283. Could The Strategic Minerals Deal be a Turning Point?
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Hello and welcome to Battleground with me, Patrick Bishop and Saul David. Well, first of all, apologies for long silence from me. That is, of course, if anyone actually noticed, I've had some health issues recently.

which are now happily resolved. But it looks like I'm reporting back to duty at a pretty good time, Asel. Yes, I would say your timing is immaculate, Patrick, because after months of rollercoaster diplomacy that have been almost impossible to interpret in real time, it seems that things are finally coming to a head. And will either result in some sort of ugly and unjust deal between Donald Trump's White House, Vladimir Putin's Kremlin and Volodymyr Zelensky's Kiev, or, and I think this is more likely personally, Patrick,

Putin will overplay his hand and give America no option but to back Ukraine and increase the economic and military pressure on Russia. Where all that will lead, nobody knows yet. Yeah, well, I think there's a lot to talk about here, isn't there, Saul? I think this morning, looking at some of the reactions that perhaps...

The consequences of this finally agreed minerals deal that was signed in Washington as we speak last night, I think the optimism that has been kind of billowing out of that development may be a bit overplayed. So we may be on the same page on that one. But anyway, let's have a look at what actually was agreed. Now, this, of course, is the...

It's significant because it's the first real shift in this logjam, this diplomatic logjam that's been holding everything up and getting in the way of Trump's burning desire to get some sort of peace deal, whatever its actual significance and consequences are. So basically, this is now an agreement to share profits from the future sale of Ukraine's mineral and energy reserves with

Now, this is actually a much improved offer. I think we can all agree on that. The terms are a lot more favorable than they appear to have been in previous iterations. So it basically provides an economic incentive for the U.S. to continue to invest in Ukraine's defense and reconstruction. America now has a stake in the place, as well as answering some of those grievances that Trump never stops addressing.

about how much Washington has given to Ukraine and how little or indeed nothing in his version of events they've got back. So I think it's a big move towards Ukraine's position. There's no payback situation.

So the previous offers were, OK, we're now going to kind of wring that money out of you going forward for this figure of 350 billion, which Trump keeps citing, which almost everyone else agrees is a fiction that we've given to you in terms of finance and arms.

a lot of controversy about what actually has been given. A lot of it's, of course, inventory from decaying US military stocks. A lot of it's contracts to American arms manufacturers. So it's nothing like as straightforward as presented by Trump. So anyway, it's a much more favorable balance, Ukraine at first sight. It's not the shakedown that was on before. No talk of payback. Ukraine won't have to

pay for the money that the Biden administration handed over without conditions, it has to be said. And sadly itself, we're dead for decades to come. It will see the establishment of an investment fund to spur Ukraine's economic recovery from the war. But very interestingly, the language is very different from what we've been hearing before. So I'll just, you can talk about some of the other details, Saul, but...

What strikes me is the way that Scott Besant, the Treasury Secretary, who seems to be one of the grown-ups, I would say, in the Trump administration, he refers to Russia's full-scale invasion. Now, that's very different from the kind of mealy-mouthed evasions that we've had from the White House before.

And Besant went on that President Trump envisioned this partnership between the American people and the Ukrainian people to show both sides commitment to lasting peace and prosperity in Ukraine. He goes on, and to be clear, no state or person who financed or supplied the Russian war machine will be allowed to benefit from the reconstruction of Ukraine.

Now, I want to hear your thoughts on that, Saul. But just to start off with, a lot of people are saying this is a direct consequence of this famous 15-minute meeting in St. Peter's Basilica. We all saw the images, this intimate event in which they sit knee to knee, and Trump is giving every indication that for once he's actually listening to what someone is saying. First of all, what do you think about that, Saul? And also, what's your take?

thought about how much this deal will contribute, perhaps, to a broader settlement. Well, it does seem that that extraordinary meeting in the Vatican, even as the Pope's funeral was taking place, has made a bit of a difference. I mean, the question is, did the content of the conversation make a difference, or was Trump already moving in that direction? Partly because, and let's not forget, Patrick, while they were talking peace, the Russians were still sending missiles in

into Ukrainian cities. And we'll come on to that in a moment because they're still doing that to this day. But of course, including that attack in Sumy, which killed children and a large number of civilians. And I think that did shake Trump. Certainly, he was saying around the time of the Zelensky meeting that it was beginning to look like he was being played along by the Russians on the one hand. And on the other hand, they were unnecessarily murdering Ukrainian civilians and he wanted it to stop.

But let's be clear, as you've already pointed out, Patrick, this is a very different deal from the one originally mooted. And it's also one, if we just look at the kind of optics of the fact that a deal has now been done, and if we accept the argument that it's all about the transaction with Trump, he's finally got something he can crow about. Now, of course, he's saying, well, this is recompense for all the 300 billion he's sticking to that figure that America's already given. It's not at all, Patrick, as you pointed out, the...

