Partnerships, not pressure: what China offers where the West hesitates
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I look at this as a consolidation of ASEAN and to do that Malaysia, Cambodia and Vietnam are key countries to signal to the other members

It's more than just the infrastructure connection. You will have the connectivity in trade and investment. This meeting then comes in this context that has injected a new dynamic. The idea of the shared future, and everywhere in Cambodia, people know about this, they do talk about this. For Malaysia, what stood out to me was the agreement on using pay to satellites.

Vietnam, I would think the most significant part is the reaffirmation of cross-border economic trade and investment linkages. The Chat Lounge. Chat Lounge. Chat Lounge. The Chat Lounge unpacks views and opinions on hot issues in a more casual way.

Three countries, one tour, and a clear message from Beijing. Chinese President Xi Jinping touched down in Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia in the past week, marking one of his most strategic tours of Southeast Asia in years. What's behind the charm offensive? What does this tour say about China's vision for the region as global power balances shift?

welcome to the chat lounge i'm to yun with me to decode the whirlwind visit and understand what it means for china southeast asia and the world art dr jack dao zhong professor of international political economy school of international studies peking university dr dickby james ren external relations advisor royal academy of cambodia and chair belt and rolled capital partners and dr dylan

Law Assistant Professor, Public Policy and Global Affairs Program, Nanyang Technological University. Thank you all for coming to the chat, gentlemen. So first, let's take a look at the background of the tour. Shall we start with Professor Jia, please? What's your interpretation of the timing of this tour?

One way to understand the timing is to say, well, this is a Chinese quote unquote reply to the United States over the trade tensions between China and the United States. That's what we heard a lot over the past few days, but it's not, right? I would think it's a lot more complex than that. A few days before the trip, there was a national conference held by the party

to discuss China's relationship with its neighboring region. And also you notice these high level visits between China and this time three countries, but virtually all the Southeast Asian countries under ASEAN is a routine.

And then the timing, we also need to understand that there is a recipient side, Vietnam, Cambodia or Malaysia, they have their agendas. So I would think it's a meeting that's based on diplomatic priorities among these four governments at this point of time. Yeah, we understand the tour actually started shortly after Washington launched a new wave of tariffs.

prompting some to call this tour a strategic calendar balance like Professor Jach has mentioned. But the three-nation itinerary was planned in advance, right? So maybe Professor Law, how would you see the intent behind this timing? Right. I think you're quite right in saying that these events would have had weeks, months of logistical facilitation, a lot of planning going into it. And what I see is a

part of a broader diplomatic push by China to focus on its periphery diplomacy. Of course, the geostrategic backdrop and the tariffs that America has imposed on the rest of the world is felt very acutely in this part of the world too. And his meeting then comes in this context that has injected a new dynamic. It has also injected new urgency to the meeting. And I believe it has also shaped some of the diplomatic narratives

narrative and messaging that has gone out in these three countries, but also more broadly to the region, to Southeast Asia and to ASEAN as well. Then why do you see these three countries, Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia, were chosen as President Xi's first overseas destinations this year?

Well, I would hesitate to say that they were chosen in the sense that those that were not chosen was somehow neglected. I think a lot of the leaders in Southeast Asia already had face time with Xi. Prime Minister Wang met President Xi in the sightlines of APEC. Sultan of Brunei met

in a state visit in Beijing. Likewise, President Pabu, Prime Minister of Thailand as well. So it is not the case where those that were not chosen were somehow neglected. And I think if you look at the messaging that has come out from his visit to the three countries, it was quite clear. He was signaling not just to these three countries in Beijing,

discourse and the narratives that were put out. But he was also very clear in directing the message to Southeast Asia and to the rest of the region. Indeed, but there are three specific countries, so let's look at the significance of each country. Maybe we start with the most recent lug of his three-nation tour, Cambodia. Cambodia was the first country to sign an action plan with China to build a community of shared future. So

Professor Ren, how has this shaped Cambodia's role in China's foreign policy and maybe within ASEAN? One should say that Cambodia is very central in terms of ASEAN in the sense of geographically very central. It also is a prime node, if you like, in the Belt and Road because it connects

from Vietnam to Thailand. It's between Vietnam and Thailand, and it's just across the Gulf of Thailand, not very far to Malaysia. And so it has that very central role. And so I think that's one key reason. And I think I might also mention that Cambodia is...

very susceptible, being the smallest of all the economies except for Laos, it's very susceptible to shocks externally. But then on the other hand, it's also been a very long standing friend of China that goes back all the way to, I think it was one of the very first or second countries to recognize China in the UN. And

So that's a very, very strong relationship. The new prime minister, his first trip was to China and that was just a year ago. So I think those are a couple of the reasons. And then, of course, there's major projects going on and China's been deeply involved in that. New airports, new infrastructure. And this is true for Malaysia. This is also true with the rail deal with Vietnam, with the canal here in Cambodia and new airports.

and then Malaysia also with rail. So I think there's many, many reasons for that. But also because Cambodia has enormous potential in terms of agricultural output and for food security for the region that's underutilized. That's another key area. And Hun Sen, the Senate president who was the former prime minister, has been very, very active working with his neighbors to stabilize not only the Gulf of Thailand, but also Myanmar. And I think that's also another point that should be made.

