China’s Strategy in Global Power Transitions: Challenges in a Turbulent World — A panel discussion
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Hey, Cineca listeners.

February 24th marks the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and as I've done for the last two years, I moderated a panel organized by Vida Holod, a Ukrainian-China scholar who happens to be here in North Carolina at UNC Chapel Hill as a visiting scholar.

Vita has worked tirelessly to promote awareness of the war, and I am honored again to have been asked to moderate this panel. I will introduce the guests in the actual program, which I'm presenting to you unedited and only cleaned up for better sound quality. Please enjoy.

Good morning, good afternoon, and good evening, depending on where you are joining us from. Welcome to today's panel discussion, China's Strategy in Global Power Transitions, Challenges in a Turbulent World. My name is Kaiser Guo. I am the host of the Seneca podcast. We are convening just days before the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, marking the beginning of its fourth year.

This conflict has profoundly reshaped the global order. It's exposed new vulnerabilities. It's redrawn old alliances. And it's compelled major powers to reassess their strategic priorities. Today, our focus is going to be on how China fits into this transformed world. But even to get to that topic, we do need to talk quite a bit about the bewildering developments of just recent days.

As we speak today on the 20th of February, it's just in the aftermath of the news first earlier this month of Donald Trump's phone call with Vladimir Putin, followed just over the weekend by highly controversial remarks made by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference, which prompted some blistering responses, not the least of which came from the Fed Secretary,

And then just this week, the meeting in Riyadh between Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. All these things are changing the scenario very, very quickly. Discussions about potential settlements, some terming it a grand bargain, others speaking of outright betrayal.

really dominate international discourse. The Biden administration's forward policy approach towards both China and the former administration's extensive support for Ukraine in its struggle against the aggressor, that's history now. President Trump just yesterday posted on his social media site Truth Social that

Calling Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky a dictator alongside Rubio, Vance, and Defense Secretary Pete Hengsteth, Trump is charting a new and very uncertain course. Trump's new policies and his conversations with Putin signal potential realignments with quite significant implications not only for Ukraine,

but also for Europe, the Asia Pacific, and the broader global landscape. So where does China stand? What role is Beijing playing in this evolving order? It's tempting to say that there's not much now. I mean, Beijing is barely mentioned right now. Uh,

How are smaller states navigating the risks that are inherent in these great power transitions, if that is indeed what we are witnessing? To explore these questions, I am honored to be joined by four esteemed experts who bring deep knowledge and diverse perspectives on China, global power shifts, and international security.

I will introduce them shortly, but before we proceed, I would like to extend first my heartfelt thanks to Vida Holod for once again organizing this event. This marks the third year that such a panel has been organized really through her efforts and that I have had the privilege to moderate. So Vida, I believe you have some remarks you'd like to make before we get started to introduce the platform.

Thank you, Kaiser. Thank you. Good morning, good afternoon, good evening, everyone. And I am glad we could all come together because without doubt, we need to talk. With Trump's second presidency, the situation is becoming even more complicated by the day. And I'd like to extend my gratitude to Una, Klaus, Dmitry and Leo Lauscher for accepting my invitation today to contribute. And of course, Kaiser Goh.

My friend, my neighbor in Chapel Hill, for your constant support. Thank you so much.

And just a few words about the Ukrainian platform for contemporary China. This volunteer project was launched by the group of Ukrainian sinologists in May 2022 to facilitate the dialogue between Ukrainian and international scholars and experts. Our primary focus is, of course, the Sino-Ukrainian relations, but we also examine China's

political, economic and social issues and their global impact. And I'd like to address to the audience, if you have any bright project, bright ideas for 2025 agenda, we can collaborate, we can discuss on our platform. Please feel free to reach out to me and my contact details are easily accessible online. You can find easily online.

And of course, I look forward to a production discussion today. Thank you, Kaiser, for this moment. Thank you. Thank you, Vida. And now I'm honored to introduce this panel. Before I do, let me quickly, a few words of housekeeping. We do have a lot of questions, but I hope that we will have time for audience Q&A. Please use the Q&A function on the, rather than just the messaging, use the Q&A function on Zoom to put your questions in.

All right, panelist introductions. First of all, Dr. Una Alexandra Berzina Cherenkova. She's the director of China Study Center at Riga Strazins University in Latvia. She is fluent in Chinese, Russian, and English. She's collaborated with scholars like my friend Kerry Brown of King's College London. She's done very extensive work on China's role in Europe and beyond. So welcome, Una.

Next up, Dr. Dmytro Yefremov. He's the associate professor in the Department of International Relations at National University Kyiv Molya Academy in Ukraine, a board member of the Ukrainian Association of Cynologists. He specializes in China's foreign relations and has traveled quite extensively to China, providing firsthand insights into Ukraine's perspective on China's role, not just in the war, but beyond as well.

Dr. Liu Qiang is the director of the Energy Economics Division at the Institute of Quantitative and Technical Economics within the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, or CASC.

He also serves as the co-chair and secretary general of the Global Forum on Energy Security. His research focuses on energy security, energy economics, and policy, with a particular emphasis on China's Belt and Road Initiative, the BRI, and its global energy partnerships.

