288. Putin's No-Show at Peace Talks
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Hello and welcome to this edition of Battleground Ukraine with me, Patrick Bishop. No Saul today, no Roger either. Instead, James Hodgson, our producer, will be stepping out from behind the controls to give his thoughts on what is the big event, or should I say, non-event of the week, which was, of course, the failure of Vladimir Putin to put in, get it, an appearance at

at the first face-to-face talks between Russia and Ukraine for more than three years to try and find a solution to the conflict talks, it must be said, which were first proposed by Putin himself. Well, the no-show naturally meant that President Zelensky himself did not turn up for these talks either, and nor did President Donald Trump himself.

who is in the neighborhood as part of his Middle Eastern diplomatic tour and who suggested at various points he might attend if things looked promising. Well, they don't. The whole thing is turning into something of a diplomatic shambles and the talking will be done

merely by two relatively low-level delegations who can't really decide anything on their own. And it seems clear that neither will be authorized to offer anything in the way of significant concessions. Talking about the quality of the delegations in the place of Putin, the Russian team is headed by one Vladimir Medinsky, who's a former culture minister, now a Kremlin aide.

and is a kind of historian nationalist historian whose books spout Putin's version of Russian history details a wee bit hazy at the moment because we're recording this on Thursday afternoon so there may be more coming out by the time you hear it but you just have to bear with us on that one if there's something really dramatic we'll of course be updating you with a special emergency pod

At the time of speaking, they're still pretty vague about what, I don't think any real talking has been done. There's been a certain amount of game playing with the Ukrainian delegation.

turning up late and as I say absolutely no expectation of progress but having said all that James this is still a pretty important event isn't it because it it does move the story forward you're right it does it's the first time the two have met for talk since 2022 since the full-scale invasion so that in itself is a move in the right direction I mean Putin's decision not to come it's

predictable, but it's nonetheless very telling. As you say, Putin is the one who suggested they start the direct talks.

which I think Zelensky's rather shrewdly seized upon to interpret them as meaning face-to-face talks between himself and Putin. That in itself is a challenge to Putin. It's a test of his seriousness, if you like, for which he failed to accept. And for Donald Trump, this ought to be further proof, if any was needed, that Putin does not intend to make any genuine concessions that would unlock the impasse and lead the way to a deal that has any chance of success. And maybe,

perhaps a bit of optimistic thinking, the longer Russia drags on this process, we'll see an increased likelihood that the scales will fall from the eyes of those in Washington to the reality of Putin's intentions. I think there is something in play which is Trump's burning desire to be awarded that Nobel Peace Prize. And I think that was a fact I highlighted earlier this week when he leapt in to take credit for mediating a ceasefire between Pakistan and India following the clashes last week. And whether

Whether his desire to win the Nobel Peace Prize outweighs his increasing impatience in securing a peace deal for Ukraine is yet to be seen. Now, the question, I think, is

is whether Trump decides enough is enough and drops the carrot and stick approach that so far the White House has been using to try and sweet talk Putin and Russia into a deal and instead decides it's time to use harder tactics against the Kremlin. That's right, James, I think. But it is a big if, isn't it? I mean, Trump's first reaction to the news that Putin wasn't coming wasn't terribly encouraging. Now, James...

just to run through the sequence of events. So, of course, President Zelensky is nonetheless, he may not be going to these talks, but he's actually in Turkey. And he went to Ankara to see President Erdogan, who's, of course, a big regional player there, is making the most of the kind of diplomatic leverage this gives him. There may not actually be very much to say at the end of it, but Zelensky is there. And of course, he very predictably

seized on the Putin no-show to try and take advantage by saying that by sending a mere low-level delegation, this was disrespecting both Trump and Turkey. He said to a press conference in Ankara, I believe the US and Turkey, they feel Russia's disrespect. No meeting time, no agenda, no high-level delegation. That is personal disrespect to Erdogan and to Trump.