Indeed, a very long traditional friendship between the two countries. And then to Malaysia, it's been 12 years actually since President Xi last visited Malaysia. So why was there such a long interval? And what makes this visit stand out in the current geopolitical context? This question goes to Professor Law. I think there were several reasons for that. Partly also during the period of COVID-19,

And President Xi did not travel out of China for a couple of years at least. And it also coincided in a period where Malaysia itself was going through some domestic contestations. But that did not mean that somehow Malaysia was neglected because of the long gap for a state visit. Receiving a state visit from a major country like China entails a lot of pre-planning and it's also widely seen

to governments of this part of the world as an honour and a privilege. And I think you see that when the Prime Minister went to the tarmac to receive residency himself.

But beyond the precedent, they have actually deepened cooperation quite a fair bit. You see that reflected in the work of the foreign ministry ministers and officials that had deep and very frequent high-level exchanges. And I think that this latest visit deepens that further. I think it's also significant that Malaysia is the chair of ASEAN, and that also adds a different dimension to

to Xi Jinping's visit. If you look at some of the statements that were released from the Malaysian side, it's very clear that the visit by the Chinese president was very welcomed and well received.

Of course. And on Vietnam, which is the first stop of President Xi's three-nation Southeast Asian tour, Professor Jia, what's the symbolic and strategic importance of Vietnam being Xi's first stop, especially given this year marks the 75th anniversary of bilateral ties? Yeah, Vietnam has played a very important role in Chinese foreign policy towards the entire Southeast Asian region.

I can probably come up with a long, long list of reasons why a visit by the president of China to Vietnam is warranted. Number one, Vietnam has announced national policies. Some may say announced again that it's going to build a high-speed rail from connecting Hanoi with Ho Chi Minh City along the coast. That's a major undertaking. And Vietnam has also announced plans to build railways that connect with the border.

with China. So I would think the meeting is symbolic reaffirmation of, let's say, China is interested in being part of the Vietnamese project, and then Vietnam would like to consider China a candidate in terms of bidding for those projects. And of course, it's more than just the infrastructure connection. You will have the connectivity in trade and investment, especially in that part, along the border regions between China and Vietnam.

And secondly, although it's not highlighted, you have an issue of what we would call non-traditional security issues, very specifically, telescam. Although, right around the Spring Festival time, about barely two months ago, Thailand and Myanmar, the border region adjacent to those two countries, were highlighted in the news a lot.

but these tele-scan operations affected nationals from many different countries, Cambodia included, also some nationals of Malaysia. China in that sense needs Vietnam's cooperation in terms of preventing the migration of some of those activities from the Thai and Myanmar border to some parts of Vietnam. Reality is the southern borders of China between Guangxi and the northern Vietnamese countryside

It's just as complex. And thirdly, China and Southeast Asian countries, we do have a maritime security issue, a maritime user safety issue. And Vietnam stands out as being different from the Philippines, for example.

in terms of having found a way to keep the maritime issue parallel to other issues of trade and investment. And Vietnam is quite agile. It's relating high-level diplomacy with, let's say, European Union, Russia, the United States, Japan, South Korea, you name it. So if I summarize myself, this should be seen as an

formation of, let's say, both China and Vietnam relating to each other at all levels possible, both in terms of being neighbors by land, in terms of connectivities through infrastructure, through industry, and in terms of, I wouldn't say can set an example because the Philippines and others in the South China Sea over the South China Sea issue will have their own agency, their own positions to respect.

But nevertheless, certainly it's in Chinese interests to showcase that, like I said, those two issues, the so-called geopolitical issues or geostrategic issues can be managed and make the bilateral interactions focus on the development of socioeconomic linkages among the two countries, or by extension, other countries as well. The Chat Lounge. The Chat Lounge unpacks views and opinions on hot issues in a more casual way.

Right. Yes, Vietnam is a close partner, as you just explained. But some also argue it's a regional competitor, especially when compared with other two countries, Malaysia and Cambodia, right, with some occasional tensions. So some people would say that has Vietnam attracted, you know, some special attention from China? Because the president, she was there, I think, back in just two years ago in 2023. So what's your interpretation then? I would think so.

Certainly, Vietnam and China are closer members to each other in terms of what you can call de-globalization or the jolt to the regional supply chains. And so they have a lot of shared common interests.

Earlier, I mentioned the railways to construct. A lot of us don't notice actually there is a expressway connection that runs right through the border beginning in Shenzhen in China and I think at least arriving in there.

So the linkages are physical linkages are there by infrastructure, but then against the headwinds of trade policies, not just with the United States, but there is also the constant realignment of supply chains. The high level of it is justified to deal with the issues of the day.

