Pressure mounts to end the War - with Amit Segal and Nadav Eyal
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Netanyahu has been lecturing us for decades about the Iranian octopus, and he was attacked by one arm of this octopus. Now, for Netanyahu, after almost defeating Hamas, totally defeating Hezbollah, handling the Houthis, to attack Iran, thus dismantling its nuclear program, is the decisive victory. This is his raison d'etre, almost. On the other hand, if this war ends with Israel stealing Gaza, bleeding one, two, three soldiers a week,

And with Iran having a nuclear deal with President Trump, thus keeping its nuclear program alive with enough uranium for six bombs, this is what will be written on the first sentence in Netanyahu's Wikipedia. It's 10 a.m. on Wednesday, May 21st here in New York City. It is 5 p.m. on Wednesday, May 21st in Israel as Israelis wind down their day.

A lot has unfolded in the past few days. Most notably, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei publicly dismissed the potential for nuclear negotiations with the United States, calling the American demands to halt uranium enrichment entirely, quote, a big mistake.

This comes as the US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, who's overseeing Iran negotiations, has been signaling, in fact, doubling down on the idea that any deal with Iran would have to be conditioned upon zero enrichment of uranium inside Iran. Speaking of Steve Witkoff, just as it seemed that there might be some progress, as we indicated in our last episode in the introduction,

There might be some progress in the hostage negotiations. Prime Minister Netanyahu has just recalled Israel's top negotiators from Doha. The talks are built around what was, what we think of as the original Witkoff framework that Israel's cabinet unanimously approved in January. But ultimately, those talks fell apart after the first phase of the hostage release.

Meanwhile, over in the UK, British Foreign Secretary David Lammy has announced a pause in trade talks with Israel, a diplomatic slap amid intensifying international pressure on Israel. Now, there are other countries who have signaled support.

increased pressure as well, notably France and Canada with its newly elected prime minister. The UK, while it has been critical of Israel in the past, this step it has taken is definitely seen as an escalation in a way that the UK has not historically engaged on these issues.

And of course, we are hearing through reports that President Trump, on the one hand, is concerned about the humanitarian condition inside Gaza and wants there to be some mechanism for Israel to deal with it. President Trump and Steve Witkoff have both been saying, but Israel is a sovereign country. It's got to fight the war that it needs to fight. And it is not going to get in the way of how Israel fights.

fights this military situation. And of course, adding more pressure on Wednesday morning, Pope Leo XIV appealed for Israel to allow humanitarian aid to enter Gaza, calling the situation in the Palestinian enclave, quote, yet more worrying and saddening.

To discuss how all of this pressure might shape Israel's strategy, we are joined by Call Me Back regulars, Nadav Ayel, Senior Analyst at Yediot Achranot, and Amit Segel, Senior Analyst at Israel's Channel 12. Amit, Nadav, thanks for being here. Thanks for having us. Thanks for inviting us again.

Okay, Nadav, before we get into the main topic today, because I really want to spend time on what on earth is happening in Gaza, what is happening or not happening with the negotiations. And when I say negotiations, I mean about a possible ceasefire.

Let's spend a moment on the comments that I quoted there by Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei calling the American demands to halt uranium enrichment, quote, a big mistake. What's your assessment of that? That on the one hand seemed like it was a potentially big statement and big move. On the other hand, it could just be posturing. What's your assessment based on the Israelis you're talking to as to where these negotiations are heading?

So these statements, it's not the only statement that was made in the last week coming from Iran. And these statements, they are very much signal to trouble in paradise. And by paradise, I mean the feeling of...

of negotiations between the US and Iran that were rather positive. We heard both Abbas al-Gakchi, the foreign minister of Iran and someone who's an expert with its nuclear program, and both the Americans talking about positive developments as to these negotiations. And we're not hearing that anymore. What we are seeing

is more and more statements with the Iranians as to enrichment-owned territory as their sovereign right, something that we have heard from the Islamic Republic time and time again. Now, of course, what has also happened is that the U.S. either changed its position or refined its position during the last few weeks, and

And we have heard this position really building up to the point in which Steve Witkoff, who's managing the negotiations, who's leading the negotiations, has said basically that it's a red line for the United States enrichment on Iranian territory. Now...

