50. A Threadbare Parade
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Hello and welcome to the Battleground Ukraine podcast with me, Patrick Bishop and Saul David.

There was this week no better indication of the weakened state of Russia's armed forces after months of futile fighting in Bakhmut, Volodars and elsewhere than the scaled-back Victory Day parade in Moscow that featured just a single tank, a World War II vintage T-34. There were in total just 51 vehicles on display, including 10 armored vehicles used by Chechen forces.

In 2021, by contrast, there were 197 vehicles which made an appearance, including many of Russia's latest tanks. Yes, and on top of that, the fly pass was cancelled for the second year running, and the marching troops were mainly cadets and students. Now, Putin tried to gloss over the humiliation of putting on such a threadbare military parade for reasons we imagine of both security and a lack of available kit.

by launching one of his trademark rants against the West, accusing it of provoking conflict, sowing hatred and destroying family values, instead of, we presume, just the families themselves. Now, just hours after unleashing another barrage of cruise missiles against Kiev and other Ukrainian cities, he raged that the West had forgotten, and I quote, who defeated the Nazis, and instead had created a new cult of Nazism through the destruction of Soviet memorials.

But even as Putin was speaking, his turbulent ally, or perhaps nemesis, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the boss of Wagner PMC, the mercenary outfit, had the temerity to issue his own video address via telegram. Russia, he said, did not deserve to celebrate any recent victories, only historic ones. And even the small amount of military hardware on display in Moscow was for him a provocation.

We have everything there on TV, he said in an expletive-laden rant. But the Ukrainian offensive will be on the ground. Happy Victory Day to our grandfathers and how we celebrate is a big question. You just need to remember about them and not effing about on Red Square.

And he went on to complain that his men had only received 10% of the munitions they had been promised and would only be able to fight in Bakhmut for a couple more days. Rogozhin added, today one of the units of the Ministry of Defence fled from the flanks, abandoning their positions and exposing a front of almost two kilometres wide.

If Wagner leaves their positions, then Ukrainians will come to Rostov. Now, Rostov, of course, is a town that's in Russia. So, Patrick, what's going on here? I mean, is this more of the same from Prigozhin?

I think so. It's quite intriguing, isn't it, though, because there is a new development here. A couple of days ago, Prokosian and Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Chechen Republic, announced that Chechen troops would soon replace Wagner forces in Backwood. Now, remember, the Chechens have been sort of in and out of this conflict. Kadyrov has been fairly quiet in recent months, but he's now sort of making a bit of a comeback.

And Prigozhin added that he was confident that the Chechens would recapture the remaining two and a half square kilometers of Bakhmut that's under Ukrainian control still. And Kadyrov agreed with this prediction, saying his men would do the job in a matter of hours. That's typical sort of bluster we expect from him. But clearly this announcement was designed to embarrass Shoigu and the regular Russian forces involved.

And, you know, as a further indication that Prigozhin doesn't think much of the Russian military command, but also, you know, looking a bit deeper, I think it might be an attempt to shift blame for the failure in Bakhmut away from Wagner and onto the Russian military.

conventional military. Is that how you see it, Saul? Yeah, I think so. I mean, he's hedging his bets really here, isn't he? I mean, after all, if the Chechens fail, Kadyrov can claim that they were also under-resourced, which is, of course, the claim that Prigozhin's made. But more than that, I think, Prigozhin's announcement is also a warning that Russia faces disaster on the battlefield in relation to the coming Ukrainian counter-offensive if it doesn't get its act together.

Now, saying this is quite clever because Prigozhin, in my view, can't really lose out. If the Russians hold the Ukrainians to relatively small gains in the coming counteroffensive, he'll take some of the credit. And if they don't, it'll be a case of I told you so. So...

I think he's thinking like this. He's calculating that as generals like Shoigu and Gerasimov are inevitably sacked if there are disasters, he, Kadyrov and their acolytes will become even more indispensable for Putin. What is striking, I think, and has been for some time, is that Putin allows all this to happen. So the question, Patrick, is why is that?

Well, it depends really on how much faith you have in Putin's control of events. You might say, as people have done frequently, this is a case of divide and rule. You know, his strategy is to remain above the fray, let the underlings fight it out.

