Ukraine will not give up - with Dmytro Natalukha, a Ukrainian MP
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Feelings inside and outside Ukraine are different. Outside, most people think Ukraine is doomed. Inside, most believe Ukraine will stand and never give up. I share the inside view, as does my guest today, a very active member of the Ukrainian parliament. You're listening to the Explain Ukraine podcast.

Explain Ukraine is a podcast by Ukraine World, a multilingual media outlet about Ukraine. My name is Volodymyr Yermolenko. I'm a Ukrainian philosopher, the chief editor of Ukraine World and the president of PEN Ukraine. My guest today is Dmytro Natalukha, a member of the Ukrainian parliament, the chairman of the Economics Affairs Committee and one of the most visible Ukrainian MPs from the ruling party.

UkraineWorld is brought to you by Internews Ukraine, one of Ukraine's largest media NGOs. You can support our work at patreon.com/UkraineWorld

We really need your support now because our media is increasingly relying on crowdfunding. You can also support our volunteer trips to the frontline areas where we help both soldiers and civilians, bringing cars for soldiers and books for civilians. You can support our trips at PayPal, Ukraine.resistinggmail.com. You will find these links in the description of this episode. So let's begin.

Mithro Natalukha, welcome to this podcast. Thank you. Thank you, Volodymyr. I'm very happy to have you here. And three years have passed since the full-scale invasion. And 11 years have passed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. So where are we? What is the point geopolitically, militarily, socially? Where are we? It's been quite a road.

And after the recent UNIC security conference, I would say that we are in the room where it seems that we are the only adults. And I mean, it's not to offend anyone, but it's just, in my opinion, the reality that we have found ourselves. And in a way, even our European partners have found themselves. Because, like, it's really hard to explain otherwise, right?

these three years of full-scale invasion and those 11 years of war in a way hardly changed a thing in an attitude towards Russia and towards the risks Russia poses. Moreover, we have a new situation in the US when we were hopeful that we managed to isolate the

the leadership of Russia that we managed to make him in a way untouchable, in a bad way, right? All of a sudden, we're seeing a total shift in that perception by Washington, who says, no, no, no, no, that person and his representatives are basically okay to deal with. They are okay to shake hands with.

we can carry on with them. It's a matter of negotiations. And that is an incredible blow, in my opinion, to all the efforts that our diplomacy and our partners' diplomacy put so much effort into, at least in the last three years. So that is also a very interesting challenge as well. Would other countries follow this change of attitude?

still to be seen, but definitely some political parties in those countries will be promoting this idea that listen, we have been telling you this in the beginning, it's time to stop pretending that we can change anything in Russia. Let's talk to them. Let's talk to Putin. Let's talk to whoever else. For us, imagining that we are still living in the same world with Putin and then we perhaps will have

some sort of a ceasefire with Russia that will still be governed by Putin was something unbelievable, but this is precisely the path that we are being pushed to by Washington. So I would first ask you about Europe. There were some different reactions from the Munich Security Conference, and depending on the country about which we're talking. Some people are saying Europe is waking up,

Some people are saying there is a wake-up call, although we know that there were so many wake-up calls and I mean it takes too much time to wake up for Europe. But some other people, given the fact that many countries like Spain, Poland, Germany, some others are reluctant to send troops to Ukraine, that it is still in a deep sleep. What is your perception?

I think, I mean, there was a brilliant and basically a formidable book. Was it by Clark? The Sleepwalkers, right? About how Europe went into the First World War. And I see so many parallels with the same attitude towards the same risks, toward the same challenges and the same problems. So in a way, some countries might be awake to

Is this like properly awake or is it still sleepwalking towards the abyss, which would be even a bigger conflict in the future? So I would say, as weird as it might sound, that we are now, we have found ourselves, at least the European continent, in a certain Pax Ukraina.

Meaning that we became, not that we are the ones who are guaranteeing the security, but we became a cornerstone, which if taken out, the whole security infrastructure will collapse. Absolutely, especially after what is happening in the United States.

