6. The landing
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Hello and welcome to Battleground. I'm Saul David and today Patrick Bishop and I will be talking about the most crucial, nail-biting and gut-wrenching 24 hours of the whole Falklands campaign.

That was, of course, the night of 20 to 21 May when the task force closed on the islands, dropped anchor offshore, and at long last, the marines and paras climbed into their landing craft and prepared to set foot on dry land. Now, this, of course, is the moment we've been waiting for since the beginning of the podcast. And Patrick, you were on Canberra. What was the mood like as you approached the Falkland Islands? Well, the first thing...

I'd say is that the weather really kind of matches the mood as we go south. You leave Ascension, where it's very sunny and warm, tropical, and head into the dark and stormy waters of the South Atlantic. They're very dramatic. You get these huge mountainous seas...

grey, scudding clouds driving rain squalls. And then the bird life, there are these huge albatrosses skimming the tops of the waves. And even the big ships like the Canberra were wallowing around in these mountainous seas.

Now, on board Canberra, as we get closer to the exclusion zone, all the windows have been blacked out. So these are the big kind of public rooms which have huge windows and they're all painted over. So there's literally a kind of darkening all over the place.

I remember people beginning to think about their own mortality. And every Sunday there'd be services for the various denominations on board. And attendance is picked up quite dramatically. I remember going to the mass in the ship's cinema.

with my fellow Catholics and the Padre there gave us all a blanket absolution for our sins which we kind of, even the kind of least kind of ardent Catholic was quite grateful for that.

But there was also a kind of strange carefreeness in the air. And I find that, you may have found this yourself, Sol, that there is this kind of, what do you call it, high spirits, I suppose, that sort of breaks out in times of danger and stress. So two days before the landing, there was a party, a big party in the Crow's Nest Bar, which...

served as the officers mess on the Canberra. You're telling me they actually had a party while people are slightly concerned about what's going to happen next. They're deciding to drink. I mean, it does remind me a little bit, I suppose, of the pilots in the Second World War, you know, before they go out flying in the Battle of Britain, you know, they're drinking away in the mess, aren't they? And some of them are not going to come back. And the

Same thing with this party. But, you know, great stuff. And it does remind us, of course, how close the whole thing was to the Second World War. Yeah, I mean, this party really was a kind of World War II-style event, with someone on the piano banging out tunes that their fathers would have known going off to war, roll out the barrel, temporary, etc. It was an absolute riot, but as you say...

It probably wouldn't happen these days. But I think it's a reflection of what you're saying. It's about the kind of proximity of the Second World War. It's still part of the tradition. Everyone there had a father or an uncle who fought in the Second World War. And you kind of, it did intensify this feeling that it's the end of an era, an end of a kind of great long phase of British history, of British imperial history. And, of course, what we didn't know was whether this is the start of a new one or really a kind of, you know, definitive...

from all our notions of grandeur and world power. You mentioned those songs, Patrick. I've heard of them, of course, but anyone under the age of 40 is never going to have heard of those kind of classic First and Second World War songs. And it just shows you, doesn't it, what an absolutely classic dividing line the Falklands War was between the Second World War and now. And in many ways, as you say, it was looking back much more than it was looking forward.

So let's move the story on. Canberra, which you were on, was, of course, carrying most of the commandos and paratroopers of 3 Commando Brigade. It was decided, or it had been decided, that it would be...

very unwise to carry them all to the landing point in one ship for a very good reason. So instead, they'd be shifted off the Canberra and spread out over several ships. And they included, of course, the amphibious assault ships, Fearless, we've already heard from the skipper of the Fearless, the Intrepid, which had come down too, and the Norland. And this operation would require them to be cross-decked in very tricky seas. Now, it took place on the 19th, which is just two days before the landing.

the great cross-decking operation, as it was known. And unbelievably, fortunately, the South Atlantic suddenly subsided to almost a gentle swell for that operation, which meant that the landing craft could carry the units to their new temporary homes and they wouldn't have to be literally winched across, which, of course, was a very hazardous operation.

And of course, now we know we're approaching the moment of greatest danger. All the ships, everyone on those ships are at their most vulnerable because at the bottom of this plan is really surprised for it to work.

They had to be able to get in, the whole task force fleet carrying the men had to get in under cover of darkness and land at a place where the Argentinians were not expecting them. So as we were sort of creeping along the coast and then into Falklands Sound, we were all looking out with trepidation to see whether there was any sign, any indication that we had been detected there.