Funds will be shared equally from investment going forward. So nothing to do with the money that's already been spent in Ukraine. This is something the Ukrainians dug their toes in about. And it also shows us, I think, another big picture idea really about how to deal with Trump is that you need to push back.

against what he originally insists on. And he's also accepted, you know, or admitted at times that, yeah, it's about the deal. And you set out your hard position and you come back from that. So I think even the seven-point plan that was mooted, we discussed on the pod with Roger last week, Patrick, is something that,

clearly there's room for maneuver on. Now, Putin will be thinking the same thing, but I'm not so sure there is much maneuver as far as Russia's concerned. So just getting back to the deal again. Yes, no repayment for aid already given, as you pointed out, Patrick. But here's another important point. It does not

prevent Ukraine from joining the EU, which is something Roger was concerned about last week, because it leaves Ukraine in charge of its resources, albeit with this division of the spoils, with America in the areas that America invests in. And certainly the Ukrainians themselves are talking up the deal. Yulia Svobodenko, the economy minister, actually signed the deal, saying that it left Ukraine in full ownership and control of its resources, and that the Ukrainian government would decide where

and what to extract. So I think we're talking about a very different type of deal. And one, at least the Ukrainians can claim is something to their benefit, or as they say, for mutual benefit moving forward. I still think we shouldn't get too carried away about this. I mean, Trump did make an intervention. After the deal was signed, he phoned into a American broadcasting company, they were having a phone and he piped up

But he wasn't talking, he was still framing this very much in commercial terms. He repeated this lie that the $350 billion, in fact, it's more like $120 billion, but...

In his mind, it'll always be 350. And saying, we're getting money back. As you pointed out, Saul, they're not, actually. But for him, he had to be able to claim a victory. And that's always been of vital importance to him. But there was nothing in his statement to the broadcasting company that he changed his mind over time.

Russia, there's some optimism that this may come given that he's made a few disparaging remarks about Putin, but nothing like as disparaging as he's made about Zelensky in the past. And I still think that underlying all this, if there is some kind of strategic imperative in his mind, it's that somehow he's going to get a great personal relationship with Putin.

And somehow he's going to, going forward, Russia will sort of start to side with America in the real struggle, of course, which is the contest for dominance, world global dominance, economic dominance with China. And I think that's completely delusional. I think that Putin is always going to side with China. And they're obviously historical and geographical and all the kind of, anyone with a kind of O-level understanding of history or current affairs would understand that China

their partnership, it may be one that's inimical to our interests, but it makes perfect sense for China and Russia to have some sort of

Well, some sort of the relationship they've already declared of undying friendship, eternal friendship. But that seems to be lost on Trump. But I think we're going to come on to Russia a bit later on about the threats to Putin from this apparently positive development. But I think it's interesting that Zelensky seems to have taken a fundamental decision that

whatever deal is done with America, it's better to have America on side, no matter how exploitative and ruthless the relationship may be from the American point of view. Is that how you see it, Sol? Yeah, I do, actually, Patrick. I think he's made a tactical decision to...

not fall out with Trump. Now, that doesn't mean that he can't say, you know, this is not a deal we're absolutely accepting, but we are prepared to talk about it. And we are prepared to not insist on ludicrous demands, which we know that Russians will never accept. So, for example, Patrick, as we know, the Ukrainians have been saying for some time now that

that yes we are prepared to go along with this freezing of the front lines we're never going to accept that those lost territories will be lost forever and even America in its seven point plan which we talked about last week has actually stressed listen if anyone's a

acknowledging the permanent loss of Crimea, it's us, the Americans. The Ukrainians don't have to do that. So I think that kind of fundamental point that Zelensky is insisting on is, yes, we're prepared to go a certain way down the track to keep America on side and to

to get some kind of peace deal and a relief for our citizens from this constant bombardment that's going on in the hope that the Russians and Putin, of course, in particular, are going to dig their toes in and hope for more. And this will lead to a falling out between the Russians.

and the Americans. Now, you don't think that's likely, Patrick, and you might be right because Trump has bigger plans afoot and he's going to put up with a lot of mischief. But it does seem to me, certainly all the signs we're looking at this week, that

The Russians are still a long way from even accepting the terms of the seven-point deal we felt was ludicrously unfair last week. So I think the parties are still very far apart. And although Ukraine seems to be saying the right thing, the Russians don't seem to be. I mean, I'll give you a quick example, a couple of quick examples, Patrick. Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev, you know,

red-blooded Russian nationalists, as we know, said that Russia's war in Ukraine must end in Russian victory and the destruction of the current Ukrainian government. Well, Trump's already said he no longer is going to insist on Zelensky holding elections and therefore possibly being toppled before a peace deal is underway. So these are maximalist demands still being made by the Russians. The former Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Pavlovich

But Petrushev also claimed that this week that Ukrainian civilians, particularly those living in the Black Sea regions, must determine their own future. I mean, this is without those four territories, those four provinces they've claimed. They're now beginning to say, no, no, we want to get our hands on Odessa. So maximalist demands, as I'm saying, Patrick, and a long way from the sort of terms that even Trump is hoping both sides will accept.

Yeah, so the ball is again in the Russians' court, isn't it? By the way, we're going to have the Russian expert journalist Edward Lucas talking about all this with great eloquence a bit later on.

But what about the Russians? Are they in the mood to play ball or just string things along for the moment? As you say, everything that's coming out of the, you know, the attack dog pack in the Kremlin suggests otherwise. But of course, you know, we should never actually take that at face value. And certainly looking again at events on the ground, it hasn't blunted much.

the Russians' appetite for bombing Ukrainian cities. As we were speaking overnight, this is just after the minerals deal was signed, Russian drones killed at least two people, injured another five in an attack on Odessa. Strange to think, isn't it? So we were there not that long ago and it seemed so peaceful and war seemed a long way away. And here we are in a very, several attacks in recent years

in the last month or so on this place that seemed to have actually come to the end of its war, if you like. So in this case, it was right in the middle. Supermarket was hit. The school was hit. And again in Kharkiv, where we were, drone attack on a petrol station, right bang in the city center. And what's really strange is what the Russians, I think,

think they're achieving by doing this at the same time as announcing these palliative, performative

like this four-day ceasefire that Putin's announced to mark the 80th anniversary of the Russian victory in their so-called Great Patriotic War, which they celebrate on the 9th of May. We celebrate victory in Europe on the 8th of May. But it's going to be a big thing this year, isn't it, Saul? I mean, it's going to be very heavily freighted with lots of regime narratives about Russian history, Russian greatness, and, of course, Russian grievances. Yeah.