Right. And maybe Professor Ren, what's your interpretation of this then? You know, Vietnam, like two visits in three years. Well, Vietnam is very important to Cambodia as well. You know, we have a long border and there's a history that...

of some friction between the two countries, specifically related to trade. But this is also true, of course, for China. Vietnam is a major importer of intermediate goods from China, and then it uses those to produce finished products that it exports to the United States. And the United States has an outsized

balance of trade. I think 72% of all exports from Vietnam actually go to the United States. So it is particularly vulnerable to external shocks like tariffs.

But on the other hand, it also anchors its geographic position on, you know, it just follows the coastline. So it anchors all the way from Hainan all the way down to Cambodia. So it has a very important strategic position as well. And Vietnam's policy has always been to kind of hedge and balance its relationship with the United States and with China. That's always been a little prickly. And I think, you know, China really wants to try and consolidate its relationship with Vietnam. And it's gone to great lengths to do that.

And the Vietnamese, well, I think they were quite happy to receive lots of Chinese investment and Chinese factories and manufacturing as people tried to skirt earlier tariffs from Trump term number one and then through the Biden term. But that loophole has been closed, if you wish, and that's true for Cambodia as well. And that's a large economy compared to Cambodia. So you can see that there's a real interest there. And it was also quite slow to accept the idea of

having the connection by rail, the rail connections into Kunming or into Guangxi. And so that's also been something that needed to gather some energy, and it has. So special attention has been given to that. And I think, you know, the just very, very long historical connections between the two countries are there and enormous similarities culturally. So that's been very important as well. At this point in time, I think that Vietnam and ASEAN as a general

rule and you know ASEAN needs its members for example Malaysia Cambodia and Vietnam you know to show that they're willing to work together and I think it was very important that the finance ministers met in Malaysia just before Xi's tour to consolidate and actually that's the way I look at this as a consolidation

of ASEAN. And to do that, Malaysia, Cambodia and Vietnam, and perhaps especially Vietnam, are key countries to signal to the others, the other members about the consolidation of ASEAN and the key role that China plays. And that being said, China first went to Japan and Korea, you will remember to act jointly in terms of the US tariffs. And so that consolidated the East Asian sort of

component. And then the second step was to consolidate the Southeast Asian component. And so effectively doing that with Vietnam is very important. And I think somebody mentioned the Philippines and to also offset the fact that perhaps the Philippines is the red line country in ASEAN. And so that's, I think, explains to a great length what the importance of Vietnam is. Right. And also he is there to

reaffirm China's commitment to these countries, also ASEAN, the trade bloc. Absolutely.

Right, and obviously he's wrapped up his three-nation tour, so let's go over the achievements he's made I'll ask each of you to name some of the most impressive achievements Obviously it produced dozens of bilateral agreements, then which stood out most to you in each country? Maybe we start with Professor Law

Sure. I think you're quite right in saying there's a slew of agreements signed. To me, for Vietnam, the ones that stood out was maritime communication. And I think Prof Ren and Prof Zalia has already pointed out some of the dynamics at play. I think that is important because, to be honest, in terms of South China Sea disputants, the only one that can really pose a significant challenge militarily would be Vietnam.

And I believe the red line was not to have Vietnam internationalize any of the disputes that is taking place in the way that Philippines did. And I think that was quite successful in managing the dispute as it stands. So to me, the agreements, although many of them were lacking in specificity with regards to Vietnam, I think on maritime communication, that to me was quite significant.

For Malaysia, what stood out to me was the agreement on using Beito satellites. I think this is an area that could have the potential to be a game changer, even as it's currently stated, it is used on so-called low-hanging fruits and agriculture and finances and navigation and whatnot. But there are clear security implications as well in terms of relying on the Beito satellite and also in the broader push to export, internationalize, normalize the use of these Chinese-made technology.

For Cambodia, I thought it was quite interesting that in the slew of agreements signed, there was this re-emphasis of global development initiative, global security initiative and global civilization initiative in the way that was not seen as apparently in Vietnam and in Malaysia. They were one of the most ardent, by day I mean Cambodia, they were one of the most ardent signatories supporters.

Of course, does this portend something more concrete that will manifest from these three initiatives? I do not know. But the fact that they are spending quite a bit of time, headlines centred around these three initiatives, to me, indicates that this is a space to watch with regards to the initiatives and with regards to concrete projects or initiatives that may spring from these causes. But those are the three things that stood out to me amongst the host of agreement signings.

On the adoption of the Beidou system, do you think Malaysia will probably face some external pressure because of this? It's always a possibility. I wouldn't discount that. But because the agreement is couched in such a, as I mentioned earlier, low-level civilian use, I don't expect them to receive any heavy pushback. Of course, if it was hypothetically saying that we will

use it for security domains, I think then that would really introduce a different dynamic. But as it stands, I don't think there's any reason. They will be watching with concern, but I think other countries are more concerned with tariffs than anything else. And that will take attention away from this specific issue.