The ship was... Well, not dark totally. There was this kind of dim twilight which intensified this sort of mood of anxiety. And in the saloons around the place, the soldiers were stretched out trying to grab a few hours of sleep before the door, before they actually had to come to and stand to for their action stations. But no one really was able to do that. Nervously, we wound up too tight. We just lay there alone with our thoughts, steeling ourselves to what lay ahead.

would the arches be waiting for us? No one knew. And I think that bloody images of Omaha Beach and the D-Day landings were running through many heads. Yeah, I'm sure, Patrick. And if anyone had any knowledge of the Pacific War, they might have been thinking about a few amphibious landings there, which didn't go so well initially. And of course, I'm thinking of places like Peleliu and even more famously Iwo Jima, where there's, you know, a real contest for the beaches. And as we

both of us know from our studies of the Second World War where amphibious landing really, you know, gets developed properly for the first time in warfare. It's getting off the beaches or it's getting to the beaches and getting off the beaches that is the most hazardous time for landing force. So, you know, you were understandably and the soldiers were understandably nervous. Now,

Now, the force was heading for San Carlos Water. It's a large shelter inlet on the far west of East Falkland. And just to orientate the listeners, the capital, Stanley, is on the far side. So that's on the east of East Falkland. Now, naturally, a lot of effort had gone into deciding where to go to shore.

The decision had been made before the force actually leaves Ascension after many hours of wrangling involving Jeremy Larkin, the captain of the assault ship Fearless, and the two other key commanders on board, Mike Clapp, who commanded the amphibious force, and Julian Thompson, who commanded the three commando brigade which was going ashore. They were fortunate, really fortunate, to have the expertise of a Royal Marine Marshal

major, rather curiously named Ewan Sudby Taylor, who during a deployment four years before had carried out a detailed survey of the coastline intended for the use of fellow yachtsmen. And also, as he told me in an interview, for military purposes, frankly, just in case a landing was ever required. With this information, they reckon that the Argentinians would expect them to land close to Port Stanley. So the obvious beaches around the capital were ruled out.

They eventually narrowed the choice down to three before plumping for San Carlos water. We spoke to Ewan Sudby-Taylor, who told us why that decision was taken. It couldn't have been the more suitable place. A long way from Stanley for the land troops.

But, of course, closer to Argentina as far as the aircraft are concerned. But it was a reasonably sheltered place. Exocet couldn't reach you. Airplanes had to fly over the crest hills either side so they wouldn't have time to choose a target. I mean, they did. They could have, if it had been out in the open, they would have had more time to choose a target.

And of course, the weather couldn't get in there. It was sheltered as far as anywhere in the Falkland Islands is concerned because the winds, the average wind speed in the island is 16 knots. In Plymouth, it's four knots of a year. So it's four times windier.

And that, of course, means you need sheltered water. It was the ideal place. I mean, we could land all around it. Therefore, we could defend it. So we've just heard from Ewan Suthby-Taylor there telling us the reason the decision was taken to actually go for San Carlos. I mean, it's interesting, isn't it? Because the obvious thing would have been to land much closer to Port Stanley and therefore save the distance required to march across the island in all the terrible conditions. And we'll come on to all of that. So,

The decision taken had its disadvantages. It was a long way. The thinking at the time was that this carried a kind of political benefit, that if they got ashore safely, that might be enough for the Argentinians to say, OK, game over, we'll go home, or at least start talking seriously about some sort of negotiated settlement. I think that was a pretty forlorn hope.

um and later julian thompson has said um that he he wasn't even though it was the sort of safest place to land it wasn't his favorite for the reason you say you've got then got to get all the way across the island 50 miles to port standing without any easy way of getting there that's why helicopters become terribly important if you're going to go that distance you really really need those helicopters there are a couple of tracked vehicles but apart from that it's uh shag's his pony that's the only way you're going to get there and that's

or by ship, which is extremely hazardous, as we'll learn. So that's indeed how things panned out. With the added complication, as we'll be learning later, that five brigades turn up and decide they want to join the party. They want to go all the way to Bork Stanley rather than just stay behind in the rear,

So advantages and disadvantages, but I think with hindsight, everyone would agree it was the right place to land. Yeah. One other thing we should mention talking of World War II resonances, Patrick, is subterfuge. And of course, you know, an element of this decision was let's land at a place where the Argentinians are not going to expect us.

just as the decision was taken at D-Day. So let's not go for the obvious one. Let's not go for Pas de Calais, which is, you know, shorter lines of communication closer to the UK. A lot of advantages, but they're going to expect us to land there in exactly the same decision taken here. So in many ways, getting the men ashore, I think, you know, in my own personal feeling, is much more important. Get the men ashore safely and established. That's much more important than even

the long distances they're going to have to cover. Because yes, we can do them by helicopter and worst case, we're going to walk. Yeah, I hadn't thought about that D-Day peril, but it's a very...

