Inside Trump's Iran attack and why Tehran can still build a nuclear bomb
49:08 Share

The Telegraph.

Picture this, you're halfway through a DIY car fix, tools scattered everywhere, and boom, you realise you're missing a part. It's okay, because you know whatever it is, it's on eBay. They've got everything, brakes, headlights, cold air intakes, whatever you need, and it's guaranteed to fit, which means no more crossing your fingers and hoping you ordered the right thing. All the parts you need at prices you'll love, guaranteed to fit every time. eBay, things people love.

At 1-800-Flowers.com, we know that connections are at the heart of being human. Whether celebrating life's joys or comforting during tough times, 1-800-Flowers helps you express what words can't. For nearly 50 years, millions have trusted 1-800-Flowers to deliver thoughtful gifts that help create lasting bonds. Because it's more than just a gift. It's your way of showing you care. Visit 1-800-Flowers.com and connect today.

That's 1-800-Flowers.com slash ACAST. The strikes were a spectacular military success. Iran's key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated. We will measure our success not only by the battles we win, but also by the wars we end. Right now, all eyes are on Washington. But who's actually watching Europe at the moment?

To the Middle East now, and more than 50,000 people have been killed in the Gaza Strip since the war began. That's according to the territory's Hamas-run health ministry. I'm Venetia Rainey, and this is Battle Lines. It's Monday, 23rd of June, 2025.

On today's episode, we'll be looking at the unprecedented American strikes on Iran's nuclear sites over the weekend. How much damage has actually been done? Can Iran still build a nuclear bomb? And could Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei be targeted next? We'll be tackling all of that and more. But let's start with a blow-by-blow account of what we know about what actually happened. So...

It was a mammoth undertaking involving a total of around 125 US aircraft, and that includes seven of these B-2 bombers that we were talking a lot about last week, as well as fighter jets to shield them, dozens and dozens of supply planes to refuel them, and according to the Pentagon, a full array of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft.

Now, we did know that these B-2 bombers had left their home in Missouri. That news came out last Thursday and reports emerged that they were bound for the Anderson Air Base in Guam or maybe the Mauritian territory of Diego Garcia. But it turns out that that was a decoy. Some were sent west into the Pacific.

But the main fleet of these 7B2 bombers headed off to Iran. They were airborne for about 18 hours and they flew in near complete radio silence. They had two man crews who were taking it in turns to sleep and they were trying to avoid, obviously, radar detection. They were joined by a fleet of fourth and fifth generation fighter jets, as well as all those support aircraft that I mentioned.

Just before the aircraft entered Iranian airspace, a U.S. submarine in the Arabian Sea launched more than two dozen Tomahawk cruise missiles at targets at the Isfahan site. That was one of three sites that were targeted, Isfahan, Natanz and Fordow, that we'll be getting onto. Apparently, the final order to attack came just before 6 p.m. on Saturday in Washington, around 1.30 a.m. on Sunday in Tehran.

And Trump gave the order to General Michael Carrillo, who's the head of the U.S. Central Command, to launch Operation Midnight Hammer. So it's just gone 2 a.m. in Iran. It's a dark night. There's a waning crescent moon. And these aircraft fly undetected into Iranian airspace.

Now, the fighter jets, they push out in front of the main B-2 strike force. They're hunting for enemy fighters, surface-to-missile threats, but apparently they don't find any. That's probably because of the Israeli strikes that we've seen over the last few weeks, having taken out a lot of the air defence systems that Iran would normally rely on. So the main strike force heads for Fordow.

You've heard a lot about this over the last week. This is this uranium enrichment site which is buried deep underground and can only be penetrated reportedly by the bombs that these B-2 bombers carry, these massive ordnance penetrators. So the main B-2 strike force heads for Fordow.

The fighter jets fire a few high-speed suppression weapons to neutralise any potential strike threats in the area. And then at approximately 2:10 Iranian time, six of these B-2 bombers drop about a dozen 30,000 pound bunker Boston bombs on Fordow. Each of these aircraft carry two of these massive ordnance penetrators that we've been talking a lot about over the last few weeks.

And as we've mentioned, they are the largest and the most powerful conventional bombs in the US arsenal. They're also the world's heaviest conventional bombs. Each one weighs as much as about three adult African elephants. Fordow shielded by half a mile of rock, so that's the power that's needed to try and penetrate.

Now, reportedly, these bombs were dropped on tunnel entrances and ventilation shafts where they had the most chance of getting through and incapacitating the facility. And the US military planners adopted what's called a sequential penetration strategy. So they dropped the first bomb and then a second bomb from the same aircraft is programmed to hit the same point of impact to try and compound the damage done.

and burrow as deep as possible to reach what the first explosion can't reach, this innermost core of the facility. So while this is all happening, a second strike group has peeled off to attack Natanz. This is the other enrichment site. It's previously been hit by Israel.

