What China's planned mega-dam means for Asia
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Hello and welcome to Chinese Whispers with me, Cindy Yu. Every episode I'll be talking to journalists, experts and long-time China watchers about the latest in Chinese politics, society and more. There'll be a smattering of history to catch you up on the background knowledge and some context as well. How do the Chinese see these issues? Just before the end of 2024, Chinese state media Xinhua slipped out an announcement. The long-discussed megadam in Medoc County, Tibet has been greenlit.

When built, it will generate three times more energy than China's Three Gorges Dam, currently the largest in the world. The Xinhua write-up gave few other details, but the news has caused reverberations across Asia because the river on which the dam will be built, the Yalong Sanpo flows into both India and Bangladesh. The existence of the dam could, as we will hear in this episode, have extensive repercussions on these dam river countries.

To break down the complicated water politics of the region, I'm joined today by Chinese Whisperer's regular, the journalist Isabel Hilton, who founded the climate NGO Dialogue Earth, formerly known as China Dialogue, and Neeraj Singh Malhas, an expert on transboundary rivers and Asian water politics, currently at South Korea's Pali Policy Initiative. Neeraj and Isabel, welcome to Chinese Whisperers. Thanks, Cindy. Thanks for having me.

So, Niraj, can we start with you? And what do we know about this mega dam in Tibet that's been proposed so far? So, this is actually not a new plan. This was actually proposed in the 14th five-year plan of China, which was started from 2021. And this will end in 2025 itself. And I think this is quite an old thing. But as China is right now

focusing its renewable energy from going back from coal to the renewable source of energy. So that is why this comes into news and becomes very important for the other countries, specifically the downstream countries to follow up on this because this Medog County is going to be the world's largest source

super dam, which will be constructed on the Yarlung Sangpo of the lower reaches bank, which is very much near to the Indian LAC border of Arunachal Pradesh, which is in the northeastern states of India.

And that is why the downstream countries like India and Bangladesh are being very suspicious about this new dam project. Although the blueprints are not yet available to all the countries, because as this project is also heavily funded with a large amount like $137 billion will be spent on constructing this huge dam.

And Isabel, the thing about rivers is that they are a shared resource, even if physically they go through different countries. And it's not as if Asia is always a continent in which the countries get along. So tell us, what are the tensions and fractures in that region at the moment? I have to say, you know, it's not only China that's building dams on this river. And part of the problem is that there is no source to sink river agreement on a river that runs through Asia.

two of the world's most populous countries, and Bangladesh. And this means that the lower riparian is always suspicious of the upper riparian. Each country along this extraordinary river, and it is the third largest river in the world, it's only the Amazon and the Congo that have a bigger flow or greater length. It's hugely important.

And, you know, each country regards it as a bit of a national battery and suspects the upper riparian of stealing the water and so on. So the kind of argument that we're seeing now between India and China has essentially been going on for many years.

Not least because China is one of the world's major constructors of dams and China has built something more than 28,000 dams over history. And dam building plays a really important part in China's historic culture. The problem is when you get to transboundary rivers as this is,

then you need a different approach to diplomacy and that is completely lacking here. Yes, absolutely. And this river, once it flows into India downstream becomes the Brahmaputra and it also flows into Bangladesh further downstream as well. So you can see why it's contentious. Neeraj, just give

What was the sense of the different interests at play? Because as I understand it, Bangladesh and India, their bilateral relationship over this river is not necessarily smooth either. I feel that, you know, Bangladesh has no such problem with India in that sense.

Because India being an upper riparian country to Bangladesh has been very cordial in that stage because both the countries just not in the Brahmaputra like in the Ganges water system also they have signed a treaty in 1995 also.