Is this an opening stance towards conversation? And at the end, the US might agree to what you might label as symbolic enrichment to a very low level and a very limited level.

amount of enriched uranium. I don't know. But what we do know is that this is not going as positively as it did a few weeks ago. And we have also seen the reports as to Israel preparing a possible strike against Iranian nuclear installations. I'm talking about a CNN report that

Now, what's important about this report is the sources of the report. The sources of the report are U.S. administration officials, Trump administration officials, that spoke about Israel being ready for an attack, being very much prepared. And let me tell you what I read into this report. I read this as an attempt to actually pressure Iran.

Because there was nothing new there. Israel has been preparing for this strike in the last year. It's very much, to an extent, ready, as much as you can be ready to such a strike. And it's a follow-up to that New York Times report of a month or so ago, where it also said Israel is ready to go. And even though they said Trump waved it off, it was, I think, implicit in that is...

Anyone who thinks Israel is far away from being able to activate some kind of operation is delusional. Yeah, there was nothing new besides me saying, you know, making a mental note. Oh, at least three Trump administration officials would speak with CNN.

about Israel ready to move forward with a strike and sort of asking if Netanyahu can do it alone. So let me answer that question. I do not believe that the government of Israel will decide to attack Iran alone

against the White House saying, we don't want this to happen at this point in time. There's absolutely no way. I don't see this happening that the Israeli cabinet would say, you know what, we're going to risk our strategic relations with the United States, with President Trump and blow up the negotiations because we decided it's the right time to attack.

This is not going to happen. And the fact that this would even be raised as a possibility in that CNN piece seemed to be deliberate to me and aimed to tell the Iranians what the Obama administration told the Iranians at the time. If you're not going to sign an agreement, the Israelis are going to do whatever they need to do. And we in the U.S. understand they might need to do that.

Okay. Amit, everything Nadav is describing also has this backdrop of the president's visit to the Gulf last week. And it did, just by watching from afar, it did appear that President Trump has been aiming for some kind of grand deal that could address a whole range of crises all at once, or maybe if not all at once, in some kind of sequenced way. So I guess I would say that it seems that the Trump administration is more ambitious about what can be accomplished than

at a macro level in the region, then I think the Israeli government thinks is realistic. So A, do you agree with that assessment? And B, if there is this gulf between what Washington wants to achieve or hopes it can achieve and what Jerusalem thinks can be accomplished, how has that changed the relationship between the U.S. and Israel?

Well, a month ago, it was very worrying from Israeli perspective because Witkoff, the go-to guy of the Trump administration, said publicly and deliberately that a certain level of enrichment would be allowed by the U.S.,

I think the picture is a bit different as we speak. We hear more staunch declarations from both Witkoff and, of course, Rubio, etc., which means that the daylight between Israel and the U.S. is shrinking. Not disappearing, but shrinking. And the question is still unsolved. Is there going to be a deal that the U.S. would see as a good deal with Iran and that Israel would see as a horrible deal?

A deal that Israel wants is the Iranian version of the Libyan deal, thus dismantling each and every facility to produce nuclear weapons. And in addition, the Iranian version, which would include dismantling the ballistic missile program made by Iran. Israel would want as well dismantling all the...

octopus arms, the hutis, hezbollah, etc. But I'm not sure it's feasible. So here's the question. First, the other negotiations going to fail and we'll see it in a few weeks. And second,

If it succeeds, is there any option that Israel sees a deal at sight or a deal signed and decides to attack Iran in order to prevent this deal or because of its fears that this deal would not stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons in the future? This is the main question.

My answer is no. I don't think there is an option that the U.S. will reach a deal or will get close to reach a deal and Israel attacks in order to prevent it. And to be clear, the reason Israel would not do that, Amit, is because if everyone knows how much Trump likes a deal and if President Trump is getting close to a deal, it's not in Israel's interest to look like the party that is upending this progress that President Trump has made.

Israel can attack Washington. It would be more efficient in this case because this is directly trying to hit and destroy a diplomatic achievement by President Trump. The situation, however, is getting very interesting and very tensed.

