Who won India and Pakistan's four-day war?
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The fighting may be over, but the conflict isn't. The situation remains quite precarious. There have been some reports of continued skirmishes even after the ceasefire was declared.

To the Middle East now, and more than 50,000 people have been killed in the Gaza Strip since the war began. That's according to the territory's Hamas-run health ministry.

I'm Roland Oliphant and this is Battlelines. It's Monday, the 12th of May 2025. India and Pakistan have stopped fighting. Will the ceasefire hold and what are the military lessons of their most recent clash? But first, last week saw the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe, with ceremonies across the continent marking the end of hostilities and a moment of remembrance for the fallen in that horrific war.

In Russia, however, Victory Day has become an annual showcase for contemporary military might and geopolitical power, intimately linked to the war in Ukraine. What did this year's parade on Red Square tell us about the global balance of power and greater confrontation? David Blair, The Telegraph's chief foreign affairs commentator, was watching. David, what did you make of the parade in Moscow this year? Well, it was a grand occasion and Putin's objective was

was to demonstrate to the world that the West's efforts to isolate Russia have failed.

And the centerpiece of that was the presence of Xi Jinping. And there he was in the front row on Putin's right hand in pride of place and not only watching the parade, but displaying on his overcoat the ribbon of St. George, which is, of course, a symbol or has been appropriated as a symbol of Russian military glory.

So Xi Jinping visibly demonstrating his support for Putin and indeed for the assault on Ukraine, because that's what the ribbon of St. George has come to signify. So the St. George's ribbon is a black and orange ribbon that you'll sometimes see on Russian soldiers or on the lapels of Russian officials. It goes back to 1769 when...

Catherine the Great founded a military order, the Order of St. George. It was later appropriated as a general sign of remembrance and of military glory in Russia. And in the mid kind of 2000s, it became almost akin to the Remembrance Day poppy in Britain. People would wear it around Victory Day as a sign of respect, as a sign of remembrance.

for those who served in the Second World War. But then in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and invaded Donbass and eastern Ukraine, it was immediately appropriated as a symbol, as a tactical symbol by the separatist forces, the rebels, the Russian irregulars who were taking part in that conflict. And since then, that has really become the emblem of that entire project and that entire war. David, do you think

Xi Jinping knew all of that when he put that ribbon on? I think we must assume that he did. The Chinese will be very well aware of that. And the fact that he chose to wear it deserves more attention than it has received. Well, what does that say then about the... Because there's been a lot of talk, I think, about, especially from the

from the current Trump administration and some of the foreign policy thinkers there about driving a wedge between Russia and China, about this idea that China is the main adversary, therefore we need to find a way of splitting Russia from China. I suppose there's two ways of looking at this. If you're right and this signifies the strength of that bond, either that makes that mission all the more urgent...

Or maybe it makes it all the more impossible. From America's perspective, splitting China away from Russia is obviously desirable. The question is, is it attainable? And when you look at Xi Jinping side by side in Red Square watching the parade, I think there's three things to remember. The first is the entire Russian military machine gets its key electronic components and semiconductors and all the rest of it overwhelmingly from China.

So China is underwriting the invasion of Ukraine. It could not be happening on the scale that it is happening without Chinese support. And more broadly, the military machine that Putin has built up, the war economy that he's developed, the machine which European leaders fear must be turned on some target. And even if it eventually is no longer turned on Ukraine, it will be turned on someone else. That whole military machine depends to a big extent upon China.

So if Russia is a threat, then by extension, China must also be a threat. And the second point is Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin clearly see themselves as co-conspirators against a Western-led world order. This is the order that they want to smash and replace with a new one. Now, that's not some passing transience convergence of interest. That is a structural convergence of interest.

And it outweighs any of the other well-known points of tension between Russia and China over their disputed border or the border that was disputed in the past, but which they say no longer is, and various other things, too. So I think all the signs are that Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are probably inseparable at the moment, no matter what the Americans do. We're talking about the diplomacy, I think, because, well...