And they also have a joint river commission, which was signed in 1978. So in that sense, both the countries are adhering to some rules and the regulations which are required in following up the riparian relation. But in context of China, we need to see one thing is very much common. If China diverges water from south to north,

to its population or it tries to alter the water from its south to the other parts of China. So then it becomes a problem because most of the time being a case of India, India being a lower riparian, it might have some kind of a benefit because as during the peak season, it is also been estimated that Brahmaputra when it flows from the upper riparian to lower riparian, its flow and the stretch gets more widened when it comes down to Brahmaputra.

But in case of Bangladesh, which is already having a water scarcity and it is with this growing challenge of climate change also, things are becoming more adverse. And now when this kind of news comes into the situation, it becomes very chaotic.

that what will be the future of the library relation between three countries. Yes, and Isabel, there's no such water agreement between India and China, is that right? That's right. I mean, in fact, there is no, ideally, with a river of this kind of importance, which plays a different function for the many, many millions of people who live along it and depend on it.

Some are farmers. They depend on, in some cases, the river flooding. Bangladesh depends on the silt that the river carries. Bangladesh is actually made of Himalayan silt deposited by the river. You know, you need to understand the river as an ecosystem. And the problem...

with not having a source to sink agreement, is that you get this competition between countries to extract value from the river and the conventional value, apart from fishing, the conventional value that countries that governments wish to extract is energy. And that leads to this kind of competition. And it's absolutely right.

that China has shown little regard for lower riparian interests. It primarily, you know, looks at it as its right. It establishes what's called prior use. So if you complete a project

on a river, it's very hard for any other river user to challenge it because you have established a right of prior use. And if you don't have a general agreement, then essentially the weakest riparians lose out. And there are a number of dangers about this. You know, China will argue, for example, that dams are useful not just for energy control, but for flood control, energy production and flood control. And, you know, to some extent, that's true, but it isn't always true.

For example, if you get a very heavy rainfall, which is putting stress on the dam, the dam managers will release water downstream in order to relieve pressure on the dam.

If you don't have good communication with your lower riparian, that can come as a complete surprise. It can also be very damaging. The sudden release of water, you know, can sweep away what's below it. So that's a particular danger of bad management. And there's very poor communication between China and the lower riparians on floodwater management. The second, I mean...

Rivers have a kind of life and a pulse of their own. And although flooding is generally regarded as dangerous to humans, it's also beneficial. Floods, particularly in South Asia, deposit silt on the agricultural land. And a great deal of South Asia's agriculture has depended on the flooding of the rivers, the kind of predictable pulse of the river. And Bangladesh, as I said, rather depends on the depositing of silt and has been created by

from it. There is a final worry, particularly in the Himalaya, which are very young mountains and highly earthquake prone, that a mega dam is hostage to seismic activity and that a major earthquake could have absolutely devastating effects downstream if the dam is cracked or breached or indeed if it collapses.

But from what I gather from how the way that this Medog Dam has been announced is that there has been no such communication with the other countries involved. And Neeraj, what do you read from the Indian response? Because this comes at a time when India and China have been having border disputes in recent years anyway. But in last October, they reached some kind of preliminary agreement. So it feels like there was a bit of a rapprochement going on. But then this announcement came.

Okay, so this announcement actually came in December 2024, as I earlier also stated. And suddenly when, you know, everyone started talking about, you know, that the new dam will be constructed on the lower reaches of Yarlung Sangpo, India Ministry of External Affairs strongly, you know, launched a very strong protest against this because this was a very unilateral decision which was taken up by China, China's government. And

no other party like in the lower riparian whether it is India or Bangladesh was taken up a consideration and having said that you have also mentioned about the border disputes yes you are rightly said because you know as in 2017 if you clearly remember when

the Doklam issue happened, or Doklam border stand-up happened between India and China. At that point of time also, you know, China stopped its water sharing for India. But whereas on the lower, at the lower end of Bangladesh, China was

you know, sharing its water sharing, data sharing. And similarly, since 2020, when the Galwan Valley happened at the western border of India at LAC. So at that point of time, also a certain level of expert level mechanism were implemented

