Threats on Our Borders | Inside Politics of the Middle East
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The objective is to create a worldwide caliphate. First, by conquering or actually destroying the state of Israel because we are considered non-believers in the house of Islam, on Islamic lands, Dar al-Islam. And then liberating, or in inverted commas, I stress for those who are not watching, Jerusalem, that would give them the symbolic...

stronghold if you wish to speak to the rest of the Muslim world and have them get excited about creating the worldwide caliphate on the rest of Western soil.

Ruth Wasserman Lande, welcome to State of a Nation. Thank you. It's such a pleasure to be here. Thank you. We've had so many of your briefings here at the Israeli Citizen Spokesperson's Office, but it's the first time we're sitting down to

unpack some of the bigger issues of what's happening. And you've really had a front row seat into the dramatic developments in the Middle East in recent decades as a professional diplomat with the foreign ministry. You served as the deputy ambassador in Cairo at a turbulent time, then as a member of Knesset, where you were the co-chair of the Abraham Accords.

And what I want to do in this discussion is talk about the threats on Israel's border. We have witnessed the Middle East change beyond recognition since October 7th. We often use the analogy of a domino effect that the Hamas invasion on October 7th, no one could imagine that the dominoes would fall and lead to the fall of the Assad regime. But I want to lean in maybe to a different analogy, which is that of a ripple effect.

of how the aftershocks of October 7th are changing the region in ways that none of us could expect and what that means for threats on Israel's borders that may emerge in future and what we need to keep our eye on. And so since you do speak Arabic, I want to understand

How these events are being perceived within the Arab world as well and how the major geopolitical trends are being analyzed by our neighbors, maybe we should be paying more careful attention to. So to start us off, I want to ask you whether you think that over 500 days since the October 7th massacre, Israel is now at its moment of greatest power, its moment of greatest peril, or both? Well, that's an easy one because it's both.

And the reason why I say that is because it depends who is the one watching. I always say that the framing, Elon, of the current situation is different to what most of the world perceives. For example, there is a tendency to speak of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Hamas-Israel war, the Israeli-Palestinian kind of perhaps even path to peace situation.

and so on, or the Arab-Israeli conflict. But none of those are, in my humble opinion, the right prism or the right way, the angle in which this entire undertaking is to be seen. It's much wider than that. And that is, in fact, the Shia

and the competition between them who will create the worldwide caliphate based on Sharia and the

And that is, in fact, a war not between Israel and the Arab world, not between the Jews and the Arabs and or the Muslims, but between radical Islam and the entire rest of the world. And that's a completely different angle from which to analyze everything that's happening in the region today.

and the Israeli Hamas squirmish in Gaza and then the rest of the border, let's say, threats upon Israel as well. Hang on, I want to understand that because I've heard the analysis that says the right frame to understand what is happening in the Middle East is essentially a cold war between the Iranian axis and between the axis of moderate Sunni states, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Afghanistan.

That's the main lens. It's a Cold War for regional domination between Saudi Arabia and Iran. But what you're saying is that actually it's a battle not for regional domination, but for exporting a global caliphate. Explain what you mean by that. So it's much, much larger than a regional squirmish. It's much, much larger than moderate versus radical or extreme Islam. Rather, I would say that it's

radical Islam, both Shiite and Sunni, against the rest of the world, and not only Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, and the rest of them, including Israel, but also Europe, Canada,

Canada, the United States of America, and Australia. And one can see it unfolding. It's not something that we can sort of try and really look for with a magnifying glass between the lines. No, one can see it in the demonstrations throughout the world of Muslims in Europe, for example. They don't

always shout and you know and and march for Palestine they do very often but not only they shout down with France they shout excuse my language but Germany they shout things that have nothing to do with the Israeli Arab conflict and or Jewish Muslim conflict and that actually is

embodies the integral issue which is embedded in radical Islam and in the ideology, whether it's Shiite radical or Sunni radical. And by the way, this is a world, and that is a completely different world. And they compete for the hegemony of the worldwide caliphate against Islam.

whoever it is that isn't in this prism. Sunni and Shia radicals competing, but also cooperating. Hamas being a Sunni terrorist group backed by Iran as the major Shia power. So I'm wondering, how does your analysis of competition between Sunni and Shia radicals help us understand the October 7th war in a way that is a different frame of reference from understanding it as an Israeli-Palestinian conflict or an Israeli-Iranian conflict?

What do the dynamics between Sunni and Shia radicals for regional domination and exporting the caliphate tell me about the nature of the October 7th war that I didn't know and therefore raise red flags about things that we should be concerned about? So first of all, the fact that there is this divide between Sunna and Shia is...

is actually an advantage because whereas they seem to be cooperating on certain fronts and for certain, let's say, objectives, it's only a make-believe cooperation. It's only temporary. In fact, the Sunni radical Salafi jihadists say,

see the Shiites as kuffar, as non-believers. And for them, it is almost, almost as bad as being Jewish or Christian or any other religion. God forbid. And God forbid. But it is so. So this is something that is very, very strong. So for example, when we look at al-Julani in Syria, who is a Salafist jihadist who

wearing suits, taking off the very long beard and so on. Trimmed it to Herzl length. Exactly. When it comes to the Iranian regime at the moment, there is no way in hell that they will ever truly cooperate because that goes against the grain of the Salafist jihadist regime.