Fair enough. And what about Professor Cha? We know the president proposed some six cooperation priorities from political trust to maintain the stability of the global free trade system and industrial and supply chains to maritime stability when he was in Vietnam. So which of these do you see as the cornerstone for future ties?

Well, Vietnam being connected with China by land is also, especially with the Northern Vietnamese provinces, I would think the most significant part in the reaffirmation of cross-border economic trade and investment linkages. Let's face it, in many ways, part of North Vietnam is very much like part of Chinese provinces in the border regions, and especially in terms of agricultural produce.

the railway connection, although earlier, as was mentioned, there may be some Vietnamese at the policy level, the Vietnamese government has to balance the competition of offers from outside. But if you think about poverty alleviation, you think about increasing farmers' economic income, the cold chains, and then also Vietnamese agricultural products,

we need to be competing with those same agricultural products, similar from Thailand and Laos, Myanmar. Laos already had the railway. So that's, in other words, you have a confirmation to that area. That's one. And secondly, as I see it, it was not in agreement, but shortly before,

President Xi arrived, there was news that Vietnam changed its domestic laws to pave the way, should we say, for a wider range of choices in terms of what that country can import foreign airplanes. Although the Chinese built C919 airplane,

It's still very much a new entrant into the global aviation aircraft market. The internationalization is an important strategy, and Vietnam, different from Laos,

for that matter, will probably be approaching the Chinese aircraft more from the commercial. That's important to China's own domestic technology or whatnot. We can't just be simplifying technology to AI or manufacturing to a word. It has to end up in a product that does involve complex manufacturing systems domestically. So those changes are what came to my mind to be actionable issue areas and it indicates commitment on both sides.

to build on the past achievements and then affirm, even if affirmation would be very important, so that you have predictability down the road of collaboration. Then what about in Malaysia? What impressed you most there? Well, Malaysia is actually traditionally quite, should we say, autonomous on these geostrategic issues. And Malaysia and China, different from them. There's another case in Indonesia has this

two countries, two industrial zones. So in other words, it's not so much just China investing in Malaysia, it's also Malaysia investing in China. That's in one of the points, some 50 or 60 of them reaffirmed. But in the security area, it does, if I'm not wrong, this is the first time whereby the two governments agreed to establish a so-called two plus two.

dialogue mechanism at the level of ministerial level, both involving both foreign affairs and national defense. That's significant because I wouldn't say it's an alliance, but nevertheless, it's a different way of saying projecting that the two want to build up on their respective agencies in terms of handling the high security issues. But then Malaysia is also quite important. ACTRA actually is the third largest producer of semiconductors.

There are a lot of areas of industrial processing, both in the semiconductors area and in other areas between the two economies. So in that sense, you have a reaffirmation of, should we say, the value of interdependence between the two countries. This has been The Chat Lounge. When we come back, we'll check out how this tour might influence future China-Azion architecture. Stay with us.

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Find Decoding the Art of War wherever you listen. Welcome back to the chat lounge. We now continue our chat on Chinese President Xi Jinping's three-nation Southeast Asian tour. I'm not sure if you've noticed that probably China is re-evaluating

the position of Malaysia in the region, right? Because both sides pledged to expand a trade digital cooperation and people-to-people exchanges. Some argue this could reposition Malaysia within shifting supply chains and China's regional economic architecture. Do you see it that way, Professor Jia? In some ways, yes.

But on the other hand, ASEAN is strong precisely because it accepts the diversity. I wouldn't think we should be here in China expecting that much. If you look at over the trade propositions from Washington DC, the European Union was able to come up with a block position.

And to my knowledge, Malaysia did launch a similar proposition to have an ASEAN joint position, but nevertheless, most of the ASEAN members still decided not to issue a joint proposition for legitimate and understandable reasons. So I would still think as ASEAN sorts its own dynamics out as a regional institution,

Right. Then about Cambodia, what would be your pick? Most impressive achievement there. As Professor Low indicated earlier on, Cambodia, very much like Laos, is more ready than others in Southeast Asia that embrace, at least in writing, these grand initiatives proposed by China, the development initiative, security initiative, a civilization initiative.

And that's significant in a way, because those initiatives are the pillars of how China projects its, let's say, template of what the Chinese call, quote unquote, alternative approach.

to modernization. And so there is buying in that or rhetorically important. But in terms of Cambodia, one of the issues I would think that's lurking in the background is that how to actually turn some of the past committed projects of economic collaboration, including industrial zones, including some of the noticeable infrastructure projects, for example, these

man-made canal that was meant to connect the Mekong River with the Siam Nog port. Those issues need to be handled and they need to be thoroughly discussed. They require, let's say, co-investment, co-commitment from both sides. But I would think

the visit to Cambodia is more in the sense of affirmation and also in some ways problem solving than was true of the relationship between China and Vietnam and also Malaysia because I may be wrong. Later I stand to be corrected. I do think Cambodia still faces the challenge of generating

more of the economic capacity, more domestic capacity in terms of competing for greater market share in the region and globally. That's for the future. But for now, do you have any deal in your mind that's most impressive or sounds most interesting to you when it comes to Cambodia?