already taking place, but there was no solution which was coming up. And similarly, in 2024, I and my colleague, we both did one study which was published in the Springer. And there we have tried to formulate this idea that how border and the water relations between India-China are connected. And we have taken up a large number of interviews from both India and the China experts who

who are basically, you know, talks about the transboundary river issues in both the countries. So there also we got to know that there is actually a connection because, you know, since then, you know, all the MOUs, because there is no formal water treaty between both the countries and in the form of soft laws, which is,

also the binding in nature or it is not binding in nature. It depends on the countries. And in 2002 also, when the MOU between India and China was signed on data sharing, it was renewed on the five yearly basis. And both on Satluj River, which is again a part of Indus River system,

and this Brahmaputra, which is again signed in 2002, both the treaties or both the MOUs were expired in 2023. And since then, you know, there was no discussion was happening whether this MOU will be renewed or not, because as the border dispute between both the countries were happening. So it becomes a very big question mark of whether, you know, and it also proves that if the country's relations are

are very good, they will have a very good bilateral relation in terms of water also. But if the relations are not good, they will stop the data sharing and they will not also communicate on other levels also. But as now the relations are improving, like because

The foreign minister, Dr. S.J. Shankar and foreign minister of China, they also met recently on a special representative meeting. And they have also talked that soon both the countries will have a discussion on renewing this water MOU. And they have also talked about they will start the Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra, which was stopped since very long time. And they will also have a direct flight access from New Delhi to Beijing.

Yes, so trust the politicians to make this kind of thing political. It's about something interesting that Neeraj mentioned there was that China has been sharing data with Bangladesh for free, a kind of access that it hasn't been giving India. I wonder if from Beijing's perspective, there is also merit in driving a wedge between India and its other neighbours, because India, after all, is also a regional giant nation. It is still a great power in its own right.

It is. And although it may be marginally more cooperative than China, as far as dam building goes, it's not. I don't think Bangladesh would really say that India was a wonderful upper riparian. You know, on the Brahmaputra River alone, there are 168 proposals for major dams on the Indian stretch.

And that, apart from the question of sharing data, the impact that that has on the wider health of the river, you know, is pretty severe. And Bangladesh, as the downstream riparian, suffers that most.

I don't think that water politics are the smartest place to drive a wedge between your rivals, to be honest. I mean, because the problem is that everybody loses. If a river is overexploited, if there is a catastrophe, if there's a dam collapse, there's

This affects everybody. And the only way to manage these very difficult water politics and to ensure fair shares is to have a comprehensive agreement, which takes everybody's interests into account. I mean, China, I'm sure, is not above finger pointing when it's convenient. But I don't think that there's an active policy to drive a wedge between India and Bangladesh. China has played

difficult games also on the Mekong. The problem is that all the great rivers of Asia essentially derive from the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, from the glaciers, from the cryosphere of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau.

And then flow, you know, in the case of the Yangtze and the Yellow River, they're domestic. But, you know, there are other big issues around the transboundary rivers of which the Mekong is the other big sensitive one. And China began building on the upper reaches of the Mekong some years back, refused to join the Mekong River Commission, set up its own organization to

manage the river's politics. So China very much pursues its national interest when it comes to the politics of dam building and hydrology. And it's not always very helpful. And speaking of the people impacted, of course, we also have to talk about the people in Tibet who may have to be resettled. And Neeraj, just give us an idea of people who are not experts in the region or in dam building, indeed. What kind of

human and ecological impact come from creating this kind of source of energy? So, you know, we need to understand whenever the dam has been constructed on any part of the country, it will always lead to a destruction because, you know, I'll just talk about the Three Gorges Dam, which is currently the largest dam in the world currently. And this dam itself has actually, you know, displaced 1.2 million people.