I mean, I always tell the Europeans, look, I was telling them since 2022, like imagine a situation when Trump comes to power and then he undermines NATO or he withdraws from NATO. What are you going to do? And they were looking at me like I was a crazy guy. Now it's a reality. Absolutely. So basically, they don't have the power to defend themselves against Russians because...

I mean, Russian army is huge, it's powerful, Ukrainians can resist against it, but it's no guarantee that any other army will be able to do that. No, by all means, by all means. And I mean, we're talking about experience, we're talking about the understanding of their tactics, we're talking about the understanding of the strategies, of the brutality, of all those kind of things. And by all means, it's a very peculiar situation. But

Keeping in mind this fact that in a way this already is a de facto Pax Ukraina, at least in Europe, we are now being pushed by Washington to deplete ourselves and to basically let everything go, just to surrender to whatever the conditionalities are. And today we heard our president who said that I have an idea

an impression that we are now discussing an ultimatum set up by the Russians in 2022, which is a bit weird because we're definitely not in 2022. I mean, a lot of things have changed.

And Europeans will be discussing an ultimatum that Russians are pronounced in 2021. Yeah. Meaning then retreat from NATO 97 borders and then Poland should be neutral. I don't know, Czech Republic should be neutral. And of course they will be neutral and that means they will not be in the NATO and therefore Russians will enter into those countries. And it's very possible. No, by all means, by all means. And...

what is interesting is that, um, in 2022, we have, we have been discussing with some colleagues and some foreign colleagues, the, the probability of the consequences in case Russia wins, you know, okay, not wins, gets the upper hand. So, um,

It manages to occupy some territories, it manages to get away from the sanctions, it manages to keep the governing elite in power and so on and so forth. And basically we are left with deal with that option. And at that time we were theorizing to which consequences for Europe this might lead and

one of the consequences was that there will be a new center of power in the world, in European Asia, in Eurasia. And populist pro-Russian parties that have been silent until today will now have a reasonable option to say, hey guys, listen, those are some tough guys as well. They managed to basically...

over the whole NATO bloc so we don't want to

align ourselves with the EU or the States anymore. Let's align ourselves with Moscow and let's talk about basically canceling the sanctions. Let's talk about restarting the trade relationships and so on and so forth. And we are talking about populist parties in Germany, in Austria, in Italy perhaps, in some other countries, even in the UK.

But at that time, what we were thinking, that would definitely change the whole landscape of Europe, political landscape, and it would change Europe as we know today. But at that time, we have been discussing Russia as a potential alternative magnet. And today, how interesting the same happens, but with the States.

It's interesting how all the far-right parties who have famous for their anti-Americanism and anti-American imperialism, the very moment when America became really an empire, they become pro-American. Fascinating. Fascinating. And it's already changing the political landscape of Europe. Yeah, I agree with you that it's a very, very big challenge for Europe. And

And it's a very low understanding in Europe about this, about the challenges inside. Even if Ukraine does not lose the war, and we of course...

We, of course, believe that it's not going to lose the war, but even if there are no, like, collapse of Ukraine politically, well, Russia can always attack Europe through militarily through the Baltic states or Poland or Finland or France.

from the inside just splitting the countries and splitting the political systems. Let me ask you this question. Like when I'm reading about all these negotiations in the foreign press, everybody is saying, okay, Ukraine is doomed, Putin and Trump will decide on everything. And I'm telling all them, look, look at the last decades of history here in Eastern Europe.

It was all about Ukrainian agency and Ukrainian subjectivity. That we went not only against the Russian will, but we went against the American will several times when, for example, the Soviet Union was about to collapse. We went against the Europeans' will when they didn't want us to get inside Ukraine.

Now, why do you think that Ukrainians will give up their agency and subjectivity? And you are now even talking in bigger concepts, like the whole European security depends on Ukraine. Can you develop on that? I'm not sure whether one could say there is a kind of thing as a national character. But if we take that as a concept, perhaps simply historically, because Ukraine was always under...

different empires until 1991 in a way, including the USSR, of course. I think that we have developed in ourselves this, you know, inner feeling of resisting whatever rules are being imposed on us except for the rules we set ourselves. And those rules appeared only after 1991, the ones that we set ourselves.