Last but certainly not least is Dr. Klaus Larris, who's my good friend, who ordinarily lives here in Chapel Hill, but he joins us from Belfast in Ireland right now. He is the Richard M. Krasnow Distinguished Professor of History and International Affairs at the University of North Carolina here in Chapel Hill. He's an expert on transatlantic relations, on U.S., German, and EU foreign policy, and on China's role in the

post-Cold War order. He has a very profound interest in the history of the Cold War, and especially in the politics of Winston Churchill, a perspective that I think may offer quite valuable historical parallels today. So thank you all for being here. Let's dive right in. And I'd like to put my first question to Dr. Berzina Cherenkova.

Dr. Berzina-Karenkova, Latvia and other Baltic states have long been at the forefront of resistance to Russian influence, have long been very wary of Russian expansionist ambitions. This is even before they were absorbed into the Soviet Union, but since 1991 has been very wary, with President Trump and his administration now signaling a new approach that may prioritize ties with Moscow,

What risks does this pose for smaller states like Latvia? Thank you, Kaiser. You're absolutely right. And there are at least two kinds of risks that we see for the Baltics that stem from President Trump's approach. Now,

First of all, let's step back by saying that President Trump currently is undermining a resource of the U.S. as well. So this resource that the U.S. has had for decades is a deeply institutionalized resource.

alliance based on trust. It's something that perhaps other great powers can only dream of. And I'm speaking about NATO, but not just NATO, also other kind of perhaps middle laterals. But then what are the risks here for the Baltics? The first kind of risk obviously have to do with our neighborhood. You've outlined the Russian factor. We have always been painfully aware of Russia's intentions, and that is why we rely on collective defense.

And for that reason, we have historically been very transatlantic reminded. And the new US administration is shaking that confidence a little bit. I must perhaps an understatement. So we feel that the risks of a kinetic Russian invasion have increased in this uncertainty.

We hear the commentators on Russian state TV saying that they would occupy the Baltics and speak of Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians in a very dehumanizing manner. I don't even want to repeat these talking points. And we have a mayoral candidate here in Riga whose campaign slogan in Russian is Riga is our city. Riga is our city for those who speak Russian.

So this is just to outline the first level of risks that we feel. But the second level is wider. It's wider than just our neighborhood. Because you spoke of small states. Europe is made up of small states. But in this risk that is posed to wider Europe also lies the answer, lies the response, right?

Because a local kind of deterrence has to emerge in this vacuum. And we are seeing that now, perhaps just the early birds of spring, but we are seeing that wider Europe is rallying in understanding that there should never again be an iron curtain. Very good. I want to stay with you here for a second now, Una. China's evolving relationship with Russia, China,

might very well impact the security and strategic calculations of Baltic nations. We recall how in 2021 Vilnius' decision to allow a de facto Taiwan embassy, a representative office, it sparked a really bad downturn in relations between China and your neighboring state of Lithuania.

How is China factoring into your thinking in Latvia right now and in the Baltics more generally? Do you see this Russo-Chinese relationship as solid? Do you think that the Chinese are basically towing the Russian line when it comes to their impingement on territorial sovereignty and integrity in the Baltics? Or do you think that they have a very different approach?

Oh, this is such an important and wide question, and I'm really happy that we get to discuss it because we know that China and Russia have perhaps different reasons for their distaste for NATO. But at the end of the day, they have a shared distaste for NATO.

And we've also seen that China has supported the narrative of the crisis, real Waijie or Chongtu in Ukraine, that it has been caused by a perceived NATO enlargement rather than by an unprovoked Russian attack on Ukraine. First red flag for the Baltics, right? Now,

Another red flag which perhaps goes into the communication sphere. So, you know, it's different schools of thought. Some people believe stratcoms are, you know, a good measure of a state's foreign policy. Others say it's just words. Wherever you may be on this, but let me remind you that there is a recently appointed special representative of the Chinese government for European affairs in Brussels. And his name is Mr. Lu Xiaoyue. Now, Mr. Lu,

back when he was ambassador in Paris, questioned on French television the sovereignty of Ukraine and what he called "les pays post-soviétiques", the post-Soviet states. Another red flag here, we're very sensitive that way. And then there's also something that we see Europe-wide, which is kind of divide and conquer, I guess, is the cliche, but sort of co-optation on state level. Now, it's no secret, but

Alice Weidel, the leader of the German ultra-rights, IFD, Alternative Deutschland, had regular meetings with Chinese officials. And there's also alternative elite grooming. And we see in the Baltics that if those forces, like IFD, come to power in Europe, the support for Ukraine will waver.

Furthermore, the support for anyone that the Russian regime has set their eyes on will waver as well. And it would also seem on top of that, that the partner bashing of the Trump administration is perceived favorably in Beijing. So the Baltic governments do see China as a critical enabler of Russia, which of course is impacting our approach. But we do understand that China and Russia are not the same when it comes to their role in the Baltic.

