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Israel and Iran Reach Tentative Ceasefire

2025/6/25
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David (Caller)
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Margot Rubio
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Mina Kim
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President Trump
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Robin Wright
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Mina Kim: 本期节目讨论了美国对伊朗核设施的军事打击以及由此引发的以色列和伊朗之间的停火协议。专家认为,伊朗的文化和政治可能比其对手的军事实力更能决定这场战争的结果。 President Trump: 美国的力量为以色列和伊朗之间的历史性停火协议铺平了道路,这场战争已经结束。 Robin Wright: 现在最大的问题是接下来会发生什么,以及是否能通过外交手段说服美国、以色列和伊朗在限制伊朗核能力方面达成共识。以色列先发制人地袭击破坏了原本计划进行的外交谈判,导致了12天的敌对行动。我们现在又回到了原点,最初的伊朗核协议经过了两年艰苦的外交谈判,涉及核科学家、武器专家和外交官。特朗普总统试图在60天内与伊朗达成一项新协议,并且只派了他的朋友史蒂夫·伍德科夫作为唯一的谈判代表,这几乎是不可能实现的。美国确实需要与伊朗进行直接对话,以确保伊朗不会将和平项目转变为大规模杀伤性武器。伊朗不会签署美国发布的声明,他们希望美国解除制裁以换取对其核计划的限制。伊朗仍然控制着霍尔木兹海峡,还有很多问题悬而未决,总统说没必要谈判可能是在试图支持他关于摧毁伊朗核设施的说法。美国情报报告显示,袭击可能只使伊朗的核计划倒退了几个月,而不是像总统声称的那样完全摧毁。美国袭击了伊朗的三个地点,但完全摧毁的可能性不大,可能还有一些部件和浓缩铀留在伊朗。要确定袭击造成的真正破坏,需要国防情报局、中央情报局和整个美国情报界的分析,以及以色列的投入。伊朗已经掌握了建造先进离心机和更快更高速度地浓缩铀的知识,你可以摧毁项目,但无法消除实际推进核计划所需的知识。从伊朗的角度来看,核能力问题关乎主权,他们有权为了和平目的发展核能。伊朗正在通过提高铀浓缩水平来对美国施加压力,但据中央情报局和摩萨德称,伊朗尚未做出制造炸弹的政治决定。伊朗可能为了获得一些筹码,故意夸大自己受到的损害。伊朗试图通过象征性的导弹袭击来防止局势升级,以此维护国内颜面。伊朗人对停火感到宽慰,但对外交努力失败后可能发生的事情感到担忧,他们长期以来一直担心外部干预。伊朗的什叶派文化强调为正义而战死,而不是苟且偷生,这种文化滋生了一种对存在的恐惧感,以及一种作为少数派的意识。伊朗在伊斯兰统治46年后,已经建立了根深蒂固的机构,他们虽然彼此争吵,但都希望生存下去。对伊朗来说,现在最重要的是生存,不仅在军事上,也在经济上。哈梅内伊在许多方面都是一位偶然的领导人,他是在前任总统在恐怖袭击中丧生后才成为总统的。霍梅尼去世时没有明确的继承人,哈梅内伊被推到了最高领袖的位置。他一直是一位中层神职人员,成为最高领袖后才晋升为阿亚图拉。他不谙世事,缺乏个人魅力和知识深度,也没有接触过西方。他的口才很好,但不擅长外交,如果他消失了,大多数伊朗人不会怀念他。他已经86岁了,伊朗人普遍认为他不会在位太久了。以色列公开表示希望最高领袖下台,并通过社交媒体呼吁伊朗人起来反抗压迫政权。美国声称不寻求政权更迭,但特朗普总统在社交媒体上表示,现在是伊朗人站起来的时候了。目前,由于伊朗国内没有可行或可见的反对派,这种想法是一种幻想。伊朗人更多地是在维护自己的身份认同,而不是团结在政权周围。在入侵伊拉克和阿富汗之后,伊朗政权基本上说,我们将保证你们的安全,但作为交换,你们将不会获得充分的政治权利或经济资产。伊朗人可能会开始质疑政权,并要求重新谈判社会契约,看看革命是否会演变,或者是否有人会公开挑战它。伊朗有能力镇压任何反对派。你正在观察伊朗未能保护其人民免受外国袭击,是否会刺激人们起来反抗政权。问题在于,革命后的第一代和第二代人依赖政府提供工作、收入、医疗保健、社会服务以及食物或燃料补贴。第三代人很年轻,规模也较小,他们还没有足够的政治成熟度、组织能力和计划来提供替代方案。没有人被伊朗国内视为合法的。袭击是否会引发波斯民族主义的 surge,尽管政权不受欢迎?80%的人口可能不喜欢这个政权,但80%的人也不希望看到外部势力介入并决定他们应该如何被统治。这与你之前说的伊朗人现在在维护自己的身份认同是分开的吗?伊朗人是一个多元化的群体,除了波斯人之外,还有许多其他少数民族。在这一时刻,少数民族可能会说,我们将不再强调我们的个人身份或民族身份,而是将我们的首要身份视为波斯人或伊朗人。我们需要非常谨慎地评估他们的意图和未来的利益。魅力攻势的另一种说法是外交。美国一直在采取一种摇摆不定的政策,我们进进出出,我们想再次加入,但我们会再次轰炸你。我甚至认为美国人也怀疑我们是否值得信任。自10月7日以来,伊朗的抵抗轴心受到了军事打击的严重影响。真主党失去了其领导人哈桑·纳斯鲁拉,损失了数百甚至数千名战士,其军火库至少在黎巴嫩南部被摧毁。在叙利亚,伊朗的盟友巴沙尔·阿萨德在12月被推翻,这改变了该地区的政治格局。在加沙,哈马斯的大部分地区被摧毁,但哈马斯仍在战斗。伊朗-以色列-美国战争之后出现的一个大问题是,这将如何影响中东的权力平衡?伊朗的力量被大大削弱,我不认为其影响力会消失。很难消除一种想法,即人们想要一些不同的政治。危险在于,这些核心政治问题没有得到解决,这可能会助长其他事情。如果我们能够消灭真主党领导人或伊朗将军,一切就会结束,这种结论过于简单化了。即使在神权统治下,伊朗也存在广泛的意见分歧。核心问题归结为:上帝的法律还是人类的法律至上?阿亚图拉和神职人员是否有权解释上帝的法律,以强加或定义政治制度?还是人类的法律至上?在伊朗人民选举产生的人中。与此同时,国内在制度、人类法律或上帝法律是否至上等问题上存在巨大分歧。最高领袖是否是万无一失的,他是否可以发号施令?无论在军事、政治、经济等任何问题上,政府机构都必须将答案强加于人民。沙阿在1953年逃离,因为他非常不受欢迎。莫萨德总理将石油国有化,他认为石油是国家资产,不应被外国政府攫取利润。美国和英国决定这不符合他们的利益。因此,他们促成了沙阿的回归和莫萨德总理的下台。伊朗历史上大部分时间都由独裁者、君主、军事统治者或阿亚图拉统治。尽管伊朗在精神上是世界上最复杂的政体之一。他们精通技术,了解外部世界。这种文化可以追溯到几千年前,他们为居鲁士大帝颁布的第一部人权法案感到自豪。 Margot Rubio: 特朗普总统愿意与世界上任何对和平感兴趣的人会面和交谈,我们希望与任何国家建立和平关系。与伊朗建立和平关系取决于伊朗是否愿意直接与美国谈判,而不是通过第三方或第四方。 Chris: 在这场冲突中,成比例的回应的概念非常有趣。阿亚图拉是否为了维护对大规模民众不满的恐惧而挽回面子?对卡塔尔进行象征性的导弹袭击是否有战略原因? Sanjay: 在英国的劝说下,美国在50年代推翻了伊朗的民选政府,因为新政府将旧工业国有化了。内塔尼亚胡至少说了五到六次,伊朗离拥有炸弹只有三到四年了。美国退出了与欧洲和伊朗达成的协议,尽管他们允许我们监控一切。在谈判进行的同时,美国允许以色列发动袭击。为什么有人会信任美国?美国只是想要政权更迭,就像在50年代那样。 David: 鉴于过去几个月发生的事情,首先是哈马斯袭击,然后是真主党,然后是伊朗的垮台,你如何看待伊朗在该地区的影响力?考虑到沙特阿拉伯在该地区的崛起,他们能否恢复? Gregor: 我过去常听说,伊朗内陆地区的保守派和德黑兰年轻、受过教育、社会自由的大都市伊朗人之间存在分歧,基本上就像美国一样。 Peter: 进步是什么样的?我们现在在哪里?你对伊朗的未来最乐观的看法是什么? Nima: 我出生和成长在那里,20多年前作为难民来到美国,原因是压迫和宗教迫害。我不认同你对政府实际上希望与人民签订社会契约或朝着积极方向发展的看法。自从战争开始以来,他们已经逮捕了数千人,他们扩大了……对间谍进行全国性起诉的热情,并且在过去几天内已经处决了很多人。所以我认为这个政权并没有利用这个时刻来为人民创造积极的结果,他们实际上是在做相反的事情。他们正在回到革命初期和战争期间所做的事情。所以我认为那是不正确的。她刚才关于代表权的评论,以及实际上让伊朗的少数民族在政府中发挥某种影响力。这完全是象征性的。你知道,伊朗的非什叶派人口,他们根本没有平等的权利,他们几乎没有任何权利。所以我认为,你所描绘的这种美好的前景…… Stephen: 有没有人考虑过,对伊朗采取魅力攻势,包括取消制裁、增加贸易以及更加开放的政治文化关系,可能是促使其压迫政权垮台的有效途径?这可能会消除或减轻伊朗公民的碉堡心态。特朗普曾发表过一些有趣的言论,说人们可以购买他们的石油,继续这样做。

