Zambia’s Kafue River Disaster Puts China’s Mining Record Under Fire
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Welcome to this new episode of the China in Africa podcast. My name is Christian Gironaima, the Africa editor of the channel Global South, and today I'm going to be your host for this episode. And today I won't be alone. I won't be with Eric. I will not be with Corbis Van Staden, but I will be with a new member of our team. I'm joined with my colleague and a new addition to our team, as I said, Robert Borey, who's going to be our new transitional mineral editor. Robert, good afternoon to you.

Good afternoon, Jiro. How are you? I'm all right. I'm doing well, just trying to keep my head up and understand what's happening in the geopolitical space with a lot of interest from countries that are exporting critical minerals to China and also understanding what are the implications of some of the export restrictions we are seeing from China towards rare earth elements to the U.S. I think it's an interesting time indeed.

Exactly. So this is basically what we are going to do with Obert here within the team. We are going to try to bring you every week or every two weeks, insight and information about what's happening in the sphere of transitional minerals or critical minerals, depending on where you are and who you are when you talk about this topic. But I try to bring you more information to try to understand where global sub-countries are standing, where China is standing in the debate, how the geopolitical impact

and interactions that are kind of impacting and touching different countries and different stakeholders in the global south countries, in global north, in Africa, in China, in all of this space. We're going to try to be there and to be those who are going to help you kind of understand, to be the translator as much as we can, the interpreter of like what's happening with China in the global south and transitional minerals and what does it mean for us. And

As you heard Albert talking, he was talking about rare earth restrictions, the US-China tariff and everything. That's something that's now happening lately. And we've seen the US putting up tariff against Chinese imported goods to the US. And we see China reacted. And one of the reactions that China has made is to...

put a restriction, not a full ban, but a restriction and make a bit complicated the export of certain rare earth elements, big magnets that are sold to the United States, adding some red tapes to the process just to make it much more difficult. And, Aubrey, this is one of the things that you've been looking into this week. So tell us what's really happening there and what are the implications for certain countries in the global south?

Indeed, I think we are in interesting times and this rare earth restrictions that China has come up with, some are saying this is one of the key areas in which China really dominates and the U.S. could be put in a very tight spot, you know, tight corner in terms of really negotiating for tariff reductions and the restrictions through export controls, which are a bit tighter. And, you know, the global implications, I think we are likely to see that the U.S. probably will try to look

for other countries where it could get this, you know, rare earth elements. Of course, there are some countries that do produce the rare earth elements, the likes of Brazil, Vietnam. In these countries, they've also been hit hard by the Trump administration in terms of hiking tariffs for goods that are exported from those countries into the U.S. And one of the implications we are seeing is that probably countries like Vietnam could use these rare earth elements as a bargaining chip for Trump to, you know, reduce the tariff since

it will be very difficult for the U.S. companies to get their rare earth elements from China. Of course, the restrictions are not a total ban. It simply means that there are added layers of administrative restrictions that will make it a little bit harder, time-consuming as well, for them to be exported to the U.S. But if you look at beyond just, you know, countries that do supply their rare earth elements to China, which, you know, processes more than almost 8 or 5 percent of the global rare earth elements,

One of the key things you might also start to postulate and anticipate is that there could be reduction of extraction of these critical minerals. I mean, this is just my thinking that some countries that do produce and export to China, they might, you know, result in, you know, reducing production.

production. There might also be some new projects that are coming on board that people might start thinking around whether to deal directly with China and so that, I mean, directly with the US so that they are able to get tariff concessions. So I think the implications are bigger than what we know right now. Of course, you know, there are a number of African countries that are also, you know, key players. Of course, they do not supply a lot, but they do produce a number of

critical heavyweight elements, the likes of Madagascar, Tanzania, Burundi, and Malawi. These are some of the countries. And I also see some opportunities. I think there could be some increased investment, who knows, from the U.S. or from the Western countries into these countries and try to start, you know, scouting potential opportunities or cutting African nations into agreements, which

could be so-called minerals for tariff concession agreements. We could also see maybe African countries trying to come together and by gain as a group and try to, you know, push the U.S. to reduce tariffs that it has put on a number of, you know, smaller economies in African countries that are also producing other critical minerals and not necessarily the red milk.