Because from what I hear, the preparations for a possible attack on Iran's nuclear program are in its highest level even more than in 2012. The year 2012 is very important because in 2012, the then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was about to attack Iran and he was allegedly stopped by the security establishment.

However, we were very close in September 2012 to a point in which Israel would attack Iran. The then Defense Minister Ehud Barak even gave an interview to Haaretz describing that Israel would not be the same state if we don't attack. So when people in the establishment describe the 2025 situation as more severe and more dramatic than 2012,

It definitely means something. I want to say you are a student of Prime Minister Netanyahu. You've been following him closely his entire career. I know him somewhat, and I have been struck over the years that if I think about an issue that he is most passionate about when it comes to geopolitics and foreign policy, it has been about stopping Iran from getting a nuclear bomb. I've seen this when he was prime minister. I've seen him when he was finance minister. I've seen it when he was head of the opposition, when he was schlepping around the world, going to state capitals.

In the U.S., trying to get state governments to divest from Iranian companies. I mean, he was this has been his obsession now for I've been tracking it for almost two decades. And as someone who's close to him put it to me, this is why he was put on the earth. If he does have a Churchillian complex, I'm not sure he does. But if he does have a Churchillian complex, it would seem that it's on this issue that he has it.

And if this really is the last chance to really deal with Iran's nuclear program, how much do you think that weighs on him? That the idea that he could carry on, that we're in a world in which some kind of deal – and we can debate what the deal looks like. But there's some kind of deal that it's obvious to everyone that there's really no way to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapons capability, that it's on that track. It may not be a fast track, but it's on that track and there's no stopping it.

The idea that given that this has been so much capital, so much energy of Netanyahu's career has been invested in heading that off and that it's happening, doesn't that weigh on his decision making? Absolutely. But here's what makes it even more dramatic. It's either a decisive victory or...

or a resounding defeat because Israel was attacked on October 7th by two Iranian commando divisions. This was Netanyahu's greatest failure, darkest moment. When you say Iranian, you mean Hamas. Hamas, yes. It was Hamas, but you're saying they're a proxy of Iran's. I just want our listeners to understand.

Netanyahu has been lecturing us for decades about the Iranian octopus, and he was attacked by one arm of this octopus. Now, for Netanyahu, after almost defeating Hamas, totally defeating Hezbollah, handling the Houthis, to attack Iran, thus dismantling its nuclear program, is the decisive victory. This is his raison d'etre, almost. On the other hand, if this war ends with Israel stealing Gaza, bleeding one, two, three soldiers a week,

And with Iran having a nuclear deal with President Trump, thus keeping its nuclear program alive with enough uranium for six bombs, this is what will be written on the first sentence in Netanyahu's Wikipedia. And that's why the decision is even more dramatic. Yes. I would say that it would be easier for Netanyahu now to decide to attack Iran had the president been Barack Obama or Joe Biden.

I think because it's President Trump and there is no leverage, there is basically no effective leverage on him, it makes the decision worse. Because I do see Netanyahu order to attack Iran's nuclear reactors if a deal is about to be reached with a democratic administration, not with Trump. And Nadav, before we move off of Iran, just one last question. The scenarios we're talking about, either they're going to reach some deal or they're not going to reach a deal.

And there's also one scenario I've heard is that neither of those two happen, that they actually reach a temporary arrangement that just buys time for everybody. And in some respects, I could argue that's one of the worst possible outcomes for Israel. It's the worst. It's the worst possible outcome for Israel because it prevents it from attacking. I don't think Israel would have attacked. I disagree with Amit. I don't think Israel would have attacked even if it was a democratic administration just because Israel is so dependent on the U.S. as democracy.

to security. It's not about the attack itself, it's about the Iranian response. Israel doesn't want to be seen as responsible for the Iranians hitting American targets across the region or energy prices in the U.S. skyrocketing as a result of an attack unless it's coordinated with the U.S. administration to a degree. And

To have a framework, a sort of a framework, a declaration, the kind that the US had in Singapore after President Trump met Kim Jong-un,

This kind of just a declaration is just not eating the cake and not having it. You don't have any limitations that are practical and long lasting. You know, Dan, we spoke so, so many words were spent on the sunset clause with the JCPOA. This actually means that there is, you know, there's no horizon and there is no sunset. And that prevents Israel from attacking definitely. And it also doesn't give us the assurance that...

that Iran is stepping away from its nuclear program, stepping away from its ballistic program. By the way, Marco Rubio this week made an important statement as to what is on the table of the negotiations and what isn't.