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Support for KQBD Podcasts comes from Landmark College, offering a fully online graduate-level Certificate in Learning Differences and Neurodiversity program. Visit landmark.edu slash certificate to learn more. Support for Forum comes from the University of San Francisco School of Management.

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The University of San Francisco School of Management. Change the world from here. From KQED.

From KQED in San Francisco, I'm Mina Kim. Coming up on Forum, a fragile ceasefire appears to be holding between Israel and Iran just days after the U.S. intervened in the war by striking Iranian nuclear sites. President Trump is claiming credit, but journalist and Middle East politics expert Robin Wright says the outcome of this war may be shaped more by Iran's culture and politics than by the military prowess of its opponents.

We take a closer look at the impact of Israeli and U.S. strikes on the Iranian regime and how it might affect the U.S.'s next moves. Join us. Welcome to Forum. I'm Mina Kim. At a news conference this morning from the NATO summit, President Trump stood by his assessment of Iran's nuclear sites being obliterated by U.S. strikes. Trump also said that he believed the ceasefire between Israel and Iran would hold.

nor the military on earth could have done it. And now this incredible exercise of American strength has paved the way for peace, for the historic ceasefire agreement late Monday. And we call it the 12-day war. Spoke to a few people. I guess that just sounded like the right name. It was a 12-day war. And we think it's over. I don't think they're going to be going back at each other. I don't think so.