Apt one. The other similarity is that if you get into San Carlos water, you are relatively sheltered. You can unload and basically keep the logistics flowing with a limited degree of danger, which would not be the case if you got any closer in. So back to that morning of the 21st of May, we're now in Falkland Sound, which is the water that divides the kind of sleeve of water that divides east and west San

So we slipped in there early in the morning and I went up on deck and it was a clear night, but there was no sign of life on the land.

And it seemed that neither enemy radar or enemy eyeballs had actually spotted this huge fleet creeping closer and closer. But how long was it going to stay that way? The conditions were really wonderful if you were on a South Atlantic cruise with the stars glittering and the sea pretty calm, in fact, very calm, flat as a slate.

But it wasn't so great if you were on what was the biggest amphibious landing since D-Day. I wrote a book shortly afterwards and described what I was seeing, and it read like this. The Southern Cross glittered overhead, and every few minutes a shooting star skidded across the sky.

The stars lit up the round shoulders of the hills on either side of the Sound. All this beauty and calm could not have been more unwelcome. We'd been praying for rough seas, driving rain and mist, anything that would mask our arrival and delay the moment when the Argentinian garrison at Port Stanley realised what was going on. However, as we approached the mouth to Soin Carlos Water...

All was still. Then, suddenly, the hill to the north of Yarmcridge, called Fanninghead, lit up with explosions. I mean, this is an amazing bit of the story, really, isn't it? And one that we really don't know that much about in terms of the detail of what actually happened at Fanninghead. So let's talk a bit about it. The SBS, the Special Boat Squadron, now the Special Boat Service, had been carrying out recce for some time now in the area.

We know from Julian Thompson that they were doing extraordinarily important work, including getting all the information about the beaches back to Commando Brigade so they could make their dispositions. The SBS reported that there were no Argentinians at all around San Carlos water.

However, they did discover an enemy position on top of Fanning Head. And the reason this matters is because Fanning Head, as Patrick's explained, can enfilade any craft coming into San Carlos water. And they did have an artillery piece there. So it was absolutely vital that this location was knocked out so that they weren't in a position to bombard the troops coming in. No one knew quite how many there were there, but clearly it posed a threat to the landings. They had to be taken out.

So I spoke to Tel, who was one of a 25-man, mainly SBS team, who were given the task with naval gunfire on tap if needed from the destroyer HMS Antrim to deal with the problem. Tel, as you will notice in the clip, refers to the Antrim as the friends from the West Country. Tel was an SBS operator. We'd been up and done some reconnaissance with thermal imagery in the Sea Kings. We identified a

heavy weapons position on Fanning Head so heavy weapons 120 howitzers you know they could have on a reverse slope been firing at the fleet and taking pot shots at them so we were tasked then as a squadron so people like Shana they were out doing their bit dark and dirty getting right in amongst their positions doing their OPs and

What was left of the SBS then were brought together. We were briefed. We positively ID'd, you know, human signatures, heat signatures on that area quite a lot. So that was it. Everybody on the helicopters, all the sticks were brought together, the sticks being the groups of people per helicopter. And then we went in the very early hours of the morning. Our mission was to take that position before first light. So off we went.

from the various ships and we landed. Okay, so tell me how you deployed for that all. So we all inserted by helicopter. Approximately, I would suggest about 4 to 5k from the position. So low level contour flying with the helicopters. Navy pilots again, absolutely stunning guys. I mean, they were so good at what they did in

in any situation I love those guys to bits I really do but yeah in we went dropped off the SBS are not typically people who carry great big mortars and things like that so we had a bit of assistance from our good friends down in the west country two of those guys helped us out with that who brought direct fire so thank you very much for that a bit of support in the back there

Off we went and then we got onto a plateau that was the ridgeline looking over Fanning Head with a lot of dead ground in between. Incidentally we had six general purpose machine guns with us. Normally a company which is 100 men in a Royal Marine Commando unit carry three.