He was asked if they are talking with Iran as to its support for regional terror. He answered that these sanctions are going to be there, meaning he said these sanctions as related to Iran's funding of terrorist organization Hezbollah and others across the region, that's still going to be there. It's not part of...

of the negotiations right now. And I hope that would change, but I mostly hope that these sanctions would not be lifted unless the Iranians are willing to make this kind of move. And what the statements by the Supreme Leader are saying, Dan, is that they're not ready to do that as of yet.

I want to move to the, what appears to be the collapse, or at least the reduced momentum, shall we say, of the hostage and ceasefire negotiations in Doha. Nadav, you've been tracking these closely. Why was there this initial sense that something was going to happen? In our last episode, in the introduction, I cautioned that, you know, there's a lot of

excitement and hype, but we should be cautious. But there was this excitement and there was the sense that something was on the cusp of happening. And then all of a sudden, it seems like nothing's happening. So what happened? Well, first of all, there was a positive dynamic because of the release of Idan Alexander. And now we know the truth. The Israeli government said that Israel received the release of Idan Alexander for free. There was nothing transactional about this.

It was between Hamas and the American administration. We know now that the Israeli government decided to allow humanitarian aid and food to enter the Gaza Strip after months of

in which it didn't because it was part of the negotiations between the administration and between Hamas. We know this now. And we also know that to some extent, Dan, and I want to be careful in what I'm saying here, but according to some intelligence sources, Hamas wanted this gesture towards the Trump administration and they were fearful what would happen if, God forbid, Idan Alexander would be hit again.

as part of this war. So to some degree, they wanted to have this gesture in order to have direct negotiations with the Trump administration, but also to make sure that they're not blamed for anything happening for him because the Trump administration was very clear in its messages

to Hamas through Qatar, that nothing can happen to this American citizen while he is in captivity. So this positive dynamic sort of rotated to the basic situation. And the basic situation is as such.

Hamas is not willing to let go of its control and disarm completely and for its leaders to go into exile as part of ending the war. Israel is not willing to end the war without these conditions.

Hamas is not willing to release hostages unless it gets a guarantee from, not from Israel, it doesn't trust Israel, but from the US administration that it's going to happen. And I remind us that Hamas went to a deal under this administration, not the Biden administration, that had two phases.

And Israel decided that it's not going to go through with the second phase because of the reasons I just mentioned. And because of that, Hamas is saying, we don't want this kind of an interim deal. We want to have an assurance that this is a one-off, everybody for everybody, end of the war scenario. And this is something that Israel is willing to do. In the meantime, the Trump administration, and you can read this in the Washington Post,

My colleague, Barak Ravid in Axios, has basically been signaling to Israel that it wants the war to end. Still not dictating, but it's saying the president wants the war to end. The president, he sees what's happening in Gaza. He sees what's happening to the children in Gaza.

And these kind of messages are signals from the U.S. administration that they're losing their patience with the war. It's in general, it's not with Israel or specifically with Netanyahu, although it is with Netanyahu, but basically they're losing their patience with the war. And they think that they're marching to a new Middle East and the war is stopping them. That's even more crucial than what specifically is happening in Doha, which is basically nothing right now because it's stuck.

And it stuck because of the reasons I just mentioned. Okay. Amit, back in March, Israel committed to a strategy of withholding aid to Gaza, especially as it was gearing up for this next operation. And the argument was the aid winds up in the hands of Hamas. And they capitalized financially off controlling the aid, and it doesn't actually get to the people it needs. And it strengthens Hamas' hold over the Gaza civilian population.

