Deep Dive
Shownotes Transcript
Hello and welcome to episode 5 of the Battleground podcast. I'm Saul David and this week Patrick Bishop and I consider the point of no return in the Falklands War. Mid-May 1982 when the amphibious landing force sets sail from sunny Ascension Island and heads for the dark and stormy waters of the South Atlantic.
The landing, though most of those on board don't know it, is only nine days away. We're also going to talk about the ethos of the 5,000 or so men of three commando brigade, most of whom were on board the cruise liner Canberra, which is carrying 40 and 42 commandos from the Royal Marines and the 3rd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment. We're going to hear from an SBS participant in the little-known storming of the Nalwal spy ship.
And we'll also discuss the other special forces operation of mid-May 1982, the raid on Pebble Island. But first, let's talk a little bit about the Royal Marines and paras.
They both have very different histories. The Marines, the Royal Navy's amphibious light infantry, have been in existence since Charles II's reign in 1664. The Paras, on the other hand, were founded in the dark days of June 1940, as Winston Churchill looked for ways to strike back against a seemingly unstoppable Nazi Germany. It's a story I should mention that I'm currently writing about in my new book, Red Devils. But let's get back to 1982.
Patrick, you were on Canberra with three commander brigade as it headed down to the South Atlantic from Ascension. Tell us something about the atmosphere on board. Well, the overwhelming feeling you got was one of great confidence. Everyone was bristling with purpose. They're also incredibly cheerful. It's kind of weird. You're on this ship that only a couple of weeks before has been sailing around Canberra.
the Mediterranean loaded with the Blue Rinse Brigade, all very sort of pucker and unwarlike. And now here the ship's absolutely crammed with all these muscular, tattooed young guys. Yet the kind of cruise life goes on. So you have these sort of white liveried waiters serving up pretty nice food. As we go south, of course, the weather improves. You get to a point where suddenly you're in blue skies and sparkling waters and everyone's out sunbathing.
And the general kind of feeling that you're on a kind of weird holiday was...
was it reinforced by the fact that you've got music playing all the time over the ship's tannoy. And whoever was doing the selection interspersed the hits of the day with kind of recent numbers that seemed to strike the right note. So I remember very clearly The Tide Is High, Blondie, Sailing, Rod Stewart, and of course Oliver's Army, which, as I've said before, is like the theme tune of the whole operation.
And it couldn't really be more appropriate because the guys on board really were the boys from the Mersey and the Thames and the Tyne.
This was their moment. You really got this feeling that this was their hour. This is a section of Britain that's been overlooked, disregarded by politicians of every stripe. But they're deeply patriotic and you couldn't get a better image of that combination of force and purpose and patriotism than the image that a lot of you will remember of the guys just running endlessly round and round the deck of the Canberra in their Union Jack shorts.
But despite the fact that it was all quite enjoyable, people were getting a bit frustrated, especially when the Canberra got to Ascension and it had to sail round and round the island. This was like three weeks this went on. They were just sailing in circles round the island. This was a precaution because it was...
with some justification that an Argentinian submarine might be lurking in those waters, so they had to keep on the move. There was a bit of R&R, but we did manage to get ashore onto Ascension, which is essentially a kind of plug of volcanic rock sticking out of the Atlantic.
but it's not a very hospitable place and the swimming was curtailed by the fact that the seas around are infested with sharks so no one was that keen on getting into the water. Anyway, by the time we left everyone was itching to get into action and we were talking to one of the Royal Marines there, Mark Hankin, who was then a 17-year-old Lancashire lad and we asked him about his memories of that time. My name's Mark Hankin and
In 1982, I was a 17-year-old Royal Marine Commando in 4-2 Commando during the Fultons conflict. I joined the Marines straight from school at age 16. I'd always wanted to be a soldier from as far back as I can remember. And as I was getting closer to leaving school, I started going to careers offices and getting careers advice. And it's during that time that I think I saw some leaflets about the Marines saying,
So I went and visited the local careers office in Liverpool and basically I thought this is what I want, it looks action packed, it was everything that I'd wanted to do as a kid so that's why I chose to join the Marines.
