Qatar's Double Game | Barak Herscowitz on Netanyahu’s Political Strategy
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It was the second Intifada 2000, 2001, 2003. And for three years there were bombings, there were suicide bombs on buses and restaurants and stabbings on the street and lynches in Ramallah. And it was on a daily, almost on a daily basis. And, you know, I remember that in my high school,

parents would send their children on separate buses to school so in case that one explodes they want to lose both of their children. Hello and welcome to State of a Nation with me, Elon Libby. My guest today is Barak Hershkovitz, former head of communications for the Israeli government during COVID, the so-called TikTok whistleblower whose exposés reveal the extent of anti-Israel and anti-Semitic bias inside TikTok. Today we're going to do something a little bit different. We're going to be unpacking Spin. We

We want to look at statements made by world leaders, international officials, ways that they're trying to put a spin on their policies, their messages for international and domestic audiences. And we're going to try to unpack between the lines, behind the headlines, what exactly they're talking about, what they really mean, and do a little bit of fact-checking as well to see how they're trying to manipulate us.

And I can think of no one better to help us unpack how they're trying to manipulate us than someone who is at the apex of Israeli government comms. Barak Khashoggi, welcome to the podcast. Thanks for having me. Head of Communications for the Israeli government. What does that mean? Give us a quick introduction. Well, it was COVID. So back then, this was the main issue that I dealt with. So I was in charge of communicating the government's policies, the government's restrictions to the public, and also the best knowledge that we had back then about the

vaccination, everything COVID-related. During the Bennett government? Yeah, it was under Bennett. The first Bennett government, depending on when you're watching this podcast and if he wins the next election. Yeah, well, you know, things can surprise us in Israel, so who knows? But it was a very, very interesting experience. Back then, we already recognized malicious networks of information

disinformation coming from abroad, trying to manipulate the Israeli public. And also we wanted to be as transparent and open with the public as possible. And it was a very interesting experience. I want to look with you at several topics today, things that have been happening in the news in the last week. And first, I want to start with the extraordinary turnaround that has happened with regards to the Israeli government's messaging about Qatar.

Now, listeners of this podcast know we're not big fans of the Qatari state. We remind people all the time that Qatar condemned Israel on October 7th for the October 7th massacre as it was still ongoing, put out a statement before the bodies were buried saying that Israel was solely responsible for the ongoing escalation. And to us, it's obvious as well that

Qatar told Hamas to keep the hostages. The prime minister of Qatar said in an interview to the Israeli media that they've been pressing for this deal since the beginning of the war, which means that right on October 8th, they wanted Israel to release thousands of convicted terrorists and not fight against Hamas, leaving it in power to have a victory. Qatar is not our friend.

And I think the Israeli government understood that at the beginning of the war, because I remember during Netanyahu's, I think it was his first speech to the Knesset on October 12th. He said this, Hamas is ISIS and the world that was outraged by ISIS and Al-Qaeda after 9-11 formed an international coalition to eliminate this blight.

Nobody said, let's meet with the representatives of ISIS or Al-Qaeda. Nobody said, let's give them an office in our country. Therefore, I say today, there is no such office. And if there are countries that maintain their presence, get rid of them, vomit them out of the countries of the world, vomit them out. Whoever does not do this, sanction them. And I think that was a very clear message against Qatar, against Turkey, against Russia, perhaps.

But that very quickly changed when the Israeli government realized that Qatar might hold the keys to getting the hostages out. They started treating Qatar as one of the mediators of a hostage deal. And then suddenly this happened just a few days ago. On May 3rd, the prime minister's office tweets.

Israel is fighting a just war with just means. After the October 7th atrocities, Prime Minister Netanyahu defined the War of Redemption – we'll get onto the name of the war in a little bit – as a war between civilisation and barbarism.

The time has come for Qatar to stop playing both sides with its double talk and decide if it's on the side of civilization or if it's on the side of Hamas barbarism. Israel will win this just war with just means. What happened? Well, if I'm not mistaken, this was a reaction to Qatar's reaction against Israel and some very heavy accusations against Israel by Qatar. I think...

To be honest, I'm not quite sure that there is a major change in the Israeli policy regarding to Qatar or the way they communicate their policy regarding... For a year and a half, Israel didn't publicly attack Qatar at all. Right. And just...

And it's interesting to see that most of these attacks now are only in English. I think it was only in English. I haven't seen anything officially in Hebrew because Netanyahu... Let's talk about the internal angle for a second and then shift back to the international angle. Internally, Netanyahu understands that this is a time of elections right now. Elections...

I assume that it will take place within a few months. Really? Yeah. Wait, hang on. Or maybe less than a year. No, because by law, elections have to take place until next November. And I thought that orthodoxy is, come on, this government is getting pummeled in the polls. It has no interest in bringing elections up before potentially November.

a knockout blow against Iran before any sort of normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia, before there is any sense of victory in Gaza. But you think elections are coming up soon? It's true, but there is...

It's not only for this government. Usually, about a year before elections, things start to shake in the coalition. So everyone wants to come to the next elections with showing that they fought for their electorate and they didn't compromise on crucial issues.

And we see that this coalition is facing very hard times right now with something that are very crucial for its members. For example, the ultra-Orthodox who are very much interested in a new law regarding to draft to the army.

And it's not going to pass. It can't pass. The law that the ultra-Orthodox parties demand cannot pass in this government. What exactly are they looking for? They are looking for a final and complete exempt for Haredim from joining the army. While the army is saying we need 10,000 men now. And while...

Half of the country is being drafted from, you know, people are losing their jobs. Their businesses, their studies. It's not even civilians getting called up for reserves. It's soldiers who are meant to end their mandatory service getting told, nope, this is just spilling straight into reserve duty after reserve duty. Right, and it's endless, endless reserves for hundreds of days. So this law, this bill cannot pass. And it's very hard for the Haredim to stay in this coalition for a long time.

So it begins to, I think, there is a snowball that started to roll and there is a deadline. In March, before March or March at the most, there is supposed to, the new deadline,

budget bill should pass otherwise the government falls automatically and usually people try to the politicians try to to do it beforehand so they don't want to reach this deadline because they want to show that they were the ones who

went against their interest and dismantled the government for good reasons. So it's clear for everyone, or at least that's how it seems from their actions, that we're in election year, we're in election time. And for Netanyahu...