That's a single B-2 bomber. He drops two more bunker busters on Natanz in an attempt to obliterate the subterranean infrastructure there. Shortly afterwards, US submarines launch 30 Tomahawk land attack missiles at both Natanz and the third site, Isfahan. So in total, 14 massive ordnance penetrators are dropped on these two target areas, along with 61 other precision-guided weapons. Now, with Iranian air defences apparently crippled by previous Israeli strikes,

The B-2s and all of their supply aircraft and fighter jets, they leave the country's airspace just as silently as they arrived, completely unchallenged the whole way, according to the Pentagon. This would have been a nightmare scenario for Trump, obviously, if they lost a strategic bomber or a fighter jet. But nothing like that happens. Here's Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth talking about the attack on Sunday morning. Our B-2s went in and out and back without the world knowing at all. In that way, it was historic.

A strike that included the longest B-2 Spirit bomber mission since 2001 and the first operational employment of the MOP, a massive ordnance penetrator. The mission demonstrated to the world the level of joint and allied integration that speak to the strength of our alliance and our joint forces. So that's what we know about what happened over the weekend. But what damage has actually been done to Iran's nuclear program? This is what Trump had to say on Sunday morning. A short time ago, the U.S. military carried out

Massive precision strikes on the three key nuclear facilities in the Iranian regime, Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan. Everybody heard those names for years as they built this horribly destructive enterprise.

Our objective was the destruction of Iran's nuclear enrichment capacity and a stop to the nuclear threat posed by the world's number one state sponsor of terror. Tonight, I can report to the world that the strikes were a spectacular military success.

Iran's key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated. The next morning, there was a press conference, including the US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dan Kaine. He gave a slightly different assessment. He described it as extremely severe damage and destruction, not quite obliteration.

So what do we know? Joining me now to discuss that is Daria Dolzikova, Senior Research Fellow at RUSI specialising in proliferation and nuclear policy. Daria, can you start by telling me what's your assessment of how much damage has actually been done to Iran's nuclear sites? It's really difficult to assess that just because we don't actually have complete information. If we look at the sites that were actually targeted,

The Natanz complex has the above ground part of the facility, the underground part of the facility, the above ground. We've seen satellite images. We've had confirmations from the International Atomic Energy Agency that it's been fairly heavily damaged and destroyed by some accounts.

The underground facility there at Natanz, it sounds like it got targeted by American strikes as well. The extent of the damage in that one, again, is a little bit less clear, partially because we don't have satellite imagery to go off of to assess the extent of the damage. But based on the IAEA assessment, because of some of the infrastructure that was damaged above ground there,

namely the electrical supply to the facility, chances are that the centrifuges, the equipment that's used to enrich uranium, have been damaged in the underground facility as well. So it's fairly safe to assume that there's probably...

considerable damage, at least to the equipment, if not to the facility underground. Although again, sort of pending hard confirmation on that as well. And then the big question is obviously over Fort Doe. So that's that very deeply buried facility that's underground 80 to 90 meters, hence why the Israelis needed US involvement is to penetrate that facility underground.

The extent of the damage there, really, really difficult to gauge. Again, going back to the fact that, yes, we have satellite images of the site and we can see what look like craters, which is probably where the munitions would have gone in. But what's actually happening underground, really difficult to assess, again, because we can't see inside the facility. Now, the facility, again, was an enrichment site, so it was using centrifuges to produce enriched uranium.

And those are really sensitive machines. So chances are, if there was significant vibration, crashing of stone or whatever it was that was penetrated, chances are that those centrifuges, that equipment probably sustained some damage as well.

But again, a little bit speculative because we don't actually have an assessment of what's going on down there. And frankly, what was down there, whether the Iranians had moved some things out in advance of anticipation of American attacks. And what about Isfahan? Isfahan, yep. So that was targeted as well. So that's quite a large complex. It has a number of different facilities that serve a range of purposes there. Again, we have satellite imagery of that. So it's a bit of a clear picture in terms of what was damaged.

So if I'm recalling correctly now, the facility that was producing uranium hexafluoride, which is the gas that goes into the centrifuges for enrichment, that was damaged. There was damage done to fuel fabrication facility there as well. But some of that damage had been sustained in previous attacks and in the Israeli attacks, not necessarily the American ones.

The tunnels to the Isfahan facility had been damaged as well. And the reason why that matters is because we suspect that that's where Iran had been holding some of its enriched uranium stocks. But again, to answer your original question, how much damage has actually been done? Hard to say because while we have had a decent amount of visibility of the Iranian program as a result of IAE access over

years to the facility. Imperfect at times, granted, but still agency access to those sites is

Over the last week and a half, we don't really know what's been happening on the program and what material is still at the sites where we expect it to be and what material has been moved and where it is now. Yeah, as you mentioned, uranium officials have said that they moved a lot of the enriched uranium out of the sites in advance of this attack. How easy is that to do? The material is movable. Countries that produce nuclear fuel, they transport uranium hexafluoride across their territory to countries

to fuel a manufacturing facility so it is possible to move it. I mean, normally it requires specialized vehicles to make sure that that material is protected, that it's moved safely. In this instance, I don't know what kind of transport vehicles would have been available to the Iranians, especially under the current conditions.