Yeah, that's right. And just to give a little bit of detail to listeners, I mean, the reason why the Russians insisted on the 9th of May is because, of course, famously, Eisenhower had already signed a deal at Rheim on the 7th of May, and that was to come into effect on the 8th of May. And of course, the Russians were thinking, hold on a second, if the deal is going to be signed, it needs to be signed by us in Berlin for symbolic reasons. And so that signing took place on the

8th of May and it came into effect on the 9th of May and that's why they celebrate one day later and it very much presaged in my mind Patrick the fact that this was going to lead to a completely different interpretation of how the Second World War turned out and the biggest dispute certainly with modern historians is who won the war or at least why the war was won. Now no one's an

under any illusions, of course, Patrick. Just look at the numbers that Russians did most of the dying. But this asks a couple of questions. One, does the body count actually add up to winning a war? Of course, a lot of Germans died too. But in my mind, this is more of the same. This is more of Russia willfully and rather cautiously

callously exposing its men unnecessarily to casualties. I mean, I was talking to Roger about the battle for Berlin just earlier this week, of course, it went out. And he was talking about the casualty list for the capture of Berlin in the region of 300,000, about 100,000 killed. And that's just over a couple of weeks, Patrick. So the number of lives that the Russian commanders and Stalin, of course, as the commander-in-chief are willing to expend is

in these huge, almost human wave attacks is very similar to what's going on today. And as I hinted at, the question is, does that win wars or does economic might win wars? And my feeling, certainly from some of the data I've looked at it, is it's much more about what

the US can bring to the party. And let's not forget, Lenin's lease was hugely important in keeping the Russians in the war in 1941, 1942, and allowing it to counterattack in Moscow in late 1941. Stalingrad, Operation Uranus was basically made possible by the mobility

provided by US trucks. So economic might from the West, but particularly the US, played a huge part in winning the war. Of course, they lost the most lives. No one can deny that. And they killed the most Germans. But was that actually the key reason that the war was won? Well, you'd hardly know that the US had played any part, frankly, Patrick, in the winning of the war, if you look at some of the narratives coming out of Moscow today. Patrick Higgins

Yeah, and we can be pretty sure that on Russian media, you won't be getting historians sitting around a table discussing these sort of issues. It'll be very much the Kremlin version, which is there'll be no mention, of course, that for 22 months of the war, Hitler and Stalin were basically in alliance. That's nearly a third of the duration of the war.

There'll be no mention of the appalling conduct of Soviet troops, the mass rapes they perpetrated on the road to Berlin, etc., etc. But we would hardly expect otherwise, would we? But it is another example of the way that truth is.

has never played much of a part in public discourse in Russia, certainly since the Soviet revolution there. But let's get back to the present. If there is some kind of ceasefire on the horizon, it's going to need to be monitored, isn't it? So it seems that this Anglo-French-led coalition of the willing, very

Very old phrase that actually, that's been sort of dusted off. I remember it back in the days of, you know, post 9-11, the peacekeeping force that was put in, the multinational force that was put into Afghanistan. Well, as it was back on the agenda, it seemed that Taylor quietly disappeared from the stage. There probably was a huge relief of London and Paris, but now it's back front and center. And that's going to pose questions.

a massive problem for Britain and France and everyone else who expressed an interest. Isn't that right, Thorne? Yeah, I mean, a lot of commentators saying that Stammer's really skewered himself by this grandiose gesture that Britain is going to lead this coalition of the willing. But the question is, does it have the capability to do so? Now, a report in The Times the other day revealed that Europe would struggle, that's Britain, France and anyone else who cares to get involved, would struggle to collectively muster 25,000 troops.

to be part of a deterrence force in Ukraine because its armies are undermanned and underfunded. Admiral Sir Tony Radican, the British chief of defence staff, is said to have asked his counterparts on the continent if they could put together a 64,000 strong force to send to the country. He said Britain would be willing to send up to 10,000 men in a meeting earlier this month. However, in subsequent meetings, defence ministers across Europe have said there's no chance they could reach that number again.

And that even 25,000 would be a big ask. And as far as we know, as things stand, only Britain and France are really still prepared to go along with this. So it's interesting. I mean, if there is a deal, who actually is going to police it? Well, you know, we'll have to wait and see. I mean, there is this tendency with the British government to this grandiosity, isn't there? They're always making, striking these sort of Churchillian ideas.

postures haven't really got the wherewithal to do it. I think that's something they should kind of wind them back from if possible, because you do get this sort of big talk and very little follow through, which must make the Kremlin laugh. Anyway, talking of the Kremlin, we're now very lucky to have today as our guest,

Edward Lucas. Now, Edward is a Times columnist, a security expert with a particular interest in Russia and something, I must say, of a prophet and a seer. Way back in 2008, he published a book entitled The New Cold War, which warmed a looming confrontation between Russia and the West. Now, at the time, some critics dismissed this as scaremongering. Now, it's all looking eerily prescient.

Now, Ed is joining us from a fashionable cafe, a pavement cafe, it has to be said, in Brussels. So that explains all the background noises. I hope I don't interfere too much with your enjoyment.