I suppose that's your specialty rather than the hardware rolling across the cobbles. Was there anything else that leapt out to you from the people on the podium about the number of leaders who showed up? I think from Putin's perspective, having Xi there was the big prize.

And not just having Xi, but having Xi wearing the ribbon of St. George. That was a very big prize. Beyond that, I think it was a mixed achievement for Putin. What he really needed was two things. He needed a clean sweep of all the BRICS leaders. And he didn't quite get that. He got Xi. He got the president of Brazil.

He didn't get Narendra Modi, but for a very good and understandable reason, which is that Narendra Modi was on the brink of war with Pakistan at the time. So fair enough, he didn't get to Moscow. But he didn't get the president of South Africa either, President Ramaphosa. So he didn't quite get a bricks clean sweep. The second thing Putin needed was a clean sweep of the more friendly leaders from his perspective in Europe.

And it was interesting that he only got one EU leader, which was, and you'll forgive my pronunciation, Robert Fico of Slovakia. He didn't get Viktor Orban, no sign of Orban, despite Orban being the longest serving and most high profile Putin apologist in the EU. He didn't turn up. So.

From Putin's perspective, I think it was pretty mixed, but except for the fact that he got Xi, and that's what in his mind would have mattered more than anything else. David Blair, thank you very much. After the break, after four days of fighting, India and Pakistan have agreed to a ceasefire. Will the truce hold? And what have both sides' generals learned from their latest battle? Welcome back.

I'm joined now by Chittish Bajpayee, Senior Research Fellow for South Asia at Chatham House. Chittish, you've been watching events closely over the past week. We currently have a ceasefire. Will it hold? The fighting may be over, but the conflict isn't. So, I mean, I think the situation remains quite precarious. There have been some reports of continued skirmishes even after the ceasefire was declared.

I think the important point to note is that the punitive actions that were announced by both countries after the terrorist attack, which took place last month, those all remain in place. The suspension of visa services, closure of airspace, trade ban, closure of their border, and most notably, the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty, which remains in abeyance. The Indian government had announced this. All of that still remains in place. We've not returned to the status quo that existed before the 22nd of April, before the terror attack, which was reported in Palgamh.

The Indian side has said that it would consider another terror attack as an act of war. The ceasefire, of course, does not address any of the underlying grievances in the bilateral relationship, and the rules of engagement have clearly shifted, you know, in terms of the number of targets that were struck on both sides, going beyond Pakistan and Indian-administered Kashmir into both countries' heartlands, in terms of drone warfare or the deployment of the Indian Navy for the first time during combat operations since 1971, and

So I think, yeah, I mean, the situation remains precarious. We're nowhere near, I think, a resolution of the tensions in the bilateral relationship. Could we go back to the very beginning? This particular round began with this terrorist attack that killed 26 people, I believe. Why did that particular attack prompt such a response compared to previous attacks in the past? Was the context different or was the attack particularly egregious?

Well, I think this was the largest terrorist attack targeting civilians in India since the infamous Mumbai terrorist attack, which took place in 2008. 26 people were killed, mostly tourists. They selectively targeted Hindu men.

Add to that, I think, is the political context. So under the Modi government, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi that assumed power in 2014, they've taken a more assertive and tough on security posture. We've seen this with the response to previous terrorist attacks in 2016, in 2019. In 2016, they responded with so-called surgical strikes, which meant crossing the line of control into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

And then in 2019, they responded with airstrikes into Pakistan proper. So they've clearly moved up the escalation ladder to a degree. And this, I think, raised the bar even further. It's clearly gone beyond what we saw in 2016 and 2019. We saw India respond with striking at nine targets inside Pakistan and administered Kashmir and Pakistan proper. Pakistan then responded with its own attacks. And there was a very real risk of accidental escalation there.

There were concerns about limited external pressure, which I think external pressure did finally, to some degree, prompt both countries to pull back.