What was really interesting to me was an unrelated announcement that was Cambodia agreed to send some of the suspects of the telescam activities, which included some who hold IDs of Taiwan here to the mainland for

I would think that's a materialization of what's called the one China principle. And that's politically seriously important to Beijing. All right, then to Professor Ren, your take here, please, for all three countries. I just agree with the previous speaker in his statement about that. That is a significant step forward, that unrelated matter with the telephone scamming.

that has been a real thorn in the side for Cambodia and specifically for Sihanoukville. And conspiracy theorists might suggest that there's a reason for that because they don't want Sihanoukville to be successful.

And it's interesting that no distinction has been made in Western press between Chinese and Taiwan Chinese. And it's been very difficult to convince people that much of this scamming was generated by individuals from Taiwan and not from mainland. But to get to what the agreements that were actually put in place by the visit of President Xi Jinping,

There were, I think, 37 agreements altogether, but the ones that, and that went across various sectors, specifically economic and trade cooperation zones. So CNR bill is one of those, SEZs and development zones.

And agricultural productivity, as I mentioned earlier, is key for Cambodia because it's still, I think, 22% of the economy is generated from the agricultural sector. And that can be much higher, actually. It has enormous resources. The problem for Cambodia is twofold. The first one is scale. It's still lots and lots of small farmers. And it's not that we need bigger farms. It's that they need to be connected in platforms, digital trading platforms.

where they can have a futures market, for example, in fruits and rice and so forth. There are some model projects for that. And so that's going to be a key thing. And so that leads me to there's two corridors that were specific about it. One is an industrial corridor between Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville. And the second one is what they call the rice and fish corridor, which goes up to Siem Reap where Angkor Wat is and the Onle Sap, which is the world's largest freshwater fishery. There's been some problems with that.

specifically during the drought period, which coincided with COVID, which was very unfortunate. So yes, there's going to be a re-concentration on that. But it's a misnomer to say that it's really just fish and rice. It includes all sorts of other agricultural products, including corn, cashew nuts, bananas, coconuts, all sorts of durian and fruits of every kind that you can imagine. Cambodia produces enormous quantities of those.

but it's not sold or warehoused or logistically, it's not at scale. That's a real problem. And that's one of the key things to address. And that's mostly about logistics and digital backbones, but also about training for farmers about how to do that. And that's a problem going forward that can be addressed now. And then, of course, multimodal transport systems, which has already made huge advances. Port in Seenookville has been deepened.

The canal that everybody's talking about, that's so important. And the reason it's important is because it enables then Cambodia to have river access, which is, you know, the cheapest form of transport. So it opens, it effectively will open the hinterland of Cambodia by river to the sea, where previously it had to go through Vietnam. And that's critical when you're talking about agriculture. Right.

So, yeah, so that's been important. And then there's a 900 megawatt LPG power plant in Koh Kong. So that's also going to help enormously in the region. That region is very underdeveloped and that's the region that goes up to Thailand. And so there's a heavy rail

that's being built or almost completed, I think, but there's still no highway connection there. And so that's going to have to be done. And this power plant is going to enable more industrial capacity and even just urban capacity as well, because, you know, you need people to be able to live there, to work in these places, to produce services and goods. Right. And

about the agricultural product it's not just about the quantity it's also about the quality right i believe that cambodia produces a very high quality of those products you just mentioned like cashew cambodia is the number two global exporter of cashew nuts and every time i go and have tea with my friends in china there is always cashew nuts and i always ask

I always ask them, where did you get these cashew nuts from? And they say, well, we don't know. And so that's an example of perhaps a small example, but an example of where there's no marketing and branding at the end. It's just that everything's kind of generic, even though it comes from Cambodia, it's not marketed that way. So there's no value add in that. It's really being sold at a very low cost.

Right. And China and Cambodia agreed to build an all-weather China-Cambodia community with a shared future in the new era. So to my knowledge, it's the second instance of an all-weather community with a shared future in the new era being proposed and agreed upon. The first being between China and the African Union earlier this year. So very briefly,

Professor Ren, tell us the significance of that and what it actually means. Well, I think one of the previous speakers mentioned this, that Cambodia has been, I think it needs capacity upbuilding to be able to sustain all of these advances for its economy, to get it to middle-level income by 2030. And so this reaffirms in a very open way the connection with China and the idea of a shared future. And everywhere in Cambodia, people know about this. They do talk about this.

So it's a reality for many people in Cambodia. So the reaffirmation of that is very important, especially in the situation that we're in with the tariff shock. I think that's a really sort of an umbrella in the Chinese fashion is that gives the whole process the relationship

an umbrella to work within. And then it goes down to the actual sort of what the Cambodians call their diamond hexagon program that integrates with Belt and Road, for example. And so then you work down into the smaller sections, so into the connectivity part and then into processing and manufacturing and so forth.