But wait, Hamas is cooperating with the Iranian regime. So that's different. Why? That's different. And because it suits Hamas and it suits the Iranian regime. And when I say that... In which case you're saying that what really matters is realpolitik, not arcane theological disputes, you know, Catholics versus Protestants as if this is the Middle Ages. Well, it depends because the Hamas... Not Middle Ages, Catholic versus Protestants. Later, I've...

shifted my frame of reference by a couple of centuries by accident. A little bit. But there is a difference. The Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, which are one and the same, in fact, it belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood kind of prism. And that is a little bit different than the Salafi jihadist Sunni prism. Both are Sunnis, but the Salafis have less room to maneuver within and they are absolutely

They cannot. It goes against the grain to cooperate with the Iranian Republic and the regime with Shiites. They are kuffar. It's the same thing for Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, but...

The Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas have a feeling, a kind of a trend. We cannot do this by letting the world know that we are OK, by fitting into political systems, by cooperating in a kind of a...

a false cooperation with the enemy. No, that is a way that is okay for Hamas, for Muslim Brotherhood. They believe in making use of false corporations or false agreements in order to further their objective, which is, of course, the religious struggle.

Muslim caliphate objective. So bottom line, if I'm... The Salafis, no. So bottom line, if I'm missing the frame of reference that you think is the most important frame of reference, which is this great power kind of competition between Sunni and Shia radicals, what am I missing in my understanding of the October 7th war? How am I reading the map wrong? So there are two issues. First of all, we need to understand that this is not an Israel war. This is a worldwide war.

battle for and you know I'm lacking a different way to describe it but the good against the evil I know it sounds very melodramatic and who are the good and who are the evil in this so the radical extremist Islam

no matter if it's Shiite or Sunni, is the evil, and their arms, their proxies, whoever they use in this game to win one thing, a worldwide extremist, radical Islamist caliphate. Sorry, explain what you mean by a worldwide caliphate. So a worldwide, on the lands of Egypt, Jordan, Israel, the entire Middle East,

United States of America, Europe, Australia, Canada, worldwide global Islamist caliphate. This is the objective. You're saying that both the Iranian regime and the new government in Syria want to turn Australia into part of a global Muslim empire? Absolutely, absolutely. Do you have any evidence for that? Let me explain how. For decades, Qatar, which is Sunni, has been actually funding

in all of those countries that I've mentioned in order to strengthen their hold

on perception, on the way that people think, whether it's buying think tanks, whether it's affecting PR, whether it's buying football clubs, whether it's buying faculty members in universities. There's plenty of proof for that. Whether it's actually funding companies

schools, not only in colleges and tertiary education. I mean, if I can play devil's advocate, they just want to expand their influence. It doesn't mean they're plotting to build some sort of global Islamic empire. They do want to expand their influence.

And whereas when we... It's a form of soft power projection, one could say. I'm being, you know... Absolutely. Thank you for playing devil's advocate. And I'll kind of retaliate and say they do want to expand their influence. They want to expand it in a manner which is true to their objective, their core objective. And because they don't have an army...

...and there are only approximately 300,000 Qataris... ...their way to expand their influence... If you don't include all the slaves. Well, they are not Qataris. So the 300,000 Qataris want to cushion their own, let's say, influence... ...by using money. But their ideology, their core ideology is radical Islam... ...politicized radical Islam...

and they use the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hamas. This is their radical arm of expression. By the way, Turkey, exactly the same. And they compete, in a manner of speaking, for that head or that kind of power. Now, when we talk about... So, sorry, the competition you see is between an Iranian axis versus a Turkish Qatari axis? I mean, who are the major players in this? Absolutely. There is the fear...

or the kind of defense set up by Saudi Arabia. They used to be the exporters of Wahhabist terrorism to the world. They are now in a different tangent of diversifying

sources of income for saudi arabia but also massive cultural transformation vision 2030 exactly the complete polar opposite of the iranian vision absolutely complete uh difference and there is a movement towards modernization and diversification of really sources of power and they see uh

the Iranian axis or rather the Iranian regime's axis including the Houthis, including Hamas and Hezbollah as the enemy but the radical Islam is currently led by Turkey's Erdogan, by Qatar and when we talk about Al Jolani in Syria it's not Syria.

It's Turkey, and we need to understand that. And that's the quest of Erdogan in Turkey, to basically...

create the Ottoman Empire, which is a different word for that worldwide Islamic extremist halafate in a different mode. All right, talk about neo-imperialism and these people get to claim that they're on the side of anti-colonialism. Interesting you said that this competition is between Qatar and Turkey on one side and Iran on the other because these are, as listeners know, the three main state sponsors of

of the Hamas terror state in Gaza. And anyone who's interested in learning more about that, we filmed recently an excellent episode of the podcast with Mike Duran from the Hudson Institute. Ruth, you set the stage very dramatically for what the conflict is about globally. I do want to look at the threats specifically on Israel's borders, and maybe we can sort of work going anti-clockwise. Egypt. Egypt.

Something is happening in Egypt that is deeply disturbing. We are seeing reports of a massive military buildup in the Sinai Desert in violation of the peace treaty. Israel is beginning to push back against that in diplomatic forums. We are seeing the Egyptian public...

consuming the same propaganda that many others around the Arab world consume, telling them that Israel is, God forbid, committing a genocide, guilty of these barbaric war crimes in Gaza. Something disturbing is happening in Egypt. There is a military buildup that can only be explained by a strategic doctrine that presents Israel as being the major military threat, because of course they have the mess of Sudan on one side and the mess of Libya on the other side.

What is happening with this military buildup in Egypt? And how concerned are you that Egypt could go from being a country with which Israel has a cold peace to an active military threat on the southern border again? I'm Imogen Folks, the host of Inside Geneva, a podcast where we tackle the big questions facing our planet.