I think that the most surprising thing for me is revolution in military affairs we're seeing in Ukraine. I've always worried that Russia was going to attack, although I did think three and a bit years ago that it was probably going

a bluff at that stage. But I've been worried for years we're heading for war. I was not surprised that Ukraine was able to blunt the Russian offensive and that Putin over-calculated. Like Hitler, he believes he's a brilliant strategist, but the evidence suggests that he's not. But the really surprising thing for me has been how the Ukrainians have managed to transform warfare. We have now this strange mixture of something that would be

to our grandfathers and great-grandfathers who fought in the trenches in the First World War, coupled with something that comes straight out of science fiction of drones with artificial intelligence enabling them to find their targets and

and doing extraordinary kinds of damage in a way that makes old-fashioned mass maneuver warfare almost impossible. Yes, and that is truly a fascinating development, which I think the most modern armies in the world are not really appreciating, I think, and not getting their heads around, and still rather grandly assuming they've got stuff to teach the Ukrainians rather than the other way around.

But let's start off with a diplomacy here, Edward. Where do you think Putin is now and what is he going to do next vis-a-vis? Let's start with Trump and his relations with Trump, which are obviously absolutely vital in all this, the kind of personal relationship, but of course, the ground of strategic considerations. Do you think he's actually...

on top of this still, that he's actually kind of setting the pace, playing the tune, etc. Is that how you see it? If one was looking at this from the outside, one would say that this war will end the way the Americans want it to end because America is so powerful. It could flood Ukraine with the weapons that the Ukrainians need to win. It could impose devastating consequences on Russia.

and Russia in the end is an economy the size of Italy. So it's extraordinary that it's able to dictate terms to the broader West, which is so much bigger and stronger. The problem is that Donald Trump wants to be friends with Russia for reasons that we don't fully understand. Some people think he's actually a Russian intelligence asset. I think that's highly unlikely. I think it's more likely he has this sort of fanboy relationship with Putin and just admires the way Putin runs Russia and would quite like to run America that way.

And he loves the idea of being friends with a powerful sort of macho leader. And that's really setting the tempo for what's happening. He wants, he doesn't really care about Ukraine as such, but he's willing to make his sacrifice Ukraine on the altar of his big plan, which is to make friends with Putin. And the big question for Europe is where does that leave Ukraine?

us. Will we support Ukraine even against America's wishes? And what will America do to us to dissuade us from doing that? But in terms of what actually happens next,

Do you see a Putin is more likely to bend to to Trump's will? Not that Trump is asking very much of him. But do you think that fundamentally, do you think that Putin's decided, OK, here's a pretty good opportunity to end the war? Let's go for it. Let's play the American game. Let's give Trump what he wants and get out of this with a win for us. I didn't feel that Putin at the moment.

is feeling the pressure much. The Russian army is bigger and stronger than it was

At the start of the war, he's got some problems with vehicles and he's finding it very difficult to make a decisive offensive in Ukraine. But he's very slowly making progress. And if it's a war of attrition, he can impose more pain on Ukraine than Ukraine can impose on Russia. So I think he feels he's on the front foot, really. And that is barring a big American or Western surge.

in Ukraine is the way it's going to be for the rest of this year. The Ukrainians don't get anything much out of this deal. And what they're quite rightly worried about is that it would set the stage for what one might call Operation Second Helpings, when after a year or so, Putin would come back and attack again.

particular emphasis here needs to go on the remilitarization of Crimea. It's been a huge Ukrainian success that they basically chased the Russian military out of Crimea, and that's opened the sea route from Odessa. If the Russians were able to come back into Crimea and put the Black Sea fleet back there and have lots of missiles and other assets, they could then switch off the sea route and have the springboard for an attack that would

Ukraine's access to the sea. And that's something that they're very, Ukraine's very worried about. But they don't have a huge number of options. Can they really keep fighting for three years until things change in America? Do they really think the Europeans will be able to

fill the gap left by the Americans? What are they going to do about air defences? They're using up their air defences to shoot down these Russian missiles. But the missiles are quite cheap and the air defences are quite expensive and they're running out. So the Ukrainians are in a difficult, difficult position. My guess is that this so-called ceasefire isn't really going to work, that what we've got now is what we'll probably see for most of the rest of the year. That presupposes, when you say that Russia isn't really feeling the pressure,

that there is no opposition to what's going on from, okay, he's essentially a dictator, but he still has to listen to some extent to his own court, to the FSB, to a lesser extent to the military. Are you saying that there is no pressure at all internally to end the war, not for any moral reason or anything like that, but simply because it's bad for business? I mean, the sanctions do have some effect,

The economy, even a few months ago, if you remember, we were all predicting how it was about to tank this year. In fact, they just actually seem to be doing that. Do you think his position is utterly secure still? I don't think it's utterly secure, but I think it's secure for now. I think the Prigogine episode showed us that when things are going badly...

in Russia's political culture, someone may well roll the dice and see if they can get somewhere. But it didn't end up well for Prigozhin. And as I said earlier, I think so long as Russia can basically feel it's winning and the sacrifices are worthwhile, then Putin's sitting pretty, really. There is, and I want to underline this, there is only one real Russian opposition in

and that is the armed forces of Ukraine. None of these exiled leaders of varying probity and integrity really matter. And within Russia, in the end, I think Russia, it's basically like the Sopranos, so long as the boss is strong and the money's

and the people are feeling scared and reasonably well looked after, they sit tight and do what they're told. If you think the boss is weak and making mistakes and you send blood in the water, then maybe something will happen. But I think that for now, Putin's fairly stable, barring a health emergency. And he isn't getting any younger, so that could do for him. If there was a very severe setback on the battlefield, if the Ukrainians were able to cut the railway link that

that supplies most of the Russian-occupied territories, that would cause very severe problems. If they were able to lead a really devastating blow inside Russia with their long-range strikes, that could have an effect. But these are fairly unlikely, I think, in the current scheme of things. So that seems to me, Edward, as if you're saying that Putin can really take this or leave it and he doesn't fear Trump anymore.