Why was the policy changed this past week? It changed because the negotiations failed and because what Israel is really trying to do in Gaza this time, in this round, and this is what marks the difference from previous sub-operations, is that this operation focuses not on the military side of Hamas,

But on Hamas as a government and the attempt to provide humanitarian aid alternatively via American companies under the protection of the Israeli army is focused on creating Hamas-free zones in bigger and bigger portions of the Gaza Strip.

So if in a week from now we'll have southern to Morag in southern Gaza between Rafah and Chaniunis, an area in which 120,000 Gazans would get humanitarian aid provided by American companies without weapons, without Hamas, it would be the first time in almost 20 years that Hamas no longer rules the life of Gazans.

And so this is a crucial experiment because if it succeeds, it necessarily means that Gazans would want to move to such areas. They'll see that there is better humanitarian aid, that they are not to be attacked by airplanes or drones or by tanks, and that they get more supply. And if it fails and something doesn't work out and the American companies will fail to deliver,

it necessarily means that the final round of attempts by Israel to replace Hamas with something different than the Palestinian Authority is doomed to fail. So we are in crucial weeks. And the hard right within Netanyahu's own government says what? Says, Mr. Prime Minister, this is a retreat? Depends whom. I think that Smotrich is in favor of providing this humanitarian aid because he sees the solution at sight.

I wouldn't treat Benkvier very seriously. He wants to be an opposition within the coalition, just to gain ground politically for those hardline right-wingers. But when it comes to the wider right-wing coalition, they will go with Netanyahu as long as it works. If it doesn't work, and we'll see it very soon, I think Netanyahu will have severe problems.

Okay. Nadav, militarily right now in Gaza? So Israel has begun its operation in Gaza. It says that it's going full steam ahead, and it isn't. It isn't. The truth is that Israel is still allowing some place for the negotiations to happen in Doha. It's trying to pressure Hamas to a deal.

But we're seeing a lot of civilian casualties in Gaza. We're hearing this from both the Palestinians. We're seeing the world's response to that. Israel is now operating five divisions within the Gaza Strip. And really, the challenges of the plan is that you have a civilian population. The fact that the Israelis said for months, we're not going to allow food and aid to the Gaza Strip. And now they've allowed this weak population.

and there is international criticism, means that Hamas feels emboldened. They feel emboldened because they're seeing that the international community is severely criticizing Israel, and they're seeing that humanitarian aid and food is entering the Gaza Strip as the IDF is rolling. Now, the question is, operationally speaking, can you come into a point, Dan, in which...

Hamas would be isolated in a spot or two spots in the Gaza Strip and you will have the population in another place and you basically know where the hostages are. That's a big question so that they won't be hurt during this operation. But the operation is rolling ahead and it will intensify if the negotiations break completely or if there isn't a phone call coming from the White House that says you need to stop.

The feeling with Israel's government is that the clock is now ticking to the point in which the White House might say, you know, you need to wrap it up. We don't care how, but you need to start wrapping it up. And I think that there's an agreement within the Israeli political sphere that this phone call is going to come at a certain time.

Yeah, I know that's the concern. I'm skeptical that it will come in that direct way, but we'll see. Amit, anything to add on that, just in terms of the military operations in Gaza and the strategy? I agree with Adav and with you. Yes, the White House and President Trump would have wanted this war to end. They don't really care how. They are still for emigration. They're still for Israel defeating Hamas. Emigration of Palestinians from Gaza. Yeah, not of Israelis to Poland. Yeah, yeah. I don't really know

whether they will decide to say, wrap it up and end this war. I think it would be more in a more gentle way, as much as Trump is doing something gentle. They're very big on gentle. Yes, exactly, exactly. He's not the man of big words. But to quote President Trump, we'll see what happens.

Yeah. I want to ask you guys before we wrap up a couple of quick things. One, in June, there are reports now that Saudi Arabia and France are planning to convene a peace conference in New York with the goal of establishing, and this is unclear exactly what this means, some kind of path to Palestinian statehood. There are other countries in Europe that are supporting this. Nadav, is this really worrisome from Israel's perspective or is this kind of more of the same? And I guess generally, if it really is something for Israel to worry about, where do you think it's heading?