So theoretically, yes, you can move UF-6 safely. But again, we're talking about moving this material in what has essentially become a war zone as a result of these attacks. So it's hard to know kind of what the options were for moving that material safely. I want to ask you for your assessment of the sort of range of possibilities for how much this attack and Israel's preceding attacks would have set back Iran's nuclear program. But I think to get to that point, it would first be useful to

have you explained what is your understanding of how close Iran were to having a nuclear bomb? We've heard a lot of different numbers chucked around about uranium enrichment levels. Can you just walk us through...

what your understanding of that is? There's, I guess, three things to look at when considering how close Iran may or may not have been to a nuclear weapon. So there's a fissile material itself that's enriched uranium. So normally for a nuclear weapon, we're looking at about 90% enrichment. Iran was at 60%, which again isn't quite weapons grade, but it's not too far off. And

it was accumulating fairly large stockpiles of that material. So in terms of, again, the fissile material that goes inside of a nuclear weapon, they had sufficient material that they could enrich

Within, I think the estimate is kind of two weeks, five to eight warheads is the assessment that I've, the latest assessment that I've seen. But besides the fissile material, you then actually have to build the nuclear weapon. And that's where it gets a little bit more complicated because we don't have as clear of an understanding of what the weapons relevant are.

or the weaponization relevant activities might have been as we do of the physical production. So again, going off of publicly available assessments, most of them coming from intelligence community briefings,

Because last I'd seen, we were sort of anywhere between several months to well over a year for the actual production of a nuclear weapon. And then you need to also mount it on a delivery system, etc. So Iran was probably at least some ways off. I mean, at least that's the latest assessment that was coming out of the American intelligence community, for one.

And the International Atomic Energy Agency has also confirmed in the last few days that they did not see weaponization of Iran's nuclear program as imminent. And then there's the big question of the political decision to weaponize. You can have all of the technological pieces, but if the political decision has not been made to weaponize, then that's obviously a big part of that process. And that's where...

I think it's important to look at the impact of the last few days. I think it's important to look not just at what has been done to the technical capability to produce a nuclear weapon, what has been damaged, what might still be out there, but also what has it done to the political resolve? What has it done to Iran's threat perception? Has it now gotten to a point where it assesses that the only way to deter further attacks on its territory is to actually move towards weaponization?

That's a really important point. Could you walk us through your analysis of those three aspects to developing a nuclear bomb, how you think that's been impacted by the attacks over the weekend and the preceding weeks? So on the fissile material, I think it's worth looking at two aspects on the capability to enrich uranium and then the actual stockpiles.

So again, a lot of uncertainty on both those things. And again, just because the damage assessment is still not entirely clear on all the facilities, but by targeting the enrichment facilities at Natanz and at Fordow, those attacks will have, again, depending on the degree of the damage, will have degraded Iran's ability to enrich in future, so to produce fissile material in future.

Again, the above ground facility at Natanz hosted a number of cascades there. The largest facility was the underground Natanz facility. I think it hosted something like 82 cascades underground. So quite a significant site. So if that site was damaged, like I said, we don't know the extent of the damages in the underground site, but

but because of loss of external power, et cetera, chances are that some of the centrifuges were damaged as well. So if those two facilities were damaged, again, that reduces Iran's capacity to enrich further. Same thing with Fordow. It had 13 operating cascades as of the last IAEA assessment. And critically, it was using, as at Natanz, at one of the facilities there, it was using advanced centrifuges as well, and it was enriching to 60%.

Damage to those facilities, depending on what it is, will have set back Iran's ability to produce further enriched uranium. Then there's the question of the stockpile, the existing stockpile, right? So we know that Iran had amassed 400 kilograms, a little bit more than that, of highly enriched uranium. So it's uranium enriched 20% or higher, but it was amassing enriched uranium to lower levels as well, but not quite at 20%.

The extent to which that's been destroyed is unclear, again, because we don't know whether that material has been moved and where, particularly the HEUs of greatest concern. So that's on the fissile material, on the weaponization aspects.

Again, a bit hard to assess the damage because we don't actually know how close Iran had gotten to having all the various components of compiling a nuclear weapon. We know that they had several aspects that were working on certain parts that would be weaponization relevant, but we don't know what all the different pieces were. So it's hard to say how far they've been set back.

But that activity would have been happening, I'm sure, in certain instances in facilities that we might not even have been aware of. They might have been happening in small secret facilities. But when I say we, I mean us in the public domain. What the Israeli intelligence services, what the American intelligence services might have known and the extent of their access to those sites and their ability to set those aspects of the program back up.

is of course a separate question. And then there's that question of political resolve. And I think this is really where, again, as I said, we need to focus kind of assessment of what is the ultimate impact of

of these strikes on the Iranian nuclear program, because all the technical stuff that I've been describing, the actual physical development, the expertise exists in Iran. This program is decades old. There's very deep indigenous expertise in Iran, so that if there is a decision, if there is a result to reestablish the program and reestablish

reconstitute whatever capabilities have been damaged, the expertise is there. The question really hinges on what is the political resolve to do that? What is the threat assessment?

And I mean, it could go one of two ways, right? The Iranians might decide that actually, we don't want to suffer future attacks like this. So maybe we should be entirely transparent on our program and roll back enrichment to 3% to 5%, what would be expected of a peaceful program and energy program and cooperate fully, basically. Or the alternative is,

And frankly, I think this is the more likely one, is that the Iranian leadership decides, you know, we tried cooperating with the agency, we've tried engaging in diplomacy, that's not worked.