So that's why it's so important. But I'd like to also add just to say that Cambodia is not so much trying to compete in the global market. What it's trying to do is have niche market access in two ways. The first way is inside the supply chains, ASEAN supply chains, specifically between Vietnam and Thailand and across to Malaysia. And so it's not trying to do everything. What it's trying to do is, and this is working hand in hand with China, is insert itself where it has a specific comparative advantage.

So, for example, it produces a lot of rubber and so it's got tire factories and those tires are then sent to Vietnam and to Thailand and Malaysia for their car industries.

It has set up a battery production facility using lithium from Vietnam to create battery packs for cars also in Thailand and Vietnam and Malaysia. So this is the kind of putting themselves into that sort of specific niches. So it produces a large amount of electronic components, but not completed components. And so that's really the kind of the program here for Cambodia is a step-by-step insert itself into supply chains,

guarantee its success in those, and then it can think about actually competing in products. But that's not its primary objective. Its primary objective is to be a successful partner for all of its regional neighbours who have larger economies and larger scale and better developed industries.

places right so that's a key that's quite smart too we know that professor uh ran got a lot to say about cambodia but up to to be fair uh pick some in malaysia and vietnam the most uh you know eye-catching achievement to you yeah well i thought malaysia also is very interesting in terms of digital that it is the third biggest supplier maker of semiconductors i think that's

going to only grow. I think it's also Malaysia has had a policy of digitalization for quite a while now. You know, it was for a long time. It was stuck in what they call the middle income gap. And that was because and this relates to technology in a real sense, because it was locked into not owning any of the IP. So it had to license the products and then assemble or manufacture them.

And so it was at the bottom of the parabola. It didn't have any of the research and development. It only had the assembly and manufacture, which is the least amount of profit in the parabola. And then it didn't have marketing and sales at the other end. And so those two ends, R&D and marketing, that's where the money is. And so this is where I think Malaysia is positioning itself at having a complete supply chain.

Yeah, which is very important. And so Vietnam also is also going to be trying to do that. Look, I would probably like to mention the idea that most of the rice production in Vietnam is done in the South and there's been problems with water from the Mekong. That's been a real problem.

and you know over farming if you like or overly intensive farming for rice that's going to have to be addressed and so it it needs also upgrading technological upgrading to be able to monitor uh its agricultural production as well so you know water levels soil levels uh fertilizer levels all that sort of thing run off into the water all sorts of things that have hindered its capacity to produce better and then also that it was unlike cambodia it is definitely competing in the world market um

And it had failed.

to enter into the American market with its car company for one reason or another. So it realized that it really had to concentrate on the ASEAN supply chains and go into those before it really tried to enter into larger global market. So, you know, relative capacity always has to be understood. And I think these new arrangements that Xi Jinping has been talking about with Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia really look to those ideas that complete supply chains across ASEAN

Yes, you've already mentioned it comes at a very sensitive, if you will, time, especially...

given the disruption of the global supply chain at this moment. So during the three-nation tour, the Chinese president highlighted building a community of a shared future with each country and called on those countries to oppose

hegemonism, unilateralism and protectionism. So Professor Law, why is this message front and center now? Right. To be fair, I think this message has always been there. The Chinese have been quite consistent, but obviously the circumstances, the context and the strategic

backdrop has changed immensely. So we see this narrative of opposing hegemonism, opposing unilateralism emerging almost as a central discursive plank of its foreign policy. And of course, even though the counterpart is not named, I think everyone knows it's referring to the US unilateralism, interventionism, and of course, with its latest tariff move that just injects a new dynamic and a lot more urgency. It's it with a lot more force, if you will, a lot more motivation with

clearly in mind. I think this message will find some appeal. I think this narrative is attractive in broad swathes of Southeast Asia and indeed the global south, partly a reason because of the long time and effort invested into these discourses, but partly because of the opportunity that presents itself to the Chinese that makes these sorts of narratives fertile ground. But I will caveat and say that

This does not necessitate or necessarily mean that countries will suddenly tilt strategically towards China. I think that is far less straightforward. I think that many countries in this part of the world accept and in many ways still welcome the role of US in terms of it being the only one that is willing and has the appetite and the capacity to serve as a counterbalance against China.