Thank you, thank you very much. I'm going to turn the next question over to Dmytro Yefimov. Dmytro, from Q's vantage point and in light of the very dramatic developments in just this last week or so,

How has the war influenced China's relations with its key partners? Let's start with your sense of relations between China and Russia themselves. I mean, because this is really the crux of the question. There's a lot of debate over this. I mean, I think a lot of the Chinese interlocutors who I speak with say that the West has grossly exaggerated the interests

so-called no-limits friendship and that there are, in fact, very real limits to it. They point to a lot of evidence to suggest that there's really no love lost between China and Russia and that, in fact, they're only sort of huddling together to stay warm and that this is only a marriage of convenience. So let's start with your sense, and maybe you agree, maybe you disagree, and then perhaps you could talk about the relations between China and Europe

before and after the Munich Security Conference, before moving on to discuss Ukraine, your own country specifically. So let's start with China and Russia and your take on this. Okay, Kaiser. So I can say that I'm also a supporter of this idea that there is no true friendship between China and Russia. So China must view any potential reconciliation between the United States and Russia as

with a deep, deep suspicion. It is obvious that if Washington and Moscow were to normalize their relations, the US could shift its strategic focus entirely to countering China. So the prospect of the American re-entrenchment from the war in Ukraine and broader European security concerns –

These all concerns Beijing, and it could free up United States resources and diplomatic energy for more aggressive, let's say, competition in the Pacific.

What maybe worries China most is the possibility that in such scenario, Russia, its current strategic partner, could adopt a neutral stance or even

tacitly accommodate American efforts to contain China. If we take into account China's vulnerabilities in its competition with the United States, including economic dependencies, technological restrictions, and also military, let's say, uncertainties, the notion of the US-Russia reconciliation represents a significant geopolitical advantage

threat to Beijing for sure. But I would also like to mention President Zelensky's declared impression of the recent meeting between China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Ukrainian Minister Sibyga during this Munich conference. So Zelensky noted that for the first time he ceased to

he seems to see that China has some interest to discuss the pressure on Russia to end the war. So according to his impression, there are changes in Chinese approach to the war. And I think that...

This could be connected first to the point we discussed about US-Russia re-approachment. And also there are some contradictions that China would like to exploit. China has recognized these emerging tensions between the United States and Ukraine, particularly in the areas where their strategic priorities diverge.

Traditionally, we can say that Beijing's diplomatic approach has been to align itself with states and actors that have frictions with Washington and in such a way leveraging divisions to advance its own geostrategical interests.

And in the case of Ukraine, China perceives an opportunity to exploit these rifts in Ukrainian relationships with Washington, particularly concerning military aid, diplomatic autonomy, and maybe post-war reconstruction. So this strategy aligns with China's broader diplomatic objective, counterbalancing American influence, and maybe also

developing its relations with the European Union. So China is acutely aware of risk of being sidelined in any future negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. And currently Beijing perhaps observes that both Ukraine and Europe have been overshadowed by US leadership in these diplomatic and security matters.

So recognizing this, China could probably seek to leverage its position to maybe ensure that it remains relevant in discussions about the war's resolution. This can be maybe important for Beijing's broader ambition to

To strengthen ties with Europe and by presenting itself as a potential mediator or an independent voice in conflict, China maybe aims to improve its strained relations with European powers, which have grown wary of Beijing's tacit support for Russia.

Yeah, I think the Beijing line has changed a little bit, as you pointed out. And when they have been asked whether any peace conference, peace negotiations they would involve would involve both Ukraine and the Europeans, they have said yes in no uncertain terms. So a very different tune. Excellent, excellent. I also agree with you, just to be clear. I think that there were a lot of foregone opportunities throughout the last four

three years now where I think

The US and to an extent the EU approach has been always to use sticks and no carrots, no efforts to induce China into a different posture vis-a-vis Russia. And I think China was signaling all along that it was open to such things. But let's move on now to Dr. Liu. Dr. Liu, China's energy strategy has seen quite notable shifts amid the global economic tensions.

Could you elaborate on how the Russo-Ukrainian war has reshaped China's economic capacity, particularly in terms of energy security and Belt and Road Initiative projects? How is China balancing its energy needs with the geopolitical challenges arising from this conflict? I mean, because obviously a lot of natural gas purchases, a lot of LNG purchases from Russia are still ongoing. Thank you.

To China, you know, we always have some confusions that any conflict in this world, you always ask Chinese attitude or what's the Chinese role in this arena. And you know, China is not in this arena. Fundamentally, it's European affairs. It's a European country.

China has some complicated relationship with Russia, so it's also issues of China.

From the perspective of the energy security, I don't think this can cause some problems to Chinese energy security. We import much crude oil and natural gas from other countries and import a big share from Russia, but it's not very critical or very important issue

share from Russia. If we don't import from Russia, we can import from many other countries. Like oil, we can import from Saudi Arabia, from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, from Qatar, Australia, no problem. If we're from America, the USA, R&D is okay for China. So, especially in the last year, just the 2024,

The energy demand in China, not energy demand, but oil demand and gas demand, the growth rate decreased for the first time, especially the crude oil import and the consumption decreased in the last year. So we are experiencing

the oil companies in China. They have more concern on the peak demand of the oil. So the situation of energy security is not so serious anymore in China. So I think this war is

international affairs to China, not energy security. Especially for economic affairs, it does have some impacts to China, but not the security problem to China.