There were 25 of us and we had six. So, yeah, that's my mathematics to write one and four. I carried one all the time. I insisted that I have a 7.62 weapon with me because it's got a lot more stopping power. And that's what I carried throughout the war. So we carried very little equipment for our own personal use. It was more ammunition and food and a sleeping bag. Typically, I'd have about 2,000 rounds of Link with Tracer ready to go. So, yeah, we lined out.

We had Rod Bell, who spoke fluent Spanish. Of course, we didn't speak fluent Spanish. All we were taught on the way down on the RFA was no asesa la palabra clave, which was I don't know the password, in case we were challenged, and sumos los animos, put down your weapons. That's as much as my Spanish education went. Anyway, so Rod, bless him, and again, nothing was official.

So all this was going on at sea and as we've already alluded to there was all sorts of stuff going down at sea, submarines, ships being taken out. But no one actually said we're at war. No one had actually said what are we going to do when we get there. We were just told to neutralise this position so the fleet could get in safely into San Carlos water. So we went fully intending to get the Argentinians to surrender.

because they were in a very vulnerable position and there was only one way out for them. And we thought, right, so Rod was there for a couple of hours and time was getting on and we were getting a little bit twitchy and we're going, look, you know, we've really got to start looking at taking this position here, guys, because these ships are going to need to come in. So we were about, I would suggest, 800 metres away, dead ground, and he was trying to get them to surrender, to come out, but they kept shooting at us.

And we were watching them through the thermal images with the guns left and right in the light mode, not in the SF mode, sustained fire mode on the tripod. So we had the light roll, GPMGs. I was actually watching the six o'clock as well with my gun, but listening to everything that was going on. And as they were trying to escape, we'd fire left and right. We didn't want to shoot them. We didn't. We really didn't. We were just herding them back in.

to say, look guys, don't escape because we can see you. They couldn't understand because you could see, they're all like this, oh my, how can they see us? Of course, we're just herding them back into the middle. There were reports that they were injured on purpose by their own people to stop them running away but that's just another story whether that's true or not, I don't know.

So we cracked on with that and we looked and said, Rod, you've really got to take a back seat here, mate, because time's getting on. They wouldn't give in. They wouldn't surrender. I think they wanted to because when I took the prisoners later, talking to them as men, they weren't out there to fight. But, yeah, so we did that and we engaged...

And we took the position. Wow, well, that really brought it back home. Tell, of course, known only as tell, because the SBS do stick to this real code of anonymity and secrecy. The bit that really stood out for me was...

the way that the reference to Rod Bell, their commander. So they allow Rod Bell the opportunity to do his bit and try and talk the Argentinians into surrendering. But the NCOs, at the end of the day, as they do in special forces units, have the last word. They say, OK, you've done your bit, now we'll take over. So I think that was very redolent of the kind of spirit of special forces units. Patrick, there's also that lovely description of...

Argentinian soldiers back

into their position, i.e. preventing them from escaping by using machine gunfire, long-range machine gunfire, almost like a sheepdog. I mean, I've never heard that before. Absolutely extraordinary. And the idea that the Argentinians, you know, didn't know where on earth it was coming from, and yet gradually they were being pushed back. And of course, eventually they're taken prisoner. Some of the descriptions of them once they've been taken prisoner are, you know, these are not top troops. And it's, you know, I think in many ways, this colours the view of the servicemen as to what they're likely to face, you know,

further on in battle. Yeah, and I think it does make the point that these are not, you know, trained, well, they are trained killers, but they have a heart and a soul and they don't want to inflict unnecessary casualties. They have some sympathy for the guys they're fighting. So, well, with the fanning head position now neutralised, the perils of getting ashore are considerably reduced. So far, so good. We'll hear what happened next in part two. Welcome back.

So as you heard in part one, the troops are about to land. Fanninghead has been neutralised, but there's still danger ahead. And as dawn is coming up on the morning of 21 May, the luck of the British is holding so far. But what's going to happen next?

From well before daylight, the landing craft were going back and forth, ferrying soldiers and supplies ashore to their allotted positions all around San Carlos water. Now, Patrick, you were there. Can you describe exactly what the scene was like and what you remember?