For reaction to Trump's remarks and insight on how the U.S.'s actions could play out in Iran, we're joined now by Robin Wright, a journalist and New Yorker contributing writer and columnist who has covered Iranian politics extensively. Robin, welcome to Forum. Great to be with you, Mina. Well, glad to have you with us. What do you think of the president's remarks on the ceasefire? Do you believe it will hold?

Well, obviously, we all hope it will hold. The big question, of course, is what happens next. And can there be diplomacy that convinces the United States, Israel and the Iranians that they are all on the same page in terms of what Iran is willing to do to limit its nuclear capabilities? And that's a big question. And in many ways, it's more complicated than the military capabilities.

getting remember that diplomacy was supposed to happen on the Sunday and the Israelis preempted the talks by hitting on Friday. And that, of course, led to 12 days of hostilities. The

The problem is that we're still back at square one. And just for perspective for your listeners, the original Iran nuclear deal took two years of tortuous diplomacy that involved teams of nuclear scientists and weapons experts, as well as diplomats. And the result was a 159-page document with annexes.

And President Trump set out to do a new deal with Iran in just 60 days and with one person, Steve Woodcoff, his close friend, as the sole negotiator. And the odds of ever getting a new deal in 60 days were infinitesimally small.

And so on that point, I actually want to play you another moment when the president was asked about an agreement or talks between the U.S. and Iran. He said that the U.S. and Iran would hold talks next week, though he also said in that same press conference he didn't think they were necessary. Let's hear that.

Can I ask you, are you interested in restarting negotiations with Iran? And if so, have they resisted? So our people, Marco could answer this, but our people are not, I'm not. The way I look at it, they fought, the war's done, and, you know, I could get a statement that they're not going to go nuclear. We're probably going to ask for that. But they're not going to be doing it. But they're not going to be doing it anyway. They've had it.

They've had it. Now maybe someday in the future we'll want that. But I've asked Marco, do you want to draw, I just asked him the question as we were walking on the stage, do you want to draw up a little agreement for them to sign? Because I think we can get them to sign it.

And then Secretary of State Margot Rubio did get up on the stage and then did say that he wanted direct talks between the two countries. Let's just hear a little bit of that. President Trump has shown a willingness to meet and talk to anybody in the world who's interested in peace. I don't know of any president that's been as willing as he has to meet with anyone and talk about peace. We'd love to have peaceful relations.

with any country in the world. And so obviously, that'll depend on Iran's willingness not just to engage in peace, but to negotiate directly with the United States, not through some third country or fourth country process. So first, I'd love to get your reaction to what they were just saying there. Do you think that the US and Iran would hold direct talks not through third parties like normal?

Well, Iran's position originally was it wasn't going to talk to the United States until Israel stopped the bombardment. The question has always been whether the two sides would have direct talks, as they did when they negotiated the original deal that was concluded in 2015. First of all, I think

that the United States really does need direct talks with the Iranians to figure out exactly how the U.S. can ensure Iran is not converting a peaceful country

program, developing enrichment for civilian energy and converting it into the world's deadliest weapon. And the idea that Iran is just going to sign some statement that the United States issues is an illusion. I, you know, this is... And I

The Iranians are not going to say that. They're not going to sign just some document. They want to know that the United States is lifting sanctions and all the sanctions in exchange for limiting its program. And so this is not something that we can necessarily dictate to Tehran. It still has some levers of power, not many.

But we don't know what it's done in terms of moving some of its enriched uranium. It still has control of the Strait of Hormuz. So there are just so many issues still on the table. Exactly. And, you know, the idea that it's not necessary could be interpreted from the president could be interpreted as him trying to buttress his obliteration claims.

with regard to the damage done by the U.S. nuclear strikes. And I'd just love to get your take on that as well, Robin. CNN first reported yesterday that early U.S. intelligence reports indicated that the attacks set Iran's nuclear program back possibly by only a matter of months instead of total obliteration, as the way that the president has claimed. How do you read this situation?

Well, clearly there's been a huge impact on Iran's program. The United States hit three sites in Isfahan, in Tehran, in Syria,

Fordow, which is the one that's deeply buried under a mountain range. The idea that we've obliterated, I suspect, is not true. I think there's probably some components, I suspect there's some enriched uranium that is still in Iran. Severe damage, absolutely. That seems pretty obvious. But obliterate, I don't think we're going to know until there's been really a sincere

battle damage estimate, as it's called, or assessment, a BDA. And that's going to take, you know, a lot of analysis from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the CIA, the entire American intelligence community, and probably with a lot of input from the Israelis who have tremendous intelligence assets as well.

They do. And the president appeared to quote Israeli and even Iranian assessments during his press conference. You know, Israeli assessments that were essentially saying that it was, in fact, very close to a total collapse.

making, I'll quote it, it said, destroyed the site's critical infrastructure. This is in relation to Fordow and rendered the enrichment facility inoperable. And then the Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson has said that the nuclear sites were badly damaged. But it sounds like you're saying that you don't think the strikes ended Iran's nuclear program.

I doubt it. And I think the most important thing to understand is that Iran has developed incredible knowledge of how to build advanced centrifuges, how to enrich uranium faster and at higher speeds, and in ways that give it a capability in a much faster time.

So, you know, you can kill scientists, you can kill the military, you can bomb programs, but that doesn't eliminate the potential, the knowledge required to actually move forward on a nuclear program. I just want to point something out, though. We look at this question of Iran's nuclear capability from a security standpoint, concern about a bomb. From Iran's perspective, this is about sovereignty.