Can UN investigations bring more criminals to justice? Does the world need a pandemic treaty? What about climate change or refugees? Should we ban autonomous weapons? Some call them killer robots. Get the answers you need with me and our expert guests twice a month on Inside Geneva, free with your usual podcast app.

So this is a very, very heavy question. And for years, since I've stayed and lived for three years in Egypt, loved it. It was the most profound experience I have ever had. Spoke the language, breathed in the smells, you know, absolutely admired, amongst other things, the music, the culture. There's so much to learn there.

It's very apparent that the perception in Egypt, and it's the highest echelon of decision makers, is that Israel is indeed a threat. Now, whether that means that they will open a war with Israel or not, we'll analyze that in a minute.

But they've seen Israel as a potential threat always. Why do they think we're a threat? I mean, do they not understand from our perspective that, you know, we have enough on our plate? We have enough threats. Why would Israel be a threat to Egypt? We're a tiny little country. We're basically a geographical extension of the Sinai Desert.

So it's quite unbelievable, but it's, you know, the Egyptian... It's like you're looking at me. It's crazy. But, you know, I've always said that logic is a very subjective thing. And when I was there, one of the main things that I learned is that

You know, like beauty is in the eye of the beholder, such is logic in the eye of the analyst. And they see things very differently from us. Whereas to us, it's absolutely obvious that we are not going to invade the Sinai. We are not going to declare war on Egypt. Their fear is

is based on a kind of a mu'ammara or a sense that there is a conspiracy theory. Obviously, a lot of declarations made by some politicians in Israel on the right makes them very, very panicky. Hang on, what have politicians on the right been saying? So, well, a lot of them have been saying that, you know, a lot of the Gazans should be pushed into the Sinai Peninsula and that is...

creates a huge panic attack in Egypt. So when you say that Egypt views Israel as a threat...

The threat that they're imagining is that Israel is going to displace the people of Gaza and push them into the Sinai Desert. Like that's the threat they're imagining. That's one of the threats they're imagining. And throughout the Cold Peace, another threat that they are and were and still will, in my humble opinion, imagine is the threat of normalization or what they call in Arabic, the Tobia.

So why has there not been any tatbiyah or normalization? I'm talking about musical cooperation, agricultural cooperation, economic cooperation and so on. There's been very, very, very little of that throughout the more than four decades of peace with Egypt. Why? The peace agreement with Egypt basically...

basically ended a state of war, created an exchange of diplomats, and as you know, not always a permanent presence of diplomats on both ends. But it didn't really create normal relations between the countries in the way that Israel and the UAE have normal countries. I mean, are there even flights between Tel Aviv and Cairo? Well, there are flights, but they've become more rare. But

That's not the only thing. It's a secret route, isn't it? The whole thing about Israel or saying this word is something that is shameful. It's not something to be proud of. It's something that, I mean, look, 110 million... They see this as an evil that they need to put up with. Exactly. And the worst thing, Elon, is that 110 million Egyptians are taught...

whether it's via messaging in the mosques, whether it's via the media, whether it's in the educational system and the curricula, that Israel is the enemy. That's what they learn and had been learning. And this is a key point because Israel has never demanded from Egypt... Under Sadat, under Nasser, under Sadat, under Mubarak, under Sisi.

Well, Sadat was short-lived. Nasser was a completely different story because that was before the peace treaty. So he was completely anti-Israeli. And during the Mubarak, especially era, a very long one,

And during the Sisi era, even though the Abraham Accords did do something to soften that approach, but I'm saying soften and not to normalize. And why do I say that? Because their fear of that normalization is the fear of the so-called, in inverted commas, attack.

They fear that Israel would try and influence Egyptian public to try and infiltrate the minds of the Egyptians, to try and take over the economy of the Egyptians, to try and really embed themselves within Egypt.

in terms of thinking, in terms of mind, via the normalization. That is the so-called logical fear that has been accompanying the Egyptian heads of state for years. And that is something that is...

indescribable to the Western mind and to the Israeli mind because we think differently. That's one thing. The other thing that really creates panic amidst the decision makers in Egypt is the potential of Gazans embedding themselves in the Sinai Peninsula. Even though the Sinai Peninsula is huge, there's no lack of land there.

Even though they may even circle these Palestinians with guards, with soldiers from the Egyptian army, they still...

are having a hysteria attack. And why is that, Elan? Because they know, they know better than anyone else what it means when even a small group of Palestinians embed themselves in any territory. It happened in Lebanon. It happened in Tunisia. It happened in Kuwait. They

They absolutely, absolutely will not have it happen inside Egypt because they know that it's the Muslim Brotherhood. So bottom line, this massive Egyptian military buildup in the Sinai Desert is a response to fears of Gaza spilling out into the Sinai Desert. That's why they're moving tanks into the Sinai? Amongst other things. I think that there is...

a very small chance of Egypt declaring a full-blown war on Israel without this phenomenon happening. But we need to look at the facts on the ground.

There are a lot of efforts and billions of US dollars spent on creating a much better navy for Egypt, underground tunnels, storage places, tanks, personnel, all over and above the peace agreement and the treaty with Israel. And that has been going on for several years, not only since October 7th. Right, so it's not a response to Gaza. Why is this happening? So...

Exactly what I'm saying. Why would you spend so much money? This is a different logic than we are used to. And that's a very, very good question. There's not one answer to that. But there is a fact. This enhancement is happening. It's happening for several years. And not only that, but since October 7th, there's been a declarative policy, first and foremost by the president himself, Sisi,

against what Israel is doing. And I've listened to his words that have been very cautious until October 7th regarding the peace treaty, regarding the stability between the two countries. And since October 7th, even as early as November 2023, he began saying that if certain things will happen, this is a casus belli. This is almost a declaration of war. And that had to do with

with the instability in Gaza. Do you see a scenario in which Egypt calls off the peace treaty altogether?