Now, this is, you know, it's obvious what he's trying to do here. But Trump is not really rising to that particular bait. He said earlier, he tried to play the whole thing down and say to reporters on board Air Force One, soon, of course, to be traded in for a fancy new model aircraft.

courtesy of the Qataris. He said, I think it wasn't possible. He said, I don't think it was possible for Putin to travel to Istanbul because he wasn't there himself. Now, his exact words were, why would he go if I'm not going? Which is what he responded when he was

questioned by journos on board Air Force One. He said, I didn't think it was possible for Putin to go if I'm not there. Now, that's a complete non-sequitur, a complete misrepresentation of what actually happened. Originally, Trump was only going to go to Turkey if Putin was there. And as he keeps saying, the talks were Putin's idea. So it wasn't Putin saying, oh, Trump's not going to be there, therefore I'm not going. So it's kind of what you expect, I suppose.

from the American president. But the point really here is that he's playing it down. He's saying no big deal, nothing to see here. And I suppose we should only be thankful that he hasn't yet at least got around to blaming Zelensky for the fact that these talks are turning out to be a bit of a damn squib at first sight anyway.

I mean, additionally, the other thing is the two leaders despise each other. I mean, there's been attempts to assassinate Zelensky. So for them to come face to face with each other for the sake of posturing for Trump, I don't think it's going to happen anytime soon. It would have been amazing television though, wouldn't it? That first encounter, as you say, they do absolutely loathe each other. There's a real deep visceral hatred, quite understandably, from Zelensky's

point of view, and also, I suppose, from Putin's point of view. I think one of the problems that he faces is that, I've said this before, that Zelensky is everything that Putin would probably like to be. He's a genuine man of action. He's got genuine charisma rather than the totalitarian equivalent, which is really fear rather than admiration, which is what you end up getting from the people you oppress. So, yeah, it would have been an amazing moment of historic theater, I think, but as you say,

It ain't going to happen, it seems, this time around. But I think, you know, James, what do you think about this? But there's something much bigger than just simply the diplomatic look of this, isn't there? I think the point is that it reflects the underlying reality of Putin's position, I think, his non-appearance, which is basically if he does anything that suggests that he may be about to bring the war to an end,

his whole kind of strategy collapses and his strategy is a very dangerous one which is really just to keep the war going because if he stops the war his own position becomes extremely precarious as Zelensky has said Putin

Putin owns this war. This is his conflict. He started it. No one in Russia, apart from a few ultra-nationalists, was clamoring for the return of the Donbass to Russia. Okay, Crimea was pretty much a done deal. But it's not like France, you know, between the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, 1871, and the

Start of the First World War, where the French nation was united in its desire to get back the lost territories of Alsace and Array. There was nothing like that kind of popular pressure in Russia for this war. It was his idea, his project. A lot of people told him it wasn't very sensible, but he overruled them. And so basically, the outcome of the war is,

really is going to be a judgment on him, his leadership and his future. So only he can stop it. He finds himself actually in the same situation, I think, as Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel, who also needs a war to keep himself in power. And that's precisely, I think that's what most Israelis now come to see. That's precisely the reason that he's continuing to rain down death and destruction in Gaza.

Yeah Patrick, I completely agree with that. I think he's like a shark almost, he needs to keep moving forward. If he stops, his purpose will cease to exist almost. The whole economy now is based around this war and I think he's playing the long game. He knows that time ultimately is on his side

the democracies of Western Europe and America, leaders change, political stances change, and if he can just outlast them then he's probably got a pretty good crack of coming out with a favourable result from this conflict. But on the other hand I can't see much change happening in the battlefield, I can't see Russia gaining much more ground, although they are making incremental gains as we say every week. But I don't think any negotiations will go forward properly until

Both of these sides can't see a way to victory militarily. Neither side can think we can't push forward anymore or they're both exhausted or there's no real gains to be made.