The feelings as we were heading down south was the politicians were trying to head off a war and us young lads, we really didn't want them to succeed. We wanted to be involved in a war. We'd train for it. We wanted to be tested in that sort of environment. So there was certainly a feeling amongst myself and the rest of the lads in the unit that
probably the rest of the people in the task force, we wanted to go to war. You don't want to train for something and not have the chance to actually do that job.
So certainly we were all hoping that it did lead to war at the time. In the Marines, there's sort of such a close-knit unit. I can remember the young officers who were sort of in charge of each troop. And I look back now, you know, at the time when I was 16, 17 years old as a young Marine, just out of training,
They seemed quite old to me, but you look back and you think, they were only sort of 22, 23 years old themselves, so young to have the responsibility that they had, you know, leading the men. But I always thought our relationship between the troops and the officers was really good and it was quite close, really. You know, the sort of ethos of the Royal Marines, courage, determination, unselfishness,
cheerfulness in the face of adversity you know the commitment the team work it was a great thing to be part of being in the Marines
I think everyone that's ever been through training and got the green berry, they always say you're never an ex-Marine, you're just a former Marine. You don't stop being one just because you leave, you know. It's kind of in you. That was Mark Hankin, a Royal Marine who was on the Canberra with Patrick heading down to the South Atlantic. And it was fascinating, I think, to hear him talk about what a close-knit bunch the Marines are. You never leave the Marines, you're never an ex-Marine, you're a former Marine.
even if you've only been in a couple of years. He also talks about the ethos of courage, determination, teamwork and unselfishness. And these are all aspects that are particular to the Royal Marines. I think it'd be interesting to get a take on the paras. And to get that, we spoke to Lieutenant General Sir Hugh Pike, who in 1982 was commanding the 3rd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, known to all as Three Para. Pike and his men were also on Canberra and would play a central role in the events that lay ahead.
So you're the first non-commando unit that's attached to the Commando Brigade, which of course originally was the ground force that they calculated might be required. Do you know why 3 Para was chosen? Well, I like to think it's because of our relationship with the Royal Marines and the fact that we are keen rivals, but very respectful of each other because we kind of have the same mental attitude and outlook to soldiering.
But the reality was, I think it was luck in a way, because we just happened to be at the spearhead, stand-by battalion, and therefore we were fingered first. And I think on the day after the House of Commons debate was on the Saturday, on the Sunday, I flew down to Plymouth to an O-Group with Julian Thompson's brigade.
Brigade Major was a good friend of mine who I'd been at Staff College with, John Chester. I have to say, a sensitive comment maybe, but I was absolutely delighted to find myself in 3 Commando Brigade at that point, rather than under the command of Tony Wilson, who was commanding 5 Infantry Brigade.
We'll come on to Tony, because I know he's a bit of a controversial figure, not least some of the comments made recently. But you leave on Canberra, I think it's either the 8th or the 9th of April. Tell me a little bit about the voyage down, because you've got a battalion of, I think, of about 500 pretty prepped up soldiers. I mean, how do you keep them busy? How did you keep them fit on the journey down? Of course, there were three battalions on the Canberra, ourselves and 40 and 42 commandos.
4-5 commandos were sort of scattered about various ships and had a more difficult time travelling down. So this is a big ship. Four times around the promenade deck was a mile. And so a lot of running went on around the promenade deck. Every day was a bit like a jigsaw puzzle because you were allocated various bits of the ship to go and do your training, whether it was medical or briefings or whatever. The three battalions kind of moved about the ship together
like jigsaw puzzle pieces really and it actually was you know it settled down very well and so the Canberra was a big enough ship to be able to relax on to do fitness training on and to generally sort of keep pretty active. What was the morale of the men I mean at this stage of course there was no guarantee there actually was going to be a shooting war and that you would be required I mean was there very much a feeling we hope that will be the case? Oh yes definitely I
I mean, from the very start, I remember talking to three para before we left the barracks in Tidworth and saying, look, this is a combined arms campaign. We're facing completely different from anything we've experienced in the last generation, almost really. So, yes, we were extremely serious about it from the start. And that was our job to be serious about it. But of course, there was a lot of discussion.