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Look, I've been asked that. And my analysis is that the chances are relatively low. It doesn't make any sense whatsoever at all. But again, I stress again and again, one, the logic is not the same logic.

Two, the survival of the regime... Because they think of Israel as trying to implant some sort of mind virus in the Egyptians. Yes, and they also see Israel, funny as it sounds to Israelis, as an imperialist entity. And they see examples of...

of what is happening, for example, by our IDF, the Israeli Defense Forces in the south of Syria, as an example of that, even though that is done in defense of the northern citizens of Israel, they see that as...

a proof of the imperialism of Israel. Likewise, they see what has been done in Lebanon, even though it was completely preempted by the Hezbollah and our defense of our civilians that had been displaced by the Hezbollah. And despite the fact that they are also against the Hezbollah, the Egyptian regime, they see what we have done and the fact that we are still there in five points,

as imperialism and it is almost unbelievable but that is the truth likewise with the west bank and judean samaria so it's quite unbelievable how we perceive our defense and our as you had said our geographical um size which is so small compared to egypt and they see uh

our actions as imperialism. So a fundamental misalignment between Israel's understanding of its own actions as being defensive, Egypt seeing it as being aggressive, imperialistic. If you were advising Israeli decision makers now, how would you encourage them to assuage the Egyptians' concerns, put their minds at ease in order to stave off the

this military build-up in the Sinai that is against the peace treaty and we really do need to push back against because we can't tolerate that violation? So first of all, there are a couple of recommendations regarding policy that I personally would have. And the first one would be that if the United States of America wants to help Egypt, there are 110 million people, most of whom are...

not full in their bellies. In other words, there's a lot of hunger, there's a lot of poverty, and giving billions of U.S. dollars for the military effort of Egypt is not the best use of the U.S. taxpayers' money, again, in my humble opinion. And that's something that needs to be addressed, even though it's a sensitive topic.

Two, I would also advise to have a very good personal relationship. So, sorry, you think that the United States could use economic aid? Of course, the only two countries whose military aid was protected were Israel and Egypt. Absolutely. By the Trump administration. But you're saying that...

the United States should use its ability to provide economic aid, food to Egypt, as leverage to get them to draw down their military escalation? In general, I think there would be a better use of their leverage on Egypt to help the civilian population. And there's a lot of need there for investment. Which is crazy. This is meant to be the breadbasket of the region. Absolutely. Instead it's the basket case. Absolutely. And there is a lot of difficulty in that regard.

vis-a-vis the Egyptian regime. This is a very significant and heavy boat to navigate in the region. Okay, so American economic aid, what else? That's one. Second of all, I would advise Israel to, for the first time, and that's absolutely insane, demand that the Egyptians, much like the Jordanians...

Change their educational system and their curricula and the messaging regarding inclusiveness, regarding Israel, regarding the Jewish people and regarding the West. This has not been done since the establishment of the peace agreement and the people learn to hate. I'm not saying dislike hate.

Israel. I know that, again, this may seem very difficult to say, this may seem very critical, but I stand behind my words. This is a

key to changing the prism of thinking. And yes, it will take 10 to 15 years, but we have never demanded that as something with which to go forward. And this is something that needs to be addressed. I'll give you an example alone. The Egyptian regime has asked us in the past years to attack the

Daesh. Daesh in the Sinai Peninsula. In fact, think about what I'm saying. They've asked Israel and Israeli capabilities and aircraft to attack. What do you mean they asked Israeli aircraft to attack? They asked the Israeli establishment and IDF to help them attack Daesh and ISIS inside the Sinai Peninsula.

Not them, but us. And we did this. We did this for them by their request. In other words, we helped them in a few mechanisms to fight their own internal terrorist cells. And we demanded...

No real return. We did not demand from them anything significant. On the contrary, Israel allowed the Egyptians to open the peace treaty and to enhance their capabilities and their personnel within the Sinai Peninsula.

In the Middle East, in this neighborhood, when you get a gift, you need to demand back. You need to be firm. And I'm not saying this without respect. You need to be respectful.

you need to be very, very honor conscious. And we should be honor conscious for the Egyptian regime. But on the other hand, we should demand a difference of messaging by the Egyptians vis-a-vis their educational system and messaging about us and the Jewish people.

And we have not done that. That's another policy recommendation that I would definitely recommend my people to take. Yeah, I mean, it would certainly be very helpful if the Egyptians reduced the amount of anti-Israel incitement in their education system. Not reduced. Eliminate. Annulled. Eliminate, eliminate, obliterate, exterminate. I mean, one of the things that's very concerning in Egypt is even if the

Sisi regime itself understands the importance of peace with Israel. You have a whole officer class in the military who will be consuming the same news as everyone else. Precisely.

thinking that Israel is committing genocide against the people of Gaza, God forbid, which obviously we're not. And that is something that is only going to poison attitudes in Egypt further. Let's go anticlockwise across the Gulf of Aqaba. I want to take a look at what is going on in Jordan with your permission, because I do want to do the full 360. But there's one very important policy recommendation still, and we cannot jump over that because...

It's so critical. As I said, the Egyptians are absolutely in a panic attack regarding the potential of the seeping of Gazans into their territory. Right. That's why they have what I think President Trump would call a big, beautiful wall along their border with Gaza. A beautiful wall. Very, very significant. And they know what they're talking about. It's hideous and concrete, but yes. They know what they're talking about and they know, and I say their fear is legitimate.