away from the process. As far as he's concerned, he's sort of, I suppose, to an extent, flattered by the amount of attention he's getting from America, but it's not actually leaving him away. If this is truly Trump's ambition to try and sort of prise Russia away from the China axis, then it's not going to work, is it? Well, that's a separate question. So I think you're absolutely right to mention this. Exactly.

dream of pricing Russia away from China. And this has been articulated by the Russia expert Tom Graham in a book published a couple of years ago. And Washington's full of people who think they're Henry Kissinger, who would love to do these sort of grand strategy deals. I don't think it'll work for several reasons. One is that the Chinese have got the upper hand in the Russia relationship anyway. And secondly, history suggests that all attempts by American presidents from

Reagan onwards to have unfriendly relations with the Kremlin always end in tears. And I don't think this sort of attempt to reset will be any different. But the big point is that Putin is flattered by this and will get something out of it. And Trump wants to do it for his own reasons. And that's a separate question from what happens with Ukraine.

there's an attempt right now to broker a ceasefire if that doesn't work america will walk away but what does walk away mean it means not expending any more diplomatic energy on this it also probably means walking away from ukraine so certainly no more american aid and perhaps even a demonstrative halt to aid it may mean putting pressure on europe as well to start supporting ukraine and that will

that will sort of clear the decks for the big story, which is befriend Russia. And I think that's what will continue. The only obstacle in the short term to this is Trump's attention span. And we've seen before that he picks up ideas like toys, Green and Vendee, Panama the next,

trade war with China, whatever. So if the reset with Russia doesn't bring success, he may well abandon it. But I think that's going to be his idée fixe for the coming months. Okay, we'll take a break there. Do join us in part two to hear what Edward Lucas had to say next.

♪♪

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So all this sounds like very bad news for Ukraine, doesn't it? How do you foresee the rest of the year playing out? The rest of the year for Ukraine, I think, is going to be probably fairly grim. They are still chewing on the question of whether to go for real mass mobilization.

They've lost a huge number of their best soldiers, partly because of bad planning, partly because we didn't give them the weapons that they needed. But they're not yet at the stage that Britain was in in the First World War of, you know, all able-bodied men must go to the front. And so that would be a big political hit for them. But I think if they thought they could win...

they would do it. But to win, they need more than just soldiers. They need to be able to concentrate combat power. And that's difficult, part because Russia's ability to hit them with drones is also substantial. And also, they just don't have the support they need from the West. Now, they would argue, and I think with some justice, that what they most need is money. Their defense industry has shown a strong

extraordinary ability to produce new kinds of weapons in great effectiveness in large numbers and in conditions that are largely immune from rushed attack but it's still working at about half power so if we were able to give them the money they needed particularly for rocket engines which is something that they need

they could start raining down death and destruction on Russian cities hundreds or even thousands of kilometers from the front line and that's a potential game changer. I also mentioned the railway, if they could hit that, that's impressive. They can also continue their targeted assassinations of Russian leaders. So,

So they think they've still got some cards to play, contrary to what Trump said in the Oval Office to Zelensky. On the other hand, they're taking heavy hits from these drone strikes and missile strikes on their residential buildings and public infrastructure. And they'll be looking with great concern towards next winter and what Russia might try and do to their power grid. But I think they're willing to keep going for the next few months and hope that maybe fortune brings them some benefits.

The alternative, which is to accept the truce, let Russia come back for second helpings in a year or two, spills death and destruction not just on a particular scale, but on a general scale for the whole country. They know that Putin won't stop till Ukraine is destroyed.

as a culture and as a country and as a people. And they're willing to fight for that. I wish we were. It sounds to me then that your view is that they don't really have any choice but to continue and that to cede to a peace plan of the sort that's being proposed by Trump would be disastrous ultimately. Yes, I mean, to some extent, they face the choice between disaster now and disaster later. But with disaster later, things may change. Disaster now just guarantees disaster. Yeah.

I'm just bringing back your own personal knowledge of deep knowledge of Russia, the long study you've made of its motivations, its leadership, its history and all the rest of it. What have you learned in the last three years about Russia that you didn't know before? What has this conflict or this new phase of the conflict told you that was surprising? I think that my basic analysis that Russia is an old-fashioned country

empire based broadly on a sort of ethno-nationalist idea that speaking Russian puts you in a political category. I think that hasn't really changed since

the early 1990s. And that's not really my idea. That comes from the Baltic states where I lived in the early 90s. And they were warning us back then we didn't listen because I was living there and I did eventually get the message. And I think obviously all this has intensified under Putin. And I continue to be slightly surprised by the extraordinary sort of lurid, almost Nazi rhetoric that you hear everywhere.

on Russian state television from people who, you know, sometimes who we've previously categorized as so-called liberals and modernizers. I'm also struck by how skin deep the sort of pro-Western liberalism of the Russian so-called opposition is and the unwillingness to understand that this is, if you're a Russian, your only real choice is to wish for Ukrainian victory.

rather as Billy Branson, Marlene Dietrich and other great anti-Nazi Germans did during the Second World War. And they felt sorry for the Germans as we bombed their cities. But in the end, they knew the key thing was to defeat Hitler. That view is fairly narrowly held.