The subject of Qatar in the public discourse is very unpleasant. It's not good for him that Qatar will be in the headlines in Israel. Because of the corruption scandal engulfing his office. Because of both things. The scandal, and I don't know if you remember, one of his ministers, Nir Barakat, was interviewed, I don't know, I don't remember if it was NBC or somewhere in the United States, and he was asked in the beginning of the war why

was your government and your prime minister allowed Qatar over the years to be so much involved in Gaza? How could you allow this thing to happen? And they didn't have good answers. So it's both the scandal and also the fact that for years Netanyahu allowed Qatar to be very much heavily involved in Gaza and in the region. So for Netanyahu, I think Qatar as a subject is something that he doesn't want to

on the public discourse. Okay, because of two things. The first is questions of why Netanyahu allowed the Qataris to finance Hamas attacks.

for all those years. And by the way, I think there is a perfectly reasonable explanation for it, which is when we see how destructive a war in Gaza is now, it's impossible to imagine a preemptive war to bring down Hamas without the casus belli of October 7th and the hostages. And if you're not going to launch a preemptive war to bring down Hamas, you need to find some way to live next to this jihadi regime on your doorstep without it blowing up. And Netanyahu thought...

naively, I guess, that Hamas were evil scumbags who could be bought off if you give them enough money. It was a horrible miscalculation. It's not only him, by the way. No, it was the whole security apparatus. Yes, but things have changed, right? And sentiment have shifted. Sorry, and the second thing for those who aren't following the news about Qatar, the allegations that two of Netanyahu's closest advisors received money from

From Qatar for some consultancy project while they were working for the prime minister's office. At least one of them while he was working for the prime minister. So that's why I don't think he shifted much the... He's trying to navigate in between, you know, on the one hand to try not to discuss Qatar publicly too much. But on the other hand, there are real problems with Qatar that attacks Israel...

openly, publicly, heavily nowadays. So I think he's basically trying to navigate in between. And we've seen that the statements were only in English and it's not occurring since. So I don't know. It's too early to say that something has shifted. What happened? No, look, something clearly shifted, okay? Because from Netanyahu saying at the beginning of the war...

countries like Qatar should be sanctioned, to Tzahi Hanegbi, the national security advisor, saying, you know, Qatar is a mediator, we respect their good offices, to now saying something like, Qatar has to choose if it's on the side of barbarism. I mean, this is extraordinary, this statement from Netanyahu. The statement he said that the time has come for Qatar to stop playing both sides. I mean, that is Israel admitting, we've been played.

Oh, yeah. We've been played by Qatar. I'm sure that everyone knew that we've been played all this time and it was a play that was comfortable for everyone. But I mean, this is another message. You know, 4th of May, he's meeting President Christo Doulides of Cyprus. And he says, we're pressing Hamas to do... We're asking others to press not only Hamas, but Qatar that has overwhelming influence over Hamas. Now...

I've been trying to push the line for the last year that the way to put pressure to get the hostages out is to pressure Hamas's state sponsors, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, maybe you can add Egypt in there as well. And I was frustrated that the Israeli government wasn't demanding pressure on the sponsors.

But it's happening now. So what has shifted in that message that suddenly we're taking a hostile or an antagonistic approach to Qatar that we weren't, we, Israel, wasn't before? Two things have shifted. One, Qatar has become much more vocal against Israel. So it's a major factor. And the second, I think, I assume that...

Egypt is trying to play a more significant role in returning the hostages and bring stability to the area. And Israel feels that it's more comfortable working with the Egyptians. But I will, you know, when Netanyahu wants or this government, when it wants to shift public opinion globally or, you

when they want to have something on the public agenda, they know how to do it. Remember the big press conference when the Iranian nuclear...

The Iranian nuclear archives. Archives came to Israel. Yes, we had David Keyes on this podcast. If you missed the episode, go watch it. He talks about how they came up with the idea for the PowerPoint where it just said Iran lied. So they know, Netanyahu knows how to shift public opinion in the world, or at least he knows how to play the... He has the methods, okay? So when I see him...

enough about it, I will say that something has dramatically shifted or changed. Right now, it feels to me like it's a reaction to what Qatar changes in Qatar's policy and

while trying not to discuss these issues in Hebrew too much. And I think it's very early to establish that it's a significant shift in the policy of the Israeli government. Okay, let me pick your brains. If you were advising the Israeli government and the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister says...

We're at a dead end when it comes to releasing the hostages. The military pressure hasn't succeeded in forcing Hamas to release the hostages, and the hostage families are right. There is a very real threat that it endangers the hostages. We want to try to put pressure on Hamas's state sponsors, on Qatar, on Turkey, on Iran, to the extent it's possible to put more pressure on Iran, perhaps on Egypt.

How do we go about this? How do we launch a public information campaign to try to mobilize foreign governments to use their diplomatic leverage over Qatar, right? What I like to tell the British, no hostages, no harrods, right? But maybe Qatar has so much economic power in these countries that it's a lost cause. I don't know. You know, I think we've made a mistake in the beginning of the war. I think Qatar was supposed to be or should have been our main target of arrows against. I think that...

the Israeli government should have conferences and events outside of Qatari offices in the world and Al Jazeera offices, and we should have been more vocal against Qatar because in the end, we need to remember that for a very good part of the war, there were American, British, European hostages involved

There were hostages inside the tunnels that were founded by Qatar. And this is something that we should have played much, much earlier in this war. I think now it's a bit too late because the sentiment in the world towards the Israeli side and the hostages

Right, you've got these cross-cutting trends that sentiment has changed against Israel in the world, but sentiment against Qatar has changed in Israel. And the unusual thing is...

It took that internal scandal implicating Netanyahu's office for the Israeli media to stop referring to Qatar as a mediator, as if it was a neutral party. They really they treated it with kid gloves and to start treating about to start talking about Qatar as a problematic country. And then when someone called Qatar an enemy state and Netanyahu said, no, no, it's a complicated country, they ridiculed it as if for a year.

the Israeli media hadn't been treating Qatar as a legitimate actor until there was an excuse to bash Netanyahu's office. It's true. It's funny. You know, I think Netanyahu is in a problem right now because on the one hand, he should and he needs to attack Qatar more firmly. I think it might yield more results on the hostages' end.

if he does it. But on the other hand, in Israel, inside Israel, it's politically problematic. Right, because the more he attacks Qatar, the more then questions are asked about his own involvement with Qatar. So I think that's what you see right now. He tries to attack Qatar, but only in English. And it's interesting. Also, you know, I think that the sentiment towards Qatar in the United States and in Europe is,

is, generally speaking, is negative. I don't think people see Qatar as a positive country. Well, they do if they're getting money from it. Well, I mean, obviously the people who get money from it, but it's not a beloved country. But on the other hand, they don't see it as a threat to their lifestyle, to the West, to the Western world, to America. And it would be very, very hard to convince people that it's a real threat on their lives. Right, and I guess for Israel, that puts it in a dilemma because if you launch a massive campaign

Qatar's name and Qatar does have influence over Hamas and is telling it not to release the hostages, you're potentially complicating getting the hostages out. I think that once there is a... Qatar also is very vulnerable to external attacks because its reputation is very important for the Qatar government. And that's all it has. I mean, let's remember, Qatar has...

you know, thanks to a historical fluke of where dinosaurs died. Right. Thanks to that fluke of where dinosaurs died and gave it oil and gas, Qatar is this tiny country that Saudi Arabia, Iran could drive over in half an hour. And therefore, the only thing they have going for them is keeping a good reputation and buying influence in the West. Right. So I think if we did attack their...