against the back cloth of the World Service news reports and all the rest of it, about the other possibilities, which are well known, the United Nations intervention and heaven knows what else, and Al Haig coming and going, trying to, supposedly trying to, I'm not sure whether, as was suggested the other day, trying to win himself a Nobel Peace Prize or just be nice to the Argentines, but anyway.
So there was a great deal of uncertainty and that was unsettling in a sense. It was unsettling. But our prime mission obviously was to be ready to go ashore and fight a battle. I think there's a quote from some of the senior officers aboard, I think possibly fearless. It might have been Julian Thompson who said that the units they were taking down, they were very much the first 11.
And you've already alluded to that, Hugh. Can you tell me a little bit about the ethos of the Parachute Regiment at this stage? You know, it's quite an aggressive infantry unit, isn't it? That's the whole point. Well, yes, I think aggressive is not quite the word I'd use. I think it's not quite the right word. It's all to do with training, really, and the way we train and select our soldiers. And the result is you have very, very self-confident soldiers.
Even the younger ones, because they are sort of buoyed up by some of the more experienced guys. The training does generate a great feeling that you can do anything, which can, of course, get one into all sorts of scrapes. But it's a very important basis for that capacity to get stuck in and do whatever you are required to do. There is this very, very positive attitude that prevails.
I think it's quite a competitive atmosphere as well. And so we don't like to be coming second. How do you think that compares to the commandos? I mean, they have a different lineage, of course. The original idea of paras is you're going to be dropped behind the lines. You might have a raiding job in the Second World War. You might have a strategic role to take bridges and key locations. How does your role or your ethos differ from that of the Marines, do you think? The differences are quite subtle. I mean, the Royal Marine...
approach seemed to be a little bit different from us a little bit more maybe um i don't mean this disrespectfully a little bit more respectful of procedures whereas i think we're probably a bit better at cutting through the crap and um minimizing the battle procedure aspect of things if you like but i think we're pretty similar really in many many respects and as i said earlier very
rather respectful of each other, I think, and therefore pretty competitive with each other. So that was Hugh Pike, as I remember very fondly as a very formidable leader, someone who combined great
obvious skill with a kind of degree of humanity degree of kindness and I think what he said was very revealing about the mindset of these elite units this strong sense of identity this emphasis on excellence and also very very strong competitive streak they don't like
coming second. But I was struck that when you mentioned the word aggression, Hugh pushed back on that one because I think paras and the Marines don't like to be thought of simply as blunt instruments. They also see themselves as being rather thoughtful. Is that what you got out of it? Yeah, I think there are distinctions which we can clearly hear between the two. I mean, Hugh Pike is very much...
paras are more, you know, they make it up as they go along, or I think he was trying to say that, whereas the Marines, as he put it, do things more by the book. I'm not sure the Marines would absolutely agree with that. But one thing you get from both those extracts is that these are thinking soldiers who like to find imaginative solutions to problems. They're not just super fit. They were that as well and highly trained, but they're also thinkers, even down to NCO level. And I think that's what probably sets them apart from NCOs.
Yeah, I was also struck by Mark's remarks about the code of unselfishness. I think that's something that's really, really important. It's the glue that holds military units together at every level from regiment right down to infantry.