And as I said, both countries have developed a more assertive military posture, India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pakistan under the current army chief, Asim Munir. Who won, if anybody could be said to have won? You know, I think it's perhaps a tactical victory for India. It's a tactical rather than a strategic victory. Frankly, I don't think it's a question of if, but when tensions will rise again. And this was, you know, very much, I would say, in some ways, a propaganda war, a war of perceptions as much as it was a military conflict.

with both sides maybe perhaps to some degree exaggerating their accomplishments on the battlefield while downplaying their defeats. And I think both sides will essentially be using this time to reassess their capabilities, what worked, what didn't, what were the gaps in terms of potential tactics and effectiveness of certain military platforms or hardware capabilities.

It's the calm before another storm.

I believe the head of the Indian Air Force has ducked a question about that, saying that losses are part of warfare. I'm not going to talk about what actually happened. I don't want to reveal things we shouldn't.

What are the lessons here? Do we think the Indians lost advanced platforms? If so, why? What can you say about that stuff? It's still early days. As I said, there's been a propaganda war as much as a real war. So the exact details of the operations have yet to be revealed.

It has raised questions about the general effectiveness, if it turns out to be correct that these French-made Rafael aircraft were downed, that it shows the effectiveness of Chinese-made J-10 aircraft and their PL-15, I think it's air-to-air missiles.

against the French-made Rafale aircraft. So I think that at the same time, there have been questions raised on the effectiveness of Chinese-made anti-aircraft systems in countering the operations or attacks by the Indian drone and aircraft into Pakistani territory.

Pakistan itself employed Turkish-made drones. So it actually goes beyond the question of India and Pakistan to some degree, because both countries are heavily dependent on foreign-made military platforms. So the Indians employing Israeli drones, the Pakistanis employing Turkish-made drones, the Pakistanis employing Chinese-made anti-aircraft systems and aircraft and air-to-air missiles, Indians employing French Rafael aircraft.

effectiveness of the Indian air defense system, which includes the S-400 Russian-made surface-to-air system. So we will see that debate play out over the coming days, weeks, and months, you know, which systems worked, which didn't. It's still early days. There's still a lot of misinformation and speculation on, you know, whether it was one aircraft, Indian aircraft that was down, or three, or five, or none. I think obviously the Indians have not come out on their position on that yet. How is it going down?

I mean, in India and in Pakistan, amongst the general public, you could have people, I suppose, rallying to the flag. You can also end up with people criticizing the government maybe for...

losses. Sometimes you see people resentful that the fighting stopped. What's the general tone, I suppose, in India and Pakistan, as far as you can tell? I think it's a combination of both. I think there, obviously, it's welcome that the hostilities have halted. This was the first time we saw in many years since the

or an attack on assault on both countries' major cities. So I think that that, to some degree, has been welcomed. There was some perception that they would be able to accomplish more than they did. I mean, if you follow the sort of the media reporting in parts of India, they talk that they would dismember Pakistan or that they would take over all of Pakistan, all occupied Kashmir. These are all, frankly, to some degree, unrealistic targets to start off with. The

once India launched its military operations. Yeah, there's also a degree of frustration on the degree to which this has accomplished something of substance in degrading Pakistan's terrorist infrastructure, or whether we will see a replay of this in the short term. How important was the American role here? And I mentioned that because traditionally, the Americans have always played quite an important role, I think, in

In restraining both India and Pakistan when these things kick off, many people are talking about how Donald Trump is no longer interested in playing a traditional American foreign policy role. But it looks like the Americans were involved here. How crucial was their role in brokering a ceasefire? Well, again, there's still some uncertainty and speculation on that. I mean, obviously, the report of the ceasefire initially came out from Trump on social media.

The Pakistanis have said that more than three dozen countries were involved in the process, including the United Kingdom, Turkey, Saudi Arabia. I think the Indians have downplayed the role of third parties and have talked more about it being a bilateral process.

