251. Has Trump secured a deal with Zelensky?
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Hello and welcome to the Battleground Podcast with me, Saul David and Patrick Bishop. Well, we're now into the third week of Donald Trump's presidency and we finally got the first clear signal that the U.S. will not, after all, abandon Ukraine.

But the Donald, of course, wants something tangible in return, and that something is access to rare earth minerals. That's right, Saul. Trump told reporters in the Oval Office on Monday, and this is a quote, and you have to listen quite hard to what he's saying here.

It goes, we're looking to do a deal with Ukraine where they're going to secure what we are giving them with their rare earth and other things. I want security of the rare earth and they're willing to do it. Now he's referring to the fact that Ukraine has upwards of 5% of the world's

These rare mineral supplies worth an estimated 12 trillion pounds, and that's vast reserves of lithium, titanium, manganese, gallium, and neodymium, which are very, very important to new technologies, particularly electrical vehicle batteries, solar panels, and cutting-edge technologies.

military hardware. What I take that to mean, I don't know if you agree with this or not, he's saying we will carry on giving you military support in return for you giving us the rights to these strategic rare earths. So that seems to be the deal. But do you think the Ukrainians are going to go for it? Well, it seems they might actually. I mean, you could see in the quote that you gave that Trump's already flagging up the fact that they're willing to do it. They're being, of course, the Ukrainians. And

And President Zelensky's office immediately endorsed Trump's comments by saying it welcomed them as part of the victory plan that President Zelensky presented to President Trump in the fall. So obviously, they've already chatted about this. And that plan included an offer to make strategic partners like the U.S. a special agreement to access those minerals.

It also warned that we must ensure the security of Ukraine and these resources so that Russia does not simply seize them physically. Well, of course, as we already know, Russia has already seized some of them in the occupied areas of Ukraine. Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk in particular.

where many of these valuable minerals are situated. Now, according to a recent report in The Telegraph by Samuel Romani, Russia since 2014 has consistently concentrated forces in areas that possess the lion's share of rare earth metal. So it's not a coincidence that it's trying to get its hands on these eastern provinces.

And what Trump and Zelensky are clearly concerned about is preventing any more of these rare earth minerals from falling into Putin's hands. This, more than anything, in my view, Patrick, might ensure that Trump actually backs a peace plan with adequate security guarantees for Ukraine, because if he doesn't, those bits of Ukraine that aren't occupied now might be occupied later. But can you see all of this working, Patrick? Well, I must admit, Saul, it doesn't fill me with optimism because it seems to be just another Trumpian idea.

deal, doesn't it? It doesn't seem to be part of any kind of geostrategic plan. It sounds like the kind of real estate transaction which appeals very much to his instincts. So just got to look at that extraordinary Gaza proposal to turn this trip into a kind of Miami on the Mediterranean. So what he's done here, he's taken a peripheral aspect of the story and made it central. There's nothing about security, okay, it's a throwaway remark, but

It seems he's focused not on the big issues which are at the heart of the matter, clearly security being first and foremost. It's replaced territory, I think, as being the thing that the Ukrainians want most. And it seems to show a lack of interest in the broader strategic aspect of the subject, which we talked about endlessly, the showdown between autocracy and democracy, which autocracy cannot be allowed to win. So I think we're seeing something about, insofar as there is a...

driving spirit to his foreign policy is definitely not the one of those values that drove post-war American foreign policy planning, i.e. the propagation of democracy, freedom, etc. I mean, Trump's really just fundamentally interested in his own well-being. He's interested in power and

for insofar as it furthers you know his reputation america of course is very much up there but i think trump always comes first so what we're seeing in practice is a kind of hemispheric division of the globe a sort of new monroe doctrine that was referenced in a listener's comment last week you know basically america wants the western half of the world and what happens in the eastern half

doesn't really bother it too much as long as it doesn't interfere with American interests in the West. So America's hemispheric control clearly now extends all the way up to Greenland and right the way down to Tierra del Fuego. So I think, you know, Europe is basically something he's not particularly interested in.