I think it would be very, very effective. It's very important for them. But we haven't done this. And I'm not sure if it's too late by now, but it's definitely something that I would have recommended. And I did recommend, by the way, back then to the hostage family forum, I told them that I think that they should have moved the...

the hostage square here in Tel Aviv, the main spot for protesting. I thought they should have built it in front of Al Jazeera offices across the world. Well, they needed a base in Tel Aviv. No, of course. Obviously, they need a base in Tel Aviv, and it's perfectly fine that they do it here. But they should have been protesting against Qatari embassies. Yeah, and I think it would have been... Yeah, it's happened here and there.

It was very marginal and I think it wasn't loud enough. And I think in the end, Qatar is very vulnerable and we should have attacked this vulnerability much earlier.

Hostages. Let's change subject. Let's talk about the resumption of the war. Israel announced this week that it is going all in into Gaza, essentially giving Hamas an ultimatum. Until after President Trump visits the region, if by then they haven't accepted what they're calling the Witkoff framework, which will allow Hamas to by time extend a ceasefire by releasing hostages, then Israel is going all in.

all in to conquer the Gaza Strip all the way and it won't stop unless all the hostages are coming out. They're going in for the full conquest of the Gaza Strip. I want to get your thoughts on how the Israeli government has communicated that to the Israeli people and internationally as well, specifically because there is an unpalatable set of trade-offs here.

And I find myself in my role as sort of this informal spokesperson giving interviews trapped in this horrible dilemma. My job is not to defend government policy. I don't have to stand up and say, this is the best decision. I need to communicate the complexities. The complexity is Hamas is demanding a ransom. That ransom is the release of thousands of terrorists and international security guarantees that it will be allowed to rearm and prepare for the next October 7th.

This government has decided we can't afford that ransom. And there is a lively debate inside Israel about what ransom we can afford. And it's horrific that we're even having a discussion about what price we should pay for the hostages' freedom, but it's Hamas that decided that there should be a price because they're literally trafficking the hostages for a ransom.

And the tragedy is, I think everyone's right. I think the hostage family forum is right when they say that the resumption of the war endangers the hostages, puts their lives in danger. I think Enaf Tsangauka is right when she says there is a real risk that Hamas will put a bullet through Hassan Matan's head, just like they executed what the families are calling the Beautiful Six, Hirsch Goldberg-Pohl and the other five hostages back in September.

But it is also possible that the other side is right, that perhaps the only pressure we have, the only leverage we have over Hamas, with the exception of humanitarian aid, and we'll get onto that in a little bit, is military pressure. Because Hamas accepted the first ceasefire because they were getting clobbered and they wanted to come up for a breather. And this is the only leverage that Israel has other than simply capitulating and paying the ransom that Israel is demanding. And you have this bizarre...

clash now between Netanyahu saying on Independence Day, the most important hostages are important, but the most important thing is victory against Hamas. The army saying actually, no, the most important thing is the hostages. It's not clear if the left hand is talking to the right hand, what the strategic priority is. The impression that comes to the Israeli public is not clear. So I'm wondering how you understand those dilemmas and how you would try to communicate them internationally and to the public as well, because

The best thing we had going for us at the beginning of the war was national unity, consensus around the goals of the war. And that's fraying now. And that makes it much more difficult to fight a war on the battlefield than on the airwaves. I think you explained the dilemma very well. I would try to explain the political side of that before we discuss the international side of that.

I think that Netanyahu understood... Before the war, we saw in polls that about 6 to 10 mandates, more or less, meaning 5 or 10% of the voters, shifted from voting for Netanyahu and his coalition to the other side. The other side is not the left? Well, it's left and right wing, and it's different...

It's different parties with different agendas, but it's very clear that there are two camps or two sides for the Israeli politics, and it's around Netanyahu, yes or no. But this coalition lost before the war about a tenth of its power and became, in the polls, it became a minority.

And it's something that is very consistent up to this day. It didn't change much. But the current government has completely permanently, not permanently, but the current government has consistently lost its majority by a very large margin in the polls. But we see minor, minor, minor changes of people who moved back voting to Netanyahu or his coalition. Yes.

And from what I saw in many studies and polls, the people who stayed with Netanyahu or shifted back to Netanyahu, the few people who shifted back, the only reason they shifted back was they said, you know, I'm not supportive of Netanyahu that much. I don't like his style anymore. I'm not quite sure if he's the right person to lead the nation in the future anymore.

But he is very stubborn on the fact that he wouldn't allow Hamas to stay in power. And that's something that they very, very much appreciate right now. Especially, I think, after the men hostages returned a few months ago and Israelis saw...

how they returned, they were very, very skinny and they looked horrible. People were using the word Holocaust. They said they looked like Holocaust survivors hobbling out of Auschwitz. Yeah, I would try to be gentle. Yeah, but that is the language people were using. You see them skinny and they look like they just hobbled out of Buchenwald. Yeah, and then I think it was a shock to many Israelis, even though, you know, obviously everyone remembered what happened on October 7th, but then

time have passed and we went back to our lives and then all of a sudden you see these people coming back from the Holocaust.

And I think back then, many people decided that we can't live with Hamas anymore. It's something that we cannot allow in any sense. I think some people are very appreciative towards Netanyahu that he's very stubborn on this particular issue. So I think politically, he understood that his competitive advantage is that he is being firm enough with this specific goal of the war.

And that's why I think from that point, you could have seen that not only him personally, but the Likud party changed their discourse, their emphasis and what they put their emphasis on. On being tough on Hamas. Being tough on Hamas. Which is this weird trap because it was the return of...

of hostages looking emaciated that strengthen the message we have to thump Hamas, even if thumping Hamas then means not paying the ransom Hamas is demanding to get hostages out. But you need to understand that many of the Israeli voters started to think, you know, maybe the only way to bring more hostages back in time before something happens to them is to put more pressure on Hamas, put more military pressure and other pressure. You want to talk about the

humanitarian aid so we will discuss it so I think there is a majority in Israel a very big majority that understands that we can't live with Hamas anymore any longer it's not something we can allow

Including those, because again, I feel like part of my role is to explain the dilemmas, including those who say we should end the war now in order to get the hostages back, they're all saying, okay, but then we should resume the war afterwards to bring down Hamas. And if we have to promise that we won't go back in, then we'll do it all the way and we'll lie because... And it's not realistic to do so in a sense. So that's why I think now that the government drafted back tens of thousands of soldiers, you know,

you didn't see many of these soldiers not coming to the, to the army. They, they, they,

They arrived. And you don't see a huge protest against the war. You see some, but it's not as big as the protests that you've seen before the war about the judicial reform, right? So generally speaking, the public accepts the government's decision to return to war with mightier power, but...