But I think, you know, it does, yes, as you allude to, once again, demonstrate the pivotal role that the U.S. does play as a mediator to a degree, although somewhat reluctantly under the Trump administration. So some of the statements that were made by Trump administration, you know, Vice President J.D. Vann saying that it was fundamentally none of our business. Trump initially talking about, you know, both countries would sort it out one way or the other.

He had changed his, I think, stance in recent days. He had said that if there's anything he could do to help, he would be there. There had been ongoing back-channel diplomacy and outreach. The U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio had been in regular contact with both the Indian and Pakistani national security advisors and the foreign ministers and the Pakistani prime minister recently.

So I think, yeah, in some ways it echoes the role that the U.S. has played during previous periods of tension, most notably in 1999 during the Cargill conflict. The then Clinton administration played quite a prominent role. I think it shows Trump's desire to play the role of peacemaker. It shows his preference for economic warfare over military warfare, as we can see with his reciprocal tariff policies.

And also, I think a degree of leverage that the US has over both countries. You know, India is in the process of negotiating a bilateral trade agreement with the United States. Pakistan is in the midst of an IMF bailout. So I think, you know, these factors also come into play in terms of applying pressure on both countries to halt hostilities. What's the role of China in all this? We know that Pakistan and China are very close allies and India has its own issues with China. Where does China stand in this current situation? Sure.

So officially, Beijing maintains a neutral position on the conflict. It condemned the terrorist attack which took place in April, and it called on both sides to exercise restraint. But the reality is, I think that China has very much leaned

in favor of Pakistan to agree. You know, it's referred to it as its ironclad friend. It said that it, you know, fully understands Pakistan's legitimate security concerns. And I think this needs to be put in a broader context. You know, more than 80% of Pakistan's arms imports come from China. In the past, you know, China's also blocked efforts by India to designate Pakistan-based terrorist organizations or put it on UN sanctions lists.

And then I think it's sometimes forgotten that China is actually a party to the Kashmir dispute through its territorial claims in eastern Ladakh or Aksai Chin, where India and China had border clashes in 2020. And a piece of territory in Kashmir was actually handed over by Pakistan to China in 1963. So in reality, I think its position is far from neutral. It's not played as hands-on a role in the hostilities between both countries. I think that would to some degree depend on

on the level of tensions between both countries. So if we see movement towards a full-scale conventional conflict or, God forbid, a nuclear conflict, I think China would probably play a far more prominent role in trying to mediate or reduce hostilities. I doubt it would be seen by India as an impartial mediator in the conflict. One other point to keep in mind is from the perspective of Indian military planners, the worst-case scenario is facing a two-front war, dealing with both

China and Pakistan at the same time. I think this is very unlikely. The last time we saw anything of that nature happen was during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan when there were reports that the Chinese military had mobilized

But that is obviously something on the back of the mind of Indian military planners. And of course, the fact that you saw Chinese military platforms being employed in this conflict, whether it be aircraft, whether it be the air defense system by Pakistan or air-to-air missiles.

to some extent, I think undermines the nascent rapprochement that we've seen between India and China over the last six months. So there was a border agreement that was announced last October between India and China. There had been movement towards renormalizing relations to a degree, but clearly it shows that the

India and China are not on the same side, whether it be on the India-Pakistan issue or on several other issues. What about the bigger geopolitical picture? Where does the India-Pakistan conflict fit in there? There can be a temptation to see everything in terms of a new Cold War and there's one set of countries on one side, you know, Russia and China on one side, the West on the other side. That's very often to oversimplify things and it's very often kind of ignores other national interests.