Looking at the past week and a half, the lesson that they are likely to take away is that actually the only option is for us to double down, whether that's to produce nuclear weapons or harden their defences, otherwise, you know, debatable. But I think that's where we're really running the risk that the political resolve has been hardened while the technical capabilities have been degraded, albeit not decisively. Just finally, from a nuclear proliferation perspective, is this sort of attack likely

in that it sets Iran's nuclear capabilities back and potentially stops another country acquiring nuclear weapons for a little while, even if it's only for a few years? Or do you think this sets a negative example that people can start attacking each other's nuclear sites? I don't think it was ultimately productive on either of the two things that you mentioned. So on the Iranian program, as I've said, you

Yes, it's done potentially significant damage, depending on what the actual practical damage has been on the ground to the capabilities. But again, I think we run the very high risk of strengthening Iranian resolve to reconstitute and move the program ahead. So I'm not sure that I would call this necessarily, in the long term at least, a counterproliferation win on the Iranian nuclear file.

more broadly in terms of the precedent that it sets for proliferation and potential would-be proliferators. Yes, it might deter some would-be proliferators from pursuing a nuclear program if they feel that they're going to be attacked. But I think the alternative way to look at this is that countries that might be considering moving ahead with not necessarily a nuclear weapons capability just yet, but a threshold capability, one that they could eventually weaponize,

Having looked at Iran's experience, you know, they might look at this and say, why would we declare our facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency? Wouldn't we be better off doing all of this in secret, making sure that these facilities are not known and not monitored and move ahead that way? And I think more broadly, obviously, it sets, you know, not a particularly great precedent to be attacking facilities that are

Yes, we're at a threshold capability, but we're not an imminent direct threat just yet. Certainly not to the United States. I don't think anybody was saying that Iran was going to develop a nuclear weapon next week or even two weeks from now. So I think more broadly in terms of international norms, it sets a bad precedent. Thanks so much for joining us. That's Daria Dolzikova, Senior Research Fellow at RUSI. Coming up after the break, what will Israel do next? And could Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, be assassinated?

You know that feeling when you clear your inbox? Or end a meeting early? Or finally check your pipeline and everything's actually under control? That's what Monday CRM feels like. It's fast, easy to use, and with built-in AI, it helps you move faster without the busy work.

Try it free at monday.com slash CRM because sales should feel this good. At 1-800-Flowers.com, we know that connections are at the heart of being human. Whether celebrating life's joys or comforting during tough times, 1-800-Flowers helps you express what words can't. For nearly 50 years, millions have trusted 1-800-Flowers to deliver thoughtful gifts that help create lasting bonds. Because of that,

Because it's more than just a gift. It's your way of showing you care. Visit 1-800-Flowers.com slash ACAST and connect today. That's 1-800-Flowers.com slash ACAST.

Picture this, you're halfway through a DIY car fix, tools scattered everywhere and boom, you realise you're missing a part. It's okay, because you know whatever it is, it's on eBay. They've got everything, brakes, headlights, cold air intakes, whatever you need. And it's guaranteed to fit, which means no more crossing your fingers and hoping you ordered the right thing. All the parts you need at prices you'll love, guaranteed to fit every time. eBay, things people love.

In Operation Rising Lion, Israel has done truly amazing things. But in tonight's action against Iran's nuclear facilities, America has been truly unsurpassed. It has done what no other country on earth could do. History will record that President Trump acted to deny the world's most dangerous regime the world's most dangerous weapons.

His leadership today has created a pivot of history that can help lead the Middle East and beyond to a future of prosperity and peace. Welcome back. That was Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaking over the weekend after the U.S. strikes.

Those strikes by the US are part of a broader war that began when Israel launched a surprise attack on Iran on June 13th. Since then, both countries have been trading missiles and hundreds of civilians have died. In Iran, more than 800 people have been killed, according to the Iranian human rights activist news agency. In Israel, 24 people have been killed, all of them in the early days of the war. Hundreds more in both countries have been injured, including in fresh strikes over the weekend.

So what will Israel do next? And what does victory look like in its war with Iran? I'm joined now by Dr. Shani Moore, a senior research fellow at the Britain-Israel Communications and Research Centre and a lecturer at Reikman University in Israel. He's also a former foreign policy director at the Israeli National Security Council.

Shani, welcome to Battle Lines. I want to start by asking you, why do you think this strike happened now? We heard about Trump's two-week window last week, but this seems to have happened quicker than expected. I mean, I think the thing that was holding up an American operation in Iran was making sure that the airspace was completely clear. Once the IAF, the Israeli Air Force, was able to definitively get rid of any kind of anti-aircraft fire that could threaten Iran,

the American plains, then the coast was clear. I mean, if there was anything that could have held it up, it would have been some Iranian seriousness at the negotiations that were conducted in Geneva over the weekend. So the Europeans, the E3, three of the six parties that signed the original JCPOA met with the Iranian foreign minister in Geneva. Now, if the Iranians had come with either a serious proposal of themselves or some kind of

agreement, not even agreement, any kind of forward movement towards what the Europeans were asking. And remember, let's just map this out. What the Europeans are asking is less than what the Americans are asking. And what the Americans are asking is less than what the Israelis are asking, right? So there's a lot of people who could still be unsatisfied. But if the Iranians had shown up in Geneva and said, okay, we're willing to talk about no enrichment or 3% limitation or something about inspections and reporting, something,

That would have put the Europeans in a position where they would have been able to say to the Americans, look, we have something here.