It has a right to peaceful nuclear energy and to make it as a signatory to the nonproliferation treaty. And for Iran, it says, look, we have a right to it and we need to make our own fuel for it. Now, it doesn't need 60 percent enrichment. It needs only 3.67 percent.

percent enrichment. So there's a huge gap. And of course, there are huge questions about why it's enriching at such a high level. But for Iran, it's their means of applying maximum pressure on the United States and saying, you see, if you don't offer us something, we can still move forward. But the political decision has not been made, according to the CIA and Mossad, to

for Iran to cross the political threshold and decide it wants to make a bomb. And that's an important question for listeners to understand, too. Would it be in Iran's interest to say there was a lot of damage? Are there motivations here that we might want to consider? Some experts are suggesting that.

Well, sure. I mean, everybody engages in propaganda. Everybody wants to put their own spin on what's happened, what will happen. And so the Iranians have an interest in saying, oh, yeah, you did so much damage if they've got a covert facility someplace or have moved their enriched uranium someplace. So, you know, this is where the Iranians want some leverage. Oh, yes, you've weakened us. But, you know, who knows at this point?

We're talking with Robin Wright, contributing writer and columnist at The New Yorker, whose most recent piece for the magazine is called, Can Ayatollah Khamenei and Iran's Theocracy Survive This War? And we want to get into that, actually, sort of the things that will inform the outcome of what just happened. Wright is also the author of several books, including Dreams and Shadows, The Future of the Middle East, and The Last Great Revolution, Turmoil and Transformation in Iran.

And listeners, did you watch first President Trump's press conference? What did you think of it in the statements that he was making? What are your questions about the ceasefire between Iran and Israel and whether it will hold? What are your questions about the Iranian regime and its internal politics?

And what do you think the impact will be of the US's decision to strike Iranian nuclear targets on relations with Iran or even Trump's actions here domestically? The email address is [email protected]. Find us on our social channels, Blue Sky, Facebook, Instagram, or Threads at KQED Forum. Or you can call us at 866-733-6786, 866-733-6786. One last question just as we go to the break.

In terms of the way that Iran retaliated by launching missiles at a major U.S. air base in Qatar, but sent warnings in advance, what do you make of that?

Oh, I think Iran was trying to prevent an escalation. And this was something it had to do kind of symbolically to save face at home, to say that it had retaliated. But this is very much what happened in 2020 after the United States assassinated General Qasem Soleimani. And Iran responded with missiles, but also simultaneously sent a message via the Swiss to the United States saying, this is where we want to stop it. Hmm.

We'll have more after the break as we look at where things go from here with Robin Wright. Stay with us. This is Forum. I'm Mina Kim. Support for Forum comes from the University of San Francisco School of Management. Celebrating 100 years of partnership with the Bay Area business community, the USF School of Management connects students to the city's vibrant culture, hands-on internships, and a wealth of career opportunities.

where AI and sustainability are integrated into every facet of business education, and where students bring innovation, ethics, and entrepreneurial leadership to a planet in need. The University of San Francisco School of Management. Change the world from here. Support for KQED Podcasts comes from Earthjustice. As a national legal nonprofit, Earthjustice has more than 200 full-time lawyers who fight for a healthy environment.

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You're listening to Forum. I'm Mina Kim. A ceasefire appears to be holding between Iran and Israel after the U.S. launched strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities this weekend. We're talking about the U.S.'s decision to intervene militarily in Iran and the impacts of this and what happens next. Robin Wright says, quote, "...the outcome of this war may be shaped more by Iran's culture and politics than by the military prowess of its opponents."

So let's take a closer look at Iran's politics. And listeners, of course, join the conversation at 866-733-6786 with your questions and comments about what happens next, about whether you think the ceasefire will hold, about your questions about the Iranian regime and the impacts of the U.S.'s decision to strike on relations with Iran. You can email forum at kqed.org or find us on our social channels at kqedforum.org.

So talk about that statement, Robin. How could the outcome of this war be shaped more by Iran's culture and politics than by the military prowess of its opponents? And what was the immediate reaction on the ground in Iran on Sunday following the U.S. bombing of those three nuclear sites? Well, I think Iranians are relieved, frankly, that it's

that the ceasefire has been breached. I think they're very nervous about what might happen if diplomacy doesn't work and either Israel or the United States goes after different targets, new targets.

You know, Iran has a long record predating the revolution in 1979 about fearing outside intervention. In 1953, the United States, with help from Britain, orchestrated a coup attempt.

against a democratically elected government that put the Shah back on the throne. And there's also kind of the culture of Shiite Islam, which split with mainstream Sunnis, you know, in the 7th century over issues of political leadership. And Shiites have believed ever since then that it is better to fight

to die for justice than to live with injustice. And so there's a culture of martyrdom, even though Iran, to me, is one of the most secular countries in the Middle East. But the culture has bred this sense of existential fear and a sense of we're a minority, whether it's as a religion or as an ethnic group in the wider world.

And so it's very nervous about what happens next. But Iran also has entrenched institutions after 46 years of Islamic rule. And whether it's the presidency, the judiciary, the very feisty legislature, the military, the different intelligence communities.

And while they bicker with each other, they all want to survive. And for Iran right now, it's all about surviving. And that means not just militarily, but economically, too. So I actually want to ask you, then, if you could just talk a little bit and remind us who the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is, and how he came to power, because you've met him, right? Right.