We are definitely heading toward a very interesting time ahead, that's for sure, where we're going to see a lot of changes happening in the critical mineral space, how critical minerals today is shaping the geopolitical landscape of the world. Today, the access to critical minerals, to the supply chain, the control of the supply chain of those minerals, have become one of the main key elements that are part of the reshuffling of the international order today.

Today, we see a lot of countries trying to take advantage of that. We're seeing a lot of countries also taking the opportunities of certain fight that's happened. And the case that you've mentioned, for example, we had that few months, not last year, when the DRC took advantage of the fact that China has imposed itself

total export ban on germanium to europe and the us what happened the dlc really stepped up by starting to produce germanium where they produce germanium using the tailing of cope and cobalt their head in lubumbashi using a european company umico

to process those tailings and then to produce germanium exported now to Europe. And that's one of the things that you see can start happening in that space. And it's going to really depend on what countries in the global south are prepared for and are ready for to be able to take advantage of that. But in this case, it's going to be quite difficult

going to have to see because one of the things that the US really import from China is really those processed rare earth element which China controls almost 90% in terms of processing capabilities the US doesn't have much of a processing capability so if they have to engage into that they're going to have also to

put money maybe into local processing somehow in those countries that's still too early to say especially given that the president trump is looking into bringing the processing back home within the united states and earlier just a few seconds ago i was talking about the case of the dlc with germanium and tailings and talking about tailings really gives me the opportunity to talk about somethings

quite sad that happened a few months ago, almost two months ago in Zambia, where there was a pollution case that involved the Chinese company Sinometal Leach in Zambia, which spilled 50 million cubic, I think 50 million cubic of acid within the Kafue River, which is one of the biggest rivers in Zambia. And to talk about it today, to have an understanding of what's happened before,

what's happened at that time and what's happening today. We have the pleasure to receive Mr. Freeman Chiwele Mubanga, who is Zambian, is an environmental researcher and policy analyst. He specializes in natural resource governance, climate justice, and sustainable development. He serves as the head of research and studies at the Center for Environment Justice Institute.

His works focus on climate change mitigation, adaptation strategy, ecological resilience and restoring degraded landscape. Degraded landscape, definitely that's something that's happening here with the Kafue River. And I'm really happy to have you on this show. Good morning to you. Good afternoon to you. Thank you so much. It's still morning where I am in the capital of Zanle Rusaka. And thank you so much for hosting me on this show.

Thank you for agreeing to be on this podcast to tell us more about what happened and how things happened there. The issue has been very devastating, not only on the environmental side of things, Geroud. However, you could also look at the social and environmental issues that we are grappling with because of the spill by cyanometers in the Kafua River. So for those that are maybe getting this issue for the first time, you must

Be aware that on February 18th, 2025, we received this report that the tailing dams of SinoMetals leach Zambia company mine, of which the majority shares are owned by China's Nanferas Metals Industry Group.

So the training towns had collapsed, releasing the amounts of cubic liters that you were mentioning, about 50 million liters, I would say, and of acid waste into the Moembeshi stream. So the Moembeshi stream is actually a tributary of the Kafua River. So the spill actually started by getting into the Moembeshi stream and the Moembeshi stream being a tributary of the Kafua River, it then eventually went into the Kafua River. Now, the question you might ask is,

Why is the Kafir River an important water system in the country? The Kafir River in itself is critical and it supports about 60% of Zambians. And I'm talking about 60% of the 20 million population that we have so far. And then we