I think because of some lingering issues as was already widely discussed previously, including on South China Sea, there is still a bit of that latent suspicion about Chinese intent in this part of the world. And that would mean that as attractive as the

discourse of opposing hegemonism, of shared destiny, and China being the defender of multilateralism and free trade, it will still find it very difficult to completely sell its message outrightly and for countries in this part of the world to uncritically and fully... Professor Jia, what's your take here? Well, as was previously mentioned,

Some of these pronouncements on regional issues and global issues, they are repetitive. And in many ways, you can say this is part of the key performance indicators in all of these diplomatic exercise. On the other hand, we shouldn't really read too much into that. A cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy is

respect for territorial sovereignty and also not interfere into another country's internal affairs and foreign policy making is another country's internal affairs. By geography, by history, by trade and investment connections,

each and every Southeast Asian nation is open for business with anyone around the world. So I think it matters, but on the other hand, it would be contradictory if not, let's say, bad in terms of serving the purposes of having a sound diplomatic relationship. From China, we appreciate those statements,

that information. But on the other hand, the bottom line is this will not be any kind of pressure on anyone to get into a quasi alliance of any sort. Well, maybe what China proposes cannot be accepted, if you will, by all partners or all countries. But it seems that Beijing or maybe what the Chinese

president proposes during his three-nation tour has been well received, at least in those three countries, right? So I'm wondering why is such an alternative narrative different from what Washington is championing now, resonating more strongly in Asia now than in

the West, maybe to Professor Ren? Yeah, well, you're talking about narratives and I was just thinking about that while the previous speaker was talking. And what's interesting here, of course, is that and I'm just going to refer to the Belt and Road in just because there's there's what do I call the substructure, which is all the hard things, you know, pipelines and roads and rail and ports and all those sorts of things, fiber optic cables and satellites. And it's all hard.

But narratives are soft. That's all carried by technology, digitalization, media and communications, telecommunications, and the development of that, of those sectors. What's really happened over the last few years is that China has become a powerhouse in digital and in telecommunications.

And this is important because it means that there's alternatives for software. There's alternatives for technology. There's alternatives for digital. And those alternatives also come, you know, for the lives of everybody every day. So in other words, the way they consume media, the way they consume, they use their payment systems, the way they use all sorts of digital technologies.

interactions, cross-border transactions, all those sorts of things. And so that had always underpinned the narrative strength of the Americans. They were so strong in that. And they always talked about attraction, but much of that attraction was generated by soft power narratives. And Donald Trump has shot himself in the foot by cutting off USAID and the Voice of America and all that sort of free radio Asia and all that kind of thing. And you can see that people now are exposed to

to alternatives in terms of their digital lives and their soft power lives. And I think that's a real cultural change. And I think this present Trump administration is really accelerating that cultural change. And actually in Asia, of course, and I think famously, I think it was the former Singapore foreign minister had mentioned this,

about how 100 years of American culture and modernization through the 20th century was really only the very top of the, you know, like the milk on cappuccino. But underneath, there was thousands of years of cultural connectivity and trade and investment that had been going on in all of Asia, and especially Southeast Asia and China. And I think people are refinding that, you know, they're rediscovering that those things were always there. And so as part of the Belt and Road, you've got, you know,

green and organic and sustainability and cultural and education, health and sciences, all in that second level of the Belt and Road or what I like to call the superstructure. And that's really pushing the narrative back towards that Asians can do everything they want to do and they are really connected, not just geographically, but culturally. And the

that they've got alternatives now to using Western systems. And to prove my point, you can say the same thing has happened in Europe. They also don't have their own, you know, they're not a powerhouse for digital and technical, although they are in terms of soft films and things like that. But for the digital and the technical and digital

They're not. It's not as if this is just an Asian phenomenon. This is actually a global phenomenon. And I think this tour sort of signals to a lot of people, and especially to me, I think it really signaled that we're going through this cultural change, real change in Asia. And it's very important. Maybe this tour may bolster the longstanding idea that the 21st century belongs to Asia.

Professor Law, your response? There is definitely that mood, that triumphalist mood that now is Asia's time. I think this is grounded in some reality and some truth. If you look at the twin engines of global growth, India, China, if you look at the emerging middle class, that's in the very sizable middle class population in Southeast Asia. But on the other hand, I also not want to get ahead of ourselves because we

The international order as much as it is currently freeing. I don't think it's yet a lot of the institutions, a lot of the norm setting a lot of the agenda driving again with the caveat that this is indeed freeing still is not and does not.

belong to countries in this part of the world. And I think that's also part of that. The reason why China feels a bit of the angst, it wants a rightful seat at the table, but beyond that, it wants the ability to be able to craft rules and have these rules taken us

legitimate rules of the international world, so to speak. It has found quite a bit of success. I alluded to this earlier in some of his narratives and the other speakers have also spoke about this at length. I think it has found quite a bit of success, particularly in courting the global South. And that extends beyond just Southeast Asia, obviously. So I will have a more mixed, ambivalent take about this really truly being

being the Asian century. All right. But lastly, let's narrow it down a little bit. How might this tour influence future China-Azian architecture? Maybe let's start with Dr. Jock, please. Well,

Well, I think the tour is significant. Certainly, you know, as young countries, these three have their own, as I said before, everyday agendas, and they also made a choice at some level of, let's say, risk of having to reply to that with us or against us, questioning from Washington, D.C., or Tokyo, or other parts of the world.

So China needs to be really appreciative. And I also agree with the sentiment Professor Low just articulated. I would think this notion of quote unquote Asian century finally taking center stage needs to be put in proper context.