to a section. Ultimately, soldiers aren't fighting about ideologies, they're not fighting about, you know, the political objectives of the war leaders, they're fighting for each other, they're fighting for the buddy standing next to them in the trench or whatever. Yeah, this is a long debate, frankly, Patrick, isn't it? Why do men fight? I mean, governments and political parties would love to believe that they're motivated by these big sort of bans,
badges of a country and, you know, maybe even a political system, you know, liberal democracy. But as you and I really know, having studied soldiers, spoken to soldiers and read their diaries for many, many years, it's really about the small group. And that's why units like the Marines and the paras fight so well, because responsibility is devolved to the small group. And it gives them the opportunity not only to look after each other, but also to make some decisions about
And this sort of so-called command control on the battlefield, you know, it was like the Germans are very good at this, aren't they? You know, you allow responsibility to a low level. It makes a big difference in a small unit fight. Yeah, and that's exactly what the Falklands is. It essentially comes down, when you get to the battles, it really comes down to decisions being made by NCOs, by sergeants and corporals. And...
people like Julian Thompson are the first to recognise the leadership qualities that were evident all the way down the chain. Now, there's something else that Hugh mentioned that we need to talk about. Now, 3 Para, they'd been part of 5 Brigade, but they'd been detached from 5 Brigade and bolted on to 3 Commando Brigade for this operation. That's something that Hugh was obviously quite pleased about. Now, exactly at the same time as 3 Brigades heading off from Ascension,
What remained of Fire Brigade was setting sail from Britain on board another cruise liner, the Queen Elizabeth II. The entry of Fire Brigade into the story changes the narrative quite significantly. It introduces an element of controversy
which is going to resonate throughout the rest of the campaign. At its heart, of course, was the question of what 5th Brigade was supposed to do when they got to the Falklands. Were they to act as a reserve to garrison the rear area when the Marines and Paras went forward? Or would they take part in the main attack? And we're going to be speaking to a member of 5th Brigade to get more of a sense of exactly what was going on.
Now we're going to take a quick break. Join us in part two when we'll hear all about the storming of the Narwhal spy ship by a special forces operator who took part. And we'll also discuss the subsequent SAS raid on the Argentine airfield on Pebble Island. Welcome back. On the morning of 9th of May, two Harriers of the RAF's 800 squadron spotted the 1,400-ton Argentinian fishing trawler Narwhal 50 miles south of Port Stanley.
A Royal Navy frigate had spotted the same ship following the task force ten days earlier and warned it to leave the area. It had ignored those instructions and the conclusion of Admiral Woodward and his staff was that it was gathering intelligence. As indeed it was. When the Harriers pilots asked for orders, they were told by the captain of HMS Coventry to engage. They both dropped 1,000-pound bombs. One missed, the other incorrectly fused, penetrated the ship but didn't explode.
and with no damage observed, the Harriers then strafed the target with 30mm cannon. Meanwhile, the Task Force Commander, Admiral Woodward, having heard about the action, ordered the SBS to try and board the Narwhal from helicopters and bring back any intelligence they could find. Among those who set off in Seaking's and Alink's from the carriers Invincible and Hermes was Shiner, a sergeant in the SBS.
The mission was given to 8SBS and all I was then tasked to do was be in the Lynx helicopter to give sniper cover and GPMG cover when they were fast dropping down. Yes, it was a quick turnaround into the helicopters out there. The Lynx was the first one in, followed by the Sea King.
with the fast roping of SBS down onto the Narwhal and myself, watching them and covering fire as they moved up to the bridge. OK, and before that, in fact, the Narwhal had been engaged by the Harrier itself, hadn't it? I mean, did you actually witness that? The timing's a little bit tricky to get your head round, but it certainly had been engaged by the Harrier and knocked about quite badly. Is that correct? Yes, absolutely.
the Harriers that strafed it. They'd killed the captain. They'd taken his legs off. And they'd also dropped a bomb on there. And I think I'm right in saying it didn't go off, but it put a hole below the waterline. It went straight through it. And she was sinking.