What we should do is stop or recommend to the Trump administration and to the world, explain that moving or even talking about moving Gazans or inviting them to move if they want to Egypt is a completely wrong policy.

Not because there's not enough land in Egypt to have them, but because one, we'd be moving the problem from one of our borders to a very different one of our borders. But the problem will still be there. Right. The same as President Trump's proposal that they go to Jordan, which would be massively destabilizing, quite apart from any other questions. Exactly. And second of all, it absolutely...

Absolutely horrifies the Egyptians. And as I said, legitimately, we should talk about a completely different option. And that's Qatar. The Qataris are the sanctuary givers of the Hamas. They are the ones, their ideological children are the Hamas.

They should host the Hamas, as they already do, but also the people of Gaza within their territory. And when I'm told that their territory is too small, that's absolutely not true. Eleven and a half thousand square kilometers, that's 30 times the size of the Gaza Strip. And that's quite enough space. Second, they need the workforce. And third, they have God knows enough money to host them comfortably. And

That's where they should go. And all the housing for the World Cup. Precisely. Well, look, I mean, obviously everyone's first preference would be that we can all live in peace side by side. But President Trump makes this point that it's simply impossible to clear that much rubble. Simply impossible to do reconstruction as long as, one, Hamas is still there. Exactly. And two, while there are people there, reconstruction itself poses a massive logistical challenge because there's so much rubble to clear and there's a lot of rubble, of course, because

Gaza's government, Hamas, chose to booby trap the place to the eyeballs and build an acropolis of 350 miles of tunnels underneath. And of course, there can be no reconstruction while the government of Gaza is committed to Israel's destruction. Exactly. Ruth, I want to go anti-clockwise. Let's have a look at Jordan for many decades. Absolutely.

Israel's quietest border, Israel's longest border, Israel's quietest border. Israel has a strategic interest in the stability of the kingdom of Jordan and the Hashemite regime. How stable is the regime?

How concerned are you that this could become the weak link in the regional architecture, destabilized by the Iranian regime, by other elements? And this is sort of the black swan that a dramatic event in Jordan suddenly transforms Israel's regional security architecture beyond recognition. Elon, you're so right. What you just asked... I like hearing that.

But truly embeds in and within itself the very answer. There is a huge level of instability in Jordan, first and foremost because of the makeup of the Jordanian population, which depends whom you ask, but is between 70% and 80% Palestinian. And the Iranian regime has been very, very active in the past years in destabilizing, inciting, fostering,

funding and really trying to terrorize, in a manner of speaking, the population against the Hashemite kingdom and in order to destabilize, because that's the raison d'être

of the Islamic Republic of Iran to destabilize societies from within and then to walk into that chaos and take control. And what they've been trying to do is basically to create a better presence and they've been strengthening Hamas and the Islamic Jihad inside Jordan

on the back of the Hashemite kingdom and the leadership in Jordan in order to strengthen the presence along the Israeli-Jordanian border, which is, for those who don't know, completely open.

completely without any kind of a wall. There's a fence, isn't there? No. There's no fence? No fence. There's no wall. There's no anything at all. And there is more than 336 kilometers between, actually that are mutual to the two countries. Now there is a fence 50 meters, 50 kilometers, pardon me,

from those 336 kilometers. And it's not a very high one. Right, I'm looking at pictures now. It really is, you know, it's the kind of ramshackle chain fence you might put around a farm.

Absolutely. Not to protect a border. Unbelievably. Certainly not a hostile border.

and drugs to the West Bank, Judea and Samaria, to the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad there in order to strengthen them and work contrary to

to the Palestinian Authority and Abu Mazen, which is the so-called, well, it's a bit funny, but democratically elected president. Yes, democratically elected nearly 20 years ago. Exactly. But they've been doing this, the Iranians, for many years, and of course to the Hezbollah in Lebanon via Jordanian soil. Now, having said all of that... So how do we stabilize the...

The Jordanian regime, given whatever disagreements we have with it, clearly it's preferable to the collapse of the political order on Israel's eastern flank. So there are two things which I would stress. First of all, the military continued support of the United States of America to the Jordanian Hashemite kingdom is

Second of all, not sending more Palestinians to destabilize that very fragile stability in Jordan. Plus, it would just move the problem, as I said, from the Gaza border with Israel to the Jordanian border with Israel. In other words, it would not solve the problem for Israel. And third, very, very importantly, I think, is

If you look at Jordan, it's quite unbelievable. But what I said about Egypt and the messaging and the educational system and the curriculum and the mosques, exactly the same thing. There is so much incitement, so much indoctrination against Israel, against the Jews and against the West. And that is something that must happen.

be demanded to change. And when the current administration in the United States looks at the region and the Trump administration courageously speaks of changing the region for the better, and I believe him,

then one of the key issues that needs to be addressed is changing the curriculum, changing the messaging. And that needs to be a core demand. Do you think that a so-called two-state solution would be stabilizing or destabilizing for Jordan? Absolutely destabilizing. Why? Because Jordan is asking for it.

All of the countries that want the Palestinian issue so-called a little bit further away from them are asking for it because they know how destabilizing

Unfortunately, and again, this is not politically correct, but the Palestinian contingent really is. And that simply has proved itself over history. As I said, in Lebanon, having killed thousands and thousands of Christians in Lebanon. But we're not talking about Palestinians in different countries. We're talking about the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the territory that Israel conquered from Jordan in the defensive war of 1967. Do you think that

the creation of a Palestinian state there would help to stabilize or further destabilize Jordan? So first of all, I would think that it would destabilize because I think an entity which would be a sovereign entity by the Palestinian people is a destabilizing force. That's what I believe, but not because of ideology, but because of past...

learning of historical activity that we've seen. Now, you've said something that I want to challenge. No, hang on, just explain why, because I want to... I will, I will, I promise. But I want to challenge something that you said. I will hold you to it.

