238. Is this the final chapter of the war in Ukraine?
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Hey there, Ryan Reynolds here. It's a new year and you know what that means. No, not the diet. Resolutions.

A way for us all to try and do a little bit better than we did last year. And my resolution, unlike big wireless, is to not be a raging a**hole and raise the price of wireless on you every chance I get. Give it a try at mintmobile.com slash switch. $45 upfront payment required, equivalent to $15 per month. New customers on first three-month plan only. Taxes and fees extra. Speeds lower above 40 gigabytes on unlimited. See mintmobile.com for details. Hello and welcome to Battleground with me, Patrick Bishop and Saul David.

With President Trump's inauguration only 10 days away, speculation is reaching fever pitch as to whether the last chapter in the Ukraine war is about to open. In Ukraine, there's fear, there's hope, there's resignation and sometimes a mixture of all three. Outside Ukraine, there's enormous interest in how Trump will approach this first great problem facing his leadership and what his approach will mean for geopolitics in the next four years.

Inside Russia, well, Russia, or at least the workings of its leadership, is, as always, what Winston Churchill once called a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. But to help us read the runes, we're going to be talking to Alan Phillips, longtime Moscow correspondent for Reuters and the Daily Telegraph and veteran Russian watcher, who will be giving us his thoughts about how things may play out for Putin in the coming year.

But first, there have been some surprising and also, it has to be said, some alarming events on the battlefield, haven't there, Saul? Yeah, I mean, the surprise is that just when we thought it was all over, that the Ukrainians' efforts in the Kursk salient were pretty much exhausted, they've launched a new offensive there, clearly aimed at reversing the gains the Russians have made in recapturing territory taken in the initial Ukrainian incursion way back in August.

It looks like an all-arms battle with tanks spearheading the attack and Russians using airpower and armor to counter the thrusts, which seem to be focused on the area of Berdin, a settlement about 35 kilometers inside the Russian border, just west of the main road to Kursk city. Now, I've seen geolocated footage, which was published on January the 5th and January the 6th, which indicates that

Ukrainian forces recently advanced not only in southern Berdin, but also in two adjacent directions. And all of these are northeast of Sudza, which is the main town which is still in Ukrainian hands. Now, needless to say, the picture is still pretty murky, Patrick, not least because Ukrainians are so good at operational security, or OPSEC as it's known, while attacks are underway. But

Some details have emerged and some comments have been made by both sides. Here's a Russian mill blogger, the archangel of Spetsnaz Z, who has 1.15 million subscribers on Telegram. And he wrote earlier this week, the enemy is driving forward with tanks and armored personnel carriers full of soldiers.

Both Ukrainian and Russian officials have confirmed the attacks. The Russian Ministry of Defense said, not surprisingly, that its forces were defeating Ukrainian military formations in Kursk. But Andriy Yamak, head of the Ukrainian presidential office, said that the attacks had scared and worried Russian forces. And just how scared the Russians might have been by these attacks is indicated by the dispatch reports.

by the Kremlin of one of its top generals, a guy called General Yunusbek Yevkirov, was photographed meeting Alexander Kinstein, the acting governor of the Kursk region, in what appears to be designed as a tough response to the Ukrainian attack. Just a bit of context on Yevkirov. He was promoted in December 2024 by Putin and trusted to run border defenses and Africa mercenary projects. So he's obviously sent him there to sort things out.

But what do you think is going on, Patrick, at least as far as the Ukrainians are concerned? Well, it seems to me pretty obvious that this is an attempt

to regain some of the ground lost since the August incursion, primarily for political reasons, i.e. in order to have as many territorial chips in hand when the bargaining begins on the peace front. So listeners will remember that Ukraine claimed to have captured about 1,300 troops

square kilometers initially. But since then, Russian forces, including, we shouldn't forget, North Korean soldiers have reportedly retaken around half of that lost territory. So I think probably the primary aim of the operation was to seize ground that could then be used as leverage to price back Ukrainian territory, no Russian hands in future negotiations. And the timing suggests to me, Saul, that

Kyiv is assuming that Donald Trump is going to follow through on his rhetoric and will be looking to get both sides to the table as soon as possible.

after the 20th of January. But looking at the broader military picture, clearly the Russians have had the same idea, haven't they, Saul? Yeah, it would seem so, Patrick, judging by the effort they're putting into the Donetsk front. I mean, we've mentioned incremental gains over the last few months, in fact, over the last year. But the alarming news today is that it seems that the important objective of Churakovo has now fallen with authenticated images confirming that much of the city is now in Russian hands. Why?