But, you know, something else might be at play here. Does Putin recognize that perhaps that the only reliable fighters he's got left are Wagner and the Chechens, which is really an indication of weakness, isn't it? And if that's the case, he can't afford to alienate their leaders there.

There is a big risk here, though, isn't there, that they become a sort of Praetorian guard, you know, I'm thinking back to sort of Roman parallels, who are, although they're meant to be kind of allied to the ruler, they end up actually intriguing against him and overthrowing him and installing their own man as just a thought.

I don't know how much time Putin spends on his Roman history, but yeah, I mean, an interesting development. There's been another assassination attempt, just to move on a bit, on another prominent Russian nationalist, this time a man called Zakhar Prilepin.

who's a co-leader of the state Duma party known as A Just Russia. He was badly injured by a car bomb, which also killed his driver. Now, Moscow's blaming, as you might expect, the Ukrainian Secret Service. And there's a precaution element to this story as well, because he's said to have fostered ties with Russia.

party. And so it might be that this is a sort of indirect attack at the Wagner boss. And there's been a few of these. Remember Maxim Fomin, aka Vladimir Tatarsky, another ultra-nationalist, a middle blogger who was killed in a bombing in St. Petersburg at a cafe back in April. You know, he was a big pal of Prigozhin. And Prigozhin hinted that the attack might have been

aimed at him. My thought there is that I think that if the FSB was going to kill Prekoshen, they would have found a more efficient and ambiguous way of doing it. Yeah, it's interesting, isn't it? It's almost like they're sending a signal. I mean, possibly, Patrick, with pure speculation here. Of course, it could have been the Ukrainians, but it might also have been an inside job done by the FSB, for example, to send a signal to Prekoshen. But, you know, it's interesting, isn't it? Prekoshen,

Prigozhin, as we're speculating, could be a problem for Putin in the long run because his forces have had relative success. Let's not go overboard here. I mean, they've managed to take a few block-in-back moves. They're fighting steadily and they're taking enormous casualties, but he could be a problem for Putin in the future. There's no question about that. And one of the ways he might be is by building up a political power base with a group like Just Russia. So, Prilepin's

attempted assassination could be all part of that process.

Okay, now the other interesting news this week, and potentially quite alarming for the Ukrainians, is a CNN report that Russian electronic warfare jamming has limited the effectiveness of Ukrainian HIMARS strikes in recent months. And if it's true, and it seems to be pretty well sourced, there are five separate sources coming out, some American, some Ukrainian, this might explain why the counteroffensive has been so long delayed.

as US and Ukrainian forces have had to find ways to counter evolving Russian EW, that is electronic warfare, jamming efforts. The delay, of course, might of course be for the other obvious reason, and that is that Ukrainian commanders are waiting for the battlefield to dry out before they launch their 12 all arms brigades.

But the attack is coming and it's coming soon. Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister Volodymyr Havrilov said on May 8 that the timing and location is not significant because Russian forces and leadership will panic regardless, but that he would not be surprised if something occurred in May or June. So we're early to mid-May now. It could be another few weeks, but it could be any time in the next couple weeks.

Yeah, lots, lots of hints, you know, which could be psychological warfare on the Ukrainian side that it's coming soon and it will be decisive. Well, you know, watch this space.

Well, you mentioned at the top saw those new missile and drone strikes. Well, it seems that most of the incoming missiles were shot down by the improved Ukrainian air defenses, including towards the end of last week, a Russian hypersonic missile, which was taken down by a US-supplied Patriot battery. These missiles, the hypersonic ones, I mean, the Russian ones,

was supposed to be impossible to intercept. This was the Russian claim. But like so many of their claims, it seems to be hyperbole.

hypersonic hyperbole. So this claim didn't really hold up either. Of course, the odd missile is getting through. That's inevitable. And one did in Odessa, where it destroyed hundreds of tons of humanitarian aid in a Red Cross warehouse and killed a civilian security guard. Okay, well, on that unhappy note, we'll take a break. Do join us in part two, when we'll be answering listeners' questions.

All right, welcome back to the Friday episode of the Battleground Ukraine podcast. We have, as ever, a rich selection of listeners' questions. And the first is from Nick, who's in northern Italy. He starts off by saying, my wife and I are avid listeners to your really excellent podcast, Keep Up the Good Work.