And he doesn't see Ukraine as a big strategic or moral question. So, I mean, the worry for me is that if he doesn't get a deal with Russia, which makes him look good, you know, how much longer is he going to actually engage in all this?

Yeah, there's no question, Patrick, we can't be certain now how long Trump's attention will stay on Ukraine and rare earth minerals. And yet we do know that this is something that is of big concern to Americans. You know, it's been an issue with the Chinese attempt to really grab hold for itself the majority of rare earth minerals. And it's done that very well with this Belt and Roads project.

This may be something that actually matters a little bit more to Trump. We'll have to wait and see about that. But I suppose what isn't in doubt is that Zelensky in particular seems to be prepared to negotiate a peace. In his most recent interview, that was just this week, he said that Ukraine's partners are not currently providing enough military support to allow Ukraine to recover all of its occupied territory. And as a result, he would be prepared to negotiate a peace, even if he has to talk directly with Putin.

What Ukraine will never do, he added, is recognize Russia's legal occupation of Ukrainian territory. And there could, moreover, be no compromise on Ukraine's sovereignty. So still a long way from the sort of thing that Russia is demanding. Ukraine would, he said, eventually recover all of its territory, either by military or diplomatic means. But that would take time. And he reiterated that Ukraine wants peace.

peace and that the US, Europe, Ukraine and Russia must all be represented in future talks. So he's building up, you know, a situation where Ukraine can be flagged up as very keen to enter into discussions. The question is, will Russia be prepared to play ball? I mean, in that sense, Patrick, it's probably quite a clever strategy, isn't it? Yeah, I think it is. And it's been consistent. And he's, in effect, putting the ball in Putin's court.

and suggesting that they're the ones that are holding up peace. And I think that that is the smart thing to do. That's the right way to go. I think everyone's realizing that you've got to say yes to Trump straight away and then try and finesse it a bit further down the line. So, you know, if he carries on down that path, as he seems to be successful, he's got this, what appears to be a promise or an undertaking to carry on

with the military backing to continue the war, continue the ramped up sanctions until Russia's economy finally implodes, something we've been talking about for a long time, but still hasn't happened. And this was also the strategy suggested this week by Finland's foreign minister, Alina Valtonen. She says, we see the sanctions are working. Russia's economy is showing some serious cracks. We just need to be ramping things up so that there could be peace, hopefully later in the year. So a bit of a timeframe there. Yeah.

Yeah. And talking of timeframes, we've mentioned in the last few weeks, actually, of course, that Keith Kellogg, Trump's special envoy for Ukraine, will surely be heading over to Ukraine in the not too distant future to present Trump's long awaited plan. Well, it looks like that

is about to be presented by Kellogg, not in Ukraine at first, but actually at the Munich Security Conference, which is taking place next week. And that will be a week shy of the three-year anniversary of the full-scale invasion. Now, what about the detail? Well, again, we don't know much. The proposal, as we've mentioned many times before, and we haven't heard anything different. Certainly, reports coming out of the US this week aren't indicating any difference. So that's going to be

a freezing of the conflict along the current front lines but also and this of course is a crucial bit which Zelensky keeps coming back to giving Ukraine sufficient guarantees to deter Russia from any future aggression and the quote from Kellogg this week was I'll meet with America's allies who are ready to work with us and that of course is both NATO powers but also Ukraine we imagine.

Yeah, of course, focus then switches back to Moscow, doesn't it? And Vladimir Putin, who apart from a few sort of flattering remarks to Trump, hasn't really said anything that suggests any real willingness to engage. And on the battlefield, of course, his forces are still battering away at the Ukrainian defenses. But as we keep saying, at enormous cost. Now, there's a

Some new figures from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, they're saying...

the Russian forces suffered 48,240 casualties. That's over three motorized rifle divisions worth of personnel in the month of January 2025, the first month of the year alone, making it the second highest month of losses since the full-scale invasion. And in that time, Russia gained roughly 498 square kilometers of ground.

or roughly 16 square kilometres per day, which is not an enormous amount, but it is making an impact, isn't it? It's what it is.