Let's exhaust this diplomatic possibility. And then the Trump administration would have had to decide if it's serious or not. But there would have been – I suspect that if there had been anything there in Geneva, the administration would have said, all right, let's give it two weeks. Two weeks is not a lot of time. That wouldn't have promised – but it would have at least explored the possibility. The Iranians show up in Geneva with nothing. The answer to your question why now is –

Once tactically, they had essentially an open highway to Fordow, thanks to the suppression of anti-aircraft batteries by the IAF. And once politically, they had no open diplomatic avenue in Geneva. There was no reason to wait. How much was Israel involved in the strikes over the weekend? Was it just this preparatory stuff that we've been talking about over the last two weeks of the war? Or were they involved on the night itself? Yeah.

I have no idea. I suspect that the IAF wasn't directly involved. But yes, I mean, in terms of the preparation, the nine days of offensive operations in Tehran were, from a tactical perspective, absolutely astonishing. I don't know that there is any air operation that has been so successful in conditions like this.

And it far exceeded even the expectations that the IAF had for itself. It certainly exceeded the estimates that the Americans and others had of IAF capabilities. Were you surprised? Has it been easier than Israeli Defense Analyst expected it to be? I mean, I think there's three variables to take into account here. And they're particularly relevant if we're comparing the operation that did take place in 2025 versus an operation that was bruided in 2012, 13 years ago.

In terms of Israel's offensive capabilities, which are a combination of air capabilities and special ops and intelligence capabilities, this is, as we said, astonishing, hugely impressive. Beyond what we could have imagined, if I compare it to what we could have done in 2012, probably a bit better, but I'm not sure a quantum leap.

But there's two other things that are really different now than they were 13 years ago. One is the geopolitical environment. The geostrategic environment is radically different now from what it was in 2012. The generational investment that the Iranians had made in vassal states and proxy militias surrounding Israel had turned to naught.

in the last year and a half. Hezbollah is a larger armed force than most sovereign state militaries in the region. And its rocket and missile arsenal was supposed to deter any Israeli action in Iran. And it was disabled effectively in 2024. Hamas still exists in Gaza, but it's a shadow of its former self. Very crucially, the Assad regime in Syria that was the Iranian land bridge to the Mediterranean collapsed in December of 2024. So that's very vastly different

And then there's the third variable that's probably even more pivotal than the second, which is Israel's defensive capabilities. In operation in 2012, if Israel had gone and tried to attack Iranian nuclear sites in 2012, it's almost certain that we would have had an easier time attacking the sites. They would have been less dug in. There would have been less progress in the nuclear program. We would have been dealing with a problem at a much earlier state. That's absolutely sure.

But in 2012, if we had done this, the Iranian ballistic missile response to us would have just slammed into people's homes by the hundreds. At the time, the estimates were of hundreds, if not thousands of civilians killed.

We did not have at the time, Iron Dome, Iron Dome is relevant for the Iranian ballistic missiles. We didn't have an Iron Dome either, but we didn't have the other anti-missile systems that we've seen work now. Not the Arrow in its various iterations, nor the David Sling system. In other words, we might have had an easier time of doing damage to the Iranian nuclear program because it would have been 13 years behind what it is now. But the cost to Israeli civilians and strategic infrastructure would have been enormous if

And by the way, the cost to Israeli aircraft might have been bigger too. Today, we're operating freely in what is a one-way aerial highway between Israel and Iran, thanks to the collapse of Iranian proxies in Lebanon and in Syria, and thanks to the Israeli operation in October 2024, which destroyed much of the Iranian anti-aircraft system. And the home front is protected. Now, you can see the pictures of damage here when a missile gets through

These are not Hamas rockets. They cause devastation. The civilian casualties in Israel have been limited. We've had 25 civilians who died and no combatants who died.

They're limited because everybody's in shelters, because we have this handy app that tells you with a certain amount of time where you need to go and things like that. And in particular, because most of these missiles aren't getting through. Fewer than 10% do, and the fewer than 10% do cause an enormous amount of damage. Now that we didn't have in 2012. Going back to what happened over the weekend, what's your assessment of how much damage has actually been done to Iran's nuclear program? I haven't read any BDAs, any bomb damage assessments. I don't know that they're produced yet. I haven't scanned any satellite images. I'm not sure you would want my...

non-existent expertise on those things. But based on what I hear and what I've read, it would seem that there was a significant amount of damage. Again, this is your question, I think, is asking about the American operation. The American operation succeeded in hitting places that we lack the munitions and the delivery capacities for the munitions to do on three crucial sites. If the estimates that we're hearing are correct, this would set the Iranian nuclear program back 10, 15 years at a minimum.

But it's not just 10, 15 years. The Iranians are in a place that's very similar to where Hezbollah is after the ceasefire in 2024, just a writ large, which is, it's not just that they've been set back.

It's that their enemies, which are Israel and the United States, can now freely operate over their skies and continue to set them back with each move that they make to reconstitute their nuclear program. How important was it for Israel, for the US to be involved? As you mentioned, Israel has been doing a lot of this work already, lacked munitions to attack some specific sites and cause some specific damage.