I think what the Israel public demands and asks for, even people on the right hand or the coalition side,

and the government fails to deliver, and it will have to deliver at some point, is the answer to the question, what will change this time? What will we do different this time in order to make sure that it's not just another round, and then we'll have a fifth and sixth and seventh round for seven years from now without dismantling Hamas power? People want to understand what's the strategy here,

not the strategy for sustainable peace. What's the strategy for dismantling the Hamas regime? And it's something the government fails to deliver, and it will have to very, very soon, I think. How would you advise the government to communicate to the public the very dramatic decision to return Orlin to

to the wall. Should it be something they wake up and they hear on the radio that an Israeli official said so-and-so, or are we expecting an address to the nation? Because there are impossible trade-offs here, right? You know, I think the Israeli government, generally speaking, and Netanyahu specifically, they should and can learn a lot from Trump now as a president and before when he ran for office. I think that Trump was...

genuine enough to sit in front of cameras, even in podcasts for three and a half hours. He's welcome on this podcast if he wants. You think there's a chance? I don't know. President Trump, if you're watching at Elon, you have an open invitation. You're coming to the Middle East next week. Might as well come here. It's an amazing studio, by the way. It's the best. It's the best. He's going to love it. The best. I think he he was

it was very clear that he was comfortable enough sitting in podcasts for three and a half hours or now giving interviews to American media even when he doesn't appreciate these media outlets. But he's

He's there. He's giving answers. And these are genuine answers in most times. And I think the Israeli government has good answers to give the public. And obviously, if they will be genuine and open and transparent enough, the dilemmas are very... The public understands the dilemmas. It's not something that the public wouldn't be able to understand and grasp. And I think they should be more open and...

and transparent and just communicate directly with the public, either on television... And it provokes immense anger, right? When, you know, some politicians say the most important thing is crushing the Hamas regime, not bringing back hostages. And some say that, okay, if we have to pick a priority, you have to pick a priority. The hostage families say, you're sacrificing the hostages.

Hey there, I'm Aviva Klompas. The news moves fast, and it's not easy to cut through the noise and understand what really matters. Okay guys, we gotta get off the roof. Sorry to interrupt, we do now have... That's why twice a week I sit down with former Israeli Ambassador to Washington, Dr. Michael Oren, and other leading voices to dig beyond the headlines. It is happening fast. This is not something that's... Let us go back a 30,000 foot moment. Subscribe to Boundless Insights wherever you get your podcasts.

But, you know, I think they have a good answer. The answer is right now the only thing that will bring all of the hostages back, as we can understand, is a deal. And there can't be a deal if we don't pressure Hamas into it. And it's very unfortunate that you don't see the prime minister and the government just communicating this to the public directly, either on television or on podcasts or whatever, on Facebook Live, I don't know, Facebook, TikTok Lives.

They should be more transparent with the public. And I think I remember that in the beginning of the war, the prime minister gave a press conference, press conferences.

And the press in Israel is not on his side, mostly. They're not on his side. But he was... His answer made sense. So he wasn't attacked most of the times in these events. And

And it was very important and very crucial to mobilize the Israeli public with him. And I think he should do it again. And on the international, you understand better than me on the international front, but it's also on the international front because I see right now that the other side is using the silence that comes from Jerusalem to

and tries to build the narrative that Israel is trying to occupy Gaza again, build a

in the heart of Gaza and advance its genocide against the poor Gazans. And I think those stories flourish on the ground of silence from Jerusalem. It's not just silence from Jerusalem. It's statements like that from the finance minister, Bitzel Asmotrich, who said, we're going to occupy the Gaza Strip. We're going to stop being afraid of the word Oman.

By the way, I think it was mistranslated because the Hebrew word Lichbosh means conquer and not just occupy, right? There are different voices inside the Israeli government. And it's okay. It's in every government, I assume. Yeah, but the problem then isn't silence. The problem is, you know, two voices speaking. No, there's only one voice speaking. You only hear the B'Tzal Yisrael Motrich voice. Right. And you don't hear the prime minister or more moderate ministers speaking.

explain the government's policy in a coherent and clear way. And it's very unfortunate, I think. I want to get back to something so people don't say, we've listened all this time and you completely forgot to touch on this. The name of this war

I've been using consistently. No, no. First of all, they originally called it Swords of Iron as if this is a Game of Thrones episode. And I have consistently called it the October 7th war, the October 7th war, because I wanted people to remember how.

How this war started, when it started, why it started, what we're fighting to prevent. And I think that that name has in some circles stuck, the October 7th war. But the prime minister uses in Hebrew, which means war of resurrection. And they've translated into English as the war of redemption.

To me, that sounds really weird. Try to help me understand. It doesn't work for him, though. Netanyahu is the son of a historian. And he is very much occupied in how will he be remembered. He's not occupied. He's disputed. It's true. He's very busy with how he will be remembered from this war and history.

And obviously he can be remembered as the person, as the leader that this war broke in his shift, or he can be remembered as the person who led the Israeli public to redemption or other... Snatched victory from the jaws of defeat. Yes. So he's constantly occupied with this, but I don't think the Israeli public...

adopted his terms, correct me if I'm wrong, and I think this is a failed attempt to change the discourse. Yeah, war of resurrection of his political prospects, perhaps. It doesn't make sense. Even if the war will end, and it has a chance to... Do you think the war will end eventually? No, of course it will end. You know, I remember myself...

I mean, historians are just going to look at all of these wars as different battles in one long Arab-Israeli conflict until, you know... Maybe, but we do have a chance to change things because, you know, I remember when I was in high school... All those many years ago. Yeah, I'm an old person, you know, I tried to open the microwave in my back sword. So, yeah, it was a gazillion years ago. It was the second Intifada, 2001, 2003,

And for three years, there were bombings. There were suicide bombs on buses and restaurants and stabbings on the street and lynches in Ramallah. And it was on a daily, almost on a daily basis. And, you know, I remember that in my high school days,

parents would send their children on separate buses to school so in case that one explodes they won't lose both of their children. That's horrific. I'd heard that during... I mean, I wasn't here during the second Intifada. I heard people used to speed up when they drove next to buses fearing they would explode. I'd never heard of dividing your kids so that your eggs aren't all in the same basket. It's horrible. So...