But he goes on to talk about semiconductors, and it's a fascinating question. He says that the suggestion is in Western press reporting that there's been a huge increase in the importation into Russia, of course, of items like high-end washing machines so that they can be stripped of their chips and those chips can then be used in smart munitions.

He goes on to say this is a fallacy for two reasons. And I should point out that Nick's got a long history in semiconductor work. In fact, he tells us that he's been in the business for 36 years. So he should be in a position to know. And basically, in a nutshell, he's saying that in terms of...

how robust these basic item semiconductors are, they would never really be effective if you try and adapt them for weapons. He says specifically, even if the washing machine's microprocessor could be repurposed to work in a missile or guided shell, it would come in a commercial plastic package that even under modest G-forces could cause the internal wiring to tear itself away from the chip.

Any electronic system fired out of a barrel requires sophisticated packaging. These packages are normally high spec hybrid ceramic metal and are very expensive. That is the ones that are normally used in munitions. In other words, this is a bit of false reporting. Um,

His question after, as he puts it, a long-winded preface is, how effective do you think the current sanctions regimes imposed by the West on Russia really is? And what more can be done to close the door completely to technology imports, such as semiconductors, which would stop Russia's ability to manufacture smart munitions? Well, you know, this is a fascinating area, isn't it? We haven't really addressed sanctions much over the years.

last few episodes. So I'll attempt to do that now. We've also got a question from David from St. Albans and from Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Mayer of the Canadian Armed Forces. He's retired on this sort of area. So let me try and sort of answer the question broadly first on just how effective has the Western sanctions regime been? Well, the bad news is that Russia's actually managed to weather the

sanctioned storm pretty successfully. There's some IMF figures recently, which says that the

Russian economy is likely to grow by 0.7% in the coming year, which actually puts it in a better place than Britain and Germany. And on a par with France, sanctions appear to have had little impact on the ordinary Russians' standard of living. Food and consumer goods are in reasonably good supply. So that obviously reduces the potential for war-related unrest.

Also, the sanctions that were aimed at the very rich men in Putin's circle were

also failed to have much impact. Yes, they've had their yachts impounded. They can't travel abroad so freely, but they've still got plenty of loot stashed away. And what it means in effect is that they now have to go to Dubai and Antalya in Turkey for their holidays rather than to Miami or the Riviera. Now, the reason for this is that there are big holes in the sanctions system and plenty of third world countries are around who are willing to help Russia

evade sanctions, places like Serbia and Kazakhstan. And of course, China's doing its bit as well. For example, you know, big important areas, for example,

the decision to close down the SWIFT international money transfer system to most Russian banks. I mean, that would have made importing and exporting very difficult, and the results could have been catastrophic for the economy. However, the Chinese have stepped in, and they've imposed no restrictions, and consequently, much of that business is now being done through their equivalent, the Chinese equivalent of SWIFT, which is called CISO.

C-I-P-S, and using the yuan as the currency. So to cut a long story short, all this makes it likely that if the war continues at its present level of intensity, then the Russian economy can jog on quite successfully. However, that is not the case if Putin seeks to intensify the conflict

And his main problems here, and of course they're very significant ones, are manpower and weapons. He's got enough to keep things ticking along at the present rate. But if he seeks to escalate, things could rapidly go pear-shaped. And on the weaponry front, obviously there's still a lot of weaponry and ammo in store, but it's old kit, out of date, and in poor shape. And what they need to improve their battlefield situation is

is modern stuff. And as Nick very eloquently points out, Russia is running out of the microchips needed for this high-tech weaponry. Outside sources can't supply it, and cannibalizing washing machines, etc., can go so far, but it's not really going to do the job. And all the available dual-use stuff is already being plundered. For example, earlier this year,

There was a temporary ban on Russians applying for biometric passports because they were told that the microchips involved were no longer available. It seems they were being diverted to military use. And intriguingly, on the manpower front, Russia can't really produce more soldiers without possibly collapsing the economy. We already know the political risks of calling a mass mobilization campaign.