Right. So it's a dilemma from the Israeli perspective. I think there was many good reasons why Israel would prefer for the entire thing to be just, as we say here, blue and white. I think there are some important political and geostrategic reasons why...

why it's important that de facto non-proliferation regime that's been in the Middle East since 1981, since Israel took out the Iraqi reactor in Osirak, is seen as an Israeli operation. I think that has some importance to it. It's possible to exaggerate that importance because, of course, all of that blue and white firepower is purchased and supported by the United States anyway. The fact that the U.S. does come in on a war that Israel initiated has some benefits as well.

in terms of the message that it sends about Israel's alliances to anyone in the region. And as you suggested in your question, tactically, it's crucial. Well, not crucial, but it helps a lot. The definitive damage to these three sites, and to one in particular, was not something that Israel had the capacity to do from the air. So it obviously helps. It shortens the war. It has a certain possible psychological cost and prestige and deterrence, but with another possible psychological benefit.

It's hard to ignore the broad smiles on the faces of some of Israel's decision makers. So I suspect that they think it is overall a good thing, or they're putting on a very good act. What do you think are the options now for Iran in terms of how it might respond? And is there any concern in Israel that

Iran might try to attack Israel's nuclear sites. I know Israel has never publicly acknowledged that it has nuclear weapons, but is widely considered to have them. The best thing Iran can do right now, the absolute best thing it can do, which it probably won't do, is to come to the negotiating table with the P5 plus one or the E3 plus three, however you want to call it. It adds up to six either way. To come to the negotiating table and sign a good deal for the limitation on its nuclear facilities.

such a deal would include strict limitations on enrichment, on weaponization, on its ballistic missile programs, and that was not included in the JCPOA. I think also that such a deal should include a declaration of non-belligerence regarding Israel. The Iranians don't need to sign a peace treaty with it. If they do, if they want to, that would be wonderful. I don't think they can. If they make a commitment to non-belligerence, which means not attacking Israel and not carrying out terrorist actions against Jewish or Israeli targets abroad, I think that would be a very reasonable demand for the Europeans and Americans to make. For the

For the Iranians, that's probably the best option at this point. They won't take it. I don't think that they feel backed into a corner quite yet. That means that in the meantime, the war continues. If there's some kind of discrete ceasefire that's agreed to, I think that could be good for all sides. If there isn't, I suspect that at a certain point, Israel, assuming nothing goes wrong, assuming there isn't some shocking event, some missile that kills a lot of people, some terrorist attack somewhere, a plane that's shot down and a pilot who's taken prisoners, assuming nothing shocking happens, Israel will be in a position to

declare victory and go home to make its own ceasefire. Maybe the Iranians will try to get a last shot in or whatever, but that's that. And then the Iranians have to figure out what they do domestically. The essence of the regime is ideologically and theologically committed to this cosmic struggle against the Jewish state. And that's been what's clouded the judgment of its leaders throughout this crisis in the last year and a half. That's very difficult for them to recover from. In the last hours,

We've seen that IAF warplanes have struck really symbolic targets connected to the regime. They hit the walls of the infamous Evin prison where political prisoners were kept. So prisoners weren't affected, but hopefully they can escape now. And that has some symbolic value. And most amusingly, the giant countdown to Israel's destruction clock in the middle of Tehran was just destroyed by an Israeli bomb.

metaphor alert, if you will. And that's that. What the Iranians can hit in Israel, I mean, they're trying very hard to hit every strategic target that they can, including things that they suspect are connected to strategic weapons programs in Israel. So far, unsuccessfully, for the most part, unsuccessfully, I mean, they have managed to do some damage to Israeli infrastructure. We saw the attack on the refinery in Haifa in

Today, I don't know exactly what was hit in Ashdod. These things are usually kept under censorship for a while, but it did cause a minor power outage. That's what they can do. Knowing their MO over recent decades, the most likely thing they will try to do is sponsor some sort of spectacular terrorist attack outside of the Middle East.

What about what Israel can do next? You mentioned that at some point they might be able to declare victory. What is that end point? What is Israel looking to get to? If we...

are the day after a war with Iran and there's still an Islamic regime and it's still very hostile and it still is trying to build weapons and it's still operating terrorist networks abroad and it's still everything we don't like about the Islamic Republic. But we've managed to do huge damage to its missile program and its nuclear program and some of its other key infrastructure sites.

then that's enough. That's fine. That will have accomplished a lot for Israel's strategic interests. In fact, a huge amount. So regime change, because of course, we had Trump posting on Truth Social overnight, talking about, you know, regime change, if it happens, why not? You know, mega, make Iran great again. Is that something that Israeli government officials are talking about? I know Benjamin Netanyahu was sort of suggesting that the public might want to spontaneously rise up. Israel's performance in this operation has been stunning, that's for sure.

But Israel, a tiny country with 10 million people, 2,000 kilometers from Iran, that has a few hundred really good pilots.

And a few, not even, right? And a few hundred really impressive Assad operatives on that kind of payroll and manpower is not going to affect a regime change in a country 70 times the size of Israel with 90 million people. It's not in the cards. It's not a reasonable goal. It's also something that even if we could do, isn't something that should be coming not from Israel, not from the United States. This is something that the Iranians will have to sort out.