among the so-called Russian opposition and that's been a sort of disappointment to me. I was hoping to see more of that and I think that the other sort of real surprise is the continued inability of the West really to see what's going on. We've kind of understood that the Baltic states were right. We

We still haven't actually learned to listen to them when they talk to us now. One final question, given the way religion seems to have intruded on the story a bit, what with the day marsh at the Pope's funeral, etc. last weekend and Putin making great play of his orthodoxy. The question has been posed. Do either of these two men, does Trump support?

really believe in God? And does Putin believe in God? You can talk with authority about Putin. Do you think that there is anything genuine about his apparent devotion to orthodoxy? Well, I think it's, as it's Matthew's gospel, it draws us, judge not that be not judged. It looks from the outside, I would say more like religiosity than religion on both sides, really. I mean, I recall Donald Trump being asked what his favorite Bible text is. That should be a

tremendously difficult question for someone who is a committed Christian or even a sort of David Cameron tuning in and out sort of Christian. Donald Trump said, well, I like all of it. He was also asked, are you an Old Testament guy or a New Testament guy? And the answer is, well, I like them both.

Yes. You may have got the quote more accurate than I have. But I think that there is a strand. I mean, in theology, this is called Erastianism, the idea that the main role of religion is to be as a prop for the country. And I would say that both, I doubt that either Putin or Trump know the meaning of the word Erastianism. But I think that from the outside, it certainly looks as though there's a strand of Erastianism there.

And this sort of universal message of Christianity, of love and compassion and redemption doesn't seem to feature terribly strongly in the official discourse, either on the sort of magyar American right or on the Putinist strand of orthodoxy.

But I think fundamentally, it's partly decorative and it's partly a sort of ideological driver. And as the Germans, as you'll know, Patrick said in the First World War, Gott schlafe England und Gott mit uns. And we had John Betjeman's wonderful poem about, please God, don't let the Germans bomb me. So this always happens a bit in wartime. I think the thing that really strikes me is how deep

The Ukrainian ecumenical consensus is we have the Greek Catholics, we have the Orthodox Protestants, very strong emphasis on the Jewish side with the chief rabbi of Ukraine being a kind of

moral and spiritual aircraft carrier and his significance and also the Muslims from Crimea and elsewhere. I find the, although the Russians like to beat the drum and say that Zelensky is persecuting the Moscow Patriarchate, I think that the Ukraine's faith has been tested, of all strands, has been tested and deepened by the sort of Calgary patriarchy.

that they're going through at the moment. There was certainly our experience when we were there earlier in the year. In fact, we were there for the inauguration of Donald Trump, and it's astonishing to reflect that there was actually hope in the air that he was actually going to come to their aid and put...

the necessary pressure on Russia. That dream has long faded, I'm afraid. It's partly, it was a dream. But if you're in a desperate situation, roll the dice, you might get a double six. And what was clear to me was that Biden was a disaster in the end. Biden's deep cowardice in the face of Russian nuclear saber-attling almost guaranteed that Ukraine was going to lose, whereas with Trump, there was a chance that they might win. And

So I think it was quite understandable. They thought it can't get worse. In fact, it has for now. But who knows what providence will bring in the coming weeks and months. Okay, Edward, thank you very much indeed for joining us. We'll let you get back to your Brussels cafe. You're obviously on a whistle-stop tour of the chanceries of Europe. So we wish you luck with that. And thank you very much indeed for enlightening us. Bless you, Patrick. Thank you so much. Bye-bye.

Okay, well, once again, rich crop of questions from our listeners. Thank you very much. Keep them coming. First one is from Ian in Lincoln, who says, when will the press stop calling Trump the leader of the free world? Surely he's lost the right to be called this. Well, yeah, that's a pretty good point, Ian. I think as it's going at the moment, Donald Trump is on track to be the most hated president

president in history by the outside world, by non-Americans, certainly, and I think possibly by the end of his tenure, by Americans too. What do you think, Saul? Yeah, I think so. I mean, leader of the free world is a historic label, usually attached to the president of the United States, but it very much goes back to that, those halcyon days, Patrick, which we thought might not end so soon when the transatlantic alliance was still in being, and America was fully committed to NATO, and it's simply...

doesn't seem that that is any longer the case. You know, the deal between America and Ukraine over minerals is encouraging, but I think your point, Patrick, is more pertinent, which is what kind of strategic alliances is Trump looking for in the future, if it's with Russia, as it seems to be the case? We've got a question which we'll deal with in a moment. It's suggesting that this is some kind of nationalist Christianity deal, which is not beyond the realms of imagination. But if that is the case, then that is clearly not

a label that can ever be attached to a US president that's going to want to do a deal with someone like Putin's Russia. This kleptocrat state run by security officials that is perfectly happy to murder, bomb and invade sovereign countries to get its own way. I mean, this is not the free world any longer. This is a transactional US president that is looking to find a way to deal with its

biggest challenge china but at the same time make money and those two things trump feels you know are not mutually contradictory but what he will soon realize is that for america's industrial base and it's and it's very successful arms industry to succeed it needs to be able to deal with reliable partners in the west who can both afford the arms uh be prepared to pay for them and that will no longer be the case if this move towards russia continues yeah i know it's it's

bizarre at every level because it's impractical even if you are just driven by the profit motive why would you get into bed with the petro state which is you know teetering on the brink of economic meltdown i know this uh we've been saying this for a long time but you know these numbers do actually come home to roost at a certain point but none of it makes

any sense but a lot of what Trump does doesn't make much sense and I think one more point to make is that he in his discourse he never uses any of the kind of tropes that we've come to expect as just part of the kind of boilerplate rhetoric of American presidents he's never mentioned freedom he never mentions democracy and these concepts justice fairness none of these things seem

seem to actually mean nothing to him, let alone have any value for him. So this is a real change as to his supposedly Christian and religious instincts. We'll come on to that.