It's basically setting this narrative of apparently unstoppable, small but steady Russian gains, which gives them, the Russians, an incentive to keep going. Now, we keep saying that these losses are unsustainable if you look at historical comparisons. But I had an interesting conversation the other day with a Russian exile. And they said to me, I said, when are the Russians going to wake up? I mean, they still have very strong...

to the Russia proper family still living there. And they said to me, well, I think you Westerners look, or you non-Russians look at this completely the wrong way. Yes, they're dying in enormous numbers, but most people don't regard them as survivors

sort of Russian lads who have been dragged into an unnecessary war. They regard these casualties as mercenaries because a lot of the people fighting in Ukraine are on contracts. Therefore, the kind of emotional attachment, the sentiment that might go with these appalling losses, which might later translate into some sort of political unrest, isn't there. Yes, there are conscripts fighting there, but a lot of them are actually in Kursk at the moment.

And so it's being sold as, you know, okay, you know, they are dying, but they're getting very well paid. I mean, comparatively speaking, the rewards of signing a contract are pretty high. And then if you die, there's a death grant to your family. So it's actually a commercial deal, which takes some of the kind of emotional sting out of it. So I think that's one explanation for something that we found pretty baffling in the past.

Yeah, I mean, they're missing the point, Patrick. Someone's got to pay for this war. And, you know, the huge sums being spent on mercenaries and also on what happens to the casualties afterwards, the pensions, you know, this is all going to be bankrolled at some point. Meanwhile, the Russian economy is heating up nicely, as you say, the Finnish foreign minister had pointed out, Eleanor Valtonen. So there will be a price to pay down the road, and it may not

be that far down the road. So that sort of attitude that you can just use foreign forces to, you know, to actually get valuable land in Ukraine may blow up in the average Russian's face, but we'll have to wait and see on that. And meanwhile, as we mentioned last week, Ukrainian forces continue to

to escalate their drone strikes on Russian oil refineries and military infrastructure. More targets hit this week, an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai, also the vast Astrakhan oil refinery in Volgograd, a blast, the sixth largest in Russia. And more targets hit last week, all part of a coordinated campaign by Ukrainian UAV regiments to wreak havoc on enemy air bases, ammunition depots and oil refineries deep inside Russia.

Yeah, we've just been given a real insight into the sophistication of those strikes by the excellent Maxim Tukha, the Times reporter based in Ukraine. He spoke to a number of key Ukrainian personnel, including one using the call sign Kasper, who commands the 1st Battalion of the 14th UAV Regiment.

And he had this to say, this is not just one group. In order to succeed, we need to launch dozens, sometimes hundreds of drones simultaneously from different launching sites. And these drones fly a thousand kilometers away. So in order for the operation to be successful, we need to launch decoys too to get across the contact line where the most intense air defense is. We launch decoys to Maersk.

make a corridor for ourselves. And that paints a very vivid picture, doesn't it? It's all of, you know, really complex operations where you have, you know, you feints, you use decoys to draw away the air defenses to use up their ammunition and then steam through the corridors that you've created. Fascinating stuff. And the damage being done is very considerable. To say for 20 of Russia's largest facilities have been hit.

And another soldier quoted, that's Brigadier Yuri Shikhul, who coordinates the strike for military intelligence, Ukrainian military intelligence, says the success rate has increased a dozen times since the start of the war. So, you know, really impressive, you know, that this brigadier is saying that you've

You've got no airfields left within 300 kilometers of the Ukrainian border that they can use to attack Ukraine. The infrastructure for them physically does not exist, thanks to our deep strikes. Yeah, it's extraordinary. And if you look a little bit more deeply into that report by Maxime Tucker, it's not just the decoys and the launching of these drones from multiple different places. And of course, they have to be very careful about avoiding counterstrikes by the Russians, who are very keen to target them, needless to say.

but they're also being used in coordination with deeper strikes by missiles. And there was another report, actually, interestingly, this week, Patrick, which I hadn't really seen confirmed anywhere else that suggests that Trump has actually given authorization for American missiles to be used much deeper into Ukraine. Well, we'll have to see if there's any accuracy in that. I'd be a little bit surprised if that is the case at the moment. I mean, certainly if

as we've suggested Putin digs his toes in a little bit on peace negotiations that might happen but I would be a little bit surprised if it happens now. Okay that's it for this half we're going to take a quick break there do join us in part two for listeners questions.