I have. I had a working breakfast with him when he came on his only trip to the West. He came to the United Nations to give a speech at the opening of the General Assembly. And it was a bizarre setting in the ornate room at the Waldorf Astoria in New York. So Kameny is in many ways an accidental leader. He emerged as president after his predecessor was killed in a terrorist attack.

that also killed the prime minister, the chief of the judiciary, 27 members of parliament. It was a devastating moment. And so he was put in as the president at a time the presidency was actually not a strong position. And then in 1983,

1989, the revolutionary founder, Ayatollah Khomeini, not to be confused with Khamenei, died unexpectedly and with no heir apparent, no one in place. And Khomeini as president was put in that

role. And so he has always been kind of a mid-level cleric. He only rose to the position of Ayatollah after he became supreme leader. He is not a worldly man. He has almost no charisma.

very little intellectual depth. He's not had any kind of exposure to the West, unlike some of the former presidents or foreign ministers. And he's very good at rhetoric, but not very good at diplomacy. And I

I think that the majority of Iranians would not miss him if he disappeared. And one last thing, he is 86 years old and Iranians have been of the mindset for a few years now that the actuarial charts would indicate that he's not going to be around that much longer. And they're prepared for that.

Well, Israel and Iran, of course, have been arch enemies essentially since the fall of the Shah. And Israel has been, you know, trying to spur sort of a counter revolution based on some of the ways that it has conducted its military onslaught. What do you think of that and its potential effectiveness?

Well, this is the so-called regime change. Yes. The Israeli prime minister and his defense minister, Israel Katz, have talked openly about they want the supreme leader no longer to exist. Netanyahu went on social media the day of the first strike and said that Israel had cleared the path

for Iranians to rise up against an oppressive regime. You know, the United States claims it's not for regime change, and then President Trump tweets or puts on social media that it's time for the Iranians to rise up, and he called it MIGA, make Iran great again. I think at the moment that's an illusion. Short term, it's going to be very hard to see

because there's no viable or visible opposition on the ground. There haven't been bizarre strikes or protests on the street as we've seen in the past. Iranians right now are

kind of not rallying around the regime as much as rallying around their own sense of identity. Iran has been, you know, it was the world's first major empire as Persia. It has been a player throughout kind of modern history as well. So I think, you know, the question is, is there a moment at which Iranians are

and the regime under pressure, have to renegotiate the social contract. Since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Afghanistan in 2001, the regime has basically said, we'll promise you security

But in exchange, you won't get full political rights or economic assets. There is a compromise. There's a social contract. And I think Iranians are going to start questioning the regime and saying, we want to renegotiate. And that's the moment where we see whether there is an evolution of the revolution or someone emerges to try to

challenge it more openly. But Iran certainly has the tools to put down any opposition, unfortunately. So you're watching to see if Iran's failure to protect its people against foreign strikes actually spurs, you know, greater revolt against the regime.

Absolutely. And I think that's the question, whether there is a generation that is willing to stand up. The problem is the first generation, the second generation after the revolution kind of depended on the government for jobs, for income, for health care, for social services, for subsidies of food or fuel.

And the third generation is young. It's also smaller. And it doesn't have the political maturity, the organization, the kind of program to provide an alternative yet. And there's no one outside the country that is viewed as legitimate inside Iran. Could the opposite be true that the attacks could prompt a surge in Persian nationalism despite the unpopularity of the regime?

Yes, I think that's probably the case, that 80% of the population may not like the regime, but 80% also does not want to see an outside power, be it Israel or the United States, step in and say, this is how you should be ruled and by whom. And that's where it plays, not just to Persian nationalism, I think it would play if that happened to any country.

Right. And is that separate from what you were saying earlier about Iranians asserting their identity right now? Well, Iranians are a diverse group.

group of ethnic minorities, except for the Persians. Persians are just over 50%. There are other Kurds, Baloch, Lors. There are lots of other minorities. And this is a moment at whether the minorities kind of say, okay, we're not going to

push our individual identity, our ethnic identity, but we're going to stand, which is our first identity, as Persians, as Iranians. And, you know, I'm not in Iran at the moment. I've been going there since 1973, I think more than any American who's not, you know, a dual national. And I think, you know, it's

It's so interesting to me. I remember during Khomeini's life that there was a, I had a minder, as they say, from the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, who was telling me how unhappy he was. He wasn't paid enough, you know, sanctions that hurt their economy. He was grumbling, you know, didn't like these guys. And then there was a rumor from the BBC that Khomeini was

had died and suddenly he was, oh, he was the father of our revolution. This is a terrible loss. So again, this is where

you know, the reaction. We make simplistic and sometimes flippant conclusions about what Iranians might do. There are 92 million people. And I've always said where there are five Iranians, there are six different opinions. So we need to be very careful in how we assess what their intentions, what their interests are in the future.

We're talking with Robin Wright about why she says Iran's culture and politics might determine the outcome of this war or shape it more than the military prowess of its opponents. And you, our listeners, are invited to join the conversation with your questions and comments about that. Chris writes, I find the concept of proportional response in this conflict fascinating. Is the Ayatollah saving face in hopes to maintain fear against his mass disapproval? Or are there strategic reasons for symbolic missile attacks into Qatar?

You're asking me? Yeah, that was the question from our listener, Chris. Yeah. Chris, he's right. I mean, it's very interesting. Iran's response to the US attack was symbolic. It went after a US base that

in Qatar. It's the largest military installation that the United States runs anywhere in the Middle East or South Asia. It was used as our base, again, for the war in Iraq, for the war in Afghanistan. What was so interesting is that

The president of Iran, Massoud Pazeshkin, called the emir of Qatar and apologized and said, we weren't intending to hit you. We were intending to hit this military base, which I've stayed at many times. And it's actually a fair distance from Doha, the capital out in the desert. So, yes, it was a symbolic event.

response and a way of saying we have to respond, but as in 2020, it's going to stop here. At least that was Iran's intention. I think that's an indicator that it does want to see some kind of diplomacy. It does want to see the ability to rebuild society, not just whatever its nuclear program is. This is all about development, that it

Iran has lost hundreds of billions of dollars from lost revenue amid U.S. sanctions. And it wants to get back to the existence of running a state and helping Iranians get through daily life, which the regime is not delivering on its revolutionary goals right now. How many ever simply step down? Oh, I think that's very unlikely. He's been in power since 1989. He believes, I think,

uh sincerely that you know this is god's uh way of kind of guiding iran it is a theocracy and there are those who are devout believers and i think he's one of them i think there are a lot of iranians

who probably don't accept him as the, you know, dictate from God. But, you know, we don't have a poll to indicate that either way. And you were mentioning earlier the power of martyrdom. Let me go to caller Sanjay in Fremont. Hi, Sanjay. You're on. Join us. Hi. Hi.