Why does this matter? Well, it's a major milestone on the way to Pokrovsk, which the Russians have been trying very hard for the best part of a year to capture and losing, as a result, many thousands of men in the process.

Why are they making all this effort? Well, Pokrovsk is a major stronghold, a linchpin in Ukraine's strategic defensive arrangements designed to prevent a serious Russian breakout. It's a big logistics base and transport hub for the military. It has lots of roads and railway lines intersecting there. And the fall of Kurokove means they are now only 35 kilometers south of Pokrovsk.

They will now, as a result of this capture, be able to move up to tighten the encirclement of Pokrovs from the south. Some Russian units closing in from other directions are reportedly only eight kilometers away. Now, if Ukraine loses Pokrovs, it will be much harder to move the troops, provisions and ammunition to other parts of an overstretched front line in eastern Ukraine.

It will also bring the war much closer to central Ukraine. Dnipro, one of the biggest cities in Ukraine with a population of around a million, is only two and a half hours away by car. Now, on last week's show, Patrick, you blithely said that you didn't think Russia had the wherewithal to mount a major push that would significantly alter the strategic situation.

that might still be the case, but the staggering losses we keep referring to don't seem to have slowed things down at all, do they? Whatever happened to the traditional winter pause in fighting? And should we be seriously worried, do you think? Well, I think we should be worried, but perhaps not seriously worried. And you're right to reference that, you know, that the lack of a slackening of tempo, you know, throughout the eons, the ages, um,

armies tend to slow down in winter, don't they? But we're not seeing that here, particularly in Ukraine. So, no, I think the answer to the question is that I don't see a collapse yet.

of the front in the current circumstances. They've still got a long way to go before they take Podkarsk and who knows what will have happened on the diplomatic and political front by then. But I think the only real concern is if US aid to Ukraine does stop. And that is something that's been talked about. That's something we'll be talking about later on. I don't actually think it's going to happen. But let's not panic just yet. But

But talking about the whole peace scenario, there's been a lot going on, hasn't there, inevitably. And the first thing I'm noting is just how active Zelensky's been in doing everything in his power to maximize what is sometimes called first mover advantage. That is taking the initiative and trying to shape the diplomatic landscape as favorably as he can in these circumstances. He's doing that by...

signaling to Trump, who of course is going to be the key personality in all this, that he's as eager as anyone for peace, and thereby drawing a very sharp distinction between himself and Putin and the Kremlin, the utterances from which have thus far been largely hostile and negative. So he's signaling constructiveness, readiness to engage,

he's also trying to sort of set the agenda as he busy Trump hasn't really explained what it is that he's got in mind he's made lots of vague statements always people around him have made some vague statements some of them made some much clearer proposals which we'll be discussing later on but I think what's an excuse trying to do is get into Trump's head and put some ideas that that he can then present as his

his own. And he's also been doing a lot of media work. There's a big three-hour long encounter with a rather curious Russian-born podcaster called Lex Friedman, who now lives in the US. He's got a YouTube channel with nearly 5 million subscribers. So he's previously shown himself to be a bit on the kind of Tucker Carlson side of the media fence, if you like. He's had him on the show a

And in this interview, he was asking sort of strange, naive questions. And Zelenskyy handled him with a lot of humor, as you'd expect, and some devastating logic. Now, given that Friedman's audience is pretty much, I would have thought, Republican-leaning, skeptical about Ukraine, it was a smart thing to do to get on that show and try and change the narrative there.

So he's basically hosing down Trump with lots of sort of syrupy praise, saying what a great man he is. He's saying Trump and I will come to an agreement and offer strong security guarantees. Basically, together we can sort this out.

Well, how likely do you think that is, Saul? Do you think that's going to work with Trump? It might, Patrick. And I think it all depends on Russia's response to, of course, what is clear from the messages that have been coming out of the Trump camp is that they are prepared to freeze the lines, offer security guarantees. What those guarantees are means everything, of course.

not entry into NATO within 20 years. Of course, what Ukraine would really like is immediate entry into NATO. But even the rest of NATO isn't really up for that. They've said it's going to take a considerable amount of time. There is a pathway, but it hasn't been mapped out yet. So this is really absolutely key, I think, to Kiev agreeing to enter these discussions. Trump is going to have to say to him two things. One,

If the Russians don't play ball, we're going to give you what you need and the rest. And even if they do play ball, we are going to back you in the future with the sort of security guarantees that can allow you to rest easy at night. Now, exactly what those are is another matter. And it's all really going to depend on the discussions that are going to happen very soon between Keith Kellogg,

who's, of course, Trump's Ukraine negotiator, former general, and Zelensky himself, and of course, his senior security officials. And they'll be trying to thrash out some kind of deal before they then move on to discussing with Russia. And I think that's quite important, Patrick, that the initial discussion is between the Americans and the Ukrainians.