Maybe China would like to do some help to stop or to end this war. But it's a big dilemma. You know, in China's diplomatic affairs, we always think, we hope to avoid any conflicts, any disputes, or any maybe problems with other countries. We hope to be friends.

to each country. So you can hear we say we are friends to Russia, we are friends to Ukraine, and we are friends to India. If we have some maybe arguments with these countries, the diplomats or the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, they obviously we are friends, we have a partnership with some countries. So

This may be because some countries think China maybe plays some secret role in this role. I think that's not true. I want to ask you a little bit about declining oil.

oil and gas imports in 2024 That's I think a lot of people will jump to the conclusion that that's mainly because of China's massive installation of renewables And it's shift to electric vehicles less dependence now on gasoline But it's also because of slowing growth in China. Is it not? It's also because of

I mean, well, while manufacturing is certainly up, I think, you know, a lot of the really energy intensive sectors, especially in construction, that is down. So how much of that, because you're an energy expert, is attributable to the shift to renewables and how much of it is because of other economic variables?

We have a big plan of carbon neutrality. We are pushing the energy transition very fast. Last year, EV penetration was very fast. It reduced the consumption demand of gasoline very quickly.

And the renewable energy develops very fast. In this view, we are not concerned about the energy security, but we, you know, you are right, we are a big country of manufacturing. We export some new products like EVs, like PV channels,

So in this issue, we hope to keep a good relationship with Ukraine, with European countries and USA. So we want to expose the manufacturing booths. But because of the

transition of the economic model you must know the real estate this business is the situation is very serious you know so we make less energy than before right right right very very good

I want to move over now to Dr. Lares, to Klaus. Klaus, over lunch a few months ago, you turned me on to a novelist named Robert Harris, and I've gone on to read many, many of his books now. One in particular has been very relevant to conversations I've had a lot recently. It's called Munich. It is a faithful but fictionalized account of the 1938 Munich conference.

It happens that you also have great expertise in the history of the Cold War, the politics of Winston Churchill, as I mentioned in the introduction. And so seeing this, some are drawing parallels between the current geopolitical climate and the events leading up to 1938 to the Munich Agreement.

I am interested in your perspective. Are there lessons to be drawn from Churchill's opposition to Neville Chamberlain's so-called appeasement when you consider today's negotiations involving major powers like the US and Russia? Or is this a spurious comparison? Do you think Neville Chamberlain is unfairly being cast as the villain here? Well, thanks for the question and thanks for being here. It's a

Great pleasure to be here. Regarding Churchill appeasement and the current situation, I think it is a little bit artificial to bring that about. When we look at the current people, let's call them people who are involved in major decision-making at the moment,

And then you compare it to the people like Roosevelt and Churchill, even Stalin, who were the big three of the Second World War, then I think the quality in thinking, the quality in intelligence is huge. So I think it would

insulting to Churchill and Rousseau to compare the current chaotic scenario with what they were doing. I mean, the general lesson that appeasement is usually not a wise policy probably applies, but of course we have to look at the circumstances rather than making these kind of simple conclusions from the Munich conference.

But on the whole, of course, and I think most people have come to this assessment, just to give in to Putin is probably not a very wide policy. But that is exactly what we are seeing right now. Regarding some of the comments which were made, and I have the privilege to talk last so I can actually comment on what was said before.

I mean, there was, you know, someone expressed that China fears to be on the sidelines. But of course, we all sit on the sidelines. Everyone sits on the sidelines. And as you know, there was huge outcry in Europe that they were on the sidelines. And the European have actually provided lots of funds

for Ukraine while the Chinese of course haven't. So the right for the Europeans to be participating is totally ignored. No wonder that of course the Chinese are not included in any way. But then also I would like to say the fear that the AFD might be in government is really not correct.

The AFD will not be in government. It doesn't really matter whether they get 20 or 23 percent. There is a so-called firewall by the other established democratic parties. Maybe in four years' time, in eight years' time, that could look very different. One never knows. But for this current election and for the government, which is to be formed afterwards, it is possible.

I would say 99% unlikely that the AFD will be anywhere close to government. And of course, from my personal point of view, this is very sensible and very wise. Regarding China and Russia...

I'm not sure that China really ever moved away from its alliance with Russia. And of course, all political alliances are alliances of convenience. We see that even between the US and Europe. And of course, it's clear it also is the case between China and Russia. There's no real love lost between Putin and Xi Jinping. But still, it still is a good alliance of convenience between

And despite all suggestions to the Chinese that they would improve their relations with Europe, both economically and politically a lot, if they gave up on Russia or moved away a little bit from their borders.

working relationship, their alliance with Russia that has not happened at all. So I think Putin and Xi Jinping are as close now as they were one or two years ago. They are cooperating not without envy, not without very critical suspicion of each other. It's not a real friendship. I fully agree with that. But I can't see that their working relationship, that their political alliance has really become diluted or

less close than it was before. At present, as you know, Kaiser, there is that rumor going around in China that a secret deal has been hatched up by Trump and Putin or the negotiators in Riyadh and that China will lose out. I think there's no evidence for that. We all see, we are all on the sidelines.

we all get ignored. And when I say we, I mean anyone else apart from Russia and the US who has a stake in the Ukraine war, even including Zelensky himself. So it is no wonder that China hasn't been brought to the table and they will not be brought to the table. But I think what will happen in the end is when we...

need a reconstruction effort, then the Europeans and I would say German companies will try to be at the forefront, but we will also undoubtedly see Chinese companies, Chinese reconstruction companies and perhaps oil companies

will be there and play a huge role. That is economic collaboration with Ukraine and the Ukrainians, I think, will be dependent on any aid they can get, any support they can get, particularly if Trump remains as lukewarm as he is at the moment and has these outrageous demands for 500 billion dollars

a value of $5 billion in minerals to get paid for a war effort, which was actually $119 billion U.S. dollars as far as this was concerned. So Ukraine will, of course, be open to aid and reconstruction support from any other country. That includes China, but also, I would say, the Europeans.