Well, first of all, you've got to visualise the landscape, and the landscape is very much like the Scottish Hebrides. It's all lowish, bare hills, lots of scree, rocky outcrops, precious few trees, not even many shrubs. And the hills slope down fairly gently to rock-strewn plains.

beaches. There's not much sign of humans having made an impression on this landscape. There's a few settlements scattered around the anchorage. Yeah, well, if you look at San Carlos water, you can see on the map, it's V-shaped with two forks, one short one leading into a river that heads to the east and another one forking down to the south.

And on the eastern end of the north shore of the water is Port San Carlos. And that is about five or six miles from the sea entrance. And this is where three para under Hugh Pike will go ashore. Halfway down the eastern shore of the Sutherley Fork is the settlement known as San Carlos. This is where two para and 40 commando were to land. So what exactly were these settlements, Patrick? I mean, we've got these visions in our head, probably erroneously, of a kind of reasonably modern looking settlement.

you think of the UK in 1982, what did they look like then? Well, a settlement is really, it's a sort of extended kind of cluster of farm buildings. You've got, so this is a sheep farming territory. There are many more sheep than there are human beings on the Falklands.

So it's basically a main house, which is where the manager of the sheep farm lives. And next door to it, a couple of bunk houses for the shepherds who live this very lonely existence there. And of course, there are also sheep sheds, shearing sheds. So when the itinerant sheep shearers arrive from New Zealand and Australia, as they do every year at the season,

The sheep can be taken in there and sheared. Now, these proved very useful for... Not all the troops could be accommodated in there, but some could from time to time to get them out of the appalling weather. So the look is very kind of... It's not ramshackle exactly, but it's got a very temporary feel of these wooden corrugated iron roofed

Buildings plonked down on the landscape. On the other side of San Carlos Water, there was a disused refrigeration plant at Ajax Bay. Now, this became home of the famous red and green life machine, the field hospital, where British casualties and Argentinian casualties were first taken.

And that was also where 4-5 Commando went. Talking of 4-5 Commando, I spoke to Sergeant Dave Watkins of the Royal Marines, ex-4-5 Commando, who was actually the coxswain of Foxtrot 3 landing craft from HMS Fearless, which ferried men from Fearless, from the mouth of San Carlos water, through the darkness that morning. We embarked, I believe it was a company of 4-5 Commando from the Fearless, on my particular boat.

And I can distinctly remember going down to the tank deck to see these guys because I served in 4.5 Commando prior and there were a few people there that I knew from my time up there. And I made a point of trying to find them people and just having a chat with them, make sure everything was OK and they knew what we were going to do and so on and so forth. By which time, of course, all these guys were hyped up and they were blacked out completely with camouflage paint and all this.

weighed down to the nth degree with the amount of kit they were going to have to carry with them and I remember it being very very quiet very still guys who maybe with a look of disbelief on their faces but they knew it was going to happen it was no longer a game now the

This was it, you know, and people were beginning to, even though it sounds like a very, very last minute thing, these people now realised that, you know, it was about to hit the fan and it was no longer a game, it was no longer an exercise, it was real. And from that point on, it was just the utmost of professionalism. From my point of view, we were briefed by Colour Sergeant Michael Francis, Connie Francis, who was a senior coxswain on the feelers. So before we left the boat, we knew where we were going to go to rendezvous

We knew who was going to be on board what boat and we knew the order of the boats that we were going to go into the beachhead with. And basically, for the fearless, it was a simple process of one, two, three, four. Connie Francis was on boat number one, Foxtrot one, because he was a senior coxswain. I believe he had with him on the boat

Ewan Sutherby Taylor, who had an intimate knowledge of the Falklands because of his prior deployment down there. And he was a very keen sailor, so he knew most of these places on there. So when we'd come off the boat and we started to circle around the stern to make sure we'd all got ourselves into the correct order and we set off, as coxswains and that for the boats, we had night vision glasses on.

And also the boat in front was showing a Dayglo stick. So that was on the stern of each boat so that we could make sure we had a visual reference and also with the night vision goggles, which sounds pretty good, but they weren't because the night vision doesn't give you a sense of depth or depth.

It wasn't a particularly clear picture because you're bouncing up and down all the time and everything else. And then the spray coming over and so on and so on and so forth. I wrote a book about the Second World War and the early days of beach reconnaissance when the Second World War SBS would go in and get the sort of information that you need when you're going to bring in landing ships, which is gradients, beach gradients, the firmness of the sand and all of that sort of thing. I mean, was that information you already had? You had a pretty clear idea of what the beaches would be like.