later on. One here from Keith in Ireland, Ukraine has held off Russia and inflicted serious damage on Russia. Why do we not believe that with full-throated European support they can finish the job? And he references, Keith references a statement by General Hodges, who pops up a lot on the media, former American general, who says that Europe has the capability, they just lack the confidence. Well, basically, even though Europe has all these

It has wealth that has collectively military might. What it hasn't got is the means of actually bringing them all together and applying them to a particular situation, which would mean that some of the parts added up to the potential, if you like. So, as always, it's a political problem rather than a military problem or resources problem, wouldn't you say? Yeah, I would. I mean, they are heading in the right direction. They're setting up, you know, funds that will...

procure arms you can see that the defense industrial base in europe more generally is expanding british aerospace as i mentioned last week is hugely ramping up his production of 155 millimeter shells i think the whole european arms industry patrick to be truthful sees an opportunity here if people aren't going to buy american they'll buy european but uh you know this works both ways so on the one hand you sell and you make money but on the other hand you have to pass

capacity to produce weapons for your own country if it needs it. So that's the important point here. I think we're heading, that is, Europe is heading in the right direction. But for Keith to think that they could step in now, I mean, I've made that suggestion over the last few weeks, but I'm not entirely sure that's the case. I mean, if they're even struggling to get 25,000 troops on the ground in Ukraine as peacekeepers, you can see that Europe does still have a little bit of a way to go.

Now, a real good question from Mark in Glasgow, who asks if Trump ditches US sanctions on Russia, can the EU effectively maintain its own in a meaningful way? Now, I haven't got an answer to this. We all know the basic details. I mean, the crucial thing is that these Russian overseas wealthers put it about and think

up from 320 billion dollars i think it is i may be wrong about that but it certainly is in that ballpark the vast majority of that wealth is held in european banks financial institutions or the rest of it so they did a certain amount of leverage there on that that question of you know using frozen russian overseas assets to do all sorts of things to pay for ukrainian uh

defense or reconstruction or whatever, but basically to be used going forward to support Ukraine. But on the question of actually enforcing sanctions, I don't know. But it is obviously a crucial question because there is still no indication that the direction of travel that Trump's taken, which is to pretty soon in order to keep Ukraine

keep Russia on side and keep it in a peace process, will be advocating for, indeed, just unilaterally lifting sanctions on Russia. Do you know anything about the technicalities of this? Well, I mean, the reality is that Europe could, of course, maintain its own sanctions on Russia. But the question Marx asks is, would it be meaningful? And that's the real issue here. I mean, we can see that even Europe and America in lockstep up to this point within the boundaries of

of course, but in relative lockstep up to this point on the sanctions issue, there's still so many loopholes that Russia's been able to slip through. So if it's just Europe on its own, would that make much difference? I mean, in reality, it wouldn't. What we've now got is the possibility of secondary sanctions, but those are really secondary sanctions that only...

the U.S. has the kind of economic might to impose on places like China and India that are buying Russian oil. For Europe to do that, really, frankly, it would have very little difference. So I think this sanctions issue is important. Yes, you're right, Patrick. Europe holds the whip hand when it comes to frozen assets, Russian frozen assets abroad, the majority of which are in European banks. But as far as the sanctions are concerned...

really, America is the key to this. So if it drops those sanctions, I think the whole sanctions regime will be in trouble. And I think everyone realizes that, which is why, of course, if there's going to be a deal and sanctions are dropped against Russia, it has to be a deal that Ukraine is prepared to go along with. You know, it goes without saying. Now, an interesting thought raised by Henry from Finland. He says, I've been thinking about the position that the U.S. has had throughout this war. There's been, of course, a big shift

since Trump took office. But nonetheless, it seems clear to me that the US, and he means by that not just Trump, but by the administration beforehand, does not want Ukraine or Europe to prevail. It seems that the US sees Europe and Ukraine not as allies, but more like future rivals. Even from the start, it seemed that the US would be happy for a stalemate between Russia and Ukraine rather than a clear victory for Ukraine. And he goes on,

Biden administration was dragging its feet on almost every weapon system or license to give Ukraine what it needed to target the Russian military. In the 2023 so-called Ukrainian counteroffensive, the U.S. delivered 31 tanks several months after the counteroffensive. This all leads me to the conclusion that the U.S. is not and has not been very serious about the whole war. It's pushing European countries to order weapons from its companies to make them more dependent on the U.S. kit.

Well, he asked for our thoughts on the subject. Well, I think that's taking it a little bit too far, that final thing about some conspiracy to get European countries dependent on American military hardware. But I do take the general point. And I think that as Ed Blucher says in the interview, the Biden administration handled the whole situation very, very badly, giving Ukraine enough to survive but not to prevail and backing down repeatedly again.

in the face of Putin's nuclear bullying. I think all that is true. I think with hindsight, it's becoming clear just how weird, basically, the Biden sort of strategy was with Ukraine. Don't you think so? I mean, they didn't seem to want an outcome. They didn't have a clear strategy about what they wanted to do with Russia, what sort of threat they thought Russia posed, how they were prepared to

deal with it, et cetera, et cetera. So there was no suggestion one got from, even though they were very able individual operators, I'm thinking of Antony Blinken, et cetera, there wasn't any message coming from the top about what outcome America actually wanted.

wanted. So I think history is going to judge Biden pretty harshly on this one. Well, I mean, they were making it pretty clear that the outcome they wanted was for Russia to withdraw and the war to end with the retention of Ukraine's original territories. Certainly, those are the statements being made. Now, you could say, well, their actions didn't seem to support that. And I agree with that. But the question is, what were their motivations?