Great, great, great. Just getting back to this Trump apparent effort to pull a reverse Nixon in which he somehow warms ties with Russia in an attempt to counter China. I completely agree with you. This is fast forward. But I think it's worth looking at some of the major differences between now and the very early 1970s and late 1960s.

because there are a lot of people who are still clinking to this idea for whatever reason. We, let's remember the Sino-Soviet split had been, you know, active for over a decade by that point. Uh, there, there was, uh,

fighting actually on Damansky or Jumbo Island along the border between Russia and China. You know, China was building massive underground cities against the likelihood of a Soviet attack. None of this is analogous to today.

It's just a fantasy on the part of some people. It's a terrible application of this so-called strategic triangle thinking. But about sidelines, Klaus,

I completely agree. I think that Europe has every reason to be very unhappy about being sidelined. China certainly has much less reason to. And I mean, one very smart commentator who I really like, Evan Feigenbaum, he's a former U.S. diplomat, deep experience in Russia, China, Central Asia, South Asia.

He wrote on Twitter, I think this is great, China has no reason to get deeply into this. They can sit back watching the U.S. introduce friction to its alliances, chase the fantasy of a Moscow-Beijing split by courting Putin, blow up tools of U.S. power like foreign assistance while modestly improving ties in Asia and Europe.

So let's talk about this modest improvement of ties in Asia and Europe. That seems to be a gift that has followed into Beijing's lap.

Beijing has obviously long cherished this idea of genuine European strategic autonomy. Now it seems like without lifting a finger, it may enjoy this. So I want to ask all of you to weigh in on this. What is the likelihood right now that we will see

markedly warmer ties between the EU and China now that the United States has really brought into question this long-standing transatlantic alliance. Let me just say something about Nixon, the parallel with Nixon. I think this parallel is, of course, kind of comes to mind immediately.

But we had a strategic thinker in the White House, despite Watergate and all other nasty, you know, nasty personality traits Nixon undoubtedly had. And despite the Vietnam War, other very cruel things he did, he was a strategic geopolitical thinker. And he did not embark on that policy towards China and the Soviet Union suddenly out of the blue. He thought about it for years. He had this article in Foreign Affairs. Right. Back in 1967.

And then he implemented it two or three years later and he also had very good lieutenants like Henry Kissinger and others who clearly helped him a lot doing so. When you now look to the Trump team,

then you know that Trump makes decisions on the hoof. There is no sitting down and thinking strategically, carefully about things. And also his lieutenants, Rubio, Waltz, they still have to prove their mettle. I have no idea whether they really have any geopolitical sense and strategic thinking. Maybe, but right now it would be too early to say. So I think that parallel comes to mind, but I don't think we should take it too seriously.

seriously. Regarding, and then I shut up, regarding Europe, better relations with Europe, for years that has been, as you know, that has been the Chinese ambition to bring the Europeans closer to itself and away from the United States. Whenever a Chinese journalist interviews me, then the last final question always is, when are the Europeans leaving the U.S.?

joining us. And that is a totally fanciful thinking. But that the link with the United States is now loosening and that it is intensifying with China almost as a cavalry

without really that they need to do anything, because they need to trade with some partner. If Trump puts on tariffs on European cars and steel and aluminum, they still have to export. So where are the Germans going to go to? They're not going to Bangladesh or other small countries. They will go to them as well, but they are not a substitute. The only real substitute to China would be India, and India is not exportable.

as much developed and has much needs for German product as China. So they have no other way to go. That started already under the Biden administration with the infrastructure law, and it is now continuing under Trump at an exaggerated pace. So yes, we will see closer European-Chinese relations, but we will not see a true alliance as we had previously.

or have, who knows, within the NATO countries. You know, that was a true and still is hopefully a true alliance. We will not see a similar development regarding Europe and China, perhaps with the exception of Viktor Orban in Hungary and some other outliers, but not the majority of countries in the EU.

Una, let me go back to you now and ask you to comment on some of these same things, especially on this question of whether European and Chinese relations stand a chance of warming now that, as Klaus describes, the bond is loosened between... I would go beyond loosened. I think that it's been sort of, you know, the rail lines have been blown up, but...

What's your sense of this? I mean, obviously those of... I mean, I wasn't at Munich, but my colleagues who went say that Wang Lin's speech was like the grown-up in the room, whereas, of course, J.D. Vance was something that was absolutely ridiculous and scandalous, and apparently there wasn't much boss at all. But I still want to say that there are several points where...

the vision and I want to bring this back to Ukraine right because we are approaching that that a date of of um of of three years that mark of three years after Russia's full-scale invasion and I want to say that um even the um oh I'm sorry my family's coming back so I gotta turn up turn my uh uh my background or rather blur my background uh this is uh for you uh so let

let me quote, um, um, an article that came out, uh, by a, uh, Chinese social academy of social sciences, European journal, uh, just now. Um, and, and, um,