But, you know, I remember that back then, for three years or so, it felt like it's never going to end. Never going to end. And the atmosphere, the international atmosphere towards Israel was very negative. I don't know if you remember Muhammad Adura's story. So it felt like everyone is against Israel and everything is falling apart. There was a big recession there.

And it felt like it's not going to end. But it did end eventually. And Israel has the amazing powers to overcome such horrific times. So it will end, for your questions. But I think that Israel has a very interesting opportunity here in this war. And I think you discussed it a little bit with Enad Wilf. Not to...

finish this war only as another round of, as you said, endless battles between Israelis and Palestinians or Israel and the Arab world, but also to demand a shift in the way that Palestinians and us communicate, maybe to demand the dismantling of the mechanisms that leave Palestinians

UNRWA, the United Nations. Yeah, right, and UNRWA. And so we do have an opportunity here, I think. We've done something incredible in the north with Hezbollah. I don't know what will happen in a few years, but we allowed a new structure, a new political structure within Lebanon that will allow possibly...

a new future for Lebanon and for Israel in Lebanon to communicate in the next few years. Maybe we can do something with the Palestinians as well. Inshallah, I don't know. And on that topic, Lebanon, I want to change subject. Let's zoom out of Israel a little bit. A statement made by the French foreign minister, Mr. Monsieur Jean-Noël Barrault at the Security Council last week, spoke specifically about Lebanon. He said this.

Israel will not...

recognize it. And I think that international policymakers need to be demanding from Lebanon that peace with Israel is the end goal. And just as they keep banging on about the two-state solution and saying, okay, maybe it's not realistic immediately, but that should be the long-term horizon, they need to be telling Lebanon, we need to work towards peace rather than this bizarre spin that claims that they brought peace while we don't actually have peace between Israel and

Lebanon. The French are talking about the need for an international conference to support Lebanon's economic recovery in Paris.

I darn well hope they invite Israel as well because the greatest contribution to Lebanon's economic recovery would be if Israeli tourists are able to go up into Lebanon on the weekend to enjoy little weekend holiday cottages. And here's what he also said about Lebanon. Mr. Barrow said this, Lebanon needs to recover its sovereignty, its full sovereignty. We call on Israeli forces that are still in Lebanon to withdraw fully from Lebanese territory so the Lebanese armed forces can be redeployed there. Now, on the one hand,

you know, he's right. The presence of Israeli forces still inside Lebanon is an obstacle to Lebanon's

false sovereignty. But a much bigger obstacle to Lebanon's false sovereignty was the fact that it was basically occupied by an Iranian proxy army called Hezbollah that was stronger than the Lebanese armed forces. And it was only as a result of Israel's war against Hezbollah, the spectacular Bipur attack, the taking out of their missiles, that Lebanon not only has a chance to take its country back, they are internationally mandated to take their country back. And they have a once

in a lifetime opportunity now to make Lebanon a real country and not this patchwork dominated by Iran. And I wonder then, you know, putting your spin hat on, why can the French not say that? Why can they not say that

Israel's defeat of Hezbollah has given Lebanon an opportunity to take its country back. When you read the statement, it's as if Israel is the bad guy in all this story because a couple of Israeli tanks are the biggest obstacle to Lebanon's sovereignty when in fact, you know, it's Israel that's given Lebanon an opportunity

to recover its sovereignty. Israel's war against Hezbollah, without that, there would be no opportunity to recover its full sovereignty. Let me take you on a weird journey. Like, why can't they give us credit when it's due? Okay, let's do something weird here, okay? Okay. Let's talk about TikTok for a second and then connect these dots together. Okay?

No, TikTok is a great... It's a really great app for great content. And I got to know it as a user back during COVID. You know, there are only two... We use the word user for two things, right? Social media and drugs. It's true, but it's very similar in a sense. But there are good aspects to TikTok and to social media. But what I saw from within is...

And what was your position at TikTok? I was managing TikTok's... I was sort of the liaison for the Israeli government. Okay. And...

So what I saw from within is how TikTok is being exploited by radical powers and movements in order to... There was a very harsh content bias against Israel, an anti-Semitic content bias. And I saw how these teams of... They call it trust and safety teams...

Content moderators, essentially. It's content moderators and people who are in charge of policy, how it's filled with people who support Hezbollah and Hamas and the Houthis and radical views against the West and radical views against Israel. Because the content moderators are in such problematic countries like the United States. That's one of the reasons. But also, I think it's...

In the end, it became a company policy because when they realized that they have a problem and they decided not to act upon it, it became a policy. And we saw how they banned the campaigns for the hostages to raise awareness for the hostages crisis while they allowed...

weird radical campaigns against Israel. But I think it's not only TikTok. And I think the public discourse through social media and sometimes through legacy television and campuses and other means was hijacked by malicious powers who hate the Western order led by America and Israel.

And they fight against it and they try to dismantle, they try to fight against the liberal West. And they managed to portray Israel as the ultimate bed in many countries in Europe. And France is one of them.

And I think... How did that happen that they were able to portray the Jewish state as the ultimate evil in Europe? How did that happen? I wonder. Yeah, how? How did Europeans fall for that? Such a weird thing, yeah. After centuries of being so friendly to the Jews, how did they get hoodwinked? Very, very weird. But, you know, Israel knew about it and didn't do anything about it for years. And I think that basically these leaders, these French ministers and leaders...

talk to their electorate in the end. It's a matter of internal politics. They have a mission to be re-elected. They have a mission to be loved within their audiences. And I think it's much easier for them to attack Israel, even though Israel is...

In the end, Lebanon has the influence of malicious powers, bad powers coming mostly from Iran, Iranian money, and the Muslim Brotherhood, and other malicious powers that are anti-Western and anti-democratic and positive powers. And it's much easier to attack Israel than actually dealing with empowering the positive powers who are...

not pro-Israeli, but are willing to communicate with Israel. You've got me thinking now that one of our problems in explaining Israel to the international community is that because of the hostility to Israel in international public opinion...

Even policymakers who recognize that Israel has done something positive won't give it credit where credit is due because that will resonate bad internally. So they end up covering up Israel's achievements or attacking Israel, and that only strengthens the negative feedback loop of hostility to Israel. And we all know that, or I wouldn't say no, but I assume that there are many people in Lebanon itself

that understand that Israel, in a sense, saved them from many years of being occupied by Iran. Yeah, they understand it better than the French do. Yeah, but the French are having a hard time to admit it themselves because it's easier for them to attack Israel in France and find whatever angle is possible to attack Israel because it gives them credit in France because...

because whole generations were heavily manipulated by malicious powers through social media and through academia. And I think these are the results. And it's perhaps that hostility to Israel with this self-reinforcing negative feedback loop that has brought France to the brink of recognizing a non-existent Palestinian state this summer. They're holding a summit in New York together with Saudi Arabia. And I want to get your thoughts on how they're spinning this approaching decision, perhaps,

a very dramatic decision by a UN Security Council member, no less,

to recognize this non-existent Palestinian state effectively as a reward for October 7th. And Israel needs to be absolutely aggressive about explaining that Palestinians cannot look back at October 7th as a moment that took their national cause forward. They cannot think of October 7th as a national holiday. The message that Palestinian extremists would take is that if you keep raping Jewish women, abducting Jewish babies, burning Jewish families, you will be rewarded for it. We will

upgrade you diplomatically. It's a disaster. But I have a question for you, Elon. Do you think that Israel is in a stand right now to make these claims and be heard? What do you mean? I mean...