And now what we see is a reminiscence to those times when we did not control our own country, our own legislative, our own fate in a way. And we are being forced to subject to specific rules or to specific consensuses that we understand would limit us greatly. And I think that is something that touches very much

on this natural, of this national character that one might argue there is. And this is why it creates so much criticism inside the Ukrainian society. I mean, I haven't heard, okay, I've heard very few voices in the Ukrainian society who said, yeah, let's accept everything the states tell us and just let's become the 50, whatever, first, 52nd state, just colonize us.

it became a stupid thing to say. Because another thing this war has produced is also a feeling of self-dignity. It has strengthened this feeling very much, in my opinion at least, and from what I see. And people naturally think, okay, if we have managed to resist the demands and ultimatums of Russia,

At the time when we were at our lowest probably, when we were literally almost helpless, there was chaos in the country like the first couple of weeks. And we didn't fall and we managed to push back and we managed to regain territory and we managed to inflict a colossal amount of damage and we are still doing this.

And now if you check the news and updates around Pokrovsk, Ukraine still manages to recapture some villages to gain some territory. Why should we give everything up only because a country like the States have said so? I mean, this is an interesting feature probably of ourselves, but in a way, I think when you have nothing to lose...

Something like the Samson option turns on. You know, this biblical legend of Samson sitting in the Philistinian temple. And when he realizes that there's nothing left, he just tears apart the columns, the ceiling falls down, killing him and all of the Philistinians with him. So he kind of dragged everyone to the tomb with himself. And this is precisely the feeling I'm getting from more and more people here in Ukraine.

that for us it's a matter of existence anyway. I mean, we have seen what the Russians are doing to us. The moment they colonize, they take territories, they are colonizing us culturally, economically, socially, and ethically. So if you think that it would just go away because one person said so, it won't. And if you don't have enough...

experience, brains or intelligence to realize the scenario this will drag and the consequences, then okay, we will do whatever depends on us. But then sorry, guys, but you will be probably falling with us together.

I really share this story with you and I really have the same opinion. But what worries me, and let's be frank with our listeners, is that there is this level of consolidation of Ukrainians, but there are so many signs that it is weakening. So we have new and new kind of fractures in the society. There is increasing mistrust or even hatred,

on the part of those who are in the army with regard to civilians who hide from the army, who do nothing. There is also some kind of hatred from the civilians who don't want to go to the army. And we see some horrible examples of how people identify themselves with those who avoid the military service rather with the army.

And we have more and more political criticism, which is absolutely normal in Ukraine, of Zelenskyy government, of the ruling party. Don't you have the impression that it's so fragile that it can collapse from within? Of course it can. And let's, I mean, let's accept this. Russia will do anything, literally anything, that it does collapse.

And they're very good at subversion. Hands down, probably they are the best in the world. I mean, they know this tradecraft very well since the KGB times, and they have been only improving it. And unlike, unfortunately, our Western allies, would rather not engage in hostile information campaigns and so on and so forth, because for them it's a matter of principle and ethics, fairly so.

I respect that. But when your existence is at stake, perhaps you should consider or reconsider. But in my opinion, I think that what might be a game changer is precisely us winning or start winning in certain ways.

aspects and in certain places in the battlefield. I mean, I know you go to the front line a lot and thank you for doing that. It's really incredibly important. And I don't know what you hear from our guys there, but the last time I went there, I talked to some friends of mine and this was precisely when the Northern Koreans were introduced, right? And my friends told us, me and some other MPs who were there,

They told us, nobody's fighting for Ukraine. And I was like, how do you say so? And he says, no, I mean, like physically, nobody's fighting for Ukraine. I was like, no, no, no, wait a minute. We have the International Legion. We have people from Colombia, Great Britain, Sweden, France, Ireland, everywhere in the world. Like, yeah, but those are volunteers. Those are people who have decided to come at their own will.

What North Korea did is they adopted a policy decision on the state level that they are introducing their forces into this war on the Russian side. No other country did the same for Ukraine. And that was a hard question to answer, to be honest, because, I mean, in a way, they have a point.