But there are also big consequences for the economy. There is huge labor shortages currently, thanks to the mass flight of young males and the demands of the military. So there are now two and a half vacancies for every unemployed person in Russia. So I'm going on a bit here, but I think this is an important subject. So the bottom line is that Russia is only spending 3% of GDP at the moment, which it can manage. That's less than the US spent on its warring career.

But if it's going to up the ante, it will have to spend a lot more and raise more troops, which will impact living standards and further spook the population and risk significant unrest. However, it can sustain the war at its current level, which raises the vital question of whether Ukraine and more importantly, the West can do the same.

Good stuff, Patrick. You've obviously been doing your homework. Very impressive. We move on to Bob Densley. He doesn't say where he's from, so I'm assuming the UK. His question is in three parts. Given that neither Russia or Ukraine are interested in the peace deal as things stand, is it not in the best interest of a quicker resolution for the West to provide the requirements

Thank you very much.

Well, Bob, we've been going on about this for quite a while. I mean, I couldn't agree with you more. But the main, well, there are two main obstacles in my view. One, of course, is political. There's still a belief among NATO, the US in particular, that we shouldn't be giving the Ukrainians anything that they can use

for an offensive into Russia. It sounds nuts, doesn't it? When exactly the opposite is happening all the time. But there's also a supply issue too. Maybe not so much with things like planes. The Ukrainians say they want F-16s and that that

could be a big game changer in the air power scenario. And also air defense, actually, interestingly enough, is one of the points they've been made. I mean, Bob, basically, what I'm trying to say is I totally agree with you. I think there needs to be political will. So if things are going to change, it will probably be because there doesn't look like there's going to be a resolution on the battlefield unless something like that happens.

and we could be in a very, very long drawn out war. So we'll have to see with the coming Ukrainian counteroffensive, that could change everything. But, you know, even people like Phillips, O'Brien, who are reasonably optimistic about Ukrainian prospects, is urging caution. Yes, it is slightly depressing, isn't it? This foot dragging on things like the sending of F-16s, you know, it's the backbone of NATO air forces now.

has been for the last 30 or more years, and there's plenty of them around, so they're available. But

As you say, this fear of escalation, of offending the Russians, I mean, what more do they have to do for us to actually get really serious? It seems to be still playing a large part in NATO, in Western Allied decisions. And even if they do actually move now, it'll take a long time for this kit to get into theatre. The feeling or the argument, the excuse that's being made is that actually surface-to-air missiles, ground defence systems are what's really needed now.

And it'll just complicate the issue if they have to sort of train up pilots to fly F-16s, etc. But I think, you know, in terms of a statement of intent of a display of resolution, a decision that F-16s will be supplied would be very welcome at this point. Okay, moving on to our old friend Ivarus from Lithuania. He asked, do you see some signs in Russian armed forces for a change that would make the Russian army a more formidable force?

in this war or after can necessity uh be the mother of invention and bring about changes avaris's question and no i can't see much change i have to say avaris you could say that the electronic warfare jamming that they've been using to disrupt haimas is an example of them getting their act together absolutely but in terms of the way they're actually fighting on the ground uh

it's more of the same, isn't it? They are butting their heads against a brick wall. And even Prigozhin, of course, whose Wagner group has had limited success, as I've already pointed out, is not really changing the tactics of his men, or at least his commanders are not. They are still dying in enormous numbers and making the only claim they can because of a lack of success, which is it's all down to the Russian high command for not giving them the ammunition they need. But what does that tell you?

The ammunition they need is more of the same. It's more destruction block by block in this kind of Syrian Grozny type attitude. And none of the all arms warfare we're hoping to see from the Ukrainians in the weeks ahead. OK, we've got one here from Anthony Lemura in Mackay, Queensland in Australia.

And his first part of the question is about the Nord Stream pipeline, which is a very complicated issue, which we won't necessarily go into here. But the second part of it is about something that we were talking about quite

quite excitedly last week, Saul, and that is the drone attack on the Kremlin, which at the time seemed like a big event and that sort of fizzled out a bit like the actual munition, whatever it was, that actually struck the Kremlin. Now, at the time, we said, we thought it was probably Ukrainian-inspired attacks

And we didn't actually raise the possibility of it being a black flag operation, which did get quite a lot of attention, didn't it, that explanation at the time. I'm going to ask you in a second for your thoughts about that, Saul, but just want to reference another contribution from Andrew McDonald in Marlborough, Wiltshire, who, talking about this attack, says anyone that knows about explosives will tell you that whatever the Kremlin drone was, it was not a serious explosive device.