I promise. And please do. When you say that Israel has conquered this territory from Jordan in 1967... From the illegal Jordanian occupation. Right, because I would beg to differ. According to international legal standards, the British mandate, in fact...

gave or it was all over the region including the current West Bank Judea and Samaria and Gaza and when it actually rescinded its power and allowed for

for the taking of or creating some kind of state by the Jews, by Israel, then those areas are within the sovereignty of the Israeli forces. This is the legal presumption of uti possidetis iuris. Anyone interested in learning more about it? We have an episode with a British barrister, Natasha Hausdorff,

who is an expert in the field. Who is a real expert. But I do want to get back to the focus of our discussion now about the threats on Israel's borders. We've heard here a number of arguments on this podcast about why an independent Palestinian state would be destabilizing. We heard Rowan Osman, an amazing Syrian peace advocate, explaining that within Iraq,

Iran's quest for regional domination, it would try to transform an independent Palestinian state into an Iranian client state so that it could hold Jerusalem as being, giving it title to leadership of the Islamic world. We heard another argument here that actually in the case of a two-state solution, an independent Islamic presence in Jerusalem would excite

the world's jihadists to try to converge on Jerusalem to liberate the rest of what they see as Arab or Islamic land from the river to the sea. The entry point for them to do so and reach Jerusalem would be to go through Jordan and Jordan would become like the drainage channel for the world's jihadi sludge.

to move to Jerusalem to try to continue the war. I'm interested in why you think that an independent Palestinian state would destabilize our region, because it's common knowledge, it's an international consensus. All the experts know that a two-state solution is going to solve this conflict, right? So, you know, Ilona, I would even share with you that once even I...

truly believe that for a lack of a better solution, that is in fact the solution. So did I. And I've changed my mind, uh, having learned Islam, the religion, having learned, uh, Arabic, uh,

and spending time in an Arab country, having spent years and years of my professional life studying the mentality and the culture and the religion, which is key, and the language in order to better understand. And I must say, again, less politically correct, but why is it a destabilizing force?

First of all, if we look at the inciting curriculum, and I'm sorry to be returning to it, but it's key to understand the answer to your question. Both in Gaza and in Judea and Samaria by the Palestinian Authority, so both by the so-called nationalistic Fatah movement and the religious Islamist movement Hamas,

both of them incitement and indoctrination, hating Jews, hating Israel, and wanting to conquer the entire land where the state of Israel is currently in place, and of course liberating Jerusalem. So all of that is being learned in both areas. Now if we create a two-state solution, whether the Fatah will be heading it, which will be very, very short-lived, or Jerusalem,

The Hamas will be heading it, an Islamist extremist regime like now. Beheading is an interesting choice of words. Exactly. Freudian, by the way, but still very, very appropriate. Still, this will be an extremist Islamist body. Now, think about that. It's impossible to avoid that conclusion. Exactly. And whether for Israel or for Jordan, it needs yet another...

Islamist extremist body right next to its borders. This is absolutely destabilizing because, as we said, they already have 70 to 80 percent Palestinian population. They already had Black September in 1970, where the former king killed many Palestinians to stop and attempt to undermine his authority. And we do have the Islamic Republic of Iran

to destabilize the kingdom and create yet another backyard for its own ambitions, but so will the Salafis, so will the extremist Hamas or Mubarak

Muslim Brotherhood. Right, they would obviously use an independent Palestinian state as a basis also to destabilize the monarchy in Jordan. Absolutely. And the whole reason, I go back to my first sentence, the entire reason is not only to liberate the entire state of Israel because we are non-believers. Conquer, not liberate.

Well, liberate in their language, absolutely. The people who are listening on audio platforms can't see the air quotes, but if you're watching on YouTube, you can. Absolutely. Oh, gosh. I must repeat, from their point of view, of course, this is anything but resistance in my humble opinion, but rather, and I stress, the objective is to create a worldwide caliphate first...

by conquering or actually destroying the state of Israel because we are considered non-believers in the house of Islam, on Islamic lands, Dar al-Islam. And then liberating, or in inverted commas, I stress for those who are not watching, Jerusalem, that would give them the symbolic freedom

if you wish, to speak to the rest of the Muslim world and have them get excited about creating the worldwide caliphate on the rest of Western soil, which is obvious when you look at the infiltration of extreme Islamism in Europe, in Canada. By the way, in Canada, the most massive,

membership of the Muslim Brotherhood in the entire globe. Do you know that? Whereas in the UAE... Per capita is a total number? What are you talking about? Absolutely. Per capita? Per capita. Per capita of the total Canadian population? Exactly. No way. And the reason for that is why? Because they are allowed to be Muslim Brothers in the open. Whereas in the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, they are outlawed.

Ruth, let's continue our journey anticlockwise of the looming threats on Israel's border. No one could have imagined when Hamas launched the October 7th war that the dominoes were going to fall and lead to the collapse of the Assad regime. That happened because the war in Gaza triggered a Hezbollah attack from Lebanon. That brought an Israeli response that took down Hezbollah, the main ally of the Assad regime, which then crumbled in 11 days as the rebels in Idlib swept across the whole country.

And it's now embarking on a charm offensive to tell the world, reassure it, that what it's really interested in is the reconstruction of Syria, that it's not as scary as you would think, given that, you know, Al-Jalani was recently on the list of, you know, America put a bounty on his head for his location until he started hosting world leaders at the Damascus presidential palace. And it was perfectly clear where he was.