Even Lusaka, the capital, depends on the Kafua River for drinking water. There are other institutions that depend on the Kafua River for irrigation and agriculture. But at the same time, you have the Kafua River and its vast basin supporting wildlife and other endangered and endemic ecosystems like the lechwe, for example, in Zambia. And you would then consider to say at the center stage of everything, in as much as Kopa

is one of the major exports in terms of mineral exports that Zanga has, and it supports about 70% of our exports comes from copper in itself. And China-Zambia relations have been quite dominant in the sector because of

our relationship we have with the Chinese government, not also forgetting that Zambia owes China about 4 billion in debt. Now, the question would ask, why am I giving this background? I feel it's very important to understand when we start talking about why do we see a certain lapse in terms of engaging.

and calling for justice, issues of ecocide, issues of the social and environmental degradation caused by this impact. You need to understand where we are coming from. Are there any diplomatic alliances, bilateral agreements? This is where we are coming from. We're dealing with a company that is...

owned by a country whose relationships are so tied to our country because not only that we owe them quite a lot, but at the same time, we've been depending on them for such investments. Now, let me just talk about the wide social impacts that have come as a result of the spill of the acid in the Kafir River. We know I've talked about

the water supply. This has disturbed quite a lot of people. And at some point, reticulation companies that were, you know, getting water from the river had to shut down their supply in certain communities on the Copper Belt, for example, in Kitwe.

and other nearby provinces that were getting water from there. So this had affected schools, you know, hospitals, homes, and this partial, there was, and at some point there was a partial supply of water after the intervention by government to employ, you know, neutralization of the acid by adding huge amounts of lime, I think about 100 kilometers, if I'm not mistaken, from the spill going all the way down so that they could try to neutralize. However, you talk about the environmental damage, we saw,

a number of aquatic ecosystems being disturbed. We saw fish floating in the river and some farmers that had farms and gardens near the river, their crops spoiled. I'm talking about people who were accessing water and the health risk that they were facing, reporting headaches, coughs, diarrhea, muscle cramps, soles, all sorts of issues were being reported. However,

What has really caught our attention is the kind of approach that has been taken. There have been dialogues quite all right. Government engaged civil society organizations, the private sector, to have this meaningful dialogue in terms of understanding what happened and what government intends to do.

It has been over three weeks, if I'm not mistaken, close to a month, if not a month or so since then. And you really can't hear any tangible sanctions, if you would ask, that would require restoration of the damage, though they've been cited that the company has been given some sanction.

These are minimal. We need to see restoration. And scientists are actually saying that there's no assurance on the restoration of the ecosystem in the Kafua River, given the damage that has happened. This can happen, but at the same time, it's 50-50. No one really understands.

So Freeman, we're going to go a bit back to understand what was the context of that incident. Was it a technical failure or was it just a negligence from either the government, either the Chinese company involved where the tailing dam was not built properly to sustain the quantity of waste material they were keeping? How did we get to that part to begin with? Is there any inquiry that happened that gave us a bit light on what happened that day?

I think the blame goes on either side. I know the Engineering Institute of Zambia also wanted to launch an investigation as to find out the engineers who built the tailing dams in the first place and the quality of the tailing dam in itself. So there was negligence on both sides, in my opinion, because one of the key issues that have come out

over and over, for example, from the Office of the Auditor General's report on environmental degradation caused by mining has always been that there's been a lapse from government side in terms of monitoring environmental impacts and monitoring...

Mines, for example, and their impacts on the environment. And there have been a number of issues that have been raised referring to the issues of, you know, poor financing, technical capacity, human resource. But for me, that's not an issue. We know that we are a pro-mining country and we've been mining for over 50 years now. I don't think so we should be grappling with the issues of having inadequate human resource, either for environmental management or technical capacity.

capacity in monitoring impacts caused by mining in the country. That should have been our first step if we're going to support sustainable mining within the country. So there's always been that issue coming from the government point of things. But would we say outrightly that the blame would be placed on one side? It won't be placed on one side. However, given that government has the mandate to ensure that, for example, if we're going to put it on human rights principle, they have to ensure that the companies that are within the country are

adhering to the environmental laws within the country, but also safeguarding the rights not only of the environment, but also the people around there. So yes, there was a lapse on the government side, but there was also a lapse on the company because these tailing dams are monitored over and over to look at the stability of the tailing dam. And I don't think so they've given an appropriate report so far that shows that

these tailings dams were well kept. And this is why an apology was laid or was given by the company when civil society and government had an appeal in terms of dialogue. So yes, both sides are to blame. There was negligence in terms of monitoring and there was also negligence in terms of maintenance of the tailings dam by the company. Zimbabwe and Zambia share this huge water body, the Zambezi River.