Yeah, I think that's absolutely right. But that's what Zelensky is saying. He's saying that we, myself and Trump, are going to get this thing nailed down and then we'll take it to Russia. Now, that will definitely be the sequencing. But you're absolutely right. It is all about the security guarantees. And I emphasize the word guarantee because everyone in Ukraine remembers the Budapest Memorandum signed back in 1994 under the OSCE auspices when Britain was

the U.S. and Russia gave assurances that they would protect Ukraine's sovereignty. But the key word is assurance, not guarantees. So they've got to get guarantees. They cannot be a ceasefire without a security guarantee of some sort, the shape of which still to be decided, all sorts of variations on that NATO theme. Zelensky has already said this.

made a kind of major concession, if you like, by saying that those guarantees would only be extended to the territory that's currently held by Ukraine. Hence, one of the reasons for this frantic sort of military activity going on at the moment on the

all the fighting that we've just been describing. But, you know, that is as much as he can possibly concede. He can't have what they call a naked ceasefire. He's got to have protection. He's got to have serious cast-iron guarantees that if Russia puts one foot over whatever line that finally is decided upon, then there'll be serious major consequences akin actually to Russia.

triggering Article 5, I suppose, of NATO. So it would be absolutely suicide for Zelensky just to accept a ceasefire, not any real plausible guarantees on future security. Just want to say a few words about Keith Kellogg. You know, there's been speculation about is he pro, is he anti-Ukraine? I think the answer is that...

He's not a flake, get it? Kellogg is not a flake when it comes to Ukrainian security. He's actually said that he may not be terribly pro-Ukraine, but he's certainly not pro-Russian. And his plan, which has been reported by Reuters,

actually has got a fair kind of response in Ukraine. It's basically as much as they could hope for. It looks a bit harsh, you know, leveraging military support as a bargaining chip, you know, unless you show serious intent about negotiations, then we're going to pull the plug on military aid.

But it's also equally tough on Russia. That's the interpretation that's been put by sort of moderate commentators in Ukraine. So I think, you know, he's the right man for the job in the circumstances, the best that Ukrainians could hope for. So he was meant to be going to Ukraine, actually, as we speak. But for some reason, that's...

That visit's been cancelled. I hope there's nothing sinister in that. Yeah, I mean, being delayed, I think, is a better way of putting it, Patrick. There was some hope that he'd actually go before the inauguration. Now it looks like he's going to be going after the inauguration. Exactly how long after, we'll find out because we'll be there ourselves. Well, before we move on to our interview with Alan Filtz, who will be giving us his take on what Russia's position is likely to be in any negotiations, we just want to flag up a sad story from the Ukrainian front lines.

The death has been reported of Jordan McLaughlin, a young Scotsman from Ardermirken in the Western Highlands who was serving as a volunteer army medic and was killed a week ago. He was 26 years old and he'd been on the front lines from the beginning of the full-scale invasion. His family said in a statement, Jordan always believed that he was making a difference and we are all so proud of him helping others. He

It's a long way from Ardnamerkan to the freezing front lines, Patrick, isn't it? But what a hero and what an example to us all. Rest in peace, Jordan. Absolutely. Yeah, it's a very, very moving story. I don't know if you know Ardnamerkan, but it's hard to think of a more peaceful, beautiful, quiet place. It's right up on the western highlands of Peninsular, jutting out into the sea there in the Lochaber area.

And yeah, I mean, I know it quite well. I know that part of the world quite well, and it just seems...

It seems there must be an amazing story there behind Jordan's decision to set off, you know, to do his bit there and die in the process. So, yes, a true hero. Okay, now it's time to hear from Alan Philps, a great Russian expert, an old friend of mine, an old colleague of mine. He's going to tell us what he thinks 2025 holds in store for Vladimir Putin.