This notion of global south or what else is by and large, let's say, rhetorical. And that has its own space, its own utility. But at the end of the day, the realities of world affairs are such that rules are constantly being remade. Should there be, let's say, an effort to benchmark

quote unquote regionalism or regionalization or say who's up, who's down by ticking the boxes.

in terms of the meetings, in terms of organizations, in terms of documents, or in those documents, the authorship. I think it's going to be less useful in many ways for the crafters. And one of the things we need to bear in mind, no matter what we may say as sea change in world politics, the word is a lot more stoic. I mean, different countries are a lot more stoic than back in the 60s and 70s.

If we recall the so-called new international economic order movement, it was very much celebrated as a quote unquote, the South winning over the North. But later on, as we, and those principles laid down in those documents were quite, you can say a diplomatic success.

But then later on, it still takes the true ingenuity of the human beings living in different societies, the capacity to organize and the capacity to create your own niche areas and take advantage of the larger forces of change that one party may not feel like it.

Right. Fair enough. And Professor Wren, please. Yes. Well, I like to approach this with the idea that, so yin-yang, the idea that there was always going to be oppositional forces. And this is very important to accept this. One of the greatest problems with unilateralism and with the global order, that so-called rules-based order that we've lived under for the last 75 years, has been that it seeks to

dominate completely what it sees as opposition and to crush it. And I see China's approach and ASEAN's approach has been much more to accept that there will always be some kind of oppositional force and that what's the most important thing is to be adaptive and flexible. So I think that's going to be a great challenge because, you know, the governments generally tend towards bureaucracy and more and more layers. And that, I think, is not always useful in terms of

of maintaining flexibility and adaptability, especially when it comes to trade and investment and security and so forth. So I think that's a key thing that we need to be always looking at. And then also to be thinking about the expanded, you know, not just the domestic and the regional, but also the other multilateral forums that exist. They all kind of overlap. And you can think of ASEAN and RCEP. Then you can think about BRICS, those kind of ideas, and even the Global South. And as with

Fresno Gia said, that's kind of rhetorical in many ways. But look, multilateralism is here to stay. It's definitely consultation and negotiation is always going to be the best way forward. And that's what we need to keep in mind. And I think that

part and parcel of President Xi's tour has been to reiterate that China is ready to stand to strengthen that, to keep that strong, but at the same time to allow or to understand that there will always be opposing interests of some sort and

And the way to move forward on this is to negotiate it within multilateral forums. And what we see with the Americans right now is that they're trying to break everything down to bilateral so that they can use their power more efficiently and impose their will. And everybody's resisting that. And so I think, yes, it's much better to have the balance that's maintained inside multilateral forums and to support those more, but to be very careful that they stay flexible and adaptive and responsive to the people in each country and their development models.

And so far, so good. I think this is reiterated that. And going forward, I see that strengthening, creating more efficiencies for people to be able to communicate in this way and to interlink their systems, but with their own characteristics is so important. And I think his tour really stands as a testament to that effort. Xi Jinping has shown that he wants to maintain that and strengthen that and that China is adaptable and flexible and always willing to discuss every country's specific needs.

interests and problems, and then to have that in a wider forum. I think that's very, very important. I think Bodia knows that. I think Vietnam is realizing that more and more. Malaysia is also keen to keep that going. And this is the best way to offset all of the external forces that are in play right now at this time. Right. Last but not least, Professor Law. I don't think the

architecture in regards to ASEAN-China itself will change dramatically already. There are a lot of ASEAN-China mechanisms existing that has proven their worth. That partnership is one of the key mechanisms. What I do see that

could be intensified a lot more. And Prof Cha alluded to this earlier where China initiated a 2+2 with Malaysia. In fact, Vietnam has a 3+3 with China and all the ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Myanmar as well, have a 2+2 dialogue mechanism. So I think that there is some value in these sorts of bilateral mechanisms with particular central nodes of Southeast Asian countries.

I do hope, and this is more of a hope than anything that I've read from the reports of his tour, I do hope that this move and his tour of Southeast Asia will give a deep push to conclude the long drawn-out COC of the South China Sea. It should be one of that key, if you will, progress or a

motivated to push it past the finish line, but I've not seen anything to that sort. But I think this would be a very apt opportunity to really, as Prof. Grant said, consolidate some of these gains that they have made. I think to a lot of the countries in Southeast Asia, the conclusion of the CoC would also be a key product that many, many in this part of the world are looking very much forward to.

Indeed, it makes a lot of sense. And on that note, we wrap up our chat for this session. Many thanks to Dr. Dylan Law, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Global Affairs Program, Nanyang Technological University, Dr. Digby James Rang, External Relations Advisor, Royal Academy of Cambodia and Chair of Belt and Road Capital Partners, and Dr. Jia Daozhong, Professor of International Political Economy, School of International Studies, Peking University for your time and insights.

The show is available on all major podcast platforms. Please email us your comments at radio at cgdn.com. Thank you for listening. Join us again next week for more chat at the chat lounge. Bye for now.