Even the CAS authors agree that there are different readings in Europe and China. And the three points that they bring out is the first point is that the EU closely aligns with the US, engages in conflicts through alliances. I mean, yes, maybe the US bit can shake a little bit, but still the alliance approach, right? That's something we're criticized for. The second approach is that

And this is something we cannot agree with, is that the EU overlooks NATO's impact on Russia and Russian fears and Russian anxieties and the deep-rooted tensions of Russia and Ukraine. Again, something that we cannot agree with. And the third is on conflict resolution. And this is especially hard for Europeans to agree with because we just simply don't see it that way, is that the fact that the EU...

was providing Ukraine with advanced weapons and had introduced sanctions across Russia, sorry, against Russia, in fact, prolonged the war, something that we completely disagree with. And I think especially the third point on EU prolonging the conflict is a major challenge for China as a peace force for Europe, but also as a partner for Europe today.

There are these differences. But having said that, we have to go back to Ursula von der Leyen's recent speech, where, according to some murmurs that we saw online, initially the speech was supposed to be quite tough on China, but the text came out being sort of

stating that this year marks the 50th anniversary of China-Eurasians and we should deepen the relations and exchanges. So that tells you that obviously in a situation like this, the EU is looking, is perhaps rereading its own de-risking policy on China. So interesting times to come. Indeed, indeed.

I want to turn to Dimitro. Dimitro, there are competing visions for peace. China issued this position paper, very short on detail, but backed by countries like Turkey, like Brazil especially, while the Trump administration seems to be advancing a plan that on its surface doesn't look that bad.

different from what I can see. Trump seems to be more explicit about freezing the conflict and expecting explicit territorial concessions by Ukraine. How do you assess the difference between these two proposals? And maybe is there even a realistic chance that China might maybe play a constructive role in this peace process?

Maybe in this process it's maybe too late for China to jump in, but maybe China can take some part or contribute somehow into post-war reconstruction. This is a matter to think about. So what can I say is that Ukrainian public opinion is...

largely skeptical against China. So China is considered as pro-Russian only, and that's why there is no real trust for Russia. But the position of countries' leadership, I mean Ukrainian leadership, seems to be more pragmatic and

there are some subtle indications, unofficial statements, that they suggest that Ukrainian authorities view China as a potential participant in the reconstruction. So there are some practical considerations to invite China to be a part of these post-war movements.

The scale of destruction, first of all, demands some substantial external funding and maybe also expertise. And China remains one of few global players which can provide such technical and maybe somehow financial capabilities to

to support large-scale reconstruction. So if we look at China and their participation in post-war reconstruction in other regions like Afghanistan or maybe Syria, Beijing has always prioritized infrastructure-driven reconstruction. And it was its means to develop economic ties with China

that particular territory or country, and in the same time to preserve some political neutral posture. So rather than emphasizing some humanitarian aid or maybe social development needs, China tends generally to

focus on hard infrastructure, ports, roads, energy facilities, industrial hubs. So those sectors that align with its broader economic interests. And in Ukraine, China is likely to apply some kind of this approach.

as Ukraine has an image of a major grain exporter. So, Beijing would be particularly interested in revitalizing ports and logistical corridors that are essential for agrarian trade. Additionally, China may explore opportunities in the energy and water supply sectors, where reconstruction efforts will require extensive investment.

Such project would not only reinforce China economic engagement with Ukraine, but perhaps also serve Beijing long-term interests to secure stable access to food exports. However, despite its interest in reconstruction, China

maybe is unlikely to commit large amounts of direct funding from its own resources. Instead, Chinese companies will seek some opportunities to compete for contracts, which will be financed by European nations, by international organizations and maybe some Ukraine's non-Western partners.

And here is also an important point, how Russia will view all this Chinese participation in Ukrainian reconstruction. So I think that...

Moscow may view it as a significant, that this significant Chinese engagement will be a challenge to Moscow's own influence in post-war Ukraine, particularly if Chinese companies establish some lasting economic presence in Ukraine. However, China is unlikely to be overly concerned with Russian objections. Yes, but

Beijing values its strategic partnership with Moscow, but it ultimately prioritizes its own economic and geopolitical interests.

So if participating in Ukraine reconstruction offers for Beijing some tangible benefits, it will proceed for sure, despite even Russian discomfort. So maybe that is all I would like to say. Maybe also that China will likely

tread carefully avoiding projects that could be perceived as overtly political or directly strengthening Ukraine's military and defense capabilities. But instead, for sure, it will focus on economic infrastructure where its involvement can be framed as neutral or commercially driven, let's say. Thank you so much. That's excellent and I think very spot-on analysis.

Dr. Liu Qiang, you would be in a very good position to understand how Chinese firms are looking at this opportunity.

if indeed they are, how they are probably intending to or gearing up to participate in Ukrainian reconstruction. Would it be infrastructure-led, as Dmytro has suggested? Will the focus be on agrarian infrastructure, on rails and ports, especially for grain export? I'll

What are you hearing right now among the firms that you talk to who are our Belt and Road participants? How are they looking at this opportunity? Thank you. Yes, this is the biggest advantage of vendors' companies. For BRI is...

really a connection between infrastructure connections and energy pipelines and the commodity exchange. So if

the war can come to an end, there will be big opportunities for Chinese companies if the Ukrainian government let Chinese companies join. But you know, there must be many, many competitors to get this cake, a very big cake.