The big white flash, cloud of white smoke and lack of blast are more akin to Hollywood than a real war. So he says it was a pyrotechnic. It was a firework, essentially, and not a serious munition. So what do you reckon now, Saul? What are your thoughts over a week on?

Yeah, it's interesting, Andrew's contribution. Thank you for that. The idea that the actual explosion gives an indication that it wasn't really that lethal. And that would tend to support the argument, frankly, that it was a false flag. This is, you know, this is for show, as it were, to blame on Ukrainians, but actually has been Russian inspired and probably within the Putin regime itself.

And that, interestingly enough, is the conclusion that's been come to by the Institute for the Study of War, who we're often mentioning because they're one of the most reliable independent sources of information on the war. And they think it almost certainly was a false flag operation. So we're going to have to backtrack here a little bit, Patrick. We don't like to say we were wrong and we won't know, of course.

Possibly ever, but maybe until the end of the conflict. But ever, I suspect. But it does seem that, you know, little indications are that it could easily have been an inside job. Yeah. If so, you know, it is a pretty pathetic thing.

kind of ruse, isn't it? It doesn't. None of the kind of, you know, what actually do they get out of that? Nothing except just to make us even more sceptical about anything that comes out of the mouth of the Kremlin. Just a quick one here from Till, who's talking about saving Private Ryan. It's kind of a

rather obscure question, but a sort of quite interesting one. He says that, you know, of course, in the Normandy campaign, the US forces used what's known in military speak as a countersign, which is a kind of, you know, a challenge by the sentry and a response by the troops. And they used the words flash, which is the challenge, and thunder to identify each other. So,

The sentry calls out, Flash, and the approaching soldier says, Thunder. And the words they chose were because thunder was difficult for Germans to pronounce. And he's asking whether there's a similar sort of countersign in use in this sort of close quarters fighting that we've seen in Bakhmut, etc. My immediate thought is that, you know, as lots of Ukrainians speak Russian,

I'm not sure how this would actually be effective there. Have you got any thoughts on that, Sol? No, it's a good point, isn't it? In terms of that kind of pronunciation, it will be relatively similar. And as you say, Ukrainians speak Russian, so they're at a slight advantage, I suspect. But let's be honest here. I mean, both sides will have a way to unify.

use identification signs that only they know about or in theory only they know about as you know any kind of password situation Patrick as you know in a military sense and you you change it as often as possible so it's not just a question of how people pronounce although interesting enough you had a similar thing in the pacific where they used to use words that they knew the Japanese couldn't pronounce for that reason too and I suppose you could keep repeating those words

maybe that's the point. And it's, it's easy to remember one that it's to remember hundreds, but, but yeah, no question with that sort of close quarter fighting, they are going to need to be able to identify themselves. They're using those little colored flashes on the uniforms, but anyone can change those and impersonate someone else as the Germans, of course, were, were so good at doing during the second world war when they were,

pretty happy to put on the uniform of their opponent, which technically is an offence for which you can be shot, actually. But they were happy to do that. And I suppose most infamously during the Ardennes Offensive, when they dressed up as American soldiers, these SS special forces in their attempt to get behind enemy lines.

Okay, we've got one here from John. Again, no location, so probably UK. Gents, thanks for the great pod. Generalising here, but given the strong inclination of Russians to gladly accept bribes, and if you combine this with Russian soldiers' low morale, lack of purpose, could it not be effective to bribe the Russian front line en masse?

into waving the white flag and surrendering. Patrick, what do you think? Well, this is something that has occurred to people before, but not with money. I remember during the Cold War, there was a kind of semi-serious suggestion that given that the Russian troops' proclivity to drink, that it would be a good idea to airdrop mass suppliers of vodka, which would have a completely sort of debilitating effect.

effect on them. I think that is actually not a bad idea. Okay, now, a question last week, which was that how could we donate, you know, how could interested parties donate to the Ukrainian cause? I think the question was specifically about drones. Well, actually, a couple of our listeners have

come back, Mary Lee O'Brien from Leyland, North Carolina, in particular, who says, actually, what you need to do is go to the official Ukrainian government's website, and it's called United24. And the web address is u24.gov.ua. It's on the initiative of President Zelensky, and it gives you the opportunity to buy reconnaissance drones or contribute to humanitarian aid.