So you can really imagine that, you know, huge cascades of destruction it comes with. It leads to this kind of a problem, but it also leads to a problem of ecological. People are migrating. It is also leading a very huge impact

on the soil of that region because you know the fertility of soil gets eroded and specifically to the aquatic life where you know the fishes have to migrate from one chunk to the another point and large number of aquatic life is also being damaged with that scale so in the tibet itself you know just not about that you know the quality of water also gets detroyed so because you

In China, if you see, the problem is not the quantity of water. The quality of water is not there. Most of the origin, the rivers which are there in China, for example, Yellow or Yangtze River, 90% of them are already polluted.

So the freshwater availability only comes from the Tibet. And Tibet is the source of all these major rivers, which is basically a lifeline to all the South Asian countries or even to the Southeast Asian countries. And in Tibet, we have seen large number of protests from the people itself.

coming and people are actually revolting against the PRC government that, you know, you cannot construct this kind of a dam. But there is one more problem, you know, where these dams are being constructed. They are very remote places. We cannot think of any kind of infrastructure development that this will happen just in a day or night. This will take a huge, you know, destruction to the large environment because large number of trees, deforestation, people, habitats, flora, fauna, etc.

each and everything will be, you know, comes to a question mark whether what will happen to them. Similarly to this new dam where, you know, this Madok, in the Madok County where this dam is proposed, look at this, you know, geographical location of this dam. This is also at a very, very remote location where if let's suppose if China starts the construction of this dam. So you can well imagine that how much it is going to impact. And similarly, not in Tibet, similarly in,

India side also, when we talk about dams, there also, you know, people have migrated, people have displaced from their places. And it has really, you know, impacted the ecological aspect of it. And Isabel, does the remoteness of this new dam make it different to the Three Gorges Dam? Because the Three Gorges Dam being in Sichuan province. Absolutely, yeah.

I mean, certainly in terms of the number of people displaced and I guess also the centrality of the issue in Chinese politics, because as we know, the Three Gorges Dam was heavily, heavily contested and there was tremendous resistance to it. It was discussed for nearly 20 years and it was only after Tiananmen, after the suppression of the protests in Tiananmen, that Li Peng, who had become prime minister, pushed it through. Now Li Peng's family

were closely connected with Big Hydro, this enormous engineering sector in China, which for many years has built dams. The dam that we're discussing now was also a project that was proposed by Lipeng all the way back then. It was also in the 12th Five-Year Plan. What happened now to make it newsworthy is that the final permission has been given and the construction will happen.

But because it's, you know, in Chinese terms, it's remote, it's lightly populated, it's in Tibet, which most Chinese know little about anyway. It's not going to play that kind of central role in contestation that things like the Three Gorges Dam did. And actually, opposition to dam building was one of the drivers of the emergence of China's environmental movement.

in the noughties. And it was the proposals under the 12th Five-Year Plan, which really relaunched dam building because in the 11th Five-Year Plan, at that period, there was so much debate, discussion and resistance to dams. Places like Tiger Leaping Gorge, you may remember, were a kind of focal point of civic resistance in China itself.

But come the 12th five-year plan, come the question of climate change, the building up of non-fossil fuel energy, big hydro got its kind of go ahead. And there has been a surge of dam building really ever since. Is it

curious kind of green energy, isn't it, Isabel? I mean, in terms of, Neeraj touched on there, the ecological damage, the human displacement, but at the same time, it is a green energy source. And I was surprised when I was doing research for this episode that it was China's largest renewable energy source now as well. Yes, it is. Well, of course, there's this heroic engineering tradition in China, which is

which goes back a very long way, but was always contested. You know, you had the Taoists who said, let the river flow because that's the, you know, there lies ecological health. Yeah, it's probably bad feng shui. Well, yes, quite. And the Confucians were all about state control.

And curiously enough, you know, there is a modern form of this debate still. So the idea that Big Hydro is actually ecologically sound is also highly contested for a number of reasons, including climate reasons. It takes an awful lot of concrete. It disturbs natural systems in an irreversible way. And there tends to be a buildup of methane in these dams, depending on how they're built and where they're built, which is in itself a highly potent greenhouse gas.