But the thing is that, okay, of course, we argued that our allies are providing us with weapons, with all the instruments to oppose Russians and North Koreans. But then again, when there is not enough instruments on the front line, you're having another difficult question to answer. Now, in my opinion, what might be a game changer, and we have seen this during the Kharkiv counteroffensive,

right, is when you have enough of what is required. Ukrainians, and we have seen this, are very good at waging wars, really. I mean, I don't know where it comes from, but it turns out we're good at waging war. And when we start showing success, our own people

want to be on the side of the winner, which is natural. I think every human being wants to be on the side of the winner. So when you're saying that people are progressing,

People are not just being wasted in the trenches under the hostile FPV fire or hostile artillery shelling. We are recapturing what has been taken or taking the Kursk operation. Do you remember the upheaval that, I mean, in a way that is uprising in a good way that was in the Ukrainian society? There were some debates on whether it makes sense or it doesn't, but those debates were on the margins.

The major part, at least of what I was witnessing, was yes, we root for you, we support you. So donations increased. People started enrolling themselves more because they saw an opportunity to literally wage war on the Russian territory. For them, for some reason, it made sense. And what I'm trying to say is that

If our allies would understand this, that we are still able to do it ourselves, the problem is the instruments that we lack, that would solve also the internal so-called crisis. Because as soon as we start showing progress and success, we start unifying and reunifying back our own population. Because when all you see is basically misery,

and giving away territories, losing territories, death, and, you know, this fatigue, it's naturally that people start discussing, questioning whose fault is this, why is this happening, why is this going on. So in a way, to stop, it's weird because to stop this internal kind of rotting

We need to start winning, but to start winning, we need getting what we require. And to get that, we need our partners, and the partners are not giving it to us. And in a way, it's a vicious circle because what our partners are telling us, you are losing anyway. No, we're not, and we might still win if you give us what we've been asking for all these years.

including we will win the hearts and minds of our own people. We will win them back as soon as we start winning on the battlefield again.

How do you see the developments in the Ukrainian army? Because I see two very different trends. The first trend is that smart people, very intelligent people have been to some headquarters. I mean, it's amazing how technologically advanced it is. The planning of the operations, the implementing of the operations, the level how you actually operate with big data, you operate with reconnaissance drones, you operate with...

with information actually, not only with artificial intelligence, whatever. But on the other hand, we see that what Ukrainians are calling paper army. We see that the paper army, we see that horrible bureaucracy, we see that absurdity. We see the commanders who are not caring about the soldiers. And it seems that there are two realities. And I don't know

what reality is going to win? And there is a fear that the reality of the Soviet army will win. I mean, I'm no expert in military affairs. I don't want to even pretend to be one. But I can tell you that we've been to a number of different brigades. And I think it's the same as you take the whole society. And then you go to different departments in different homes, different cities.

And you will see that somewhere there is certain decay. Somewhere there is, on the other side, you know, some prosperity and everything is going according to a plan. Because, I mean, we've been to one brigade, typical rubber barons, you know, like,

Literally, I have an impression that everything they own, they have taken it from the enemy. Like literally the state gave them nothing or something. They have traded it for something else. And they are absolutely incredible. But then you go to some other brigade and it's a tank brigade. And those are typical Kazakhs. You know, they have this community.

They're very close. They are very, how to say, they have some vegetables on the side. They're growing them. They have some fruit trees. They're growing them. They're keeping some chickens and cows. So they're well prepared to survive a nuclear winter. You have to have a chicken batata. Yeah, yeah, absolutely. No, and they're very serious about this. So like if we...

we will experience a shortage in supplies, we can feed ourselves, we can provide for ourselves. And then you go to some guys like Kazov,

And those guys are nuts in terms of the discipline, in terms of how extremely well they are prepared, in terms of how they look, even how they look. Nuts, you mean crazy? I mean, in a good way, in a good way. I mean, they are obsessed of being the best, you know. I mean, that was at least my personal impression.

