We're sunsetting PodQuest on 2025-07-28. Thank you for your support!
Export Podcast Subscriptions
cover of episode Xi Jinping Cannot Let The Belt And Road Fail

Xi Jinping Cannot Let The Belt And Road Fail

2025/3/17
logo of podcast China Unscripted

China Unscripted

AI Deep Dive Transcript
People
(
(未明确指出)
Topics
主持人: 我想谈谈‘一带一路’的现状。多年来,债务陷阱外交和许多基础设施项目烂尾或崩溃的事实已变得透明。鉴于中国经济目前面临巨大挑战,‘一带一路’还能继续下去吗? Michael: 五年前或四年前,如果问华盛顿的智库专家这个问题,普遍观点可能是‘一带一路’会随着中国经济挑战的加剧而逐渐消亡。这涉及到对‘一带一路’本质的根本性争论:它究竟是经济计划还是公共宣传?成功的项目会打上‘一带一路’的标签,而失败的项目则不会。我认为这种二分法完全忽略了重点。中国乐于将失败的项目也标记为‘一带一路’项目,中巴经济走廊就是一个例子。它本应是‘一带一路’战略成功的典范,但进展缓慢,瓜达尔港、从新疆南部到巴基斯坦北部的道路建设等都进展不顺利。 ‘一带一路’能否在中国经济挑战持续的情况下生存下去?我认为绝对可以,原因在于政治和战略。政治上,习近平无法让它失败,因为它写入宪法,是他的标志性项目和外交政策。战略上,‘一带一路’非常灵活,可以根据需要调整方向,例如从硬基础设施转向绿色能源项目。 ‘一带一路’的第一阶段是签署谅解备忘录,建立合作基础。西方经济学家认为第二阶段应该是成功的项目,但事实并非如此,因为‘一带一路’并非主要以经济为目的,而是以战略为目的。中国并不介意有些项目延误或搁浅,因为第二阶段是军事。在我的书《反击中国的伟大游戏》中,我分析了中国海外军事基地的扩张,它与‘一带一路’伙伴国家之间存在大量重叠。在太平洋岛屿地区,‘一带一路’谅解备忘录的签署往往伴随着台湾前盟友转向北京,之后中国海警或海军舰艇就会出现在‘一带一路’项目的港口,机场也会进行改造以服务重型轰炸机。 所罗门群岛就是一个例子。它曾承认台湾,之后转向承认中国,签署了‘一带一路’协议,大量投资涌入,然后就是允许中国军舰停靠的港口,以及秘密安全协议和警察培训。这是一个多阶段的战略策略,非常聪明。而我们对此的回应却不够令人印象深刻。当所罗门群岛与中国达成协议的消息传出时,美国和澳大利亚都感到震惊,并试图阻止,但为时已晚。我们的公开信息传递也做得非常糟糕。说中国基地将是美国的红线,但这意味着什么?如果解放军进驻,我们会采取军事行动吗?我们会阻止中国军舰停靠吗? 我们应该在事情发生之前就有所行动,而不是在最后一刻才采取威胁措施。五角大楼每年都会发布中国报告,其中列出了北京的目标国家。几年前,我们险些在阿联酋遭遇类似情况,中国差点在阿联酋建立一个具有军事意义的港口,拜登政府不得不采取强硬措施才让其放弃。我们必须吸取教训,不能总是等到最后一刻才采取行动,要参与长期经济发展项目,让对方有选择,我们才能在危机来临之前有所准备。 Michael: ‘一带一路’项目目前面临诸多挑战,包括债务陷阱外交和项目烂尾等问题,在当前中国经济面临巨大挑战的情况下,其持续性存疑。然而,‘一带一路’将继续存在,原因在于政治和战略因素。政治上,习近平无法让‘一带一路’失败,因为它写入中国宪法,是他的标志性项目和外交政策。战略上,‘一带一路’具有战略灵活性,可以根据需要调整方向,例如从硬基础设施转向绿色能源项目。‘一带一路’的第一阶段是签署谅解备忘录,建立合作基础;第二阶段并非经济上的成功,而是军事上的战略布局。‘一带一路’的战略目标是军事上的,通过基础设施建设为中国在海外建立军事基地创造条件。‘一带一路’项目与中国在太平洋岛屿地区的军事扩张密切相关,例如在港口建设、机场改造等方面。所罗门群岛的案例印证了‘一带一路’的军事战略:先进行经济投资,再发展军事存在。美国和澳大利亚对所罗门群岛事件的反应过于迟缓和被动,未能有效阻止中国的军事扩张。美国和澳大利亚仅仅在最后时刻采取行动,并发出威胁,这种做法是无效的。美国对中国在海外建立军事基地的意图和目标国家都心知肚明。美国在与阿联酋的事件中侥幸避免了中国建立具有军事意义的港口,但这并非长久之计。长期参与经济发展项目,才能在危机出现之前就有所准备和应对。美国和澳大利亚在所罗门群岛事件中失败,需要吸取教训,避免重蹈覆辙。

Deep Dive

Shownotes Transcript

i'd like to kind of talk about where the belton road is right now um because as we saw over the years that it became transparent that there was debt trap diplomacy going on a lot of these infrastructure projects were left uncompleted or crumbling falling apart uh currently china's economy is facing tremendous challenges is it even possible for the belton road to continue

If you were to ask that question to any think tanker in D.C. five years ago, four years ago, I think the conventional wisdom would have been the Belt and Road is just going to peter out over time as China's economy continues to face increasing challenges. And this gets to a fundamental debate about what the Belt and Road is and what it isn't. Is it

an actual economic plan, or is it public messaging? Where if the project is working, it gets the Belt and Road stamp, and if the project is failing, China holds back and doesn't brand it because they only want successful projects in the Belt and Road. I reject that dichotomy because both sides completely missed the point. China is happy to label

failing projects as Belt and Road projects. Look no further than the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. This was supposed to be the poster child of strategic success of the Belt and Road. And listen, on paper, it would be a huge strategic win for China and for Pakistan if this thing ever fully materializes, and it would be terrible for India. Um,

How is the Gwadar port doing? Not so great. How are the roads from southern Xinjiang into northern Pakistan? How are construction on those roads going? Not so great. And it's been that way, I would say at this point, nearly a decade. We've been talking about this thing for a long time. It still hasn't fully materialized. Eastern Europe, European countries have this exact same issue too. So...