So the argument about there being the best option for climate is also contested. Well, Isabel, how does all of that make you feel in terms of whether or not we should be welcoming hydropower as a source of renewable electricity? I think that big hydro, like many powerful lobbies, has had far too much of its own way, if you like, that the kind of methodologies that the sheer economic

power of these companies has meant that dams were not always well constructed. They were not always constructed in the most or the least damaging way. There's a difference, for example, between the dam that builds an enormous kind of retention of water, like the Three Gorges.

and that releases it to, having built up your massive reservoir of water, you then release it to turn the turbines. And what are called run-of-river dams, where you try not to disturb the flow of the river. So you divert part of the river

parts of the river away from the main flow and that turns the turbine. So you're depending on the continuing flow of the river to generate your electricity. Now, these, you know, run of river dams are not perfect, but they have far fewer major environmental impacts than the big retention dams. And I think that although China is essentially in love with hydroengineering,

There have been some sobering lessons in China of the dangers of overengineering. The Yellow River, the mother river of China, which is probably the most engineered river in the world, actually dried up about 15 years ago and caused a great shock.

in China and that was over extraction, it was the wrong kind of engineering and it was a lesson that river health and source to sink functioning ecosystems are absolutely essential to maintain the river even from the hydrological point of view if you're trying to use it for the extraction of energy you need a healthy river. One of the arguments in favour of big dams and hydroelectricity has been that it's clean and reliable

But we aren't really taking climate change into account here. And as climate change effects are accelerating around the world, we are beginning to see that hydroelectricity is not as reliable as we thought. Now, we know that these rivers begin in the glaciers of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. Those glaciers are in rapid retreat.

14% of the flow of the river at the point at which it passes into India is from those glaciers. So anything built above the frontier of the border with India is highly vulnerable to the diminishing water that those glaciers are going to produce. And even further downstream, for example,

in Sichuan, which is a big hydro province in China. There was a drought on the Yangtze four years ago, which meant that electricity production in Sichuan dropped precipitately. And so they're not as reliable. We see the same effect in Brazil, where a drought meant that Brazil, which has a huge hydro sector, it wasn't producing electricity. So the traditional arguments for hydroelectricity are looking

pretty stretched right now, to be honest. So I think that we've had a lot of misguided engineering. I have mixed feelings about hydroelectricity, but I think if we're going to do it, we need to do it in a much less brutal fashion than we have been doing it.

And finally then, Neeraj, presumably Indian diplomats are now working behind the scenes scurrying to kind of get an explanation from their Chinese counterparts. But what can India really do given that these plans have now been approved? Is there much recourse for action?

So, you know, for India, this always been a cause of concern because just to connect and, you know, just to have sit and talk with China becomes very difficult. As both the countries are right now not in a position to, you know, have a formal water treaty. So, you know, in that case, there is only one way that, you know, both the countries can communicate.

to improve their own bilateral relations. That's the only way I see, because in Asia, as you already mentioned, that both the countries are very giant and they are actually, you know, economically also and with the population wise also, water will always be a need, whether it's for their industries, whether it's for their urbanization. So we cannot actually, you know, ignore this part.

So there needs to be some kind of a solution to it. And I feel both the countries have that potential to work on these areas. So I think if the growing relation will improve, there are still chances where these issues can also be taken up. Although in the expert level mechanism, there has been going on talks between India and China counterpart.

And they have already decided that, you know, there would be some kind of a trilateral, you know, joint mechanism would be there where China, India and Bangladesh would come up with some kind of, you know, mechanism. Likewise, what Southeast Asian Mekong River Commission said.

So in that same sense, you know, there would be some kind of a discussion where all three countries or specifically the India can take a big role, taking up Bangladesh also into consider where the river water relations between India, China and Bangladesh would be improved. I like the optimistic note to end on. Neeraj Singh, Manhas and Ismail Hilton, thank you so much for joining Chinese Whispers. Such a pleasure, Cindy. Thank you. Thank you, Cindy.

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