Isn't the Israeli government or official Israeli officials in a position that they're not being heard by the major publics in America? No, they're not being heard because they're not even bothering. No, I mean, even if they talk, their messages, the public is not ready to receive messages from them because they are...

government officials. I wonder who is the best body or person to deliver these messages. And I wonder if the Israeli government is the right entity to do so. Well, there's definitely an advantage to it coming from civil society, but there's a limit to how much I can snipe on Twitter at the heels of the Norwegian foreign minister and say that you're going to have blood on your hands. No, but I'm absolutely deadly serious. If these countries... No, in English. He speaks English too.

If Britain, France, these countries...

reward October 7th, they will be encouraging more violence and they will have blood on their hands because instead of ending this conflict, and the only way to end this conflict, I was asked about this, I think, on Nigerian TV the other day. This has been going on for so long. How does this end? And I said, the war is going on because Israel is still surrounded by enemies that seek its destruction. And the war ends when they decide to stop trying to destroy Israel and we can live in peace and security. They will have blood on their hands if they continue to sustain the Palestinian illusion that Israel is temporary, they'll be rewarded for political violence. Anyway, but it also has to come...

internationally as well, at the top level as well. I think there are things where the country has to put its foot down and explain why something would be completely detrimental to its national interest. But I want to get your take. It's true, but I think that Israel should and can do something even beyond that. Go on. We have a good opportunity right now because we are controlling the humanitarian aid to Gaza. And I don't know if you remember for...

Once in a while, every few months, the idea of humanitarian islands comes up to the public discourse. So the idea was to take an area within Gaza, inside the Gaza Strip, only allow civilians to get in, mostly women, children, or men who were thoroughly vetted by the Israeli Shabak.

And then inside these areas to give them everything they need, education, food, whatever, and set up an example of how life could have been for Palestinians and then lure more Palestinians to this lifestyle and to these places. But it should have come with a price. And the price would be to give up the status of a...

a refugee, a Palestinian refugee. On an individual basis. On an individual basis. Because 80% of the Gazans or something like that are considered, even though they were born in Palestine, obviously they agree that Gaza is Palestine, they were born with an inherited status of someone who was displaced in 1948. Fictitious refugee. It's ridiculous. So I think that Israel should...

obviously fight against the decision of a Palestinian state, but also to show what it is willing to do and how we can, how it is putting or giving some opportunity and a plan for future peace, even if we understand that it's not going to be easy to make any peace here. Yeah, but like Barak

Is it moral? Is it legal to use these sorts of restrictions in order to try to end UNRWA? Yes, I agree. But I don't think Israel is in a position to try to put a price and condition. We will create humanitarian islands if you make this concession. Because look what happens when Israel puts forward a humanitarian aid plan. The problem at the moment is this. But we should present a peace plan. What's our peace plan? For Gaza.

For the Palestinians? Oh, that's a different question. And for Gaza. But if we proactively, I think, show a peace plan, even though we understand that it's not going to lead for peace in the near future, probably, but hopefully, maybe. A vision would be amazing. But I want to talk specifically about this question of humanitarian aid, because the problem is this at the moment, humanitarian aid. During the last ransom,

Israel let in 450,000 tons of aid into Gaza. Over 25,000 trucks. One third of all the supplies that went into Gaza during the war went in during those six weeks.

But Hamas was hijacking it. How do we know Hamas was hijacking it? Because it's being sold in the markets at exorbitant prices rather than being distributed for free. And UN agencies are covering that up, the mass, mass looting, including by Hamas itself, which remains the government of Gaza. The Wall Street Journal reported a few weeks ago that Hamas is running low on cash and can't pay for its fighters because the sources have switched off.

Israel is obviously not obligated to continue financing the enemy's war machine, but there are people who are desperate and you don't want them to suffer. So Israel puts forward what I think is a creative plan. Is it perfect? No. Is it deeply problematic? Yes. Is it creative? I guess.

to create humanitarian compounds and say that civilians can go there to get weekly rations for their families. And then you cut Hamas out altogether. You don't give it an opportunity to hijack on the way to the warehouses. You don't need to control the warehouses. And therefore you switch off Hamas's main financial pipeline. And instead of embracing this, and instead of working with Israel to come up with a humanitarian aid mechanism that starves Hamas of cash, the UN is demanding a continued role for Hamas

in aid distribution. That is the meaning when Israel puts forward this proposal. And then UN Orchard says, for example, that the plan contradicts fundamental humanitarian principles, endangers civilian lives and relief efforts, continues to the intensification of force displacement.

would leave large parts of the Gaza Strip without access to food supplies as if during the war to destroy ISIS in Mosul, the UN was insisting that food trucks go right into the middle of Mosul. Of course they didn't. They supported efforts to get civilians out of a combat zone. But of course it's a different rule for Israel here. And Israel is coming under a lot of pressure. I see Kaya Khalas, the EU foreign policy representative.

by and large, a very friendly figure who is in regular contact with our foreign minister, Guy Densart, was on a phone call with him and said that, you know, the humanitarian situation in Gaza is untenable. Humanitarian aid must resume immediately, should never be politicized. The new aid delivery mechanism should run through humanitarian actors. Great, humanitarian actors, great. But what happens when those humanitarian actors are turning a blind eye to Hamas siphoning humanitarian aid?

And that turning a blind eye is extending this war because it is allowing Hamas to finance this war. How does Israel make the case for a new humanitarian aid policy?

policy when the world doesn't want to acknowledge the dilemmas that Israel is confronting? Is it because, I mean, I gave an interview in Australia and said, what's the evidence? What's the evidence? Is the problem that we haven't given enough OSINT evidence of Hamas hijacking humanitarian aid? Is there enough evidence and the policymakers want to ignore it? Do we have to produce more evidence so that they can't ignore it? I mean, how would you handle this from a comms perspective? I think that first, it's not new. Obviously, the

ongoing support of the international community to UNRWA, even though it's very clear if they only listened to Israel, they could have known that it's so corrupt. I got asked, Barak, it's beyond corrupt. I got asked on British radio, Times radio,

They're very skeptical of the idea of running it through private actors. Don't you think there is an option for corruption here? And I was so surprised by the question because that line of thinking hadn't even crossed my mind. What I should have replied was it comes...