I think that's when the negotiations will open up. Because at the moment, I think Russia thinks if we can keep applying that pressure across the whole front at some point, the Ukrainian front may collapse. I don't see that happening. But what do you think, Patrick? We are essentially in a stalemate now, aren't we? And the variables on the Ukrainian side is, of course, different.

how much support they're going to get from America. But that's been the case for a while now, and it looks like they'll be able to actually keep the thing going, keep the conflict going, to keep defending their territory, preventing the Russians from making any kind of breakthrough.

for the medium future, which then puts the pressure back on the Russians, doesn't it? And I've always been a bit optimistic on this front. And I think unlike you, perhaps, I think that probably without very much warning, there will suddenly be a crisis, a military crisis, which will develop into a political crisis on the Russian side. You mentioned that, you know, lack of any real progress, apart from a little bit of incremental progress

territory seizing here and there. But on the big battles, the ones that might make a difference, like the fight for Pokrovsk, which has been going on for as long as we can remember just about,

They're not making any progress there at all. They're throwing people in. They haven't changed their tactics at all. The toll in equipment and life is just as high as it was. And, you know, even in an autocracy, these chickens come home to roost eventually. So the death toll, the effect on the economy, you mentioned the inflation, the very high interest rates, et cetera, et cetera. Even Putin can't resist these forces forever. Right.

So, you know, it's pointless making predictions. But of course, the other thing which will decide it is what happens from Trump's point of view, because the two people that really matter here are Trump and Putin.

There are a few things that we can say, I think, about Trump. One is that his pride is very important to him. So it's quite conceivable that, as you mentioned earlier, James, he will say, OK, enough already. I've tried cozying up to Putin, who he clearly admires, and I'm not getting the respect, which Zelensky identified as being a significant factor.

component in this story that I'm due. Do you see that happening, James? Do you see him actually deciding, okay, I have been dissed by this guy who I've shown every sign of friendship to. And if so, how would he react to that? Would he react simply by walking away thinking this is a game that I'm just never going to win? Or would he actually

do something else, which he's on par for me is entirely capable of doing, which is start taking a very vengeful view of how he's been treated and then start seeing Putin as an enemy. What's your money on? So I think I sort of two and throw between these two positions, Patrick. He's so unpredictable, Trump, isn't he? But I think it is his Nobel Peace Prize. I think he wants a legacy for himself as being a Nobel Peace Prize winner and resolving these conflicts.

especially Russia-Ukraine and I think he'll probably eventually run out of patience with Russia I don't think it'll be coming anytime soon but it's starting I say in a few months time if the Russians are still dragging the negotiations out then perhaps his patience will turn to anger and then he'll start applying

pressure and sanctions on Russia and perhaps arming the Ukraine with more weaponry but I think the one thing he can do is apply sanctions on people buying Russian oil and gas and at the moment the two biggest importers are India and China but

whether he can do much about China is yet to be seen. And I think you saw from Putin's Victory Day parade how relatively close the ties are between China and Russia with Chinese troops marching in the parade, President Xi being the guest of honor of Putin. So

He does have a lot of tools at his disposal, but will it be the point at which Russia can't continue this war? I'm not too sure. That's a very interesting part of the story, isn't it? There has been, as always with economists, when they're looking at what might happen if Trump was to decide to carry out this threat, which he's made in the past, you know, of carrying out secondary sanctions on countries by Russia.

Russian oil and gas like, as you say, India and China, what effect that would actually have. And some say, and like I say, with economists who get completely different views on this, that this would actually deliver a pretty heavy bow to the Russian economy.

War economies, one estimate says 40% of its capacity would be lost. But there are others like there was a Sergei Bakulenko, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center think tank, who was saying that, OK, it would create problems for the Russian economy, would not, quote, bring it to its knees immediately. So, yeah, I mean, clearly it's not going to be a sort of silver bullet, is it?

to bring Russia to the negotiating table. My personal view is that I think that he's still got a bit of a crush on Putin. This is Trump, of course. It's

despite all the kind of shilly-shelling and all the kind of signals that he's sending to Trump that he's basically just playing with him, Trump still harbors the hope that somehow they'll get together. And in the way he does business, just man-to-man, person-to-person, leader-to-leader, great-figure-to-great-figure historic deals are done and that he can pull off another one here. I think he's absolutely deluded about this. As you say, I think Russia...