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Welcome back. Well, the first question is from Peter, and he's in Oslo, Norway. Hi, guys. Love the podcast. Thank you for the continuous work keeping us updated. Now, he stumbled upon a Twitter, that's an X thread, from an account called New Rules Geopolitics.

this week that claimed that horrendous war crimes had been taking place in the village of Rasko-Porekno by Ukrainian troops. Now, that's actually in the Kursk region. The headlines there were mass executions and rape with an order to eliminate all civilians. The videos look real enough, says Peter, and there was even an interrogation of a Ukrainian soldier confessing to these crimes. No doubt that the account posting this is Russian-focused,

friendly and the only media so far that has confirmed this is indeed Russia but do you think it has any truth to it? Do Ukraine really issue orders to eliminate all civilians or is it another propaganda scheme from the Kremlin? Well I had a little look at the news piece on this because Peter very helpfully gave us a

a link to something in a US newspaper called The Express, which has the detail of all of this. But as Peter also mentions, there is no confirmation from any Western sources. In my view, it's almost certainly Kremlin disinformation. That's the point that's already been put out by the Ukrainians in rebutting this.

Is it possible that Ukrainians have committed atrocities on Russian soil? Of course it is. We do know, though, actually, Patrick, don't we, from chatting to Aschold, who went in shortly after the initial incursion and spoke to a number of Russian civilians, and none of them mentioned any atrocities. And he also spoke to a number of soldiers, that is Ukrainian soldiers, who were all told that

actually, in reality, far from being ordered to murder Russians, they had to do the very opposite. They had to be on their best behavior. And as far as Askel's...

could tell that's exactly what they were doing. The idea that you're going to give a propaganda coup to the Russians by ordering your soldiers to murder Russians, which is, of course, exactly what's happened in Ukraine. No, I'm just not buying it for a second. Patrick, what do you think? No, I think you're absolutely spot on there. I think that's the reality of the situation. This is just another propaganda scheme. Of course, in every war, all sides commit atrocities to a greater or lesser extent, but the balance

in this conflict is very much on the side of the Russians. There will be the odd incident where Ukrainian troops have committed war crimes, but I think they're pretty few and far between, and they would have very much come to light. There's Western journalists, proper journalists, independent journalists operating on the Ukrainian side of the lines, and they do their job properly. If there is something to the discredit of the Ukrainians that is there to be reported, it will be reported.

We could take up a whole program on Russian war crimes which day in, day out come to light, executing prisoners, torturing prisoners, etc., etc. They actually provide the evidence themselves by filming themselves committing these atrocities and then posting them on social media for people to, fellow Russians, to enjoy. So I don't think there's any doubt about who is guilty or most guilty here.

Bradley asks us, apropos my comments this week and for many weeks, of course, about these deep strikes into Russia by Ukraine, particularly targeting Russian oil refineries. The pictures look spectacular, says Bradley, and must be a morale boost for Ukraine. But do you know if they're having any significant effects on the Russian war effort? Well, we don't know for sure. But I mean, some accounts are suggesting, I mean, it's difficult to get accurate information out of Russia, isn't it? But

Some accounts are suggesting or some reports are suggesting that actually the production in some of these facilities is down by about 30 or 40%. And given that, you know, huge chunk of Russian revenue is coming from oil and fuel and all the other things that are produced by these refineries, that probably is...

I think there's no doubt that it is having an effect on the war effort. Yeah, I've got one here from, I just want to mention Kevin from Stroud and Gloucestershire has sent us a link to a story about the theft of Ukraine's cultural history from museums by the Russians. And it's a very interesting story. I think it's a very interesting story.

I think we're going to come back to that one, Kevin, because I think it's an aspect of the war is often overlooked, but it's very significant, the whole kind of out of sight campaign against the cultural identity of Ukrainians. I've got a question here from Julia Lee in Iowa City, Iowa, who asks, can you explain how it is that there are NATO alliance members who are against extending membership to Ukraine at this point? Do they not really believe in NATO's power as a deterrent? Yes.