Hi, everyone. It's Katty here from The Rest Is Politics US. Anthony Scaramucci and I want to tell you about our new series that looks at one of the darkest days in modern American history, the Capitol riots of January the 6th. You know, four years have passed since Donald Trump supporters stormed the Capitol building and tried to overturn the 2020 election results. And Katty and I are going to explore the tensions and the

personalities at the heart of that storm. Yeah, we're going to look at the whole story, starting off with, of course, the 2020 election result itself, Joe Biden's victory, Donald Trump's attempts to undermine that result right up until January the 6th and those horrifying scenes that all of us watched on television back then. So don't miss it. Go and search The Rest Is Politics US, wherever you get your podcasts, to hear just how Donald Trump tried to defy

American democracy. And we've included a clip from the series for you to listen to at the end of this episode.

of several books, The Red Hotel, brilliant account of the activities of the journalists during the Second World War inside the Soviet Union. And your latest book is going to be about the Kremlin, isn't it? I think that's the physical building as well as the political entity. Can you start by giving us a bit of a historical perspective? It seems to me that Russia is particularly alienated from the West in these days. Can you think of a moment in

in Russia's past when it faced the situation that Putin is confronted with now vis-a-vis its relationship with the West. Well, thanks for having me, Patrick and Saul. I would say the biggest difference is that even during the Cold War, there were rules which everyone abided by. And of course, generally, the leaders of the Kremlin

were fairly cautious folk and wanted to abide by the rules. The rules applied to foreigners, journalists and things working in Russia. And basically, you knew that you might be expelled, for example, but you weren't going to end up in jail charged with espionage.

So, that's a huge difference. Now, looking back in history, and I am writing a history of the Kremlin, but I'm just thinking of the time of Ivan the Terrible. Before Ivan the Terrible, there were some quite strong relationships with the West, and Russia was replacing the Byzantine Empire. But during Ivan's rule, he was so suspicious, basically insidious.

everything was cut off except for some minor trade deals with England actually at the time. And that was at that time Russia's only sort of connection was moving east to Siberia. And of course you can see that

happening now that Putin's major allies are China and of course North Korea. So I would go back to the 15th century to compare this. Of course Ivan didn't live forever and when the new Romanov dynasty took over things rather changed and there was much opening up. So Russia does go backwards and forwards but I think you do have to go back a very long time to see a comparative time to what Putin is facing.

Fascinating. I was going to ask Alan a question which came in from George, which he is uniquely positioned, Alan, that is, to answer. So George says, it seems to me that to many people in the West,

that things are going badly for Russia both globally and domestically. The Russian economy is struggling, hundreds of thousands of Russian men have been lost during the war, then there's disappointing events in Syria, Wagner Group, etc., etc. So the question is this, is there any chance that things are proceeding as Russia and President Putin have predicted and that they have a master plan simmering in the background?

Some are of the opinion that the Russians are masters of the long game and are always several moves ahead of the opposition. Is there any chance that President Putin is actually a political chess grandmaster and these setbacks Russia was experiencing are actually steps towards a victorious outcome? So what do you make of that? I don't see Putin as a grandmaster. He's a consummate tactician, however.

In terms of a long-term plan, I thought you were going to ask me about what he thinks of doing this year. I think he wants to continue what he would no doubt see as the West's striptease before the realities of the Ukraine situation. As you know, whenever he speaks publicly, Putin says he's in favor of peace talks. This encourages the anthills in Washington and elsewhere, the anthills of foreign policy experts to come up with ways to sort of

meet him halfway. And every time a new plan comes up, the West gives a little bit away. You remember some time ago, Putin suggested that it might be possible to delay Ukraine's NATO entry for 10 years. Well, lo and behold, the Trump administration-to-be has now said, yeah, we can offer you a delay of 20 years. Putin has said, well, 20 years, in my book, is a blink of an eyelid. So

So he's still standing out for a rejection, a total rejection of NATO membership, i.e. Ukraine would be forever neutral and with a veto on all its foreign policy actions, a veto wielded by Putin. Now, this doesn't mean that Putin is never going to go for peace talks. There may come a time in a year or two when he needs a break, and then he will count up

the various items of clothing which have been thrown off, ripped off by the Americans. And that will be the starting point. So every suggestion which comes up from America will be rejected and then they'll go further and further. And this is really a long-term Soviet and Russian negotiating tactic. You just say, and you expect the busy brains in the West to come up with something new and ever meet you halfway. And if