medical aid, rebuilding Ukraine. So whatever you want, if you don't feel comfortable spending money on munitions and that's understandable, then maybe the humanitarian aspect is something you'd like to contribute to. So go to that website and you can do that. And Mary Lee,

finishes by saying, please keep up the good work. I feel it's important for America to not lose focus on supporting Ukraine. Well, you and I have both been in the US recently, Saul. I don't know what you thought, but I was actually quite alarmed by the level of anti-Ukrainian sort of

stuff coming out from right-wing commentators like Tucker Carlson, now no longer in his pulpit at Fox News. But, you know, there is a strong strain of, you know, that very long-established American tradition of staying out of foreign wars. So there is, you know, that old strain of American isolationism is alive and well, as far as I could see in America. And that is something that is very

alarming to me. Against that one, I must say that I found a lot of support, a lot of Ukrainian flags around. Admittedly, I was staying with our old friend, Asgol Krushelnitsky and his wife, Irka. So we were in contact with a lot of Ukrainians. But yeah, I mean, it's by no means totally solid American support for Ukraine. And of course, the upcoming election is

is going to play a huge part in how this develops going forward. I've got one here from Shane Duggan, which I think you should answer for because he's referencing you specifically. He says, although originally Irish, I live in Frankfurt and work at the Goethe University in Frankfurt in the IT department. He noted that you're researching your new book, which largely focuses on Eisenhower.

And he says Eisenhower is still a big figure in Germany. And he's wondering what advice you think Ike would give to the Ukrainians next.

as they shape up for the offensive? Yeah, excellent question. I am working on a book that Eisenhower features very prominently in, but it's not specifically about Eisenhower. In any case, I think the advice he would give would be along a similar sort of strategy to the one that he adopted himself when he was

when he was in charge of all Allied armies towards the final push into Germany. And that was for a broad front. So big debate at that time. Monty, of course, and Patton, to a certain extent, were trying to get the lion's share of resources so that they could punch a hole through the enemy line. Most infamously, I suppose, or famously, but failed was the attempt by Monty, very out of character, frankly, but the Operation Market Garden attempt to bridge too far,

punch their way into northern Germany. But Eisenhower was absolutely determined that the way to crack the nut, so to speak, was to the broad front, which is you keep the pressure up on a lot of different locations. And I suspect he'd be saying the same to the Ukrainians. Don't put all your eggs in one basket.

go for a single breakthrough. I think you should keep the pressure on. And then, as I mentioned before, with the kind of Alexander the Great scenario, where you feel weakness, then maybe you can reinforce success, so to speak. But don't leave, you know, a single thrust

because that, of course, can be counterattacked. Whether the Russians have the capability to do that or not is another matter. But the final point on that, which is slightly contradictory, is, of course, the great success of the Germans through the Ardennes. And that really was all eggs in one basket, advancing on a relatively narrow front. So there obviously are different ways you can succeed in war. But the question was about Eisenhower, and I suspect he would have said, go for the broad front.

Yeah, and of course, the Ardennes counteroffensive failed. And even if it had succeeded, I don't think it would have actually brought German victory. Another point about this, actually, on the broad front is that I think we forget that after D-Day, there was a second invasion of Europe from the south, Operation Dragoon, which

It was launched on August the 15th, several weeks after D-Day, more than several weeks after D-Day. And that really did cause the Germans huge problems because they've got attacks coming in from the northwest and west.

from the South. So how you actually then defend your line becomes much more problematical. Okay, last couple of questions. The first is from Mark Jordan in Washington, DC, a city I recently visited, as you will know. Enjoying the podcast, your collective optimism and hope for Ukraine is a welcome respite from the daily cadence of

of worrisome news, which we both experience, as you say, Patrick, when we're in the States. However, with so much commentary about how Ukraine and its people have been consistently underestimated before and during this conflict, should we not reflect more on Russian history as well as its national character and similarly conclude that it too is underestimated, its vast natural wealth and size, its history of enduring unspeakable suffering and privation for the sake of ultimate victory and its military, albeit compromised,

all suggest that Russia's reserves of people, material, doggedness and resources should temper our optimism. What does your cold-eyed analysis tell you about how our collective hope for Ukraine may be clouding our judgment?