I think maybe American companies, Japanese companies, South Korean companies, European companies, they must complete this speed tech. But I think Chinese companies, they have maybe a strong advantage to do this business. Even before the war, the Chinese had many investments in the Ukraine.

I think many projects have been destroyed by Russian bombardments or their military actions. But after the war, if opportunities come, they can recover these projects. And we have a big demand for Ukraine's deterrent and minerals.

and maybe some other products, this will be a big opportunity for China. I hope this wall can come to an end very quickly so we can do the reconstruction and repair the BRI corridors. No, no. The wall destroys the corridors. The BRI has six corridors.

but the wall destroyed two of the six. So even the railway between China and Europe, this project might be a problem recently. I heard the news that Russia even blocked this railway project. Carlos was

still a distant in russian territory they have many issues to stop the transportation so uh if the world can stop we i think this is it will be good news for chinese bi but i i also understand there are many negative uh

things about BRI. They think these BRI projects maybe have negative impacts to European countries and maybe are not a good thing to the world order. Maybe they think maybe have big have the worst impact

if you influence to the whole world trade. But I think it will help maybe the Central Asia, the South Asia and the African countries.

So I still believe that BRI is good for this world. Yeah, for facilitating grain transportation out of Ukrainian grain ports to the developing world. I think that's something that we haven't talked about and we should.

I want to turn to Dr. Laris, to Klaus. Germany, as you know, has historically sought to keep its economic ties with China in balance with its security commitments to NATO. Given your deep knowledge of both German foreign policy and China,

And given the tone of conversation on the sidelines of Munich between Wang Yi and Olaf Scholz, where he, Scholz, was thanked profusely and tacitly for voting against EV tariffs, for example, for Germany voting against EV tariffs. Do you think that Berlin is shifting toward...

a less skeptical stance on China? Do you think that economic comparison, I'm talking not just about the EU in general, but Berlin specifically, do you think that, how do you think it's going to strike this balance going forward?

We have had some conflict within the Scholz government throughout its duration for the last three years, where the Green Party, an important coalition partner, was much harsher on China than, let's say, Scholz's party, the SPD, was. The fair block seems to be falling in line too now, though. A little bit now, but I think throughout the life of the government, we had that kind of division. Scholz also went on that division

state visit, working visit it really was to China with a large delegation of German businessmen and he really tries to focus on business and the German economy is not in good shape at the moment. We are facing a third year of recession. So exporting and investment relations with China become of course very important even more so than they were before.

Now we will have a change of government. In all likelihood, Friedrich Merz of the CDU will be the new chancellor. We don't know in which coalition, with the SPD or with the Greens or with both of them. But I would say that, and the chancellor is always more important than the leader of the

junior coalition partner and Friedrich Merz is a businessman in his past life he is understands the dilemma of German the German economy and the German finances at the moment so he will also be open to business with China but I think he's more ideological more pro-western orientated in a

in an anti-China way. So I think the ideological differences, the political differences we will actually see emphasized while the economic relations they tried to improve. That is the old dilemma which German foreign policy has faced towards China really for the last decade or two and I think that dilemma essentially will continue. We will see of course as we said before if there is a

a loosening, a cooling of relations with the Trump White House that will lead to warmer relations with China, both for political reasons, but also for very needed economic reasons. What we said before about the reconstruction of Ukraine,

In a way, I can't see that China will play that much of a role because Trump has of course one advantage that he knows where the money is. He knows or he thinks in economic terms. And the US, as he claims, having committed over 300 billion, in fact, 119 billion to aid for Ukraine, the Europeans altogether, including the UK, round about 150, 160 billion. This is still a lot of money.

And will they not want to have something in return? Will that not be participation and major participation or exclusive participation in the reconstruction of Ukraine? And the Ukrainians themselves, as we all said before, have that uneasy feeling that,

Excuse me, that China of course supported Russia at least indirectly, if not a little bit more directly in the war effort. How will that help China to land generous reconstruction offers? Of course, in some areas they may not have a choice. They may depend...

be dependent on Chinese companies. You know, we will see some role for China, but I would be very surprised if the Chinese are being given a major role in the reconstruction of Ukraine and European and American companies will not protest loudly and will have success with their politicians. They can protest as loud as they want, but do they have something to bring to the table? Do they have the capacity? I seriously doubt that...

I'm not so sure. For example, look at the German economy, which is downtrodden at the moment. So there's lots of spare capacity for German construction companies to actually employ their workers. And German construction companies have a good reputation. They are pretty capable, I would say. The same applies, I think, to American construction companies. Their books, their order books are much fuller than the German ones.

but they will want the major piece of reconstruction. And I think there's a political reason to that, what I said, that China actually supported Russia, at least indirectly. Whether that will, in the end, totally exclude China, I doubt it, but I can't see that the Chinese will have a really major piece of reconstruction coming their way. And the Ukrainians, I think, would be strange if they neglected the people who

who they got money from and very hard-nosed aid from in favor of people who really were at best lukewarm about Ukraine. Well, let's turn to our Ukrainian panelist, to Dmitry. Why don't you weigh in here? What do you think for the likelihood of Chinese participation in a meaningful way in reconstruction?