Look, I don't think that in general these talks about recognizing Palestinian statehood are something that Israel needs to worry about because, Dan, you remember this, Amit remembers this, you know, recognizing Palestinian statehood, having Palestine a seat in the UN, these are things we already seen. We already saw, you know, Yasser Arafat declaring Palestinian statehood. Right. Here's where we are at right now. And I think this cannot be downplayed.

Israel is in a very difficult and isolated spot internationally. The association agreement between Israel and the EU is the number one trade partner of Israel, not the United States. And the fact that they are thinking about posing, somehow stopping the association agreement is...

is devastating, you know, if it will ever happen. Now, I don't think they will have a consensus, but countries can do that. The fact that the UK is stopping, as you mentioned at the beginning, its negotiations as to a free trade agreement.

That's extremely problematic. The type of condemnations that we are hearing now for Israel and threats as to sanctions that we are hearing, all related to the war in Gaza, although the EU is actually using Israel's democracy or the section in the association agreement related to a democracy in order to make these arguments. These are big problems. And here's something important there. Where is the U.S.?

Where's the US? Where's the phone call from the White House to these countries saying, don't go there? You know, you want us to be on your side with Ukraine. You need us for this and that.

And maybe the U.S. is working its way. I'm not making an accusation here. I don't know. I'm really factually asking, and I'm going to try and check out what the U.S. has been doing in that regard. But if they keep hearing from the White House that it's critical of what's happening right now, and they're also seeing the president traveling to the region, visiting Saudi Arabia, visiting countries that are very critical, more critical than Western countries as to the war in Gaza. And I think that they are seeing this.

as an authorization. And there was the Houthi agreement. There are several things that have happened in the region and they're piling on us, the EU right now and other countries. And they're also seeing what's happening in Gaza. They're asking, what's your vision as to Gaza? What do you want to do there? What's the plan? Something that the Biden administration told the Netanyahu administration. I'll just say, Nadav, I hear you on the one hand. On the other hand, these pressure points on Israel get hyped. Like when President Trump was in the Gulf, we were reading in the Israeli press that

that Abu Mazen, the head of the Palestinian Authority, was going to be invited to Riyadh and was going to be in a meeting with President Trump and the president of Lebanon and the president of Syria. And that the President Trump was, there was another report saying President Trump was going to acknowledge, while not support, sort of express respect for the Saudi position that there must be some path to Palestinian statehood before Saudi Arabia can normalize with Israel. And that Trump would almost be backing Saudi Arabia's position. There was all this hysteria in the press and none of these things happened.

So I'm not saying that the Saudis and the French and other members of the EU aren't going to try and put pressure for Palestinian state. But I think the press so wants to report that somehow Trump is now ready to get behind these things and they do all this buildup. He's thinking about it. It may happen. And then so far, at least, it hasn't happened.

I agree, Dan. But one thing. During Trump's first term, European countries did not dare to do such things because the idea was that the U.S. is like the Iron Dome or the Golden Dome, as Trump rebranded it, of the state of Israel. Now, that was the case in Trump's first month in office.

There was a very disturbing process during the end of the Biden administration in which many Israeli right-wing activists were sanctioned. Smotrich and Ben-Gurion were on their way to be sanctioned as well, both by the US and European countries. It stopped the moment President Trump got elected.

The fact that the UK and France and now Italy and the Netherlands that are considered good friends of Israel with right wing or even far right coalition governments actually threaten Israel to do it is something disturbing. I would expect President Trump to actually act against it decisively and loudly, because if he's not doing it, it might signal what Nadav is implying.

I guess he would do something. And that's why at the end of the day, my verdict goes to what you said.

Amit, just in terms of the growing pressure, it seems like there's growing pressure on Israel. What impact does this have on domestic politics? From a political perspective, it's very good for Netanyahu to have the discourse organized around the Palestinian question, because this is an era which he wins 75 to 25. Unlike, for instance, the ultra-Orthodox question, which in which he's in minority position.

