got in this offensive. But in reality, the fighting's really only in the balance for the first week or so, isn't it, Anthony? I mean, it drags on into January, late January. You're quite right. I mean, for the 5th Panzer Army advancing, the 6th Panzer Army was blocked at the Elsenborn Ridge. Peiper was eventually ground down and his convoy

column was broken up and he couldn't get any further. But Manteufel, with his 5th Panzer Army just to the south, was charging through to seize Bastogne. Now, Bastogne was the largest town there. It was the headquarters of the 8th Corps. And of course, it was the center of communications. All roads, really, in that part of the Ardennes had to go through Bastogne. So this is why it was an absolute priority, A, to hold it and B, for the Germans to seize it.

and the paratroopers from the 101st, the 82nd were used elsewhere, but the 101st were all in these tentan lorries driven through a freezing night and dropped off in Bastogne. And they got into position just as the Germans were arriving. And I mean, it was literally almost a matter of minutes, but it was certainly a matter of a couple of hours or whatever. If they'd been any later, the Germans would have been straight into Bastogne.

And anyway, this forced Hitler into a decision.

And once again, Hitler, out of impatience, made entirely the wrong decision. He ordered Manteufel to carry on to the River Meuse, but to keep on attacking Bastogne at the same time. So basically, he was splitting his forces, which meant they achieved neither objective. So you have the 2nd Panzer Division and others, you know, pushing forward towards the River Meuse, where fortunately,

Horrocks' 30 Corps were already getting into position. There were even some scratch French battalions being sort of put together and so forth, because it was completely open to the Germans, while the other German divisions were ordered to surround Bastogne and start attacking inwards. And this is where the paratroopers, as I say, arrived just in time. And they combined with a battalion of tank destroyers and scouts

Some of the survivors of the 10th Armored Division managed to fight very effective, brave battles. I mean, the courage showed when they were often short of ammunition, definitely short of food, holding them off down the roads leading into Bastogne.

So effectively what you're saying, Anthony, is because of maybe these two key defensive actions at Elsembourne in the north and Bastogne further south, the Germans are held up long enough for reserves to be brought in. And slowly but surely, this great offensive runs out of steam. They don't actually get as far as the Moors, although they get pretty close, don't they? I think you say in the book the battle is effectively over by Christmas, although it takes another month of hard fighting before the bulge.

This big bulge into the Allied line, which is where the battle gets its name, before that was finally flattened. Well, the weather was a key factor because during all of this particular period, from the 16th of December for 10 days up to the 26th, it had been completely overcast.

And then what was known as a Russian high, which meant freezing cold weather, but absolutely clear skies, started. And this is where the Americans were able, A, to fly in support and medical supplies into Bastogne for all the wounded sort of kept in cellars in the city, which was under bombardment the whole time. But also it meant that the fighter bombers and others were

were able to start taking out the German tanks. They could follow the tank tracks through the snow to see where the tanks were hidden and hit them with their ground attack aircraft, with the Thunderbolts and others.

But there was one other I should have mentioned. Sorry, there was one other key defense, which was the defense of Saint-Vite, which was also on that row, where continual attacks and orders, you know, Saint-Vite had to be taken. The very, very brave defense of Saint-Vite by American troops, again, held the Germans up for almost a week there. So all of those, but you're quite right, Elsenborn, Bastogne and Saint-Vite,

slowed up the whole process of the German advance. So the idea of getting to the MERS in 24 hours, you know, here they were 10 days into the campaign and they were now within only a few kilometers of the MERS.

But the tank regiment from the Royal Tank Regiment from Horrocks and others were there and then started the American troops then also started to come piling in. And there was no chance. The Germans stood no chance. And by then, they were running out of fuel because in most cases, they'd failed to find the largest of the fuel depots. So...

they were also short of ammunition but above all it was a question of fuel and even though they got just enough for that particular time soon they were having to start even abandoning their end vehicles we tend to say never say never as historians Anthony but do you think it ever even if things had you know gone its way or gone its way even more than they did could it have ever succeeded this offensive no that's fair this

is the answer to that. You know, they simply, even if they got all the way to Antwerp, it would have been such a narrow corridor, but the British in the north and the Americans as well would have been able to break it with ease. So, I mean, in fact, the armoured thrust never really stood a chance. And all of the generals, I think there were about only two out of all of the divisional commanders, you know, 32 divisions,

I think there are only about two who actually believed that it stood a chance. So from that point of view, I mean, this was Hitler imposing his own fantasy on his own armies, but they couldn't say no. Ever since the July plot, you know, the Nazis were now completely in command and the generals couldn't, I mean, they knew perfectly well what their fate would be. They'd be arrested for treason if they refused to carry out the orders.