And I'm trying to get my head around what are the possible impacts downstream, if any. Is there been anything from the Zambian side to understand the extent to which this damage is going to have downstream, particularly for countries where you share this huge water body? Because I understand that CAFU also feeds into...

Zambezi River and down to Malawi, into Mozambique. So I want to understand the extent to which this contamination is likely to have downstream. And secondly, the question of justice. What has been happening? Has there been any organizations that are trying to help, particularly those that have already been impacted? You talked about people that have lost their crops.

that are downstream. You talked about the potential that fish and wildlife, you know, along the Kafu National Park has also been impacted. What has happened in terms of sanctioning, but also in terms of access to justice for those that have been affected?

I'll start by giving an illustration of what I was talking about earlier. So if we are going to understand better the impacts of this acid spill into the Kafua River and ultimately into the Zambezi River and what are the impacts on the downstream with also the neighboring countries or the transfrontier boundaries, my comment is simple. So when you look at the incidents, the way it started,

When the tailing dams are broken, the acid first went into the Kafua River tributary, which is Mwembesi. So the same way the acid went into Mwembesi stream and then from Mwembesi, because Mwembesi

feeds into the Kafua River. So you're talking about a nutrient content for aquatic species that were coming from Mwembesi River and all the other aquatic species that do migrate from Kafua and Mwembesi were disturbed. So looking at that on a micro level, take that now, comparing Kafua River to Zambezi. Zambezi in this instance becomes the mainstream, the main river, and the Kafua River becomes attributory to the Zambezi River. So if

If curbing this incidence is not properly managed, the impacts of the acids will be felt into the Zambezi. Now, when you're talking about the impacts on, for example, availability of fish or a disturbance of the aquatic system, ecosystem, that can happen. It's very possible. I'll give you an example. When you look at the confluence of Wangua River and

and the Zambezi River, right there where you have Luangwa on the Zambian side, you have Zimbabwe and Mozambique on the other side, you realize that from the Zambian side, there's little to no fish within the two water bodies. So now,

Fishmongers and other fishermen go all the way down to Mozambique along the Zambezi River to get fish. And this is the fish now that is being sold on the Zambian side. And we're calling it wongo fish, but it's no longer wongo fish because it's being brought in downstream now.

It shows you also the impacts of ecosystem conservation, but also the way we've been taking care of our rivers and other streams within the country. So my comment would be that the impacts are very real. And if we do not take care of neutralizing the acid, by the way,

We haven't heard any updates so far after they did the Lyme. Has that worked in terms of preventing the impacts? The pH levels, yes, they've been stabilized, but the impact is still felt. So we need a full detailed scientific or environmental impact assessment of what that has done. And I know government has appointed a

company. They are on ground, I'm sure. I'm not just aware of how much they've done or how much they've covered. So perhaps when they give a report, we'll hear. And there are also other independent institutions, CSOs that are also willing to do this. I'm working with research think tanks like universities. For example, the Copernicus

Upper Belch University and the University of Zambia, they want to engage them to also carry out impacts assessments to see so that we can compare whatever will come out from the government side and what will also come out from the private sector, civil society point of view. So yes, if the issues are not resolved, if the acid is not neutralized properly, I think, yes, we'll be able to have impacts felt in the Zambezi River. By the way, if you're not aware, so from the point of the

spillage to the confluence between the Kafua River and Zambezi. It's about 400 kilometers from the spill when you look at the distance between the Kafua River's confluence with the Zambezi River. And so far, pollution experts, they've also shared insights that they detected, for example, things like dead fish and contaminated water at 100 kilometers downstream from the spill. So that is just like