They are all uniform. They all follow the rules. They don't talk in the HQ premises if it's not for work or something. You will never see some guys wearing flip-flops outside, having a cigarette and playing World of Tanks on a mobile phone. At least, I mean, that was my impression. I was absolutely...

shock, but in a good way from what I saw. And so the point I'm trying to make is that this is in a way a reflection of our society. There is no good people, no bad people. I mean,

There is just Ukrainians and some people are dealing with some challenges in a certain way. The others deal with the same challenges in a different way. I do understand that there is a problem of the Soviet paper armies, the bureaucracy and everything else. That is probably the challenge of the general stuff.

to deal with it. Are they doing a good job? Again, I don't know. I'm not a military person. I hear different opinions. I have some friends of mine who are at war saying that they are doing a horrible job and the general staff is useless and they're wasting people and they're wasting time and so on and so forth. And then you have some other guys, again, from Azov, from the 3rd Storm Brigade, who are saying, listen, we don't really care what they do.

For us, what matters is what we do. We do it in the right way, everyone is happy. And so, like, I don't have a right answer here. That's what I'm trying to say. That's incredible. I also agree with you that there is this anarchic element in the Ukrainian army that is always there. And it's a very strange competition between the units, like between different brigades. So it seems sometimes I have the impression that

Okay, Russians, they are indifferent towards Russians. Russians are enemies. They need to be exterminated. No emotions about them. But whom we hate, who we really hate, is headquarters, general staff, the brigade, which is another town, the policemen who are on the block post. These guys are we hate. And I don't know, this anarchism...

very intrinsically Ukrainian character. It brings positive sides because people are aware of what they can do. They take the responsibility on themselves. But on the other hand, of course, we understand that it can fragment very much the army. But let me ask you about mobilization. From your perspective, from the parliamentarian perspective, how you see that process? Because everybody says we lack people, we

Again, there is unwillingness of many civilians to go to the army. There are problems of recruitment. On the other side, you go to these brigades like 3rd Storm Brigade or Khartia who are very, very present and they mobilize people and people want to go there. How's your estimate? Again, I think in a way that we are failing on the national level with information policy.

I mean, I do understand that there is a price that you pay for democracy, but perhaps the martial law should have some implications. Because the only thing I see when I get into some news channels, when you enter Telegram, when you enter TikTok, is basically how bad the army is and how horrible the TZK is, those who recruit people.

And that is actually very different from, if you remember, 2022, when the same news outlets were flooded with videos of our soldiers dancing, being happy, you know, like showing around and just showing some camaraderie with their buddies and stuff.

saying everything is fine just trust us believe in us donate us and there was this feeling of um and it was also bad because it's created the impression that the war is easy precisely that we don't we we don't need to care you should trust the the army and that's it precisely so it's going like a pendulum you know in a way from one extremity to to another extremity and um

In my opinion, the thing is that we do not control the narrative inside. Because I'm not saying everything is fine. Mobilization is always a challenge. It's not just about Ukraine. I mean, take the same states during the Second World War. I mean, they have introduced a specific fee, which you were able to pay if you didn't want to get enrolled and enlisted in the army.

they had some serious problems even in the UK during the Second World War, even though they were at the same peril that we are and they realized that basically it's about their own existence. So it's not a walk in the park for any country. The problem is that what is being demonstrated to the public and now as to the previous point that we've been discussing,

why and from where would you get the motivation to join the forces if everything you see is decay, defeatism, and how bad is everything, how corrupted is everyone, and so on and so forth. So in a way, that doesn't help for sure to enroll or to join. My cousin was conscripted

I think months ago, probably months and a half or something. He lived in Kharkiv and he moved to Ivano-Frankivsk. And on his example, I was able to analyze how different it is. I mean, he read the same news. He watched the same news outlets. But he had some buddies in a specific brigade who were telling him that, listen, it's not that bad.

We have what we need. We are being trained. Our commanders care about us. So if you get conscripted, join us. And that's what he did. And now, I mean, as for a soldier, he's super happy. So that is precisely something that should be, you know, signalized and communicated to the outside, but it's not. What we're seeing is basically only some...

pretty posters, which is better than nothing. I agree. Then you have some YouTube channels, but they also run by some private initiative, by those brigades, and not everyone sees those. But in terms of a nationwide kind of informational effort, I don't think that's being paid enough attention to.