I have three points. One is that, and these are not mentioned frequently in the media. One is that under the persuasion of the British, the U.S. overthrew a democratically government in Iran in the 50s. And this was because the new government had nationalized the old industry. Number two, Bibi has said at least, I think, five to six times that Iran was

three years away, four years away, just around the corner with the bomb. And he's been saying it five, six times, including this infamous cartoon bomb at United Nations. And that is not mentioned. So, you know, and, you know, he goes and says that again in United Nations to defend his position. And the third thing is that we, the U.S., pulled out of a negotiated agreement

agreement with the Europeans and Iran. Okay. And they were letting us monitor everything, but we pulled out of it. And then suddenly now we want to make a new negotiation. Okay. And while the negotiations are going on,

the U.S. allowed Israel to attack. So, I mean, this is just ridiculous, okay? Yes, I understand the threat now might be a lot more real than maybe in the past, but why would anybody trust the U.S., the way it's acting? Okay, it just wants a regime change. It wanted a regime change in the 50s. Now it wants it again.

Sounds like there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Thanks for your comment, Robin. I'd love to get your reaction to that. There is, of course, there are huge questions about the likelihood of any kind of deal or agreement, whether the situation is better now or worse, and then the massive trust deficit that exists as a result of pulling out of the, you know, JCPOA agreement.

Oh, absolutely. And Sanjay, I did earlier mention that the United States was involved in orchestrating a coup with the British in 1953. And in response to the nationalization of oil, which had been run by Britain, yes, and

the Prime Minister of Israel has since 1996, we're talking 30 years, said that Iran was just weeks or months away from having a bomb. And we all remember that kind of crude drawing he showed at the United Nations conference

a few years ago that looked like a cartoon that Boris would hold in a Bullwinkle cartoon. So the U.S. pulled out of the nuclear deal in 2018 under President Trump.

But remember that Iran still honored that deal for 14 months. And the monitors, most of the monitoring devices have been in place. Now, in response to the assassination of the father of Iran's nuclear program, the Iranian parliament decreed that some of the cameras

in nuclear facilities had to be removed. But Iran still has plenty of monitoring mechanisms in Iran, and that's how it was able to warn afterwards about whether there was radiation or contamination as a result of these airstrikes.

And again, Sanjay, thanks very much for the call. Stephen writes, has anyone considered the possibility that a charm offensive consisting of eliminating sanctions on Iran, increased trade and more open political cultural relations with that country might be an effective way of causing their repressive regime to fall? Among other things, this might eliminate or lessen the bunker mentality in Iran among their citizens. Trump has made some interesting statements about people can just buy their oil, keep doing it.

What do you think, Robin? And again, we're coming right up on a break. I'm so sorry. We can continue it afterwards if you have more to say, but just quickly...

Yes. The alternative to is charm offensive is also called diplomacy. And this gets back to the trust question. The United States has been engaging in a yo-yo policy. We're in, we're out. We want to be in again, but we'll bomb you again. And now we're back. We want to go back to the table. I mean, I think even Americans wonder if there's a trust component for us in there.

We'll have more with Robin Wright and with you listeners after the break. Stay with us. You're listening to Forum. I'm Mina Kim. Support for Forum comes from the University of San Francisco School of Management. Celebrating 100 years of partnership with the Bay Area business community, the USF School of Management connects students to the city's vibrant culture, hands-on internships, and a wealth of career opportunities. Where AI and sustainability are integrated into every facet of business education.

and where students bring innovation, ethics, and entrepreneurial leadership to a planet in need.

The University of San Francisco School of Management. Change the world from here. Support for KQED podcasts comes from Earthjustice. As a national legal nonprofit, Earthjustice has more than 200 full-time lawyers who fight for a healthy environment. They wield the power of the law to protect people's health, preserve magnificent places and wildlife, and advance clean energy to combat climate change. Earthjustice fights in court because the Earth needs a good lawyer.

Learn more about how you can get involved and become a supporter at earthjustice.org. Welcome back to Forum. I'm Mina Kim. We're talking with Robin Wright this hour about what's next for U.S.-Iran relations after the U.S. launch strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, to intervene militarily in this way, its impacts internationally. Listeners,

What are your questions about what's next, about the ceasefire between Iran and Israel, about the Iranian regime and the nation's politics, the impact of the U.S.'s decision on Trump's actions? Some people are worried about what effects it might have internationally.

with regard to his actions there, as well as domestically. The email address is forum at kqed.org. Find us on Blue Sky, Facebook, Instagram, or threads at KQED Forum, or call us at 866-733-6786, 866-733-6786.

Wright is the author of Dreams and Shadows, The Future of the Middle East and The Last Great Revolution, Troumoil and Transformation in Iran, among many other books. Her latest piece for The New Yorker is Can Ayatollah Khamenei and Iran's Theocracy Survive This War? And let me go to caller David in Santa Clara. Hi, David, you're on.