And you've mentioned the geopolitical context of all of this. We haven't seen, correct me if I'm wrong, any attacks from Hezbollah, from the Houthis in Yemen.

those Iranian proxies seem to have really effectively been neutralized by Israel over the last few years. Hezbollah has been neutralized for now, as has Hamas as an offensive military force that is not able to really defy rockets or anything like that. Houthis are still around. They're still able to harass us. Why they have been so reticent this week is a bit of a mystery. They're probably doing their own situational assessment. But yes, it's a very, very different

It's a radically different geopolitical. The map of the Middle East, the coloured checkerboard of this region looks nothing like it did on the morning of October 7th. Just finally, how do you see this evolving in the next few weeks? I tend to avoid making predictions because nothing can go right when you do. I have no idea where this is going to go. I think there's been a huge achievement. The Iranian ring of fire or axis of resistance has been definitively broken.

Now would be a wonderful time for what's left of the Iranian regime to come to a serious nuclear agreement with the superpowers, if they choose to do so. I hope they do. I'm skeptical that they would. And now would also be a very good opportunity for the moderate Arab states, the ones that are already aligned with the United States, to sign peace treaties with Israel. And at any time now, yesterday, today,

at any point in the last 600 days, would be an excellent time for Hamas to release the hostages, surrender its weapons, bring an end to the catastrophic war in Gaza, which they initiated on October 7th. It's always a good time for that.

Dr. Shani Moore, Senior Research Fellow at the Britain-Israel Communications Research Centre. Thank you very much for joining us on Battlelines. Thank you so much for having me. Now, Israelis might not be explicit about the prospect of regime change in Iran, but Trump posting on Truth Social overnight was. He wrote, it's not politically correct to use the term regime change, but if the current Iranian regime is unable to make Iran great again, why wouldn't there be regime change? Question mark, question mark, question mark.

And then he added, "Migah," which we assume means "make Iran great again." I'm joined now in the studio by my co-host, Roland Oliphant. Roland, you wrote an excellent piece on The Telegraph about how vulnerable the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, is right now, which we'll post in the show notes.

Give us your briefing. Is he at fear of his life right now? I mean, I suppose he probably is. I don't know where he is. The Americans have said they know where he is. We've seen reports that say he's actually being guarded by a new top secret team of bodyguards that was so secret no one in Iran, no one else even knew it existed to prevent against the threat of infiltration. And one of the things that will be going through his head and is definitely going through the heads of actually all Iranians I've spoken to

is this question of just how far they've been infiltrated. Because this operation from the beginning, from the start of the Israeli operation, more than a week ago now, it was absolutely clear that they had very high-level penetration, very, very good access, which suggests that they've wormed their way in. Israeli intelligence has wormed its way into quite high levels within the regime. And that's got to make you nervous, right? Who can you trust? The other thing to remember about Ali Khamenei

is that he has been in power for 38 years. He's got a really good track record of surviving really, really grave crises. So it's absolutely not a foregone conclusion that he is going to fall, which I think actually presents a real big issue for the Americans and the Israelis here because it's looking more and more like they seem to be assuming the endgame of this campaign will be a collapse or a change of regime. It's not guaranteed that's going to happen. He systematically crushed his internal rivals.

That is something that means looking over your shoulder, thinking about who might be out to get you, so on and so forth. So, yes, absolutely. I think he will be feeling somewhat vulnerable. I think he will be looking over his shoulder. And you'll have seen there was a new report, I think, in The Atlantic the other day by Arash Azizi, getting much more specific about the kind of discussions that are going on amongst socialists.

certain people in the regime or high-placed Iranians talking about whether we can move him aside. Because I guess the examples of two of his mates, shall we say, in the region are not particularly encouraging. Hassan Nasrallah taken out by an Israeli bomb in Lebanon and Bashar al-Assad ousted by a jihadist group in Syria and he fled to Russia. Is there any sign of a popular uprising in Iran against the regime?

Not that I can see, with the obvious caveat that I'm not in Iran. My Farsi is next to nonexistent. And that has been, I mean, I think it's over now, but there was at least an at least 48-hour internet blackout over the weekend. So it's incredibly difficult to get information out. But nonetheless, I mean, everyone I spoke to last week in Iran or people who knew people in Iran and so on were all saying, look, you know,

People are running for their lives anyway. Huge numbers of people are trying to get out of Tehran, at least at the beginning.

Nobody appreciated being told to rise up against the regime by Benjamin Netanyahu, the leader of the country that is bombing them. So as far as I'm aware at the moment, no sign of an Iranian street protest or uprising. And bear in mind, they've had several in the past decade and a half. It's not something that cannot happen. But as far as we're aware at the moment, there's no sign of it kicking off at the moment. Yeah.

You mentioned discussions about how to push, perhaps gently, Khamenei aside. Who could replace him? Well, look, the question of succession has been a live one in Iranian politics for a long time because he's so old. So he's 86 now.

We think he's quite ill. As many people are when they get into their 80s. So the question of who is going to succeed, Khamenei, has already been a live question in Iranian politics for quite a long time. Iran watchers have been looking at as possible successes. And they've always caveated that with the point that even he was not who anybody expected to succeed, Ruhollah Khomeini, the first supreme leader. The man whose name comes up most frequently at all is Mojtaba Khamenei.