Let's talk about the war economics because economics is your field. I remember when we met at one of the events and you were saying that, look,

Ukrainians are very smart, technologically good, but we lack the capacity to produce at large scale. We have huge amount of different small factories who are producing drones and the Russians can do this large scale production and we probably make better things, but we are unable to scale them up. Is it still the reality? It is still the reality. It is still the reality. It has to deal with the same anarchism you mentioned.

In my opinion, this feature of anarchism, in a way, it has breeded adaptivity in us, which is a good thing. But the same adaptivity forces us to consider any rules as an obstacle to our existence. The tragedy is that any civilization was built around rules and following the rules.

We're not good at that. We're not good at that. So when we are being told, what I'm leading is to, when we are being told you should produce en masse only a specific kind of drones, everyone starts yelling, you're killing competition, you're killing the market, you're killing this entrepreneurial spirit. We want to be creative. Yeah, yeah. No, but I mean, fair enough. Fair enough. But probably not during this time.

Even though this, in my opinion, is precisely this war, I mean, is a pivot in what power is globally. Like before 2022, power was about economics, progress, technologies, innovations. And even small countries were able to project an incredible amount of power simply because of their economic powerhouse.

Netherlands, the UK, Austria, Switzerland, you name it. What happened after 2022 is that Russia said, I don't agree. I think power is about demographics. You can have the most sophisticated army in the world, maybe the most innovative army in the world, but I have enough people that will hold a Kalashnikov in hands

and will be running towards your most innovative tanks, and in the end someone will get there and will throw a grenade inside. And in my opinion, this is what this war is about. And in the beginning, we haven't seen quite a sophisticated Russian army, have we? No, it was just huge, and it still is.

in a way. And only after some time they realized that technology is key. So they start employing the Iranians with the drones and so on and so forth. But even today, basically, in my opinion, the bet is on the population. And you cannot outnumber them by no means. And not just Ukraine. There is hardly any country in Europe that can outnumber the population of Russia.

Even the EU combined will have difficulties with this because of different aspects. And if Putin is right, if he proves his point,

that basically brute force is again the decisive factor in foreign relations and in the new order. If demographics prevails over economics, then we're all screwed and we're living in a very dangerous world. Not only demographics, but demographics with very low value of human life. So your ability to sacrifice as many people without any consequences. And this is one of the points of the Russian army.

And I think the only way to deal with it is to invent technology which will save your people but kill as many soldiers of this sadistic or masochistic, I don't know, necrophilic army. What else? This is precisely the point I'm leading to. So the only way to challenge, in my opinion, the demographics of Iran, Russia, North Korea, China, Iran,

is to stay inventive like our people are, to stay creative, to produce some new instruments and new solutions, but then being able to scale them. And scaling is key, and that's where we need the Europeans.

So let's talk about Europeans, because Europeans, the mood in Europe is that we cannot do anything. We are screwed. I mean, the mood in those people who support Ukraine is very pessimistic. What I'm telling them, look, you should not be...

I mean, you should not be like mobilizing all your population. What we need from you is, yeah, probably some contingents here on the ground. But what we also need is economic support so that Ukraine produces its arms on a larger scale. Because we produce a lot already. We produce a lot of drones.

You don't have this armament, so you are way behind us technologically. You probably are doing good tanks, but they're not necessarily on the front line in that way as they were. You're producing your good Mercedes, but nobody cares about your Mercedes. But you can help us technologically and financially as well.

Is my argument correct? Yeah, your argument is very precise because again we are being very innovative per se because of this adaptivity features that we have. Then we are able to test, which is probably more important, our ideas right away on the battlefield. But then what we need is capital.

to start the production of whatever the new ideas is or the update of the older instruments and then we need the ability to scale that. It's really hard to scale everything here and it's even more harder to get the capital here.