Israel has been on the side of waving a red flag and saying, do not let yourselves be fooled. Our foreign minister, Gideon Sa, just visited the EU, the first European-Israel Association Council that should have happened a long time ago. He dismissed the idea of a transition government in Syria as being a moderate force. He said the new government is a jihadist, Islamist terror group from Idlib that took Damascus by force.

The Islamists speak softly, just like Iran did in 1979, but they are exacting vengeance on the Alawites and hurting and harming the Kurds. We've also seen Israel demanding international protections for the Druze in southern Syria. We've seen Netanyahu, the prime minister, demanding no Syrian military presence south of Damascus, essentially trying to expand security

the buffer zone we've already created by creating another demilitarized zone inside Syria. I'm wondering when you look at these dramatic changes inside Syria, how you evaluate the threat. Is this

An opportunity for a more stable border because there is a country that is now going to be focused on reconstruction and is going to have no interest in adventures and attacking Israel and they're going to clamp down on Iranian smuggling routes and this is a good thing for Israel? Or is Mr. Al-Jolani a wolf in sheep's clothing and we should be worried? Both. Explain, please.

Both. The Middle East is complicated. Yes, it's complicated. It's not black or white. It's a myriad of nuances, but this is rather less nuanced. We are talking about jihadist, Salafi extremist Islamists that were affiliated with ISIS and Al-Qaeda and have now taken over, as you had said, because of the weakening of the Shiite axis and

but we need to understand who is behind this and who is behind this is the father of Muslim Brotherhood and that's Erdogan of Turkey. So we need to understand that we have on our so-called borders, not al-Julani and a terrorist group, but in potential, but Erdogan's

And that is a completely different story. This is a member of NATO, a very, very strong country. You see the Al-Jolani government as what, like a proxy of Ankara? In a manner of speaking, absolutely. There is a will of Ankara to shorten routes to the West in terms of energy.

and to make a lot of money and to become the center of that route. And that's a very, very strategically staunch and relevant plan. And I believe that the American administration quite understands that and the strength that lies within that. However, it's

If we annul the presence of Erdogan in Syria, in fact, not annul, but almost circumvent that by creating an alliance with Saudi Arabia, then the route can go via Israel, Saudi Arabia, and then to the West, and that shortens the route even further. And that's a mechanism via which money, centralism, and let's say circumvention of

extremism. So this is a good thing? Well, if it is circumvented. Now about the threat. If we understand that Salafi extremist Islamist regime in Syria is

hand in hand with Turkey, and their aim is first and foremost to rebuild Syria, to strengthen Syria, to open it to foreign investment, to get the West to take away the sanctions and the blacklisting of Hayat al-Tahrir, then we understand the suits, the trimming of the beard, the taking off of the turbans. All of these things are not against the fatwas, not against the...

practices of Islamic religion. You're saying it's all a show to reassure the West that these aren't Islamist extremists after all? Exactly, exactly. So in the short term, Israel is not on the agenda, only for the short term, because Salafi Islamic tradition and religion is in epitome.

Impossible within it to accept the non-believers on the land in Dar al-Islam, meaning they cannot accept the reaching out of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Shiite Islam.

It is impossible. This is against the grain of Salafi Islam. It cannot be accepted.

It cannot be negotiated. It cannot be taken away. This is against Allah. It is impossible. So a potential long-term security threat coming from Syria, something to keep our eye on. Let's continue anticlockwise. Lebanon. Yes. When the October 7th war began, Hezbollah, Iran's proxy army in Lebanon, was the most powerful non-state actor in the world. It has now been reduced to...

an almost leaderless militia, I say almost leaderless because the leader didn't even go to Hassan Nasrallah's funeral, that is under pressure. We saw just recently Israeli warplanes flying over Hassan Nasrallah's funeral in Beirut and Hezbollah didn't respond at all. All they could do is wave angry fists at the sky. The Israeli warplanes came though this time as liberators. And I don't mean that in a trollish way.

Israel's destruction of Hezbollah has not only given the Lebanese people an opportunity to take their country back from the Islamic Republic of Iran, it mandates that they do it. The terms of the ceasefire, which envisaged the Lebanese armed forces taking back Hezbollah positions south of the Litani River, that ceasefire mandates...

that the Lebanese restore their sovereignty over their territory, away from the Iranian occupation. I wonder when you look at our northern border, until recently our most dangerous border, do you think that the Lebanese army is going to successfully take up the challenge, remove Hezbollah from southern Lebanon, restore Lebanese security and sovereignty,

Or do you see Hezbollah reconstituting, not least because, as our foreign minister, Gideon Saar, recently said, Iran is trying to continue smuggling funds into Hezbollah and it's doing it through Turkey with Turkish cooperation. That was a sigh for those who don't watch. So first of all, I think that we need to understand that Lebanon was formed in

almost superficially by the European powers, like all the countries in the Middle East, Jordan, Egypt, actually Egypt less, but Jordan very much so, and Syria certainly, as a sanctuary for the Christians in the Middle East. This is something that according to the Islam, especially the Salafi Islam, is an impossibility.

Now, it's difficult to comprehend how deeply that is ingrained in the belief, in the ideology, in the understanding of radical Islam and Islam in general. There cannot be a country governed by non-Muslims and non-Muslims.

That's okay. That is an impossibility. It is incongruent with the core belief. That's number one. Right, but Lebanon isn't a majority Christian state anymore. No longer, no longer. That's number one. But we need to keep that in mind when we understand what is going on in Lebanon. Now, the Hezbollah has been significantly weakened, I agree with you.