And that's why the life rafts of the crew were in the water, except for a number of people that were still on board, which were taken out by eight SBS. And then the teams were recovered. No sooner were the teams recovered, the narwhal sank. We really wanted that boat. That would have been an ideal service craft.
us and being selfish here SBS to do various insurgents around the Falklands I mean you tell the story in typical SBS fashion which is you know it was a job we had to do and we did it but I
We shouldn't underestimate the difficulty of an operation like this. The trawler, for starters, is a relatively small target. I mean, most of the training that you would have gone in for would have, frankly, been on much bigger craft. And, of course, it's much easier to land on a bigger craft, like an oil tanker, for example, or even a cruise ship. And so to land by helicopter onto a trawler,
is not an easy thing to do. So you, obviously they're coming down, they're fast roping down onto it. I mean, you were watching, did you actually open fire, Shiner, to lay down suppressing fire? Did you, did you feel that that wasn't actually necessary? No, I was laying down suppressing fire. I was more worried about keeping my eye on, and you've got one corner of your eye on where the team is and keeping suppressing fire right from the bridge to the fore ends. Now,
Talking about the fast-rope, I mean, credit's got to go to these parlours. 846 Squadron, I think, was down there. It's like 148 Battery, the naval gunfire support teams. You know, you can't do anything without them in many ways on missions like this, conventional missions like this. Great stuff to hear that from someone who was actually involved. But we're also very fortunate to have got our hands on a previously unseen written account from an SBS operator who actually went aboard the Narwhal.
It provides fascinating detail, including the fact that the SBS operators found an Argentinian naval officer and an Argentinian petty officer on board. Confirmation, as you say, Patrick, that it was indeed a spy ship gathering intelligence. They also recovered, amusingly, a large amount of intelligence material, including a briefcase inside which was a passport-sized photograph of Margaret Thatcher with several pins stuck in the photo. Yeah.
But the drama, interesting enough, was far from over because you think they're on board. They've captured the intelligence and the crew, of course, and also these Argentinian naval personnel. But what they actually have to do is wait for what seems in the SBS operator's words, like an eternity for the sea kings to return from dropping the narwhals off.
crew at the carrier task force. And by the time they get back, the SBS men notice that it's getting dark and the weather conditions are deteriorating. They're getting particularly concerned because the only communications they have are through their small search and rescue beacons with a maximum 50 mile range.
Eventually, the helicopters do appear, and as some of the SBS men were winched aboard, two SAS operators, who were also on the mission, set standard charges on short-time fuses below the waterline. The SBS account reads on. We then winched up the final personnel and stood off and awaited the explosions and watched the trawler aft first, up end, and sink into the South Atlantic. A sad spectacle.
We then started our journey back to the carrier task group, or so we thought. Unbeknownst to us, the task group had moved and we were running out of fuel. The skipper of the Sea King realised that we would be ditching at sea about 25 miles short of the carrier. Give us time to share this news with Mother, that's invincible.
The reply we received was, We have turned HMS Glasgow towards you at best possible speed. She will appear in front of you on the horizon. That's the best we can do. The Sea King pilot shut one of the engines down to preserve fuel. We were now flying above the wavetops on fumes.
We eventually closed the distance to HMS Glasgow with the fuel warning lights flashing. The pilot manoeuvred the aircraft, restarted the second engine and started his descent approach to the Type 42. Unfortunately, the Seaking is too big for a Type 42, but the pilot managed to position the aircraft with a rotor disc three feet clear of the ship's hangar.
The Glasgow's crew moved at lightning speed to get the fuel hose plugged in for a pressure refuel. Apparently, the ship's crew had offered to check the oil and wash the windscreen. The humour certainly served to break the tension in the cockpit. With the aircraft refuelled, we made our way back to Invincible and Hermes and rejoined the rest of the Special Forces party. We later discovered that the Narwhal had been pressed into service as a spy ship. The total flying time for the mission...