But what we can do is we can share those production lines, those technologies, those solutions with our partners and they can centralize the production of that, which is not happening. Because I've been talking to some senior officials in Brussels just a couple of weeks ago and they told me this, like picture this. In the States, they have only one tank production

that is being officially purchased by whatever types of army, whatever types of forces, so like army, special and so on and so forth, on various levels. The federal level, the state level, that is Abrams tank. In Europe, they have eight tanks produced by different countries. Each country has its own procurement system.

Now, the challenge is to unify those procurements and to basically say, listen, let's not produce eight tanks. Let's produce, I don't know, two, perhaps three. And here is the first issue because it would mean that some production lines would have to start producing some other tanks and they will lose their competitive advantage and so on and so forth. So they simply refuse to do it.

And when you start analyzing basically the air force, the tanks, the artillery systems, it's all the same. Like you have the states with a certain amount of standardized unified systems or products. And you have the EU that produces a lot of different things in different countries that are very, very hesitant products.

to cooperate because that would mean to give away from their own economic champions, to deny them in a way the opportunity to evolve economically. So that is the problem with the EU because in a way there was never this ambition, like really, to create something scalable

on the European kind of continent level. In a way, they were producing whatever they needed for their own reasons and for exporting those to Africa, to the Arab states, to the Asian Pacific region, and so on and so forth.

But nobody ever thought about scaling something over national level, on the European level. And that is precisely the challenge that they are facing now. And to be honest, I can hardly see how they can solve that challenge, except for giving away at least a bit of their sovereignty in terms of economic power and industrial power.

Yeah, and there are huge other problems of procurement, and it's precisely the problems of rules and legislation, which must be absolutely different for the wartime than during the peacetime. For our listeners, we have a podcast about that with Gustav Kressel, a well-known Austrian analyst. You can listen to it. Maybe the last block of questions, and maybe...

the most one of the most important so let's talk about all these plans of the peace deal and and trump and putin what is your what is your feeling what is your estimation because the fear of course in you among ukrainians is that trump will sell out ukraine or is selling out ukraine and uh

You probably exchange Ukraine for the Middle East and say we are the masters on the Middle East and Russia will be the masters of the Eastern Europe. And, of course, given all that that we have talked about, Ukrainian agency and subjectivity, still there are, of course, the very worrying signs of this. What is your feeling?

I think that the ultimate ambition that this administration has is not to transform Russia into the masters of the Central Europe or whatever, but is to reverse them towards China. They have this illusion that this can still be done, that both Ukraine and Russia, after the ceasefire, after this peace deal, whatever it looks like,

will start cooperating together with the states and that's where the natural resources come out in terms of strengthening the pressure on China that the states are already projecting. So it's anti-Kissinger. It is anti-Kissinger. It is anti-Kissinger. And what I think a lot of people lack to understand is

is what really happened in the States with the new administration. I think it's a genuine revolution. There was an article in New Statesman, I think in 2017, 2016, which was called the Neo-Bolsheviks. It was a caricature of then President Trump looking like Trotsky or something like this. But, I mean, of course it's humor.

But in a way, I think they got the point because I think that this administration, and it's not my opinion, it's their words, that the globalist order is over, this is over. So in a way, they are demolishing this neoliberal consensus that was present there, of which China was a big part as a market, as a player, as an investor, and also

in which China was to be controlled by such instruments as the New Green Deal, the low carbon emission mechanism and limitations, and that the Europeans and the then Democratic administration hoped would basically allow them to control what Beijing does and

how to put pressure in the negotiations with Beijing if the American and the European market will become unaccessible for Chinese goods because of the high carbon emissions. I think that the current administration basically reverses the whole thinking. They are out of any ecological deal already. They start drilling again. The oil is again the new black gold.

The old, new black gold. And that is, again, I think because basically the major part of the US defense tech is still dependent on oil. And that's where they need the human capital from Ukraine and Russia to still become a buffer zone against the Russians. Because of the Chinese. Yeah, because of the Chinese. As simple as that.

So I think that is the mistake that is in their perception. I think it's profound naivete and...