If corruption is the issue, then it would seem a double standard to let Hungary stay in NATO. How is that squared? How uncorrupt was Hungary when it entered NATO? And I think she is referring to the...

recent reaffirmation by both Hungary and Slovakia of their opposition to Ukraine's NATO membership bid. So they're saying very much that they were standing side by side, Viktor Orban, the Hungarian prime minister and his Slovakian opposite number, Robert Fico. I think I'm saying that right. I think we've been corrected on this one. Anyway, that's what I'm saying today.

And they both said the other day, we share the same opinion, not only on what is happening in our countries, but also on the international scene. Now, these two are a bit of a Trojan horse inside both NATO and the EU, aren't they, Saul? But to answer your question,

Julia, I think they're essentially sort of, I wouldn't say allies or agents, but they're certainly on the Putin side of the fence when it comes to defense and security issues inside the EU and NATO. And I think their main objection is that they just want to get this war over. I think in practical terms, they want to get the war over with. They want to get oil and gas flowing again to their countries.

And anything that holds that up is a nuisance as far as they're concerned. They don't see any big moral issue in this. And so, therefore, NATO membership is clearly going to be a big stumbling block to getting that war over. And therefore, that's behind their opposition.

Interesting message sent from Doogie. He writes, listening to your pod about Konigsberg in 1945, and that, of course, is on the Battleground 45 feed, and the tragic story of the Wilhelm Gustloff, which was a ship that was torpedoed by the Soviets with the loss of, I mean, according to Roger, who was on the podcast,

up to 11,000 souls, many of them civilians. There were some soldiers on board, but many of them civilians. But anyway, when he heard that on the pod, he said that, Dougie said it reminded him of a trip he made to Kaliningrad city in 2017. In the English speaking world, the sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff is remembered as a tragedy. And that's true, of course, mainly because of

So many civilians died. But this doesn't automatically apply to the Soviet Russian side. While in Kaliningrad, I came upon an impressive memorial to Alexander Marinesco, captain of Soviet submarine S-13. Marinesco, says Doogie, was a controversial figure in his own right. Alcohol problems, issues with military discipline, etc. No doubt being in a Soviet submarine at the bottom of the Baltic Sea was a rough detox.

But Marinesco is best remembered as being credited, in inverted commas, writes Dougie, with the sinking of the William Gormley

I mean, it's absolutely true, isn't it, Patrick?

And to be fair to Doogie's point, I mean, in 1945, when this happened, the Allies generally would have been reasonably supportive of any attempts to interdict the movement of troops. I mean, if there are civilian casualties as well, you know, that's unfortunately going to happen with the strategic bombing. So, you know, very few tears would have been shed at the sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff at the time. It's only later, really, that we see it as, you know, a completely unnecessary act.

really a rather ruthless act by the Soviet commander. Yeah, I'm just interested in the point about whether when Alexander Marinesco went to sea, he was forced, he had a kind of enforced detox, because I don't know, maybe you do, Saul, whether the Red Navy, the Soviet Navy, was dry. I mean, the American Navy famously was dry,

uh the british navy not so what did you know whether the um whether they had a policy of no alcohol on board or whether there was a vodka ration equivalent to the rum ration something you looked into yeah i'm not i'm not sure it's a very good question actually we need we need to ask our experts we might get roger on that subject i mean having just written a book about u-boats he probably knows what the what the soviets were doing at

the same time even if they're where you know technically the boat should be dry he is the skipper after all and you know he may well have taken a little bottle of vodka with him who knows okay there's one here for you here right up your street saw chris french in fairfax virginia

Last week on episode 248, Saul made a comment about Russia's nibbling gains on the Western Front in Ukraine that immediately triggered a thought. Is Russia duplicating British General Herbert Plumer's bite-and-hold strategy in the Western Front in the First World War? Well, that, of course, is not.