Well, it's a perfectly reasonable question to ask, Mark, but I do think that things are different this time. We've talked before about how dogged Russia's been in defence of its own nation, when it genuinely believed. I know Putin's been banging on about this and saying that, you know, the defence of Ukraine is existential for Russia. But surely, surely, surely, the average man and woman in the streets in Russia know that's not true. And more importantly...

In my view, the soldiers know that's not true. And it's all about motivation and morale on the battlefield. And I'm certainly convinced, and I think Patrick's at least half convinced, that Russian conscripts do not have the same determination to fight. And there's a very good chance in the weeks and months to come that the Russian effort will collapse because of low morale, poor equipment and incompetent leadership.

Yeah, I think that analysis is pretty sound, Saul. I think it is a very different...

scenario. I think it's probably more akin to Afghanistan, the kind of attitude of the Russian armed forces than it is to a World War II scenario, when as you say, they are actually defending the homeland against attackers who are determined to, as the Russians are in Ukraine, actually wipe the nation off the face of the earth. So I think that all the motivation to fight is really on one side in this one. Okay.

Okay, we've got a last one here from Hugh Murphy in Ireland, who says he's a lawyer with a keen interest in international relations. And he's always been a bit confused and bothered at something that occurred to him about the opening phase of World War II. The United Kingdom entered the war as a result of the invasion of Poland. However, the invasion of Poland was instigated by two aggressors, Germany and Germany.

the Soviet Union. So his question really is, why didn't Britain declare war on Russia as well as on Germany? So, well, I mean, it's a complicated story and quite a fascinating one. The first thing to point out is that the Russian invasion actually came 16 days after the German invasion. And this had already been agreed that they were going to carve up Poland between them, Russia and

Germany in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August the 23rd. And of course, once the Russians arrived there, it was followed by kind of mass oppression of the Poles in an attempt to crush the kind of spirit of Polish nationhood there.

many political murders, of course, culminating in the Katyn Massacre, which, of course, explains the Polish attitude towards Russia in this current war. And none of this, of course, was mentioned in the Victory Day celebrations the other day. But the answer specifically to the question is that when the UK signed the agreement with Poland in 1939, the treaty to defend Poland or go to Poland's aid in the event of

of German aggression. It was limited strictly to that, to German aggression. There was no mention of Soviet aggression. In fact, there was a secret protocol that really did make it specific to a German attack. You've got to remember that during that summer, France and Britain were trying to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union to defend themselves from the Germans, but it collapsed because there was sort of mutual suspicion on all sides. And

and a fear that Stalin was actually playing with Britain and France, lure them into a full military alliance that would then allow him to have a free hand to move into Poland and Finland. A fascinating question, I'm afraid, for a rather complicated answer.

Okay, just before we finish, I should mention a couple of other people who've written in to talk about where you can fund military equipment. One of them is Andy Martin-Smith, and he's talked about a website called thedrone.com forward slash the war zone. So have a look at that if you're interested in an initiative, which is to send British Scorpion vehicles to Ukraine. Also, Evelyn Van Cleef mentioned the u24.gov.ua website.

website. Thank you, Evelyn. And finally, an interesting suggestion by Ruben Marshall to watch a YouTube channel called Lindy Beige, that's L-I-N-D-Y-B-E-I-G-E, because it's got quite an interesting interview with an ex-British soldier who went to Ukraine to fight in the Foreign Legion. And while I'm on the subject of the Foreign Legion, actually a question we didn't have time to deal with, but really asking, you know, what was the contribution of Werson Rees on the Ukrainian side? Well,

I'm not sure you'd call them mercenaries. They are volunteers fighting, as I say, in the Foreign Legion. But the real important distinction is there are relatively few of them. And we're talking about maybe a couple of thousand compared to the tens of thousands who are fighting on behalf of the Russians in these PMCs, these private military companies. Okay, that's all we have time for. Remember to keep sending your questions into battlegroundukraine at gmail.com and do join us next Wednesday for another big interview. Goodbye.