Did you raise your eyebrows? No, I didn't. Radio, anyway. I raised my ears. It could not be possibly more corrupt than the existing system in which Hamas was able, over 16 years of rule in Gaza, to build its terrorist army because the United Nations took control.

of welfare and education, took it off Hamas' hands during this war, has been turning a blind eye to Hamas' hijacking aid, has covered up every time they talk about UN workers being killed in Gaza, covering up the endless names Israel has provided of how many of those were Hamas operatives. And you just tell your hero and say the existing system is so corrupt and so rigged against Israel. And I'm not a conspiracy theorist, right? 9-11 happened, the moon landing happened, but the United Nations is rigged

against Israel. But how do you explain the fact that it was, as you mentioned, it was those stories were all over the media. They were they were published even in the New York Times. OK, and still and yet people turn blind eye to that, to that, to the corruption and to the. I think part of the problem is that domestically Israel is in a bind between what the Israeli public wants to see and what we want the international audience to see.

We want to show the international audience, look how much aid is getting into Gaza. Look how much Hamas is stealing. And therefore, look how generous we are and what suckers we are that we're letting aid into Gaza, even though it's getting hijacked by Hamas. But that's a terrible message for the Israeli public, which does not want to see supplies being delivered to the

enemy and definitely does not want to see that we're allowing supplies to be taken in that are being hijacked by the enemy. So is the problem that we just haven't produced enough visual evidence? It's true. And it brings us back, by the way, to the thing that I mentioned earlier, that we are, according to Israeli politicians that I talked to, we are in an election year. So they can't go against the Israeli public. They can do things that jeopardize their own existence as politicians.

so therefore it's very hard for them to say, yes, we'll let all these humanitarian aid to get in, etc. But I do think that Israel, and it brings me back to the idea of displaying a vision. So if Israel is displaying a vision of how we would like

the Gaza Strip to be run and how we would like the humanitarian aid to be run and we explain how it's going to be run and why. I think not everyone, obviously there are

huge audiences in America and in the West that hates Israel, no matter what. But I think some people are looking for answers and looking to hear something positive, something hopeful from Israel. And I think it will help these people. And these people are very crucial. The UN itself is itself a very corrupt organization. It's because...

in the end, the mechanism of the UN is that they give each country, each state, each country, they have one vote, right? And most countries in the UN are not democratic.

And obviously it corrupts the whole mechanism. So I don't have high hopes for the UN itself and for the organizations that work closely with the UN, but I do have high hopes to this small but very, very crucial audience that is in the middle, in between, that...

that is looking for answers, looking to hear what Israel is saying, looking to hear the other side. We're not necessarily going to convince all of them, but we can reduce a lot of pressure. Do you think from a civil society perspective, the approach should be to continue to attack, attack, attack, attack the UN and expose it and shame it?

No, I think it's obviously a just approach, but it's not a very effective approach. Because I don't want to just convince the people in the middle. At the end of the day, I want to affect policy on the other end. So how do you get through to them? But policy is being crafted in the media, in social media. What you see in policy, eventually what you see, the decisions and the...

That's what I saw from a prime minister's office and from many years of working with Israeli politicians and also with politicians abroad.

The decisions and the statements you see from politicians are being crafted on social media way before that. They usually react to please their audiences. And we need the audiences, at least those audiences that we can influence, the switchers, we need them on our side. And I think for that...

We have a good story to tell. We have a very good story to share. Israel is not an evil country, and we know that. And Israel has done a lot to ensure humanitarian aid in Gaza throughout the war. We know that. It was used for bad purposes. We know all the facts. And we need to focus on these switchers, these people who we can give answers to.

they're not necessarily going to love Israel, but they need answers to not hate us. Yeah, and that's the tragedy then of Israel basically having given up in the international battle for public opinion and even trying to reach our allies who feel that Israel is not communicating. But anyway, let's put that to one side. Many of our listeners, I assume, are from the Jewish diaspora and people who are not Jewish but care about Israel very deeply, right? And some of them,

They're looking for the answers of what, you know, they know Israel is not a bad party here, but they need more information. They need the explanation. They need to understand what's really going on. Because otherwise all you're hearing is the side that's trying to gaslight them. Barak, I want to move on to our last subject, which is the Houthi ballistic missile attack on Ben Gurion Airport this week. We could very easily have been in a totally different world right now on Houthi.

Sunday, the Houthi pirates in Yemen fired a ballistic missile that hit Ben Gurion airport. It was a few hundred meters away from the main building. It is a miracle, not only that no one was killed, but that we avoided a mass casualty incident that would have seen bodies all over the arrival hall of the airport.

It's not the first Houthi ballistic missile attack aimed towards the airport. They fired hundreds since October 7th in solidarity with Hamas. But really, it's a miracle that it landed outside. In a response, Israel said, anyone who hurts us will hurt them sevenfold, launched an astonishing bombing campaign against the Houthi zone airport in Sana'a. And I think that should be a warning to anyone thinking of firing a ballistic missile at Ben-Gurion airport. Don't, okay? Don't even test us.

But I'm wondering about how you think official Israel should communicate this event to the international audience. Because there's one approach, which is to cry gewalt and say, look what they did. Look what they did. Draw attention to the fact that the airport was attacked in order to justify this.

The response that we have to, the disproportionate response we have to do in order to restore deterrence. But there's something very dangerous about that because you don't want to scare away international tourists, right? I was asked on, I think, anyone, anyone, anyone, right? I was asked on, I think, Nigerian TV. The Houthis are now saying they're going to continue attacking Ben Gurion Airport. Is it safe? I had to pause for a second before knowing what to say because... And what did he say?

I said, it's not 100% safe because our air defenses are not hermetic. And that is why Israel is going to have to respond forcefully against Yemen because we can't rely on blowing out every missile out of the sky. But you want, on the one hand, to reassure people. You're almost certainly going to be okay flying into Ben Gurion. It's probably the one safest airport in the world. But on the other hand...

you can't pretend that everything is okay and that this was not a major escalation. How do you manage that delicate balancing act? We need to think about the strategy with the Houthis. On the one hand, it's very hard to deter them because they don't care about tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of their own people if they'll be hurt or

killed in a in a in a in airstrikes we saw that before we saw that big countries that fought against the hooties basically failed in the egypt saudi arabia it's right and um so they're not maybe they're not afraid of i don't think they're afraid of uh of uh airstrikes by israeli air force um and we saw that the americans uh

They try to, I don't know, they try to withdraw their hands from the area, from the region. Yeah, and President Trump announcing a ceasefire with the Houthis, saying we're going to stop bombing them, they're going to stop bombing international ships, while the Houthis are saying we're going to continue attacking Israel.