Where does the India-Pakistan conflict sit in that wider geopolitical context of what is going on in the world today? Well, there are degrees of convergence. For instance, Modi and Trump, they have a shared worldview to some degree. They both regard China and radical Islam as existential threats. So,

There's a degree of convergence, but at the same time, I think, you know, both China and the United States were eager to see a de-escalation of tensions in South Asia. They don't want to see a nuclear conflict break out. So there's a there's a perhaps some degree of a meeting of the minds between both countries or shared interests there. So I don't think it's as simple as that we can just transplant like global geopolitical fault lines to to the sort of the regional level in South Asia.

There are different dynamics. Even, you know, it's interesting, you know, we often talk about the China-Russia relationship, the so-called no-limits partnership between both countries. And yet they're on opposite sides in the India-Pakistan dispute. India is heavily dependent on Russian military hardware, Pakistan on Chinese military hardware. So I think...

It's not as clear cut as perhaps some of the broader geopolitical dynamics that we see taking place between the US, China and Russia. Countries like Russia, Turkey and China had called for de-escalation, but frankly, they lack credibility as impartial mediators. Turkey had referred to India's actions as an unprovoked act of aggression. Israel had been supportive of India's position, noting that India had the right to self-defense.

had offered to mediate its foreign minister was visiting India last week. And I think, you know, another watch point for future attempts at further

Further de-escalating tensions would be to look at the role of Gulf Arab states, you know, countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE. I mean, these are all countries that have good relations with both India and Pakistan. The UAE, for instance, played a role in helping to broker a ceasefire in 2021 along the line of control, which demarcates Indian and Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

And Qatar and Saudi Arabia have clearly demonstrated their credentials as mediators for the ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine.

But the other point that I would just mention is the appetite for international mediation. So Pakistan, I think, is far more eager for third parties to play a role, whereas India sees the Kashmir issue as a bilateral or in some cases even a domestic issue. And it is – the only external involvement that it would be willing to tolerate would be that which restrains Pakistan's actions, at least from New Delhi's perspective. So –

There is an international role, a component to the conflict or tensions in South Asia between India and Pakistan. But yeah, I don't think it's a simple question of transplanting sort of global geopolitical fault lines to the regional level. You mentioned at the beginning that the fighting has stopped, but we're not back in the status quo. You talked about tariffs, you talked about closed borders, but the big thing seems to be this question about the waters of the Indus River system.

India has, I believe, suspended participation in the water sharing treaty.

Where are we with that? And could you just explain to listeners just how significant and how important that treaty is? Yeah, so just to be clear, I mean, the agreement is held in abeyance. It's not been abrogated, which essentially means that it's been temporarily suspended. There's no immediate impact from India's decision to do so. It lacks the capacity to immediately redirect river flows. But it frees India from, say, restrictions from taking actions under the terms of the treaty.

So it could fast track or expedite projects. It doesn't need to share water flow data anymore with Pakistan. It can ignore legal challenges. But just to put this in context, this is a World Bank-brokered water sharing agreement that was put in place in 1960. It has survived several periods of hostility between both countries. Both countries went to war subsequently in 1965, 1971, 1999, and the agreement is largely

held together. The agreement has essentially been under strain. Following the 2016 terrorist attacks, Prime Minister Modi had said, made a statement that blood and water cannot flow together, essentially, you know, alluding to the possibility that it would punish Pakistan for acts of terrorism by disrupting its water supplies.

India has requested that the treaty be reviewed and modified. Pakistan had accused India of violating the terms of the treaty through hydroelectric power projects. All of this predates the terrorist attacks which took place in April. Pakistan is heavily dependent on the Indus and its tributaries for its economy, for its agriculture, for its power sector, for its cities.

And it made a statement that it would respond to any attempt to re-divert water flows or any violation of the treaty as an act of war. On that basis, it is a significant action. Pakistan has responded by stating that it would suspend other bilateral agreements between both countries, including the Shimla Accord, which is significant for the

for several reasons. It essentially established the rules of engagement between both countries, including recognition of the line of control as the de facto border between Pakistan and Indian-administered Kashmir. As I said, the relationship remains tense. We haven't moved back to the pre-April 22nd status quo. And

It wouldn't take much to see a renewed escalation of tensions. This was a war between two nuclear powers, which is not something we often see, to be absolutely honest. The fact that it lasted four days and then stopped, as far as I understand, it was all about exchanges of shelling and drones and airstrikes, no ground forces across the border. Does that mean that deterrence works?