I beg to differ on the destroyed because they are a wounded animal whose honor and respect has been badly hurt. And that's a very dangerous animal to reckon with. And so is the Islamic Republic of Iran.

They will not put their tail between their legs and walk away. They will put up a huge fight and they will do it until their last warrior. You don't see a scenario in which Iran cuts its losses in Lebanon or the Lebanese armed forces with all the money the European Union and other actors are sending it away.

And takes it back. It's sovereignty. I mean, the smuggling routes through Syria have been shut down, basically. Absolutely not. And one can see it on the contrary. As I explained, first and foremost, there are Shiites. And according to their belief and the Islamic Republic of Iran, it's a very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very

This is the main stronghold remaining for the Axis, not the only one, because they continue, despite their difficulties, economic and other, to fund the Hamas in Gaza, in Judea and Samaria, in Lebanon as well, and now also in Syria. But first and foremost, the Hezbollah, their own Shiite group,

if you wish, inside Lebanon. They won't give it up, not easily and not at all. Do you see any prospect for Lebanon joining the circle of normalization and the signature of a, the signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon? I absolutely do. I dream of it. I, uh,

I truly wish for it. Right, we all just want to, you know, southern Lebanon for a long weekend, you can drive up, go stay at what they call in Hebrew a tzimer, like a guest house in the countryside. It's a beautiful, beautiful piece of land to vacation in. You know, alone, in general, I think the vast majority of Israelis are,

don't see Lebanon as an enemy nor the Lebanese people. No, of course not. On the contrary, I think... They've been the biggest victims of Iranian and Palestinian aggression in the region, perhaps more than us. Absolutely. And first and foremost, the Christians of Lebanon, but not only, also others.

And they've been suffering from civil war for so many years and destabilization. And to answer your question about the army taking over and stabilizing, they will not do it unless the West supports them. Because as I said, Hezbollah will not willingly go anywhere at all. And a wounded animal is a very dangerous one. And the West is supporting them. And part of the reason we haven't seen...

or rather the withdrawal went over schedule, is that the Lebanese army simply was not strong enough to take over all the positions from Hezbollah. That's why the West had to send it more military aid to put it in that position. And that will require further cultivating. Ruth, final question. You don't have a crystal ball in your handbag, do you? Well, unfortunately. You left it at home. Absolutely. If you had a crystal ball and you were looking at Israel's borders, Egypt, Jordan,

Syria, Lebanon. Let's put aside Gaza, West Bank, Judea and Samaria for now. Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon. Ten years time, which border is the most dangerous for Israel? Wow. And which is the safest? That's a very difficult question.

question to answer because things are so volatile and so mobile. And just think in 10 years people are going to watch the back catalogue of this podcast on YouTube and hold you to your answer. And that's why I will be very very cautious because as you say my crystal ball is left in my bedroom. It's a very good question and I dare say that I don't have the answer. I can only hope as a mother

as a Jewish Israeli, a proud Jewish Israeli, that war will be less dominant than it is today for the sake of my children, and please God, their own children when they will be there, and for the sake of the people in general. Am I very optimistic that this will be the case?

I'm trying. I'm trying to be. We're all doing our best. We're all doing our best to be optimistic. We are living in very difficult times at the moment. And that ambivalence of your answer that you're looking at these four borders and say you have absolutely no idea which is going to be the most stable, which is going to be the most dangerous in 10 years, whether...

which of the regimes will fall, will be replaced, which country will have a civil war, shows the danger of the reality that we're living in. Before October 7th, there was a thought in Israel that we could allow these threats to build up on our borders and we would be able to read the enemy's intentions and do something in time. That conception collapsed on October 7th. And I think Israelis are now thinking in terms of

not allowing any threats to build up on our borders, but there is so much uncertainty, so much instability that anyone who is discussing

security in the Middle East, what Israel's security interests are, simply has to factor in that question of unpredictability, the lack of wiggle room we have, how quickly things can turn sour and how badly things can go when things do go belly up, and that we are fated perhaps not to live

by our sword forever, but certainly to remain ever vigilant because the prospect that in 10 years time, all of our borders are going to be peaceful and quiet. Like, you know, the Schengen zone is, is extremely unrealistic. And even the Schengen zone is not so peaceful anymore. Quite the contrary. Ruth, how can people follow your work and,

you on social media and any of the other activities you're doing apart from following the Citizen Spokesperson accounts where we share all the interviews that you have been doing in the international media and thank you for that and being one of our voices. So it's first of all my pleasure. I feel that I'm really performing a kind of a calling. It's coming from very deep within because I believe that

in what I'm doing. I believe that had we had the chance, Israeli people would have very much wanted to reach out and have reached out and really gone for more peace. However, we face the 7th of October with a lot of pain, and I say this again as a mother, and with a lot of fear, with a lot of caution.

I very much will be happy to have whoever is listening or watching follow me on Facebook, on LinkedIn, on Instagram, on Twitter or X, and also at the Citizen Spokesperson's Office, of course. I give many talks to audiences in the international arena and within Israel, both in English and in Hebrew.

And it is a pleasure for me to try, try and break down this very, very complex conflict. We're all trying to perform our civic duty. Ruth Wasserman Lande, thank you very much for coming on State of a Nation. Thank you. It's a pleasure.

And that brings us to the end of today's episode of State of a Nation with former member of Knesset and former deputy ambassador in Cairo, Ruth Wasserman. Lande, as always, if you are enjoying these episodes, please follow on all social media platforms. Give us a like, share it with friends. That helps us. And also subscribe if you're watching on YouTube on the button that just popped

I'm Elon Levy, and thanks for joining us.