You mentioned at the beginning, Monty, we've spoken about him a couple of times. He does quite well during the battle, but he was far from his finest hour after the battle. So tell us about that, really, the consequences for the Allied senior commanders, but also the consequences for the Germans in having expended, really, the reserve of their armor in this failed offensive.

Well, I think basically almost all, and even the Americans later admitted, almost all of Monty's decisions were actually spot on. I mean, the Americans, having been caught out, that both Patton and Bradley were far too impatient. They wanted huge counterattacks on the Germans left in the bulge and all the rest of it. Monty quite rightly has said, listen, the snow is so damn deep.

The Shermans can't operate well in the snow. And it was true, they had very narrow tracks. And to get infantry to charge across open ground against defensive positions would lead to totally unnecessary casualties. So Monty was right in every single way there. The trouble was that, again, the British journalists, as soon as news got out that Monty was commanding the

American First Army and the Ninth Army, the British press again behaved abominably by sort of crowing away and saying, now Monty must be made the Grand Commander of the whole of the rest of the war.

This infuriated the Americans, not surprisingly, back in the U.S., but also in the U.S. armies in Europe. So Monti then also makes things worse by writing to Eisenhower, basically demanding that he should be given command over the other American armies. Eisenhower is furious, writes back a very stiff letter with Marshall's support,

But Monty still doesn't really get the message because although he has in a way been put back in his box and Churchill is getting very nervous about the way that Monty is wrecking allied relations. And so is Field Marshal Brooke, who's Monty's biggest supporter up till then. Monty then sort of says, well, I'm going to make a speech, you know, I'm going to make a speech to praise General Eisenhower and say I'm 100% behind him and all the rest of it. And Churchill sort of says, well, all right, I'm hoping that makes things better.

Well, Monty makes a speech, but he goes off text and then starts boasting, saying, one of the most interesting battles I've ever conducted. And, you know, it sounds as if he was the commander-in-chief throughout the whole battle in every single way, and that it was almost an Anglo-American operation. When, of course, such a corps hardly did any fighting at all. The Americans lost 80,000 casualties. The British lost 2,000.

I mean, you know, so the fury of the Americans. Eisenhower said no American would ever serve under Monty again. And he was so angry that even long after the war, he said that Monty is a psychopath and, um...

You know, he simply, simply will not have anything more to do with it. And I think it even contributed to Eisenhower's fury over Suez and the ways that the British were humiliated by the Americans when Eisenhower was president of the United States and refused to back the British and the French and was outraged at the way we behaved. So, I mean, it really did have, I think, an effect for a long time afterwards.

Did it impact, interesting enough, Anthony, the decision by Eisenhower not to go for Berlin, which Monty was pushing for and so was Churchill to a certain extent? Was there any impact on that from Monty Perry there?

Oh, God, yes. This is why Monty was diverted up the north and to Hamburg. But the trouble was Eisenhower then did get that wrong because he had this obsession with the Alpine fortress and all the rest of it. And he was completely conned by Stalin in April. It was the famous April Fool from Stalin.

saying that he wasn't going anywhere near Berlin, he had no interest in Berlin, everything was going to happen much further south. And as a result, anyway, it didn't make any difference really to the outcome of the war in that particular way. But I'm afraid Eisenhower was totally conned by Stalin.

And finally, Anthony, the Germans shot their bolts with the Ardennes offensive. I mean, they were going to lose anyway. Did they lose quicker as a result of this expenditure of armor and weapons? Oh, yes. And the trouble is, of course, Stalin would never acknowledge that actually the German defeat in the Ardennes and the destruction of most of their armored vehicles meant that when it came to the battles in Hungary...

And of course, the great winter offensive of early 1945, of January 1945, they were able to advance all the way from the River Vistula to the River Oder within striking distance, almost to Berlin, in less than two weeks. I mean, you know, it was one of the fastest battles, fastest advances in the whole history of warfare. But that was very largely due, as I say, to the destruction of the German panzer arm

the fifth panzer army and the sixth panzer army that's wonderful anthony thank you so much that was a tremendous listen i have to say to get an author of anthony's reputation to go through in such forensic detail a story as dramatic and listeners will remember i think from the battle of the bulge feature film a story as dramatic as the arden offensive is pretty special actually uh

I loved every minute of it. Do join us on Friday when we'll be hearing the latest from Ukraine and also next Wednesday when we'll have another episode of Battleground 44. Goodbye.