And Putin have decided their future lies if it's a toss-up between China and the United States. They're always going to go for China. And as you say, the Great Victory Day parade couldn't have made that plainer. Nonetheless, Trump continues to dream. And I think that will take a long time.

for him to drop the idea of some kind of détente between America and Russia, even if Ukraine fails to produce any of the results that he wants, he will still be minded to go down that road. Okay, that's it for part one. Do join us in part two, when we'll be answering lots of fascinating listeners' questions.

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Welcome back. Well, the first one is from James in Fife.

And he says, "Love the podcast and I'm hoping you're able to clarify a really important detail about the minerals deal." He says, this is of course, you know, the positive development of a few weeks back when after a lot of to-ing and fro-ing, they finally, America and Ukraine finally signed a deal for the future exploitation of Ukrainian natural resources, a much better deal eventually than the one that was originally put forward by the Trump team, but nonetheless, quite an exploitative arrangement.

And this is really what James is talking about. He says, how do you actually quantify this? How do you actually cost it? And he says it matters greatly whether the weapons from the US side or the military aid that's been granted since the start of the conflict, whether they're treated as capital contribution or are valued at replacement cost or instead at their actual depreciated value. He says there's a huge difference in what it costs the US to produce stockpiles of Bradley's, Atacom's, Patriot Systems, Expo's,

against what they should actually really be considered to be worth today, especially when factoring in the cost of storage and safe disposal. Though he actually provides the detail himself, how big the gap is between what the actual nominal price tag, if you put on these things, and what the real price tag, the real value of the contribution is, and points us towards a really interesting analysis carried out by the Centre for Economic Policy Research,

research by a couple of American-based economists. They called it Anastasia Fedek and James Hodson. Not Hodson, that's not your other job. And basically the point it makes is that the amount of aid provided in value terms is significantly lower than the numbers that you generally

get reported about how much military aid that's been given by the US to Ukraine is actually worth. So a figure of $60 billion is often bandied about, not least by the US State Department earlier this year. But by their calculations,

The real value is about $18.3 billion. And they say the discrepancy between the two, vast discrepancy between the two figures stems from inflated valuations of all the weapons, stockpiles, and other various other contributing factors. So that sort of seems to be a bit...

a kosher piece of research. So James is saying the real question here is, what number is the one that will actually be used when it comes to calculating how much Ukraine owes the US? Well, I don't know the answer to that. I doubt if anyone else has. I think that's something that's going to go into the melting pot when these negotiations about the repayments are actually refined. But it is obviously something to watch out for.

So we've got a question here from Steve in Berlin. I hadn't heard this mentioned and so wanted to ask if anyone had brought up the idea that Biden's reluctance to help Ukraine might have had more to do with the election at the end of last year rather than cowardice. He goes on, Biden and Kamala Harris both knew at the time how close the election was going to be. So it seems reasonable to think that backing Ukraine with more weapons was playing into the

Biden is pulling us into a war crowd, which might have scared off some of the more moderate voters. They could then have been holding back any full throated support for Ukraine until they were guaranteed another four years at the reins. This might have been Biden's throw the dice, so to speak, and one which unfortunately backfired.

Now, my thought on this is I do agree with his points in some ways. I think you look at other elections, there's an upcoming Polish presidential elections at the moment, and in the polls, there's support and sympathy for Ukraine has dropped significantly since 2022, partly due to Russian disinformation. But sympathy for, I think I heard on the BBC today that sympathy for Ukrainian refugees has dropped from the high 80s,

to around 50% in the past three years. So playing on this is definitely something you'd see reoccurring amongst elections in countries supporting Ukraine. And it sort of plays into the whole welfare versus warfare debate, which also plays into sanctions as well, actually. If countries are prepared to apply maximum sanctions to Russia, then that has a negative impact on their own economy. And are they prepared to do that and face the

the threat of unrest in their own electorate by default. How much can people support Ukraine without having backlash from their political opponents in their country? And so I can understand why Steve comes from with that point of view on the Biden stance leading into the election. What do you think, Patrick? Yeah, I think that it is a good point. And of course, as you say, the longer it goes on,

The more of a kind of domestic political issue is going to be in Europe, particularly around Ukraine's neighborhood, if you like. There's another question actually related to this, which I'll just mention from Zalman in Zambia, who says, considering how prior American interventions have gone down, don't you think Biden may have been right to proceed cautiously down here in the third world? Western powers have never been seen in a particularly good light.