Well, Russia has made a geopolitical turn towards China and I think this is the way how Russia sees the world. It's also a battle about future and they do think that the West has no future and therefore it's only China that has a future, demographically, economically, and they will survive only if they align with China.

It's a profound naivete to think that you can turn Russia away from China and back to whatever tyrannical United States will be. But let me ask you, what do you think will happen when Trump understands it?

Understands what precisely? Understands that, well, Russia is not an ally in a battle with China and that Russia is not going to give any concessions to Trump to end this war. I think that they will revert to the strategies they've been good at for many, many decades. They will be creating strongholds

outside of their own continent and just reinforcing them to stay alert and to basically contain whatever is coming. In a way, that is why Greenland is such an issue. In a way, that is why Panama is also an issue. And Poland is playing a key role in the strategy.

Some talks about transferring nuclear arms to Poland are being held as we are speaking. I mean, it's not something new. It's not something shocking. Those talks have started last year. So in a way, that is the strategy that the U.S. have been employing all the time. They would rather not go directly towards any confrontation, but they would make sure that there is a stronghold there

strong and reinforced enough to contain whoever is coming. So in a way, in my opinion, Ukraine might become one of such strongholds if the Americans would realize that Russia is not turning against China. But then again, we will be competing with our Eastern European friends.

if not uniting with them in terms of where the real military power of the states will be present. Can we survive without the American assistance right now? Yeah, I think so. What gives you this optimism? I would say that the question is in which form can we survive? Will we be able to hold...

Even the territories that are still under our control for the moment, I don't think so. We will be losing territory, but I think that at a certain point we will be able to simply contain the further advancement of the Russian forces because of geographical and...

geographical reasons, and because at a certain point, if the US is out, I think that some forces from outside of Ukraine will be introduced, perhaps not officially, but in a clandestine way. And I think that this is actually, it gets me back to another thought I wanted to mention here. I think we did a huge mistake.

in the beginning when we started talking that the objective of Ukraine is to get back to our territories of 1991. I think we discussed this with you, no? Because the idea is to get Russia back to its territories of 1991 because Ukraine never changed its territories. Russia has unilaterally occupied another country's territory.

and fixed it in its own constitution. Now, why is this so critical? And it might sound like a peculiarity, but it's not. It's because if you think of it in that way, that you're getting Russia back to its borders in 1991, this becomes the world's problem. It's not just our problem. Because then you would admit that any country has an option to occupy any other country's territory and just get away with it. Talking about China...

and its neighbors, talking about Iran, talking about any other countries at the States. - America. - America, right.

Yeah, the problem with this concept is precisely with America's ambition of enlargement. Let's call them that way because they don't see it as a problem anymore. Yeah, they don't seem to care anymore about international law. But things can change in America as well. We will see how Americans will react to that. Yeah, but I have faith in the Ukrainians' ability to survive in a way...

that no few few very few other countries can and we have proved it throughout our history the problem is that at a certain point we don't control our territory anymore but that doesn't mean that ukraine ukraine as as a country or the nation ceases to exist i don't think that is the case i think that we still have a lot to show um and the american support is crucial but it's in my opinion not decisive

What is decisive is the support of the Ukrainian people. That is what is critical. Mitro Natalukha, thank you so much for this conversation. Thank you. This was a podcast explaining Ukraine by Ukraine World, a multilingual media outlet about Ukraine. My name is Volodymyr Yermolenko. I'm a Ukrainian philosopher.

chief editor of Ukraine World and the president of PEN Ukraine. My guest today was Dmytro Natalukha, a member of the Ukrainian parliament, the chairman of the Economics Affairs Committee and one of the most visible Ukrainian MPs from the ruling party Servant of the People.

Ukraine World is brought to you by Internet Ukraine, one of Ukraine's largest media NGOs. You can support our work at patreon.com/UkraineWorld. We really need your support now because our media is increasingly relying on crowdfunding. You can also support our volunteer trips to the frontline areas where we help both soldiers and civilians, bringing mostly cars for soldiers and books for civilians. You can support our trips at paypal.ukraine.resisting.gmail.com

Thank you for listening. Stay with us and stand with Ukraine.