In this case? Well, yes and no. I mean, yeah, as you noted, both countries have nuclear weapons. I think each have approximately about 170 or so nuclear weapons.

The presence of nuclear weapons has helped to both, I think, escalate and de-escalate tensions. So de-escalate because it's enforced a degree of strategic restraint on both sides. So that's why we've not seen military operations between both countries on the scale of what we see in Ukraine or what we see in, say, in the Middle East and Gaza.

India's initial operation or actions that it took last week were, you know, the emphasis is on precision strike, surgical strike operations. Before both countries declared their nuclear capability in 1998, we would have seen more emphasis on large-scale conventional military operations, you know, large-scale deployments. We've not seen, as I said, anything on that scale during the most recent period of hostilities.

The flip side of that is that I think as a result of both countries developing nuclear capabilities, Pakistan has tended to rely more on terrorist organizations or sub-conventional conflict, if you want to call it that. So we've seen a surge in terrorist attacks since both countries declared their nuclear capabilities in WebEx.

capability in 1998, a string of attacks. There was a hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft in 1999. There was an attack on the Indian parliament in 2001. There was an attack on the Mumbai terrorist attacks, which took place in 2008, attacks in 2016 and 2019. The Pakistani, I think it's the finance minister, has referred to nuclear weapons as the great equalizer between both countries.

Officially, India maintains a no first use policy. Pakistan does not. But even on India's position, there's been a growing degree of ambiguity which has come into place, while Pakistan is as advocated on the use of tactical nuclear weapons. So I think it has prompted a degree of restraint, but that restraint is breaking down. I mean, the fact that we've seen what we've seen over the last few weeks, both countries

in military operations beyond Pakistan and India administered Kashmir, both countries striking it

at major cities, the fact that we've seen the employment of the Indian Navy, the scale of drone warfare between both countries, we are seeing to some degree that deterrence is breaking down. It does enforce a degree of restraint on both countries, but they've also found ways around that. And the reason I ask that question is because until, I mean, I think until the Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine...

and the return of the whole kind of East-West, Russia, NATO. Question. Most kind of experts in non-proliferation and nuclear weapons were saying if there is one place in the world where a nuclear war might start, it would be there, in Kashmir, in between India and Pakistan. Is that completely unthinkable, or do you think we are in a space now where that kind of outcome is...

a comprehensible, a kind of something we can imagine happening. It was in the late 1990s, then President Bill Clinton had referred to Kashmir as the world's most dangerous flashpoint. And that was as a result of both countries' nuclear capabilities and longstanding hostilities. So I think, you know, that that is exaggerated to a degree.

The command and control infrastructure, which is in place in both countries, it is quite robust. There has been a lot of scaremongering that I think particularly in the late 2000s, there was a fear on the Talibanization of Pakistan or these weapons could fall into the hand of Islamic extremists or terrorists. I mean, I think that is all exaggerated. What we saw in terms of the ceasefire being put in place,

over the weekend is that, you know, sanity prevailed. There is a degree of strategic restraint on both sides. Both countries seem more willing and able to move up the escalation ladder than they were previously. Jitish Bajpri, thank you very much for joining us on Battlelines. That's all for today's edition. We'll be back on Friday. Until then, that was Battlelines. Goodbye.

Battle Lines is an original podcast from The Telegraph, created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Roland Oliphant, and Venetia Rainey. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following Battle Lines on your preferred podcast app. And if you have a moment, leave a review, as it helps others to find the show. To stay on top of all our news, subscribe to The Telegraph, sign up to our Dispatches newsletter, or listen to our sister podcast, Ukraine The Latest.

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