We're just remaining with 300 kilometers before the damage can reach the Zambezi River. So for me, I feel we need a more updated report. If at all this had actually gone beyond 100 kilometers and how far did it go and what are the impacts downstream? But from my point of view, I think this thing will go beyond just being a national issue because once it enters the Zambezi River and it affects

are the people that are using the river, the Zambezi River downstream. It becomes a diplomatic issue within the Sardic region and also later on an international issue if this contamination is left unchecked. I know it might be neutralized downstream because of the volumes of water would increase compared to the acid. But in terms of the impacts at national level, I think they are vast when you look at the livelihoods that depend on the Kafua River in Zambia.

And then on the second hand, there are issues of justice that not only the civil society organizations are calling for, but also the local communities that in themselves feel their voices are not being heard because of the impacts of the spew, especially those that are living closer to the damage. So what is currently happening is that a number of civil societies have come together and made some sort of a coalition to push for justice.

And we have seen the Zambia Alliance of Women, because they are working with some of the communities where the damage has happened. They are trying to lead a litigation case on behalf of the community, who will then be the plaintiffs on the case should it pull through. So the whole idea is that if there are any other civil societies that want to support their cause, and of which there are a number now that are showing interest,

the Zambia Alliance of Women to go ahead with this route. And the issue came about because we couldn't see any tangible reaction from the government. And this is why in my introduction, I emphasize the impact

of, you know, bilateral issues. It could be diplomatic alliances with nations that you're working with and companies that are coming, for example, from China. That also has a huge toll on how Zambia reacts to this issue. And for me, in my own biased opinion, I would feel the government is being careful because this is not only a local issue. It's geopolitical in the sense that they don't want to, you know, mess up their relationship

with their old time friend when it comes to doing business in the mining sector and even in the construction industry. So I feel there's a lot that has to be done. But at the end of it all, we're talking about ecocide. We're talking about damaged environment. We're talking about social issues. And this is not the first time, by the way,

The Southern Africa Resource Watch actually did launch recently a paper where they were investigating on the impacts of Chinese investments in Africa. And some of the issues that were coming out are issues of negligence when it comes to environmental conservation, social issues, labor, and not following the standards of labor issues within the local countries where they are working, and many other things that are coming out.

And the Sino-Meadows issue for me, it's not new. It's not the first time we are hearing such to happen. But it is new in the sense that it has gotten center stage at the time when Zambia is trying to establish its stance in the green economy agenda.

You've talked about impact assessment made by the government. So far, the government has hired an independent agency to do the work. And we've also seen that the Chinese company itself also used a South African company to do the work as well. So we're going to have to wait what the results are coming out. So far, the government is going to rely on what the Chinese companies are going to produce or they're going to rely on their

own company, they've hired to do the job. How things are looking on the ground? Before you come in on that question on whether the government is going to rely on the assessment being done by the company, I also just wanted to find out, is there capacity within Zambia for government agencies to actually do independent assessments on the impacts? If not, again, the question of using South African...

institutions and the credibility of whatever results that would come out. Definitely, government may not rely on the company's reports on the extent of the damage. I know that government has engaged, I may not really know if it's a South African company or it's a local, but definitely it's a South African company to help out. They are based in Lusaka to help out on the EIA report.

And what I was saying is, on the other hand, civil society organizations as well, they're trying to come up with their own specialties to can help. So to answer in terms of capacity, do we have capacity within the country? Yes, there is capacity. However...

The only challenge is the extent to which this work would require somebody with a substantive portfolio in terms of their company, their track record and their experience in terms of what sort of projects have they worked on and how big those projects are. So it would require a company with a track record.

and experience in terms of longevity and the capacity of the work that they intend to do. And this is where the difference comes in. And we heard this so far coming out from the general population to say, why can't we rely on our own experts, our environmental engineers, to conduct these feasibility studies and EIRs? That can be done. But the extents or the capacity of this project is quite huge beyond the capacity

of some of the institutions that we have locally. And this is why you see external expertise is being brought on board to help out. However, this doesn't go to say that the local capacity or expertise cannot be involved. And this is why civil societies as well are trying to work with research think tanks like universities, for example, because of their credibility.