And their motivations were fear, in my view. I mean, I think this has come out since then that a lot of senior figures in the Biden administration were worried about escalation. And they said it at the time and more information has come out about it since. Now, whether they needed to have been, given that we were commenting on this

you know, over the last two or three years, Patrick, is another matter. But they did seem concerned that if they provided weapons to the Ukrainians that could be used to strike Russia, for example, this would be seen as some kind of casus belli and might, you know, lead to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. I mean, all completely overblown fears and ones that were being stoked by the Russians, of course. But that they had an agenda for Ukraine not

to win and this was all somehow tied up with their idea that you know this everlasting war would benefit the u.s arms industry no i'm not going that so far down that rabbit hole i'm afraid that's a conspiracy theory i simply don't believe in i think as usual with history it's more of a cock-up that's happened here and overblown fears than it is that they had some kind of master plan as to what they were going to get out of this

Yeah, no, I think that's right. But there was this sort of hesitation, this kind of timidity, really, which you don't associate with the world's greatest power. But there was a sort of lack of clarity about, yeah, you're right about

They were basically sticking to the international legal line about what ought to happen, but not delivering the means to actually make it happen. And I think that's what is now making people question what was actually, this is what's sort of fueling the movement.

rise of these sort of conspiratorial ideas about what was actually going on inside the Biden administration. I think you're absolutely right. So often there isn't a great deal of deep thought being given to what appear to be very, very significant global situations.

Something, a trend that Tracy Dannison in Paris has picked up on, which I think is very significant, and we talk about it a little bit in my conversation with Edward Lucas, is this whole business of Trump and Trump.

Christian element, very strong Christian element in his MAGA movement. So Tracy points out the importance in the Trump White House of people who are very vocal Christians. She notes Pete Hegseth, Salosi Gerbard, J.D. Vance, to name only three,

not to speak of Mike Johnson, of course, who's a Christian, they're all Christian nationalists. They want a sort of holy alliance, she says, with Moscow against Europe and against a non-white China. They believe they're saving the world from godlessness, including women's equality and non-traditional social views.

So she's saying what we have here is a allegedly religious, but possibly probably unholy alliance in the making with the Russians. And that is actually, in her view, potentially very, very dangerous because it will open sort of Western security or American security to Russia, cooperation with Russian intelligence agencies.

letting the Russians penetrate U.S. command and control. And she puts it very poetically and dramatically by saying the barbarians, in other words, are already inside the gates and working with these Christian nationalists to gain in the state. She says, may I suggest you strengthen your reporting on this subject by asking MI6 reporters

about Christian nationalism, who its actors are and what they're doing. I'm sure they can give you an earful and help you to help us all get ready to fight on our own because we're going to fight this on our own. Thanks for hearing me out. Well, you know, it's a very interesting area, isn't it? We do touch on it a bit in the interview with Edward Lucas. Both Putin and Trump, of course, make great play of their religiousness. How sincere it is is...

is, of course, greatly open to question. And, of course, we talk about this famous interview that Trump gave when he was asked by a friendly interviewer about his religious beliefs and about what his favorite passages were in the Bible. And Trump clearly has never read the Bible because he said, I don't want to go into that. It's very personal. And then, hoping for something a bit more substantial, the interviewer says that,

Well, you are an Old Testament guy or a New Testament guy. I like them both equally. It's really laughable and incredible that the vast numbers of religiously minded supporters he has don't see through his pretenses to be religious. And someone actually put it very well, someone who worked with Trump in the White House and Trump won,

was asked about the president's beliefs. And he replied, he didn't think that Trump believed in God, but he was sure that Trump was convinced that God believed in Trump. So I think that's probably the best way of putting it.

Well, we've got some interesting other questions, which we will return to perhaps another time. One from David Broniszewski in Canada, asking if there's any chance Ukraine's been holding back munitions in order to mount an overwhelming offensive somewhere along the front line. I'm afraid we haven't got time to go into that, but that would be a smart thing to do.

As Edward Lucas was saying, you know, some big military setback would be a game changer in terms of Kremlin politics undermining the narrative that the boss is actually in control of things. But that's all, of course, speculation. So, OK, we're going to wrap it up there. It's been a very interesting week and there's bound to be another interesting one.

interesting week up ahead. So do join us on Friday, next Friday, for the latest battle in Ukraine. And of course, on Wednesday, when we'll be looking back at what happened 80 years ago in the Second World War. Goodbye.

I'm David McCloskey, former CIA analyst turned spy novelist. And I'm Gordon Carrera, national security journalist. And together we're the hosts of The Rest is Classified, where we bring you brilliant stories from the world of spies. This week, we're talking about one of the most significant stories of the 21st century, Edward Snowden and how he orchestrated the

biggest leak of classified secrets in modern American and British history. Snowden revealed that the American government was mass collecting data on its own citizens, and it was really the first time that Americans and so many others around the world understood the extent of the U.S. government's mass surveillance. That's right. It's a story I covered at the time, and it also really gets to wider questions about what

privacy means, how technology has changed our lives, and what the government and companies can do with data we might have thought was private. And we'll take you through the whole story from Snowden's early career in the CIA and the NSA to his life in exile in Russia. So to hear more, search for The Rest is Classified wherever you get your podcasts.