However, if there is a sense of failure, of isolation, of flights not going from Tel Aviv and to Tel Aviv, plus those sanctions, I'm not sure it would help Netanyahu in the long run. He want to come to the election when Israel is way stronger than it was on October 7th. And the sentiment that you have problems with Europe and Israel,

things are not going as in business as usual with the Trump administration. It's not very good to him at the end of the day. And finally, Amit, the head of the Democrats party in Israel, Yeir Golan, who...

has been a guest on our podcast, which is this is the merger that's an amalgamation of the former Merits Party and the former Labor Party, had, I thought, some language that was unprecedented, at least during the war, from a current Israeli politician. There have been former Israeli politicians who've said versions of this, but not someone who's seen as a rising star in Israeli politics and could populate in some capacity the leadership of, in some role, a future government.

He threw language around like the IDF Israel is killing babies in Gaza for hobby. And I don't know if he's apologized for it since he said that. I don't know what the after effect has been. But it does seem like this topic actually has gotten more attention in Israeli domestic Israeli politics than what we're talking about in this conversation, which is just growing pressure on Israel from abroad. Exactly. And first of all, I think it's a terrible political mistake by Yair Golan to

to take a position, a stance that only 5-6% of the Israeli popular vote hold. You cannot get even remotely close to the Prime Minister's office, let alone the Defense Ministry, with such opinions. And I think he actually harmed

the opposition efforts to unseat Netanyahu, because as long as the next election is a referendum about Netanyahu and his partners, Ben-Gavir, Smotrich and the Alt-Orthodox, Netanyahu is in a very bad situation. But if it's going to be a referendum about Yair Golan, can someone who thinks the IDF kills babies as a hobby...

Can he be a defense minister or a senior minister? I think Netanyahu has good chances to gain ground politically from people who say, I don't like this coalition. I think they terribly failed. But if I have to choose between Netanyahu and his allies and someone who thinks that we murder babies for fun, so I'm for Netanyahu. You're the expert. You guys are the expert. I have a slightly different take. And the only difference is that when I talk to Israelis,

You know, the question always is, is the next election going to be an election about change where like the whole everything we've known about Israeli politics gets shaken up? Or is it just a typical Israeli structure, right, left? Are you tough on security? Are you not to be trusted on security? That that's the divide of the debate and that the old structure of how Israeli elections are waged is.

is over, it's over within this post October 7th world. And we're in an environment where they want this government out. This government was in charge on October 7th, this government for all the reasons you said, Amit, it's a referendum of this government and they just want change.

And it almost doesn't matter who the change is. And that Netanyahu wants nothing more than to revert back to the old model. And if you revert back to the old model and it's just a standard right-left structure, he has a shot, a shot, not even a guarantee, but a shot at surviving. And in order to do that, right now, if you look at the polling, right-of-center voters have been – this government has been bleeding right-of-center voters.

have been bailing on this government. And Netanyahu needs those right of center voters to come back home to the right in a world in which there's a typical right-left structure to the election. I guess the question is, does Yair Golan make it harder for right of center voters to bail on Netanyahu as much as they may have lost confidence in him

is this like a reinforcement that, you know what, it's a typical right-left election and we can't be for the government that's going to be led by a guy or having its leadership somewhere who says these things. Now, obviously it's a long time away and there's,

There's a million different scenarios and permutations, but that is just my sense of it. I want to add to that. First of all, I agree generally with your analysis, Dan. I think that this is very much going to be decided on center-right voters. I think Amit thinks that too. And I don't think that this statement by Yari Golan was helpful. By the way, he didn't mention at the statement itself, he didn't say IDF. He didn't say IDF. And then he actually walked back with saying he's not walking back. He did walk back.

of the statement saying that we are a sane country that doesn't and so forth and so forth. But I think that for Yai Golan represents for some parts of the Israeli left wing, suddenly they have this general who's been, you know, a very combative, aggressive officer in the army, the deputy chief of staff. All his kids are serving in the army. In the latest video, he said that one of his sons is going to go back to Gaza right now.