And if the talks ever do start, the Russians will have created a sort of baseline. And if the Americans say, well, sorry, we might have said 20 years, but we didn't mean it, then all the sounding boards or the useful idiots abroad will say, ah, the Americans are torpedoing these talks. They are the aggressors. So that is the plan. Is it a master plan? I don't think so. But so long as Russia can export oil,

So long as the price of that oil is over $60 a barrel, I think he thinks the economy will be okay. It may be very tough indeed for people living in the provinces. Apparently, I'll have to look this up, the price of potatoes has gone up 73% this year. Now, if potatoes are your staple diet, not really the case in Moscow and St. Petersburg, that is a big price hike, you could say,

That would encourage more young men in the provinces to sign up for contracts to fight in Ukraine. But so far, as far as we can see, he has enough troops. The economy more or less is okay, despite the dire assessments which you get from economists abroad. So he thinks he's sitting pretty, despite all the bad news.

Alan, you've described Putin as a consummate tactician, not really a strategist, not really someone who can see into the future, but someone who adjusts to the situation as it develops. And you've also made it pretty clear that you don't think he has any real interest in entering into negotiations with Ukraine anytime soon.

But he might be playing a dangerous game, might he not, with a politician as unpredictable as the new US president. Trump is someone who's expended a lot of political capital in saying he's going to find a way to get peace within a day. Obviously, that's not going to happen, but he's obviously hoping to get it sometime soon. And he's hoping to get talks started sometime soon. And the stick...

he and his advisors have suggested will be wielded against Russia, is full support for Ukraine. And that's not just military support, but economic support too, which really could tip the balance in our estimation. I mean, what's your feeling about all of this? How big a risk is Putin taking with this sort of stance? Well, I agree with you that dealing with Trump in the way that he has, or Russia has dealt with previous presidents,

presidents could be very dangerous because Trump doesn't forget when someone has disappointed them, not done what he expected them to do. Putin, of course, has a number of irons in the fire. I mean, if we look at Europe, he could be quite gratified by seeing that there is a growing bloc

in Central Europe of countries which are more considerably pro-Russian and certainly don't believe that Europe should support the Ukrainians. It looks like Austria is about to join Hungary, Slovakia, and probably the Czech Republic too, to be in the Putin-understander camp.

And of course, who knows what the next German government is going to do. So Putin sees a great advantage, a lot of leverage he can wield with the Europeans. So that's in the plus point. Putin thinks that

His fight with Ukraine is existential for Russia. This is ridiculous, of course. Russia could survive perfectly well without Ukraine. People with long memories may recall that France thought it would have no future without Algeria. But of course, that wasn't the case at all. Rather the opposite. So Putin is getting less flexible in his old age, I think. And there is, of course, a danger that he may think that he can run rings around Trump

and do the wrong thing, in which case the conflict could get much hotter, much more serious. Does that mean that the Russians might explode a nuclear bomb? Perfectly possible. That is a worry, yes. We're not talking about a master strategist, but we're talking about a tactician who could actually trip himself up.

Now, something that is virtually impossible to get a grip on is to what extent he's secure at home, Putin, because looking at Russia's global situation, looking at its economic future, looking at the war itself, there can't be very many people around him, A, who are true believers, who have his warped view of Russia's destiny, etc.,

and who one would have thought are largely motivated by self-interest. That self-interest, of course, is being severely dented by what's going on at the moment and what is likely to happen in the near and medium future. Can you say something about how you interpret...

his own position to be at this moment? We really don't know. I think probably dictatorships are quite good at disguising their own weaknesses. I mean, for example, obviously, the state of the Russian economy is much worse than

than the economic statistics produced by the government show, but still not quite catastrophic. Also, dictatorships can be blinded to their own weaknesses. And I'm sure we saw that with Bashar al-Assad. He seemed to have no idea at all what was happening. There are plenty of people around Putin who have acquired wealth and power, and they see no one who could preserve their wealth and their influence.

at the moment, apart from Putin, who still seems able to manipulate and survive the various influences of the lobbies around him. So I cannot see in the immediate future, say two or three years, any major challenge. But I could be completely wrong. But I think he's going to be there for a bit longer.

And what about his international standing, Alan? You pointed out that there is a little bit more support, growing support, in fact, for pro-Putin or understanding, as you put it, understanding of Russia elements within Europe. But

But surely his international standing has been dented by events in Syria recently, of course, with the fall of the Assad regime, which has sought refuge, of course, in Moscow. But also Iran being put back into its box to a certain extent, if I can put it that way, by the degrading of all its allies in and around Israel. I mean, how much do you think this has damaged Russia's standing, particularly with regard to its other major allies, and that's North Korea and China?