We had a very good idea of it because, again, you and Sotheby Taylor knew that area quite comprehensively. And also, before we got to do the landings, the special forces had been down to the beach area and reconnaissance the beach to make sure it was clear and so on and so forth. So we were going in on signal lights anyway. We were quite happy at that particular time that if there was going to be any opposition to our landing, it was going to be coming from quite a distance away and not on the beachhead.

So in effect, it was quite a peaceful landing. Went in, dropped the ramp, got rid of the troops, got the ramp up and disappeared, ready for the next run. So that was Dave Watkins, Royal Marine Coxon. And what he described there was pretty much the experience for all the other units. The landings went off without fuss. Everyone gets put ashore where they're meant to be.

And that strikes me as pretty impressive. You and I know, Saul, from our World War II research, is how difficult it is to bring off an amphibious landing. I'm thinking of my last book on Dieppe, Operation Jubilee. This is a disastrous 1942 raid on Dieppe. There, they're only having to cross 80 miles of water. They're carrying pretty much the same number of men, about 6,000 men.

um and they you know all the ships go all over the place and this is something they've actually rehearsed for they've carried out two rehearsals before no rehearsals before these landings in san carlos water very tricky operation and all in all off to a great start very big achievement the whole thing has been lashed up thrown together it's a come as you are party as someone put it yeah all these units are kind of working together of course the marines are

know each other, but the commandos and the Marines don't work together that often. And the whole shipping aspect of it, I think everyone was agreed afterwards that that part of the operation under Mike Clapp...

Clap was an absolute textbook, you know, Rolls-Royce job. Yeah, Clap, it should be mentioned, is a name I suspect a lot of listeners, even those of a certain vintage, Patrick, won't have heard of. He's one of the unsung heroes of this story and pretty much everyone we've spoken to, Larkin, Thompson, and even down to the ordinary guys say he did an extraordinary job. So, you know, it needs to be stressed that this

crucial early bit of the campaign can only work with planning, forethoughts and a lot of really excellent organisations. So we often talk about military cock-ups. You and I have written about many of them. You mentioned Dieppe. I'm thinking, you know, going back to Omaha Beach in the Second World War, they knew there were tough defences there, not least because the SBS had been on shore and had a look and warned them what was going to happen.

And the SBS had said, look, you know, you need to mark these beaches. You know, let's actually see where we're going. And one of the problems with landing on certain beaches, you don't actually know where you're going to end up, particularly if there's tide and there's bad weather. The advantage of San Carlos water, of course, is it's an inlet. It's inside the main bit of the sea. So that took away at least some of the risk. But

Sudby, Talia, as you've pointed out, and the Coxsons also deserve great credit. We don't want to get too carried away, but yeah, it was all great. But there were no Argentinians there, and that is a huge advantage. And we'll go into this in greater detail later, but I think we've got to flag up here the absence of real thought about the way the Argentinians acted.

conducted their defence. Basically, they're on the defensive from the word go, which is not a good mental military posture to have, if you like.

There are some really kind of obvious things they could have done, like, for example, have a force on Mount Kent, which, as we'll be hearing later, really dominates, the feature that dominates the whole island. And yet they restricted themselves to the hills around, immediately around Port Stanley. So they're kind of on the back foot already. And when they do actually learn that the British are coming ashore on the far side of the island, which they do very early on, in fact, they get interrogated.

intelligence, even on the eve of the landing, a Canberra, an Argentine Air Force Canberra, flying over, spot something mysterious. And that should have put them on the alert. That would be the signal to helicopter troops forward to cover that side of the island, or at least have kind of recce scouting outfits out there looking for the real landing point. But they don't do any of that. It's only on the morning of

that they react. Yeah, and it also reminds me, this Argentinian inaction of that great line from Clausewitz, better to make a decision than no decision at all. If you sit back and let the enemy decide, you're in trouble, as we're going to discover, the Argentinians are going to get into trouble. However, that

morning, 21 May is not over, there is danger. And one of the biggest elements of danger is that, yes, the initial landings of those troops have gone well, a lot of it under darkness, but time is getting on. And actually, the landing craft are now one hour behind time, which means that some of the troops are going to have to land in daylight, and that is going to be extremely hazardous. There were delays, and as light is coming up, some of the troops, as I say, were still on the ships,

Three para had been shifted over to the assault ship Intrepid 36 hours before. And as Hugh Pike, their commander, told me, as dawn broke, he was starting to get anxious. The plan was a night landing. And of course, by the time it came around to us, we were two para and four five commander. It might be wrong, but anyway, two battalions went on in the first wave. And then the second two, one of whom was us.