I mean, thanks a lot for having Robin on. She's obviously one of the great experts that we have at Iran. And my question is, how does she see Iran's influence in the region going forward, given what's happened over the past few months with first the attack on Hamas, then Hezbollah, and then the collapse of Iran?

their client state Assad in Syria. It just really seems like they're on the back foot, as they say, and right now. And can they recover? Or what are the new dynamics given the rise of Saudi Arabia in the region and all of that? David, thanks so much. Robin?

First of all, David, thank you very much for the kind words. I'm very grateful. Yes, he's absolutely right that Iran's axis of resistance, as they call it, is...

has been deeply impacted by military strikes since October 7th. Hezbollah lost its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. It's lost hundreds, maybe even thousands of fighters. It's had its arsenal, at least across southern Lebanon, eliminated. The interesting thing is that Hezbollah did well in local elections recently, and so it is still a political force.

He's absolutely right about Syria, too. Iran's ally in Bashar Assad was toppled in December. I was in the Middle East when this was happening. And so that changes the dynamics. This went from being a Sunni, sorry, Shiite-friendly government to being a Sunni kind of Islamist government. So the politics of Syria have changed. And of course, in Gaza, Hamas has, you know,

much of Gaza has been destroyed but Hamas is still fighting which is

in some ways kind of stunning. It has no air power and so forth. And he's right also about the rise of Saudi Arabia. One of the great questions coming out of the Iran-Israel-U.S. war is how does this impact the balance of power in the Middle East? And there are clearly some changes. Iran is deeply weakened. I don't think its influence

One of the problems, David, is that in all of these countries where Iran had allies, the core issues that led to the emergence of militias and opposition groups have not been resolved. The Shiites in Lebanon are still treated as a minority. The Palestinians are probably further away from the state than they've been in, you

you know, 30 years. The Houthis have survived attacks by Israel and the United States, but it's, you know, it's still in control of the capital. So,

The axis has not completely been eliminated, and it's very hard to strike, kill, or eliminate an idea, an idea that people want something different politically. And so whether that's, you know, Al Qaeda or ISIS or Hezbollah or Hamas or

The danger is that these core political problems are not being addressed and that can fuel, you know, something else. So I worry that we have these simplistic conclusions that, you know, it's all going to be over if we can eliminate, whether it's the Hezbollah leadership or Iranian generals, that it's just not that simple. Hmm.

Gregor, I used to hear that there's a split between conservative Iranians in the hinterland and the young, educated, socially liberal metropolitan Iranians in Tehran, basically just like in the U.S. Can your guest comment on this? I'm not sure exactly which split they're potentially referring to, but I'm assuming it's about the rulers. Yeah.

Well, one of the interesting things about Iran, even under the theocratic rule, is that there is a wide divergence of opinion. There are those, the core issue gets down to this, which is supreme, God's law or man's law? So does the Ayatollah and do the clerics have the right to interpret God's law in imposing or defining the political system?

Or does man's law prevail?

in the people elected by the Iranian people. The president's elected, the parliament is elected, the assembly of experts, which picks the supreme leader, is elected every eight years in a nationwide poll. So, you know, that's the core questions. But in the meantime, there are huge divisions within the country over

whether it's the system or whether man's law or God's law prevails. And does the supreme leader, is he infallible and can he dictate? And on any issue, military, political, economic, the answer that then has to be imposed on the people by the agents of the government. Let me go to Peter in Tampa, Florida. Hi, Peter, you're on.

Hi. Yes. Your guest is so knowledgeable. I just really want to ask her, what does progress look like? Only because I was in high school when you had the overthrow of the Shah. And I was going to NYU when I studied and learned about the person you referred to, Musadeq Mohammed Musadeq, who was the great hope of Iran, because he was a prime minister.

elected, and then he was overthrown by the Shah, and then Khomeini. In other words, where are we? I don't know what progress is, or is this just more of the same? What is your most optimistic take on the future of Iran?

Peter, thanks. Robin? Oh, Peter, I wish I could give you a good, you know, a definitive answer to that question. But you're right. The Shah fled in 1953 because he was so unpopular. He was the second of a short-lived dynasty. And because the prime minister, Mr. Moksadeh, had nationalized oil, this oil

the Moksadeh believed was oil was a national asset and should not be profited by foreign governments. And that was very popular. But the United States and Britain decided this was not in their interest. So they facilitated the return of the Shah and the fall of Prime Minister Moksadeh. So Iran historically

most of the time has been run by whether it's dictators, monarchs, military rulers, ayatollahs. And even though it is in terms of spirit, one of the most sophisticated polities in the world. And

Very savvy. They are savvy technologically. They understand the outside world. This is a culture that dates back millennia and are very proud of the fact that the first act of human rights was the result of Cyrus the Great's

telling people that government was only legitimate when it was supported by all the people. He said that Jews should go back and create their second temple, and he facilitated the return of assets and religious icons and property so that the Jewish community in Iran could do that. There is still a Jewish community in Iran. It's the second largest Jewish community

In the Middle East, it's grossly diminished, needless to say, for a lot of reasons. But there is a Jewish member parliament. There are several Christian members of parliament. The Constitution says that every religious group except the Baha'i should be represented in parliament according to their proportionate populations.

So what does progress look like? You know, it's something other than probably a monarch and something other than an Ayatollah. But I think it's going to take a while to get to that point. Let me go to Nima in San Francisco. Hi, Nima, you're on. Hi, thank you. So I was born and raised there on. I came to the United States as a refugee 20 odd years ago.