I think the Russians consider not really interested in smaller countries. They look in terms of big power, balances of power and confrontation. And in their view, the story of the last 20,

20 years or since the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. The story is of the United States losing its moral superiority, losing its role as the single global hegemon, and other countries, for example, like South Africa, even the United Arab Emirates, turning to Russia as an alternative

to what they see as something of a busted flush in Washington, particularly when the arrival of the second Trump administration is likely to have a few clown cars crashing around in it. So that's the way they see things. Iran, well, they're just providing a little bit of help on the way. North Korea, North Korea too.

slightly more worried about China, of course, because having no friends in the West, Russia is becoming close to being the vassal of China. That would be what Putin worries about. As I said, he sees things in terms of the great powers and his insistence that Russia is going to be up there with the top three. But surely the relationship with China is pretty transactional from a Chinese point of view, isn't it? I would have thought that Russia

you know, the point is approaching where they're going to start seeing Putin as more of a liability than an asset. And of course, historically speaking, there is no love lost really between China and Russia. There's lots of territorial disputes that are laying low for a long time now, but could quite easily fare up again if the tectonics plates shifted a little bit. So all this seems to me to be

Like, as I've said before, he's sort of defying gravity in some senses, isn't he? I mean, there are a lot of potential problems that could erupt more or less simultaneously.

which could trigger his downfall. We've been accused often on the podcast of wishful thinking when talking about Putin's survival prospects. Just give us an idea of, you've said a couple of years that he may still be alive.

at the helm. But how do you think the downfall may play out? Because it will come one day, won't it? It has to come one day. Of course, people have been predicting Putin's death, mortal injuries or something which would remove him from the scene. But he looks a little changed, doesn't he? Maybe we should all have those long tables that he has away from infections.

I mean, as regards China, Russia and China, I suppose, agree on one thing, which is they want to unseat or at least rattle the Americans. Beyond that, really, there isn't very much, except, of course, that the Europeans not buying Russian gas, then China is the only buyer. And, you know, no one talks about it in Russia, of course, but everyone knows that Vladivostok, the major port on the Pacific Ocean,

It was indeed Chinese territory at one stage. And during the moment of Chinese weakness in past centuries, Russia grabbed a lot of real estate, which used to have Chinese names. And these Chinese names do appear on Chinese maps from time to time, which must make the Russian blood run cold. But that's the only port they have at the moment.

If Putin was forced to withdraw from Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, for example, that would be something he couldn't recover from, clearly. I don't see that happening immediately because Russia, for all its faults, has the bodies of

and the oil revenues to keep fighting. And if there were peace talks and some arrangement was met, which didn't meet all of Putin's goals, he has control of basically the media. He could still say it's a great victory. All those who've lost sons, fathers, and brothers in the war might not like that. But the Russians have an extraordinary ability to put up with bad rulers.

I'm going around in circles a bit. I still can't see when these various weaknesses are going to come together and force him out. It will happen, but I wouldn't count on it the next year or two. Well, that was absolutely fascinating, wasn't it? We don't have time for listeners' questions as a result of Alan's excellent interview, but do join us next week when we'll be devoting a whole episode answering our rather varied and fascinating postbag,

Also on Wednesday, of course, for the latest episode of Battleground 45. And again on Friday for the latest from Ukraine. Goodbye. As promised, here's a clip from the Rest Is Politics US miniseries. Trump is naturally a conspiracy theorist fueler. He will fuel the fire of any conspiracy theory because he's always seen himself as an outsider and he wants to foment the

the people from the outside to attack the people from the inside. So he's developing these ideas that he eventually uses in January on the 6th of January. And the ideas are there's misinformation out there. There's lies out there. Let's use these lies as fodder to attack the people on the inside. He's doing it with COVID. I think hydroxychloroquine works well.

You may remember this. I took hydroxychloroquine. Mr. President, you took hydroxychloroquine? Yeah. Yeah, I'm on it. I took it. And this is the beginnings. This is the kernels.

of what's about to come. And it all starts with COVID and it leads up to this insurrection, or as the president says, a very peaceful group of tourists descending upon the Capitol building. If you want to hear the rest of the show, go and search The Rest Is Politics US wherever you get your podcasts.