And then he comes and he criticizes the government and he's not shy about it. He's not walking back and he's not trying to appeal to the centre-right. Now, again, I think that if you let go of those eight to ten seats of the Knesset of the centre-right, Netanyahu is going to be the next prime minister. If the centre-left is not going to appeal to them, it's over. It's over for them. And another thing which I find interesting, we had so many statements recently

that were so damaging by Israeli ministers, saying, let's throw a nuclear bomb on Gaza. The finance minister, Smotrich, who said, we're not leaving a stone in Gaza, we're destroying Gaza, or something like that. Members of Knesset were basically saying, we need to attack civilians as we are attacking noncombatants because they're supportive of terror, you know, all kinds of statements like that. Nadav, I had this exact argument with Alain earlier.

because he's producing this episode, but isn't a guest on it, can't speak for himself. But I had this exact debate with him yesterday, and he made this point you're making, which is ministers in this government have said crazy things. If you think what Yair Golan said was incendiary, wait till it's compared to what ministers in this government have said. And I agree with that. However, if you look at the polling right now, I think that's baked into the price of the stock. Meaning I think if you look at how badly Netanyahu has been doing in the polling, it's in part because there's a...

obviously a variety of factors here. It's not one thing, but I think the irresponsible statements from so many in his government have contributed to the deterioration in his polling. And so he's already eroded that support. Now the question, I think,

is whether or not he can win it back. And that remains to be seen. But if he has a shot at winning it back, I think that what Yerogolan is saying is only helpful to Netanyahu in winning it back. I'm not saying he can, but I think it does give him a little bit of fuel to be able to say, yes, some people around me have said crazy things, but you want to put that guy in charge?

So that would be my counter to that. Again, I think that without the center right, we would have a judicial reform in Israel. It's the center right that had deserted this coalition. It happened before October 7, by the way, according to the numbers. This coalition has not won a single poll on Channel 12 since March 2023, if I'm not mistaken.

March, not October 23. So, you know, this is how it is right now. And this is the real challenge there and not whoever is on the sidelines, either of the Israeli core left or other places. Yeah, I guess the question is, I think we agree that Netanyahu, the current crowd doesn't, in power doesn't have a clear path to 61. The question is, does the opposition agree?

Before we wrap, Nadav, I wanted to ask you about this breaking news that we've been following. Ronan Barr, the Supreme Court has weighed in now on Ronan Barr, the head of the Shin Bet. Can you just briefly tell us what happened? What was the issue and what is the news? Yeah, the Supreme Court ruled morning time in Israel that the government's decision to end the tenure of the head of the Shin Bet was made through improper and an unlawful process.

Basically, they were saying that the process itself and the decision is void, although Ronenbar already resigned. So they didn't give any specific order because he has resigned. Specifically, the Supreme Court determined that the government failed in its obligation to bring the matter before the committee, the advisory committee on senior appointments. The decision was made while the prime minister was in conflict of interest to the investigation involving his associates as to Qatar.

and that the decision lacked any factual basis, and that no proper hearing was held for the head of the Shin Bet. And this is important, Dan. This is important for the future. It's not about the past. He said that the obligation of the head of the Shin Bet, of the heads of the Israeli security services, is not towards the prime minister. They do not serve for the pleasure of the president, unlike in the U.S. They serve with their obligation towards the public,

So if the prime minister has lost trust with the head of the Shin Bet, it doesn't necessarily mean, if he doesn't have real reasons, that he can fire him. Now, this decision was taken two to one. Judge Solberg, who's the deputy Supreme Court president, and he's going to be the next Supreme Court president,

had a dissenting opinion. He thought that given the fact that Ronan Barr already resigned, it's not the job of the Supreme Court to have any ruling as to this to begin with. So this was a two to one. And Solberg is, of course, considered a much more conservative and right wing judge. So you can say that it was split by liberal versus conservative in the Supreme Court. But it's an important decision towards the future, I think.

Okay. We will leave it there. Thank you both. I will look forward to being back in touch with you guys soon. Thank you so much. Thank you so much. That's our show for today. If you found this episode valuable, please share it with others who you think may appreciate it. Time and again, we've seen that our listeners are the ones driving the growth of the Call Me Back community. So thank you.

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Call Me Back is produced by Ilan Benatar. Additional editing by Martin Huergo. Research by Gabe Silverstein. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.