For sure, I can agree that there will be objections from American and European entrepreneurs if Chinese would jump in these reconstruction efforts. And I suppose that Ukraine should coordinate somehow its political engagement with China, with overall European politics of de-risking or decriminalizing.

to that new politics from the European side, which will come in the nearest future, as we discussed. But I would also like to mention that, expectedly,

open and transparent rules to participate in the competition for contracts will be introduced. Like European style, everyone can join. And Chinese probably will overcompete Americans and Europeans, not because of political reasons, but because they will offer cheaper price, as they usually do. And this is the challenge. Can I ask you a question? Do you think Trump will tolerate that transparent contract? You

We all are aware of that 500 million offer for Ukrainian minerals. That has nothing to do with transparency. That is, you know, the exact extortion. I think it will be so micro, micro, micro level that it would not be Trump's business to engage in every particular case where Chinese will try to get contracts. Yeah.

Listen, I have a question from the audience. Michael Backfisch from Germany's Funke Media Group. He asks, could you imagine the deployment of Chinese peace troops, peacekeeping troops, he means, to Ukraine to secure a future ceasefire? Will China take an increased role in the conflict due to the new alignment between Trump and

Putin. But let's focus on the first half of that question, because we've really addressed the second already. But yeah, you know, China for many years was the leading contributor of UN peacekeeping troops. I'm not sure whether today it still holds that title. Do you think that there's a possibility that Russia, for example, would accept troops from China, maybe preferentially over the British troops that Keir Starmer has offered and so forth?

May I start? Yes, please. Okay. I think that to invite Chinese troops, it would be not an option for Ukraine because there is not enough trust.

between Ukrainian leadership and Chinese leadership. So still China is perceived as a part of this anti-Western coalition and perhaps when these troops can be installed in Ukraine and

and some accident will happen, Chinese will do nothing to somehow protect Ukraine or fulfill their obligations of stabilizing the situation and defending peace. That's why perhaps Ukrainian leadership will prefer some troops from other Asian countries. For example, from Central Asia or maybe Western Asian countries, something like that.

that. Yeah, okay. I'll let you jump in, Una, please. Oh, sure. No, I just wanted to say that our colleagues at South China Morning Post at some point during the Munich conference called Dr. Zhou Bo, who is a senior fellow at Xinhua, and printed his quote, which said,

that China does have sufficient troops and military strength to contribute to a post-war effort. However, quote, if peacekeeping operations are conducted along with European countries, Russia might see it as another form of NATO presence. So I think this comment, again, not an official comment, obviously, but it kind of shows the red lines here that just to add to Dmitry's very insightful and informative comment also appear when we talk about China's situation.

Yeah, yeah, I think I saw that quote as well and I was very struck by that. Would Trump be able to tolerate that? I'm sorry. Please? Would Trump be able to tolerate having Chinese troops introduced into Europe? He's going to sell that to his Republican Party and the China hawks in the Republican Party? I can't see it. Right. Not sure that he'll have that much of a say in it, but...

I have another question. It's a little bit off topic, but from Pratyush Sharma asks, does Putin believe in expansionist foreign military policy in Europe, or are they more into Russian Empire-style expansion in Europe? That's a little bit off topic. I'm going to skip that one for now. I think that's...

The other question, though, I think from Suzanne Martin-Finis, which is, I think, really interesting, is what will be the role of Turkey, both with regard to the reconstruction of Ukraine and the development of transport corridors in the near or distant future? So we're getting away from China here, but it's a good question. What about the role of Turkey? Anyone have a thought on that? Dimitra, do you want to jump in on that?

I can say that Erdoğan and Volodymyr Zelenskyy have really trustful relations, at least

who understand that Turkey is playing some balancing game, but still there is a high level of cooperation and communication between leaders. And that means that potentially Turkey can be invited as a reconstructor to Ukraine and perhaps also as a participant of some peace mission with troops installed. But I'm not really ready to say if Russia is

interested in this in that scenario but at least it is a point to talk about well very good I mean I think today's conversation has really underscored the the massive complexities of Global power transitions uh China's multifaceted though quite limited role within within these in in the context of the resolution of Ukraine uh as we navigate what is becoming an increasingly turbulent world I think it's important that we try to understand these Dynamics and you know uh

Let me just add a personal anecdote. I was originally going to deliver a talk yesterday about China's role in in the Ukraine war all along and many of the topics that we've talked about today I had written that talk mistakenly two weeks ago and had to completely throw the thing out now and to rewrite it now and

Now that I've rewritten it, I am quite sure that when next week, because we had a gigantic snowstorm here at UNC and I wasn't unable to give the talk, when I give it next Friday, I anticipate I'll have to rewrite it again before that because events are just changing so very quickly. So I think hopefully the remarks that we've made today will endure for a little bit long, long enough for me to put this podcast out at least.

But I want to thank you all very, very warmly. Una, thank you so much for your brilliant insights. Dimitri, thank you so much. Thank you so much for joining and bringing that perspective from China, from the energy world, and from BRI. Thank you so much, Klaus. Looking forward to seeing you again back here. And most of all, thank you to Vida for once again convening such a great panel. Vida, thank you. You've been such a great friend and a

have done so much to advance understanding here in our community about this terrible conflict, which is, as we know, about to enter its fourth year. Well, that concludes our session. Thank you all. And thank you. Thank you, Kaiser. Thank you. Thank you. Bye-bye. Thank you.