It was four hours and 15 minutes. It's a great story, Patrick, isn't it? And one, actually, that until now we've known relatively little about. I mean, there was a little bit of detail about the fact that the Narwhal was eventually sunk, but I'd never read before the detail of the SBS actually landing on it. And this, of course, is a skill that...
they're absolutely trained for. And in the 1970s, they drill on things like the QE2 for just that sort of eventuality that there's going to be some kind of maritime terrorist act and they're going to be called in to deal with it. And so it was great to hear the details of that. Sorry to interrupt you there, Saul, but it just strikes me again that the kind of disparity between the SAS approach and the SBS approach is
Without being too mean to the dear old SAS, I think that if they had done that, we probably would have known all about it by now. But the SBS, in the traditions of the silent service, actually sort of kept that one to themselves until now. So as you were saying, the other operation around this time, a couple of days after the Narwhal gig, was this attack on Pebble Island.
is just north of West Falklands. There was an airstrip on there which was causing a great deal of concern to the task force commanders. It housed a number of Pekara soldiers
aircraft. Now these are kind of small twin prop aircraft which although they don't look very deadly posed a real threat to British troops once they were ashore. The Argentinians have been using them against their own people and their ongoing dirty war against the insurgents. So there they were sitting within very easy striking range of British forces once they got onto the islands and the
The SAS proposed a raid, the SAS commander Mike Rose, that is, proposed a raid to take them out. On the night of the 14th and 15th of May, two Sea Kings, which were operated by 846 Naval Air Squadron, took off from Hermes, laden with 45 SAS troopers from D Squadron, under the command of Cedric Dells. Now, you'll remember this is the same outfit who had not exactly covered themselves with glory in the South Georgia episodes.
Well, they certainly made amends that night. They landed undetected. They managed to sneak up to the airfield and lay charges on all the aircraft sitting there. This will revive memories of the early days of the SAS. The first operations they mounted in the Western Desert were exactly this sort of thing, creeping up under cover of darkness to enemy airfields, laying charges on the aircraft, blowing them up and then skedaddling.
So having placed the charges on the aircraft, they then opened up with machine guns, etc., which was really the signal for HMS Broadsword and HMS Glamorgan, who had crept into positions just offshore to begin bombarding the airfield. Well, 11 aircraft were lost that night, and that was a great relief to Julian Thompson and 3 Brigade.
Now, here's a story you won't read about in the history books, and it was told to me by the commander of the SAS in the Falklands, Mike Rose. Now, he maintains that Admiral Woodward was extremely reluctant to move his carrier fleet close enough for the helicopters to be able to reach Pebble Island, fearing quite rightly that that would then put them within reach of the Argentine Air Force.
But Rose persuaded him that it was a vital op, it was worth taking the risk, not only because of the Pucaras, but because there was a radar station on the island that could track air and sea movements. So after the SAS boys returned, Woodward was very eager to hear whether the SAS had actually taken out the radar station. Rose told him that there wasn't any radar station, they'd just made it up in order to persuade Woodward to OK the raid.
And he told me with a chuckle that he didn't think that we would ever quite believed him again after that. It's a typical story, isn't it, Patrick, as you were saying a minute ago about the different way the SAS and the SBS operate. The SAS flying by the seat of their pants, trying to get in on anything they can, pushy up front. And the SBS, professional, calm, calm.
doing things, you know, under the radar and not expecting to be thanked for it. I mean, you know, absolutely the different ethos in the two groups are there for all to see. Well, there's so many things in the mix in an operation like this, which has been thrown together at the last minute. You've got to be very quick on your feet. You've got to take what opportunities arise. And thank heavens, there was enough kind of give and take by and large among the various groups
command structures among the various leaders of the various groups to actually allow this degree of flexibility. I mean, this placed it at a considerable advantage. There are the Argentines stuck on the islands. They haven't really got that much room for manoeuvre and we're making use of every opportunity we get.
And as we say now, it's a kind of disruptive factor which can be very creative in warfare. Yeah, fair point, Patrick. And as everybody knows, I'm slightly biased towards the SBS having written the authorised history of their Second World War story. So it's important that you give a little bit of balance for the SAS.
That's all we have time for now. In the next episode, we'll consider the planning for the landings on East Falkland, why San Carlos was chosen, and we've got some great actualities of what actually happened on D-Day, 21 May 1982, as the Argentinian Air Force tried to take out the landing force. Do join us. Goodbye.