And he thinks that the view there would be if the war had escalated, gone nuclear, even if it was any tactical battlefield nukes, it would have alienated further these African nations and the African public's attitude towards America. So I think that these are all good points. However, I'm not sure that this was actually why Biden was so hesitant about going the full Monty with military support.

And I think, you know, the more we look back on the very recent history of the American presidency and look at the Biden administration, it is often the case that how engaged was he? This new book that's just come out really lays bare what we already knew is being presented as a tremendous success.

set of revelations, but all the details that are emerging in this book, Original Sin, it's called, by two authors, Alex Thompson and Jake Tapper, both of whom were builders as Washington insiders. It's really what we kind of guessed already, that his cognitive functions, his physical functions,

were pretty circumscribed and that he had absolutely no right to put himself forward for a second term and that bigger offenders, of course, were the Democratic Party establishment who allowed

that scenario to develop. But I think he was not, Biden was not going to do anything bold. He was far too old, far too frail to be a war leader. And I suppose we ought to thank ourselves in a way that he didn't, that he kind of recognized his limitations and didn't get into a war that he probably wouldn't have been in any fit state to control. Of course, the downside of that is that he has a timidity issue

And his fear, it would seem, of a nuclear escalation, which I think we all agree, James, you and Saul, was a mere empty threat on Putin's part. Easy to say that, I know.

But that meant that we did get this drip feed, the old metaphor of the patient being given enough to survive, but not to actually get off the operating table. I think that's what lay behind that policy. There's one other thought I'll throw out there, Patrick, which is that I've heard some people argue that perhaps it was US policy to drag this war out as long as possible, to...

degrade Russia's military capacity and capability. If you knock out as many Russian tanks and armour and train troops as you can, then it

diminishes Russia's potential threat to other regions. I don't buy the argument particularly, as I think it's a bit too cynical, but there's that argument out there that US policymakers were seeking to do that. But I think that's in some essence, you don't really want Russia to fight a war like this because then it learns how to fight a modern war and probably has more experience in fighting the modern war than anyone apart from Ukraine in the world right now. So I'll dismiss that argument, but there is a sizable number of people who buy into that. Yeah.

Yeah, it seems pretty far-fetched to me. I mean, everything about American policy in the 21st century was largely to ignore the threat from Russia, wasn't it? And there would be some evidence of Americans in open society. There would have been lobbyists. There would have been a school of political thought.

that was openly anti-Russia and anti-Putin, and that was not the case. So I think that falls into the realm of conspiracy theory. Got one here about Challenger tanks from Dave, and he says, according to his researches in Wikipedia, he says, I accept that this is a long way from being an official source, but please bear with me. He says, we currently have around 70 Challengers. These are British Challenger tanks, or homemade Challenger tanks.

He said, while they would certainly need a chunk of money to bring them up to the latest spec in optics, electronics, etc., why are we not upgrading at least some of them and sending them to Ukraine? My understanding is that the dozen or so that we've sent so far have made a big difference. Well, that's certainly true. We were reporting on that a little while ago, weren't we? They did. They were very welcome on the battlefield, and they did actually operate with some success, with a great deal of success.

Well, this kind of falls in, Dave, I would say, to what Jason was just saying about the dangers to domestic opinion in being overly generous to Ukraine. So I think there's a great deal of talk in Britain at the moment about the need to increase defence spending.