at the end, towards the end, isn't it, when Plumer devises this new way of, well, attempt to break out of the kind of impasse. Do you see any parallels there? Yeah, I do, actually. It's a good analogy. I mean, Plumer's got reasonably positive reputation, which is rare, of course, among First World War generals for devising, as Chris says, the Biden whole strategy. And the point about this is it's really an antidote to the

rather over-optimistic attempts in the summer of 1916 at the Somme in particular, that actually you can make a major breakthrough and roll up the whole of the opponent's defensive line. And if we go back to the Ukrainian attempt to break through, you could see they were hoping to do something similar in the summer of 2023. But the

effectiveness of defense now, particularly with drones and, of course, the very sophisticated fortifications that Russia built and Ukraine has done the same thing, means that it is almost impossible to make a huge breakthrough, although the Ukrainians did something similar in Kursk. And so what the Russians are clearly trying to do is take a bit of ground off

hold it, and then use that as a launch point for the next, you know, bring forward their artillery and whatever supporting weapons they have, and then keep moving forward. And they have done that relatively effectively, although at huge costs. And even Plumer, who made a lot of gains, particularly in 1918, which is when the whole German line was finally beginning to crack down

and crumble, still a lot of soldiers were lost in achieving this strategy. So Russia, I mean, you know, we've addressed it many times. You did again today, Patrick. It is prepared to take enormous casualties to win territory, particularly if it feels, and there are, you know, going back to the rare minerals point, there is some suggestion that particularly in and around Pokrovsk, there are a lot of vital areas

rare minerals. It does make a little bit more sense, doesn't it, when you see them inching forward into land that actually is quite valuable.

Yeah. Got one here from Therese in Norway, who says she's an avid listener. That's very good to hear. Thank you, Therese. And she asked a really interesting question. What would it take for European countries to send troops to Ukraine, if only to guard the borders with Belarus and Transnistria? That's a good point. Or do logistics and maintenance in the rear areas, or even sortie fighter jets out of Poland and Romania against strike drones?

and cruise missiles. She goes on, it feels almost like an opposite sunk cost fallacy. The West has maintained for so long and against so many valid reasons that it cannot possibly enter Ukraine, that it now sees this as impossible, as it's persuaded itself that there's a non-start. And why, oh why, she says, are the Western leaders so weak that they still hold hope that Putin will still simply end the war amiably? And she goes on to say,

to list some of the hints that, you know, the European powers would be willing to put boots on the ground. Macron of France said that Western troops were under consideration, but only if Russia had a major breakthrough in Ukraine. And really, she develops this point very convincingly. So really, this opens up the whole question, doesn't it? Sort of when and where could European troops actually put in a proper appearance?

We saw when we were there that there are actually lots of very unpublicized, I won't say secret exactly, but certainly no one's drawing attention to them, deployments of specialist units, certainly Brits, and I imagine that goes for the French as well, and possibly other European nations, possibly Baltics, Polish, I think certainly Polish, Ukraine.

units they're advising and supporting, but not the kind of public open deployment that Therese is talking about. Well, of course, there's been a lot of talk about what would happen post-conflict, what sort of force would go in there. But yeah, I mean, in the interim...

Very good question. Why? This is one thing Europe can do. It doesn't have to wait for America to give it the green light to do this stuff. So why isn't more being done? Just briefly on that point of a peacekeeping force, I mean, that's going to be a huge undertaking. It's a very long front line. They're talking about 200,000 troops, which effectively means 600,000 troops because you've got to have people being rotated in and out in preparation and reserve, etc.,

So that's a big ask, which begs the question of, you know, would it actually be European troops in the end? Would it be more likely to get approval from Moscow if it was some UN-type force with friendly nations like, or at least not hostile nations like India or...

providing large numbers from their large army. Yeah, I mean, post-war, as you say, Patrick, it's really a question of where they come from. And quite a lot of people, I'm sure, would be willing to step forward. The UK has already said it would to provide a decent chunk of troops to police whatever kind of frozen line we end up with. But