basically tells Israel, you're on your own. I mean, the Americans presumably will help us blow the missiles out of the sky, but they're saying we're not intervening militarily as long as it's missiles at Ben-Gurion Airport. And it's very dangerous because what they basically declared is that they're trying to put a siege on Israel and continue to attack the airports. They realize that the airports is the soft spot of Israel because it's a very, very tiny country. And if you shut off a plane

the main airport in Israel, then you basically can shut off the, the, the whole economy. And, um, I think eventually what will might help with the, with the hooties, if they continue, uh,

if they continue their strikes, is only ground invasion. But we can't. We're not going to ground invasion. I think it's going to happen. So what we can do is to support, arm, and guide other opposing Yemenite powers that did try in the past, have tried in the past, and will try again.

perhaps in the future, to conquer back Yemen. And to take the fight to the Iranians directly, which Israel is now saying it will do. But even if you take the fight with the Iranians directly, then you need to understand what do you want, how do you prioritize? Do you prioritize the dismantling of the nuclear reactors or do you prioritize...

army targets, what do you prioritize? And even then, the Houthis are not, although they are an Iranian proxy, they also have some sort of sovereignty and power of their own. So it's not necessarily going to solve the problem with the Houthis. So understanding that only something much bigger, more strategic might help with the Houthis, I think that

as long as you can, as fake it till you make it, as long as you can, uh,

downsize the threat and don't, as you mentioned, we need to make sure that people see business as usual in Israel and we don't need to cry for these missiles and try to keep the economy and the transportation as open as possible for as long as possible as we can. Right, I guess the fact is no airport in the world has such a sophisticated missile defense system.

It has a very sophisticated... But you know... Right, 95% of the Houthis ballistic missiles have been blown out of the sky. Nothing is 100%. And eventually we will solve this problem one way or another, but I don't think it will be in our interest to put more emphasis on this issue globally.

The Houthis have actually been extraordinarily successful in spinning their own war of aggression against Israel. I remember when I first heard that the Houthis had declared war on Israel back in the original October, it sounded like a bad joke. They did this in solidarity with Hamas. They saw what Hamas did on October 7th, they liked it, and they said, we want to join in the fun. But they've been able to present themselves internationally as if they've come in in solidarity with the

the poor defenseless people of Gaza as if, you know, this is not a group of goat shagging, cat munching pirates whose slogan is Allahu Akbar, death to America, death to Israel, curses on the Jews, victory to Islam. And you see this, I mean, I saw Carl Bildt, the former prime minister of Sweden, bless him,

tweeting a Houthi ballistic missile from Yemen impacts very nearby Ben Gurion airport in Israel. There's heavy Israeli defense, the most intense US bombing campaign against Yemen. So this is not supposed to happen. Not supposed to happen. It's a consequence of the absence of a ceasefire in Gaza. And I'm clutching my head in my hands going, and when the Houthis attacked in the middle of October 2023, that was because of an absence of a ceasefire in Gaza. No, it was because their allies declared war and they decided they wanted to join that war because they thought they could win

win that war and and you know here's here's a terrible take i saw on twitter but it's reflective of what we see in a lot of progressive circles yemen is intervening to stop a modern day holocaust

And the United States and the United Kingdom are desperately trying to keep it going. That's it. That's the story. Yemen's actions represent one of the history's clearest moral choices. There won't be a debate in the history books. There is a section of the Western audience that thinks that the Houthis are these. And I hear this as well in interviews, you know, well, you know, the Houthis are just stepping in to protect Gaza, get a ceasefire in and then it's over as if it is normal or natural or reasonable that this

Iranian proxy army with Iranian ballistic missiles is going to shoot at us until Israel... Shoot at civilians. At civilians at the airport until Israel agrees to leave Hamas in power. But they've been able to spin this story internationally that this is some sort of humanitarian intervention to try to save Gaza. We live in weird times, you know, Elon. I think I remember that when I worked at TikTok, the first missile they launched at Eilat, or I don't know if it was a drone or a missile, but the first attack on Eilat, I saw...

and maybe hundreds of employees in internal working groups

on the internal platform for the employees celebrating these attacks on a lot on a lot on civilian TikTok employees TikTok employees and I tried to realize who are these employees so I searched for their you know their profiles and I realized that all of them were European with Europe it's not it's not it's not the content moderation center in Pakistan it's in Europe it's not in Pakistan it was all in Europe and some in America

And I realize how crazy these times are when those Houthis, obviously these are such radical, crazy Islamist people.

anti-LGBT, anti-women, anti-human rights, anti-everything that is Western, they're becoming their heroes. It's very funny. It's very weird. And I think that the long-term answer to that would be a much better education in the West of who are these really...

radical Islamist groups really are and what do they really want. It's not something that you would achieve immediately. It's something that we failed to address as a West, as Israel, also as a Jewish nation. We failed to do it over the past decade or two when other malicious powers stepped in and shaped narratives, shaped

innocent young people's narratives and worldviews. We failed to do so. We failed to participate in this war, but we need to step in and fight back. Okay, we need to step in, fight back, do more. Barak Hozhkovitz, fantastic having you on the podcast. How can people stay in touch and follow your work? Excellent.

Not TikTok? Well, I actually do post things on TikTok, but this morning I realized that I might be shadow banned on TikTok because it's the first video that I uploaded and only has four views. For what it's worth, from my conversations with TikTok, they vigorously denied that there is such a thing as shadow banning. Okay. Back to the fair, but I feel like I'm shadow banned on TikTok, so find me on X, YouTube. It's mostly in Hebrew, most of my content, but...

if you speak Hebrew, feel free to join. And what is your Twitter handle? Barakher. Barakher. Yeah. Okay. Barakher. Barakher. It's very important for me to be aligned with the New Times and mention how to be addressed. But yeah, Barakher. And

And, Elon, thanks for inviting me. Absolute pleasure. And anyone who speaks Hebrew should follow your podcast as well, De Allo Popularit, Unpopular Opinion. And there are very unpopular opinions coming right away in the next few episodes. I must say that your podcast is one of the best things that have happened to the Jewish people and to Israel. No, don't exaggerate. And, yeah, I'm...

uh, I'm a devoted listener. That's very kind. You don't have to flatter. The episode's already over. Thank you for coming on the pod. Thanks. And that brings us to the end of this episode of state of a nation. As always, if you enjoy these episodes, please give us a like wherever you're following subscribe on Apple podcasts, Spotify, uh,

wherever you get your podcasts on YouTube, of course. Give us a good review, share it with your friends. And if you want to sponsor an episode of this podcast, then get in touch with me, Elon A. Levy, on social media. And we'll be very happy to have you sponsor an episode of State of a Nation. Until then, I'm Elon Levy. Thanks for watching.