And of course, this comes at a time when this government budget is under enormous pressure from all sorts of different directions. So I think we've got a defense review coming up, which is, it seems pretty clear, is going to be warning that we've got to spend more, that we've got to actually adopt a much more kind of realistic posture towards the idea of actually having to fight another war.

in the not too distant future. So I think the optics of sending off some of your best kit or more of your best kit, should I say, to Ukraine would be quite difficult to handle. I think unlike in countries like Poland, support for Ukraine is holding up pretty well, but that's largely because we're not actually feeling the direct consequences of it. Things like sending off a big chunk of your main battle tank force to Ukraine, I think might change that

perspective a little bit so I don't see that as being a politically very attractive option yeah personally I don't see why not we can't send another dozen out to be honest I don't see what use they're doing sitting in storage I mean even maintaining them keeping in storage costs money I mean the UK isn't facing direct invasion I can't imagine Russian tanks rolling down the mall any point soon and the

These tanks are specifically designed and engineered for fighting Russian tanks in mainland Europe. So that's what they're designed to do. And I think they'd probably get away politically with sending another dozen. So I don't see why they don't do that, to be quite frank. Yeah, you just persuaded me, James. I said, why not? Yeah, that's a pretty good idea. Rather than just trundling around on Salisbury Plain, actually put them to their use. It wouldn't be British soldiers actually.

driving them. British lives would be at risk. And indeed, even the tanks themselves. And I think we've only recorded, what, two losses, is it? Something like that? Yeah, two losses. And I think there's been a few that have been knocked out, but have been recovered. I think because the armour's quite sophisticated. I think they've only been knocked out because their tracks have been taken out. So I think they've been towed away and then repaired and sent back into combat. So it's not...

These things are pretty formidable tanks. So even half a dozen would make some sort of difference on the battlefield. And I don't see what use they are, like you said, chundling round Salisbury Plain instead of doing what they're designed to do, which is knocking out Russian tanks in the plains of Eastern Europe.

Yeah, and it would be a bit of a boost for British defence industry as well, wouldn't it? I mean, proven battlefield excellence is the best possible advert you're going to get for your kids, isn't it? Yeah, yeah. I was thinking about that with the Pakistan knocking out a few French Mirage jets from the Indian Air Force.

Okay, well, I think we'll wrap it up. There's just one last one from Peter Mannis in Pensacola, Florida. And he says, Hi, I enjoy the podcast and been an avid listener since the Russian invasion and feel you are a balanced source of information. Well, thank you for that, Peter. And his question is,

He says, is there anything in the NATO treaty which precludes a member nation from forming an individual mutual defense act? He's asking this because that would appear to be one way around Putin's fixation with Ukraine being denied NATO membership. So he says, you know, could a non-member, non-NATO member hook up in some military defense act with Soviet

say Germany or France or Poland i.e. could Ukraine actually strike its own local defence pacts with those countries that would be the obvious ones really wouldn't they well the answer is yes there's nothing to stop them doing that NATO countries can participate in other international alliances and partnerships however they can't

ally with anyone who is in conflict with NATO's core principles or obligations, and particularly, of course, those around the famous Article 5, which relates to collective defence and attack on one's attack on all. So, yeah, there's nothing technically to stop Ukraine signing a mutual defence pact with Poland, say, or indeed any of those, any European allies.

And there wouldn't be anything in the NATO charter to say that this was illegal in any way. So what's the space is a kind of obvious development on what's going on generally, isn't it, in the bigger picture? Okay, well, that's it for now. I'm afraid we won't have time to talk about Hungarian spies, which would have been fascinating. We've got a question from David in London about that. Or the Sudan civil war sounds like a bit off topic.

message, but a fascinating contribution from Tilman Müller-Kirsch in Berlin, and nor indeed to answer a lengthy but another fascinating contribution from Christian Thwaite. Do keep them coming. We love hearing from you. So don't be discouraged if we don't get round to your questions.

we will one day. Thanks very much for listening. That's it for us from this week. Join us on Wednesday for Battleground 45. And on Friday, of course, when we'll be keeping you up to date with all the latest from Ukraine, exciting times we are living through. Goodbye. Bye.