You have mentioned the geopolitical context of that situation with China and Zambia relationship, how things are going. Can you tell us more about how the Chinese company reacted? We saw that they've made an apology, but were they being easier to engage with now Zambian civil society organization or even the government? Or are they still working presently with Zambian authorities and Zambian civil society organization to address the issue? What is the attitude of the Chinese company involved right now?

So far, we haven't heard any sort of retaliation from the Chinese company. From the time they gave their apology, a statement where they're apologizing, of course, other institutions had remarked on the same to say, well, anyone can make this apology. But what we want to see as an apology is actually the company taking center stage in rectifying the issue. But because of

I don't think so the company would take the center stage that most experts are calling for. There's procedure that government has to take lead so that the conclusions are not biased towards the company's interest. So,

I think in a nutshell, the way the company presented itself, it presented itself as a company that is willing to work with government and other stakeholders that are interested to ensure that this issue is resolved. And the company has gone, I think, a further step into getting some expertise from China to come on board to help them. And these are some of the issues I think may be an up

it would be very good from government to highlight on what has been done so far concerning the same. Currently, the issues are remaining with only the people that are interested. They have not been so much in public like the way it was during the time of the spill in February. Now you can see as if the issues, you know,

quietly slowing down, but it's working in the background. And for me, this is where the danger is. Very soon, there will be another issue that will happen in Zabia, and we'll forget about this, and we'll switch our minds. We'll be talking about something else. And this is what usually keeps on happening. And before you know it, we'll be coming back to say, oh, where's the Sinometo issue? They will just say, oh, it was resolved, and this was what was concluded a

on. And this is why civil societies don't want to relax on this issue so that we can see, you know, progressive updates and interventions coming from both sides. What is currently happening are more generic, in my opinion. These are more generic appeals. These are more generic interventions where it's a standard procedure by the book. When this happens, you apologize and then you try to work with the government. But

A real apology, in my opinion, would be efforts in terms of reclamation, first of all, efforts in terms of working with the local communities that have been impacted. What is the company doing to support the local communities, the farmers, for example, the fish farmers, for example, who are using if it's cage farming,

you know, fish farming or anything like that. What are they doing? That is not what I'm getting so far. Or perhaps I'm not, I'm just the one who's not aware. But as far as I'm concerned, these things are not coming out.

Before the recording of this show, Obert was telling me that this, as you mentioned, it's not the first time this kind of situation happening in Zambia. But it seems that in Zambia, it's almost impossible or not. The laws does not allow to have a class action against a company like this. Do you have the sense that there is a demand, a need for justice to go beyond reparation to us?

the justice to get involved into forcing the company to take those concrete actions that you are mentioning in this situation. I would also come in before you answer. So when we were talking with Jiro, it was in the context of lead poison by Anglo-American corporate projects in Kabwe, where the communities in Kabwe could not access justice in Zambia because the Zambian courts could not allow class action.

And this is a similar case with, you know, Kafu. What are the prospects? Again, I think I'm just building on to that question by Jiro. What are the prospects, if any? If things change today, would it be possible for the communities along that river to access justice as it were in Zambia?

Yes, I think it's possible. The extent to which in terms of legalities or how what works or what might work if a class action might work in Zambia, I may not fully comment on the legalities, but in terms of justice, that is very possible. Because outside the environmental damage, this case can also be fought on the frontiers of human rights.

And this is where for me, I've seen most civil societies are hunkering their case on the human rights principle in as much as the environmental side of things are also part of the route.

given the shortcomings within the legal frameworks within the country and as such compared to the annual America. But I think if a litigation process was to go ahead, that can be done locally. Demands can be made by the interested parties. So whoever would want to represent the community through their legal representatives, I think demands can be made.