Is the Belt and Road going to survive as China continues to face economic challenges? It absolutely will, for a political reason, but most importantly, for a strategic reason. Politically,

Xi Jinping cannot let this thing fail. He wrote it into the Constitution. Now, the Chinese Constitution is worth even less than the paper it's printed on because the Chinese Communist Party doesn't respect the idea of a constitution, but they have one. And Xi Jinping wrote it into the Constitution. This is his pet project. It's his foreign policy. Politically, he cannot allow it to die. But strategically...

it's really nimble and it's kind of useful because the Belt and Road is this kind of shape-shifting thing where when he started to get some blowback about debt traps in like 2021, Xi Jinping reframed the Belt and Road into this like cultural, civilizational project. And as the hard infrastructure began to run into funding issues,

It pivoted into green energy projects, a sector that had a ton of ripe investment inside of China. So strategically, the Belt and Road is really valuable because you can just kind of maneuver it in whichever direction you need to. But here's the real thing about why it's still useful. Phase one.

for China was getting the memoranda of understanding signed with hundreds of nations around the world to establish that beachhead of Belt and Road cooperation. That's phase one. Westerners, Western economists in particular, assume, okay, phase two is going to be successful projects. Maybe, but maybe not, because the Belt and Road is not primarily economic. It is primarily strategic.

China is happy if some of these projects are delayed, if some of them never fully see the light of day and it's very slow progress, because phase two is not economic. Phase two is military. In my book, Countering China's Great Game, I plot out the proliferation of China's overseas military bases.

And if you look at how it connects to Belt and Road partner nations, it's no accident that there's a lot of overlap. You see this really vividly in the Pacific Island region, where the BRI memorandum is signed, and in many cases, it's a former ally of Taiwan that is getting flipped diplomatically to become a partner with Beijing. The money flows in, and then a few years later,

a Chinese Coast Guard or naval ship shows up at the port of a BRI project port, and then you see the early indicators of where this is heading. Or you see China refitting a new runway to be able to service heavy bombers. Runways in the middle of the Pacific that have not serviced serious military aircraft since the Second World War. The intent of this is military in phase two.

So the Belt and Road has problems, but it will continue. It's interesting you talked about, because that is, we've been following the Solomon Islands for a long time. And that is basically what you just described, that they were a Taiwan, recognized Taiwan. They got flipped to recognizing the PRC, then signed Belt and Road deals, lots of investment. And then talking about having a port available for...

Chinese ships to come stop at. And the secret security deal. That too. I mean, training the police in the Solomons, things like that. It's a multi-staged strategic play. And I think we need to give them their due credit. It's pretty ingenuitive. It's very intelligent. It's very smart. And if you look at our response to what happened in the Solomons,

Our response hasn't been too impressive, I would wager to say, because when news broke of the agreement with Honi Aira, Washington collectively freaked out. Rightly so, because it was a big deal. And two senior administration officials from the Biden administration rushed to the Solomon Islands with the Australians.

And we did our best to try to talk them off the cliff, off the edge and reverse them. It was all too late. And then our public messaging could not have been worse. Like in response to it, I think it was, I forget if it was the Australians or the Americans, but at least one side said a Chinese base would be a red line for the United States and for Australia. Now, what does that mean? Does that mean if the PLA sets up shop, we're going to

move in and attack? Does it mean we're going to deny China's Chinese ships abilities to dock there? Maybe it is a red line and it would be an enormous problem for Australia in particular. But here's the problem. If all we're doing is swooping in at the 11th hour and rattling cages and saying, you can't do this, this is a red line. Where were we at the 10th hour, at the 9th hour, at the 8th hour? Like,

Swooping in at the very end and more or less threatening a nation is one of the most counterproductive things we can do. And it underscored how out of the game we are, how behind the eight ball we were. It is not a mystery where the People's Liberation Army is looking to establish overseas presence. And it's not a mystery that

Because the Pentagon publishes its China report every single year, and there is literally a list of countries that they have assessed that Beijing is targeting for this exact purpose.

We had a near miss with the UAE a few years ago. China was on the verge of establishing a port in UAE with military implications. And the Biden administration really had to shake these guys down hard to get them to back off.

That was a moment where at the 11th hour, we got lucky, but that's not going to happen every single time. This is why to your earlier question, this is why the long game of economic development projects matter because you have skin in the game and you telegraph way before the crisis comes. We're here to help you guys have options. We're here to help you guys have a choice.

And with the Solomons, that was a collective failure on our part, on Australia's part. And that is a failure we cannot repeat. We cannot continue.

Thank you for watching. A link to Michael's book is below. And this was just one short highlight from our hour-long podcast. The full interview is available exclusively on our website, ChinaUncensored.tv. And when you subscribe to our website, you'll also get premium China Uncensored episodes, live streams, and a community chat with me, Shelley, Matt, and hundreds of subscribers. And most importantly, you'll be supporting content you love. Check it out. The link is below.