And then that was because of oppression and religious persecution that me and my family have endured. I disagree with your guess about the government actually looking

to implementing social contracts with people or moving towards a positive way. Ever since the war started, they have arrested thousands of people. They have broadened the...

love for, you know, nationally prosecuting spies. And they've already executed a number of people, you know, within the past few days. So I don't think this regime is taking this moment to move towards a positive outcome for the people. They're actually doing the opposite. You know, they're going back to what they were doing at the beginning of the

revolution and during the war. So I don't think that that is correct. And the other comment that she just had,

about representation and actually having the minorities in Iran have some form of influence in the government. This is all symbolic. You know, the non-Shia people population in Iran, they don't have equal rights by any means. They don't have much rights by any means. So I don't think, you know, the rosy picture that you're

Oh, Nima, I think we lost you there. But I think we have the gist of what you're saying. A couple things. One is that in terms of the type of indicators right now about the direction the regime is going, Nima is saying that it's a crackdown direction and that also your comments and thoughts on what Nima was saying with regard to representation, Robin.

Sure. And I think you misunderstood me. I said, I think the people want to renegotiate the social contract. I'm not sure the regime does. But I think that that's the kind of pressure that people will put on it. Yes, on the crackdown and executions, Iran has a long history of cracking down on any opposition. I've had many friends who've

served many years, in fact, in Evin prison. And in terms of minority influence, yes, of course, it's small and in some ways symbolic, but the constitution does include that feature. Interesting that Iran's constitution is based on French and Belgian law, on Napoleonic law. And it has, however, a

separate kind of system and parallel that has Islamic institutions that are a check and balance on whether it's the presidency, parliament, even the military, and certainly the judicial system. Iran's population, 92 million, is overwhelmingly Shiite, and that has defined their mindset for centuries.

Let me remind listeners, you are listening to Forum. I'm Mina Kim. Pete on Blue Sky writes, how do you have diplomacy with a pathological liar? I think this is getting back to what's next for US and Iran relations. Do you think the Trump administration is capable of negotiating a permanent ceasefire between Israel and Iran? I think there's very little...

Maybe there's more information recently about the terms of the ceasefire. But do you think the Trump administration is? And, you know, if it doesn't hold, could we see further U.S. involvement? I think there's always the danger of further involvement if there's not some kind of diplomacy that answers all the questions or issues that Washington and Jerusalem have raised.

about Iran. Yes, of course, the regime has engaged in duplicity since its beginning. But diplomacy is all about dealing with your enemies, not dealing with your friends. And the United States has dealt with Xi Jinping in China, Vladimir Putin in Russia. There are many places in the world today and in history that the United States has engaged

with arch rivals and pathological liars because we believe that we didn't want a crisis to devolve into a military confrontation. Am I optimistic about the Trump administration doing a viable deal? I worry after President Trump's comments today that they intend to simply give a piece of paper to Iran and

say, you know, this is it. These are the terms, accept them or reject them. And if the Iranians say, look, we have a counterproposal, then, you know, there's the danger that the United States will

says the Iranians have walked away or rejected our our piece of paper and that leads Israel or the United States to engage again. I fear that we have not seen the last military action by either Israel or the United States or the Iranians. Remember the Iranians are masters at asymmetric warfare and they have been particularly effective in taking, including some of my friends, people hostage and

engaging in suicide bombings on American military and diplomatic installations, that it has the ability to do things that perpetually are a surprise to us. So I am one who believes, I've covered wars now for over 50 years all around the world, and I'm a great believer that you want to explore diplomatic options and in a meaningful way.

I imagine that question about U.S. involvement could be extended to whether or not the sites are in fact completely obliterated. Jennifer Wright says the fact that there was no detected environmental fallout following the U.S. bombing proved that Iran moved all the nuclear materials ahead of time. Does that debunk Trump's statements about total obliteration? If the early intelligence reports on the side that say that it just looks like the damage could have just been a matter of months for Iran in terms of a setback, what do you think that means?

could mean in terms of further U.S. involvement.

Well, I think when it comes to moving all materials, that's probably not true. I think centrifuges are very fragile, and it's unlikely that Iran would try to move them. Moving enriched uranium is a different question. And of course, what we don't know is if Iran has any covert sites where it might have moved enriched uranium for use,

elsewhere, or it has centrifuges to enrich uranium someplace else. So this again is, one of the questions in diplomacy will be, how do we get the UN nuclear inspectors in to verify that any suspected known or even unknown site is eligible for inspection, or an intrusive

action to ensure that there's no secret program. And I think this is where, let's say we get to a deal at the table, then the big question is, how do you verify, as Ronald Reagan kept saying? There's a lot still to play out on this issue. So much still to play out. And thank you for giving us a sense of what to be watching for, Robin. Really appreciate having you on today.

Great to be with you, Mina. And thank you to our listeners for their questions and comments as well. And my thanks to Suzy Britton for producing this segment. Robin Wright is a contributing writer and columnist for The New Yorker. You can find her latest pieces there. You've been listening to Forum. I'm Mina Kim. Funds for the production of Forum are provided by the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, the Generosity Foundation, and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.

Support for Forum comes from the University of San Francisco School of Management. Celebrating 100 years of partnership with the Bay Area business community, the USF School of Management connects students to the city's vibrant culture, hands-on internships, and a wealth of career opportunities. Where AI and sustainability are integrated into every facet of business education.

and where students bring innovation, ethics, and entrepreneurial leadership to a planet in need.

The University of San Francisco School of Management. Change the world from here. Support for KQED podcasts comes from Earthjustice. As a national legal nonprofit, Earthjustice has more than 200 full-time lawyers who fight for a healthy environment. They wield the power of the law to protect people's health, preserve magnificent places and wildlife, and advance clean energy to combat climate change. Earthjustice fights in court because the Earth needs a good lawyer.

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