However, if it goes beyond that, I'm sure we'll be able to hear if that would be the case as it were for Anglo-American. But I think as far as I am concerned and what I'm seeing so far and what I know,

I seem to be corrected. This case can be handled locally in terms of litigation and making demands. It's such an issue of the burden of proof. And this is why I mentioned that civil societies now would have the burden of ensuring that they also do their due diligence in terms of the extent of the impact.

either social, economic, environmental, and how many people were really impacted, as opposed to the general consensus to say, yes, the acid has gone into a river that supplies water for domestic purposes for the huge population.

But who are the real victims who have been impacted in firsthand by this issue? I think that would be my comment to that orbit, but would still try and have engagements with other legal experts like the Law Association of Zambia to see how best this issue can be handled.

Freeman, we are landing with this podcast and I would like us to look forward. What do you foresee as an impact for the future for business environment or the mining activities in Zambia? Do you see any change that can now take place? Do you have a sense that the Zambian authorities are now integrating that case and to say what measure needs to be put in place to make sure that those kind of incidents do not happen again?

We know that from the UN point of things, most countries that are centered to the principles on business and human rights have gone ahead to start developing their national action plans on business and human rights. And Zambia is in the process of doing that. However,

However, the Sinometo scandal for me is a reflection of why a national action plan needs to be put in place. Because moving forward, I feel with a demand for more critical minerals, and this is not just

an isolated issue, for example, on the copper belt. CEJ is currently working on another issue in central province that has to do with manganese and it has to do with leper issues. It has to do with negligence in terms of safety and how the mine workers were exposed to high levels of manganese and they now have the condition called manganesim, which really affects the neurological system of the human body. And you could see that the demand for critical minerals

In as much as it promises so much economic benefits, I don't hear so many countries that are endowed with these mineral resources talk about the social and health and environmental impacts that come as a result of the way we are experiencing.

banding. In itself, for me, I think it's a learning curve for most countries. I think for Zambia, I said we've been mining for a long time now. There are certain things, in my opinion, that we should have had standard procedures by now because we're a pro-mining country. And by virtue of us getting into mining, we should have certain standards

procedures set already. If an investor is going to come, it's non-negotiable. But I've seen this with most developing countries. The way we negotiate for investments, we are always on the begging end. It's like if we heighten our environmental policies, our laws,

scare away investors? No, we won't scare them away. For example, in the European Union, there's been a new due diligence law that was passed. And these are some of the examples we can talk about. You cannot supply in the European Union if you haven't done a due diligence in terms of human rights issues, debt by issues of the products that you're supplying within the country. But

Why is it that the producers, the mining countries that are producing these minerals, why can't we also uphold these principles of safeguarding our environment? We are so lapsed. It's easy to break the law in developing countries than it is rapidly.

So imagine if this was a Zambian company that has done this in China. I don't think so they would continue. That would be the end of this company. There would be fines. It would be non-negotiable. By this time, I'm telling you, there would have been fines to a level where the company would have even shut down. But you don't get to see this in reverse.

And for me, that in itself shows you that there's also a power dynamic issue there. If you're always on the begging side, always because you go and get money for debt from this person, you can only say so much because you know that tomorrow you're going to ask for aid. And for me, that in itself impacts development effectiveness, not only within local countries, but also at international level.

That has been one of the issues that many African stakeholders have been mentioning, the power dynamic, the imbalance between China and Africa in the interaction where African countries do not have much of agency to be able to get what they want from Chinese companies. The reality on the ground also can be much more complex where we have a lot of dynamic playing into action that's just in the stability of the states to be able to get Chinese companies to abide by the law. And the reality is Chinese companies can abide by the

law if they're put in a context where actually they can abide by the law and the government is really making sure that those regulations are implemented and are respected. And unfortunately, we see that in many African countries that's not the case. And just like Freeman has mentioned,

state capacities lacking in so many countries where countries are either thinking about the dynamic of the relationship with China or they're just negligence altogether to implement their own laws and regulations to avoid those kind of situations to happen.