Ali Khamenei's son, one of his sons, he is very well thought of amongst the Revolutionary Guard Corps. He was a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War. Most people of his age are, I suppose. Our brilliant colleague, Akhtar McCoy, some months ago, was speaking to members of the Basij Militia. And the Basij Militia is the kind of IRGC-affiliated group of irregulars who clamped down dissent in the country, who basically said, look,

We know there is going to be a massive opposition street uprising when Khamenei dies. There also may be some opposition to Moshtaba taking over supreme leader, but it's very simple. The IRGC are just going to crush any opposition to Moshtaba taking over supreme leader.

Bear in mind, this is a revolutionary republic. It is an Islamic republic, but a revolutionary republic. So a hereditary transfer of power isn't going to go down too well, even amongst the establishment. Nonetheless, he's long been seen as a potential successor. Now we're looking at a situation where he might be forced out or killed or something else that there are other names going around.

There is another guy whose name has been kind of floated as a potential successor. There's a guy called Ali Shamkhani. He was held the nuclear file. He was kind of in charge of the nuclear negotiations. He was reported killed in the first wave of Israeli strikes last Friday. It then turned out he'd only been wounded. He's in hospital. We don't know quite what kind of condition he is in, but he's...

influential with the IRGC, also very rich, runs a business empire, has his own media empire. He's kind of been looked at as a kind of slightly oligarchic figure who might find themselves basically brokering power in Iran as it goes forward. There's people like Mr. Kalabath, the Speaker of Parliament, I think, former mayor of Tehran, also ties to the IRGC, also nominally a hardliner. And then there's talk about...

And I don't know how much credence to give this. There's talk of a kind of moderate centrist takeover with a kind of a committee, a government of national unity taking over Poitras.

possibly headed by Hassan Rouhani, the former reformist president. His name's floating around. And the idea is that if he could form an alliance with enough army or IRGC men and perhaps Javad Zarif or some of the other kind of reformist-ish minded politicians, there might be grounds for a government that would cut a deal with the Americans and the Israelis themselves.

in order to, you know, finally get back to normal, end the war, relief sanctions and move on. That would require the removal of the Supreme Leader. Fascinating. Well, we'll keep an eye on all of that, obviously, on battle lines. Finally, I just want to ask you, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Arragchi is in Moscow today. Apparently he's going to have talks with Putin.

We can only assume that he's going to be asking for some help. Why has Russia not come in to help Iran so far? All right, number one, Russia's obviously tied up militarily in Ukraine. Number two, Russia enjoys or has enjoyed a pretty good relationship with Israel over the past 20, 30 years. I mean, since the end of the Cold War, particularly since Putin came to power, it's a very useful relationship to Russia. It's very useful to have Israel kind of

kind of also trying to sit on the fence in its relationship between, you know, Russia and the West and so on. There's a third consideration, which of course is that Vladimir Putin's big goal is a kind of normalization of relations with the United States, potentially with the goal of bringing Donald Trump on board a settlement for Ukraine war that suits Russia's interests. That is a much bigger goal than securing Iran. And although Iran and Russia signed a strategic partnership,

that agreement doesn't have the mutual defense agreement that the similar one that Russia signed with North Korea does. So Russia was obviously looking ahead to this. They didn't want to get involved in a war on behalf of Iran. Look, that said, Iran is an important ally for Russia. Iranian drones are very important for its war in Ukraine. And it's important to have that ally on the southern flank. Within that axis, that kind of

anti-Western axis of Beijing, China. Iran is an important junior, but an important player there. So you're going to see very strong words of support from Vladimir Putin. What you are not going to see is

I'm 90% sure what you are not going to see is what Dmitry Medvedev, the former president of Russia, suggested on social media yesterday, which is that Russia is going to give Iran its own nuclear bombs. That is absolutely not going to happen. 90% sure? I'm 90% sure that no Russian president is stupid enough to give away Russia's own nuclear weapons to anybody.

let alone the Iranians. That is just classic Medvedev hot air. But very strong words of support I do expect to see from the Russians. We'll leave it there. Roland Oliphant, my co-host, thank you very much for joining us. That's all for today's episode of Battlelines. We'll be back again on Friday. Until then, goodbye. Battlelines is an original podcast from The Telegraph, created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Venetia Rainey, and Roland Oliphant.

If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following Battle Lines on your preferred podcast app. And if you have a moment, leave a review as it really helps others find the show. To stay on top of all of our news, subscribe to The Telegraph, sign up to our Dispatches newsletter or listen to our sister podcast, Ukraine The Latest. You can get in touch directly by emailing battlelines at telegraph.co.uk or contact us on X. You can find our handles in the show notes. The producer is Peter Shevlin. The executive producer is Louisa Wells.

At 1-800-Flowers.com, we know that connections are at the heart of being human. Whether celebrating life's joys or comforting during tough times, 1-800-Flowers helps you express what words can't. For nearly 50 years, millions have trusted 1-800-Flowers to deliver thoughtful gifts that help create lasting bonds. Because it's more than just a gift. It's your way of showing you care. Visit 1-800-Flowers.com slash ACAST and connect today.

That's 1-800-Flowers.com slash ACAST.