It must have been, anyway, I think it was 4 or 5 commandos in the second. And of course, it was broad daylight by the time, the inevitable delays to which such operations are victim. And so it was broad daylight, a beautiful early morning, very fine morning for flying from Argentina. So we were very, very anxious indeed to get on with it and get ashore. And it does seem to be terribly slow, the whole thing. But eventually we got into our landing craft and

and made our way to Sand Bay just off Port St Carlos. Once ashore, what was your role that day? Our role was to secure our part of the bridgehead, as was the role of Fortou Commando, stayed on the Canberra as the brigade reserve. And although they got ashore later that day for obvious reasons, very quickly indeed,

So, you know, our job was to secure the settlement, liberated, if you like, and to secure the high ground around Port St Carlos as our part of the bridgehead. Do you remember talking to any of the Falkland Islanders that day, Hugh? Yes, very much so. Yes, yes, very much so. The manager at Port St Carlos was a chap called Alan Miller, who sadly died quite soon after the War of Cancer. And he was terrific and incredibly excited, of course.

And all the local people were, there was a famous photograph of my regimental sergeant major, Laurie Ashbridge, having a mug of tea with a woman in a little garden. Very sort of historic picture. But we'd also had a nasty incident on our way in because as we advanced on foot, obviously towards the settlement itself,

which was, I suppose, I don't know, half a kilometre or something from where we landed. Two seeking helicopters came over with underslung loads, escorted by two gazelle helicopters. And both of these gazelles were shot down by an Argentine platoon that had stayed behind. And we had no information that they were there. All our information that there had been a force there, but that had been withdrawn. And

And so with small arms fire, they knocked two helicopters out of the sky, killing three of the four crew. I read somewhere, Hugh, that the Argentinians actually fired on some of the crew in the water. Is that the case? Yes, yes, yes. And then we had a Pucara then came across with their very nasty thing, a very slow flying ground attack aircraft with its machine guns. So that gave us a bit of a blast as well.

So it was a rather nasty initiation in a sense. And very sad, obviously, that those two helicopters were lost. But it was an early lesson. You know, the theory that you could escort big helicopters with small ones equipped with SNEB rockets or what, was flawed because these helicopters remained extremely vulnerable. So that was Hugh Pike, CO of 3 Para.

And I remember this very clearly, this sort of great sense of urgency, the great sense of hurry, the helicopters buzzing back and forth constantly, constantly.

and with underslung loads. But the real priority in Julian Thompson's mind was to get these rapier anti-aircraft batteries onto dry land as soon as possible to make the anchorage as secure as they could from what was coming next. Everyone was expecting this any moment, the anticipated onslaught of the Argentinian Air Force.

These were absolutely spanking brand new anti-aircraft defences. They'd replaced the old Bofors guns and they were operated by 12th Regiment Royal Artillery, which has been attached to 3 Commando Brigade.

So it was new, and of course being new it meant it was more sophisticated, and being more sophisticated meant it was more delicate. It operated on a radio signal guiding the missile in flight onto its target. And it was meant to defend not just the anchorage, but also the harriers based on land, on this sort of harrier pad that was going to be built very rapidly as well.

just near Port San Carlos. It was a huge amount of faith was put in the Rapier. It was regarded as a sort of miracle weapon. In fact, it did have some teething problems and some deficiencies. So it turned out that its performance was not that great. But probably the Argentinians knew we had it and it probably had a bit of a deterrent effect. Now, Hugh mentioned the sighting of that Pucara, these anti-insurgency aircrafts.

And that was a particularly ominous thing. I was on the bridge wing of the Canberra when this plane, this Pucara, suddenly appeared at the far end of San Carlos water. And we kind of said somehow that it was as surprised to see us as we were to see it. I remember saying, look at these lights twinkling under the wings of the aircraft. What's that? And suddenly realising this is what being shot at means. This is what it looks like. Now, the Pucara kind of skedaddled away pretty quickly, but we all knew...

what was coming next. Next time, we'll hear about the incredible drama of what happened next when the Skyhawk daggers and mirages of the Argentinian Air Force enter the fray. We'll also be talking to the British Harrier pilots desperately trying to intercept them and to those trying to defend the ships in the anchorage. It's riveting stuff. Do join us.