But before the war ends, that's trickier. And of course, the reason it hasn't happened or isn't happening at the moment is because NATO can't agree on this. You've got France and Britain really at the forefront suggesting that troops should be sent in, not in a combat role, but in some kind of support role. But other countries, in particular Germany, aren't so keen on that at all. So there's disagreement on all of that. But what we can say, having spoken to a number of relatively senior people in both the military and in politics,

politics over there at the moment, Patrick, is that they are very keen for this to happen for the very obvious reasons that it would provide a certain element of security for whatever bits of the country those troops were in. The Russians would have to be pretty wary about targeting them, I would have thought, and the Ukrainians may even feel, well, this will actually bring NATO in in a combat sense, which is clearly what some people

in NATO are concerned about. So it's complicated. We personally, or I personally, am a great supporter of more NATO troops getting in there in some shape or form. But clearly, NATO can't agree on that at the moment. Got one here from James Skimming in Hamilton, Ontario, which

addresses a question which has been in a lot of people's minds, a lot of our listeners' minds, which is this thorny issue of recruitment, about manpower shortages, about lowering the conscription age, etc., in Ukraine to provide the human wherewithal to carry on fighting. Now, this is something that struck us very forcibly, didn't it, when we were there, saw that manpower really is the issue now. It's not ammunition as it was a year ago.

They've got the physical means to fight or they've got the material means to fight, but they haven't got the human resources. So James says back in World War II, a young English Canadian who did not enlist voluntarily was seen as a coward by society for king and country and all that.

However, in Ukraine, it seems like most of the fighting to date has been done by people in their 30s to 50s. This seems a bit odd given that this war is an existential crisis for Ukraine.

He raises the question of, are there regional differences in Ukraine about willingness to come forward, don uniform, pick up a rifle, i.e. the further away from the front you go, the less the appetite there is for young men to volunteer. Well, that's a specific question, but I think we ought to talk about this. So what is your view of the essential problem here? And do you think...

that lowering the age of conscription can actually address it in a meaningful way. I mean, it's very difficult for us to make this calculation observing from the outside, Patrick, when it's not our 18-year-old nephews, cousins, family members and friends who are going to get involved. And only the Ukrainians really can answer this question because we spoke to a number of people when we were in Ukraine, of course, recently, and

There was not a lot of sympathy for the fact that the 26 to 18 year old cohorts were not actually doing their bit. This was an existential issue. We've mentioned before on the pod that some of the soldiers said to us, yeah, this will be a problem in the future. Those who did their bit and those who did not, those who avoided it.

joining up to fight. Now, you could be a 20-year-old and volunteer, and some, of course, have done that, but plenty of them haven't. So I find I struggle, as I probably said before, Patrick, to get my head around the idea that pretty much every adult isn't doing their bit in some shape or form. So I can't quite, I mean, I understand the practical reasons why they haven't done it. It's a smaller cohort. They don't want to lose the flower of the youth. Maybe the 18-year-olds are not a

quite as robust as they would have been 30 or 40 years ago, certainly in the Second World War. Tough, maybe a better way of putting it. But even so, it does seem to me a question for the whole country really to have taken part. So it's a difficult one. But, you know, from the outside, it's very hard for us to kind of impose, you know, our views on the Ukrainians. Quite so. And I think that's absolutely right. It's not for us to stand in judgment. We can observe, but I don't think we can judge.

Okay, well, sorry to Jan and Kevin Collins and Glenn and any others whose questions we didn't get round to actually addressing, but we did learn from them. So thank you very much. That's it for this week. Do join us on Wednesday for another episode of Battleground 45. And then, of course, on Friday for all the latest from Ukraine. Goodbye. Bye.

We are now living in a world where cold, hard power is being exercised. Disorder is now partnered with the Royal United Services Institute, the world's oldest and the UK's leading defence and security think tank. And if the UK wants to convene, it needs to bring something to the party. In this week's episode, hear me, Jason Pack, in conversation with Matthew Saville, RUSI's Director of Military Sciences.

We look at Britain's role in the world. Can Britain use hard military power to become an ordering player on the global stage? If we just see ourselves as essentially a place to have nice conversations at Lancaster House, then all we're going to do is be standing still whilst China and Russia are using hard power to achieve their objectives. Follow Disorder wherever you get your podcasts. ♪