Freeman Mubanga, it was a real pleasure to have you. We are looking forward to hear more from you and the work that you are doing about this situation and to give us much more update about what happened now. It's been two months now. Today is April 17 when we are recording this podcast. It's been exactly two months. Let's now see what's going to come in next month and the month after that. What's the measure that's been taken? What's the procedure that the government has put in place to avoid that kind of accident?

incident to happen. Freeman Mubanga, thank you very much. Thank you so much, Yeroud, and thank you, Obert. So, Obert, we heard a lot from Freeman who told us what happened in Zambia. It's very quite unfortunate to see this kind of situation happening, and we see that happening in many producing countries. We had similar cases in the DRC, in the southern part, and also in the eastern part of the DRC, where people have been reporting pollution cases.

And unfortunately, it's happening in an industry where we talk about green minerals, green transition and transition minerals that are supposed to be clean. But somehow we do find ourselves that the extraction process of those minerals are leading to much more environmental damage and pollution. That's really sad to see. Indeed, I think it's a very sad situation.

you know, where we have been talking about we want green investments, green minerals or transitional minerals to be more responsible and particularly from our good friends from the east, from China. It's a very unfortunate situation and it is our hope that, you know, this situation will be remedied. Of course, it will take a lot of investigation, it will take a lot of time, it will take a lot of resources and also the political will, I think, from the Zambian side to really

stand with the communities and stand for the environment in this case. I was referring to this Anglo-American case before, and I keep going back to this because it's one of the cases that has happened, you know, for over a very long time. And until now, we are still talking about it because the communities, they have not yet, you know, received the compensation. They have not yet

got injustice, even though the South African courts have now allowed the Zambian communities to soothe Anglo-Americans in South Africa because they could not do so in Zambia. So I think one of the key things that, you know, also comes out of it is

Do African countries have proper regulatory frameworks that can allow communities impacted by investments in the critical mineral space to access remedies or access justice? I think this is a new space that we are seeing. Of course, mining has been happening for a very long time, but I think the legal and policy frameworks, they have not been updated to keep up with the pace at which mining is also taking place. And also,

As most governments are now moving towards, you know, saying let's value-add the critical minerals or these green or transitional minerals on the continent, it brings in another dimension of what are the potential impacts of processing or refining those critical minerals. Already we are seeing that if there are no proper regulations, perhaps around tailings management, that can also result in further, you know, toxic consequences.

contaminants or toxic elements being discharged into the environment. So I think as policymakers are calling for more beneficiation and value addition, they have also to tighten some of the regulatory frameworks that do govern management of tailings. I think I understand there is a global initiative to come up with some independent body that brings different actors together around management of tailings. I think it's

recently was launched and these guys are trying to do something around creating these frameworks because a lot of the countries that are producing crude communals and that are now calling for them to be validated do not have proper regulatory frameworks for management of tailings. So I think that's another dimension that is very, very important for us to take note of.

Definitely, that's going to be one of the things that producing countries in the global south, not only in Africa, but in general global south will have to take into account. Because refining midstream and downstream processing of minerals are heavy toll on the environment. So we're going to need strong regulation, very strong administration to be put in place to make sure that those industries do not do harm more than do good.

And we're going to have to have strong policy and strong political will to make sure that everything is done by the book for the interest of the people and for the interest of the country. We cannot be building green minerals and green transition on the backs of local communities where local communities are in.

negatively impacted and where there's no justice for them. So it was really my pleasure to have all of you for this podcast, the China in Africa podcast. And I'm hoping to see you next week for another episode of China in Africa podcast. It may not be me. Surely it's going to be Eric and Corbis or maybe me and Eric, but we're going to be happy to have you. See you next week for another episode of China in Africa podcast.

The discussion continues online. Follow the China Global South project on Blue Sky NX, a China GS project, or on YouTube at China Global South and share your thoughts on today's show or head over to our website at chinaglobalsouth.com where you can subscribe to receive full access to more than 5,000 articles and podcasts. Once again, that's chinaglobalsouth.com.

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