Conflicted Community: The Gaza War – What Are Both Sides Thinking?
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Welcome back, dear listeners. Thomas Small here with Eamon Dean for another episode of Conflicted,

It's been a little while, and fair to say plenty has been going on in the world of Middle Eastern geopolitics since we last spoke in January, hasn't it, Eamon? Indeed, it's been a roller coaster. We're back now with the first episode for members of our conflicted community. For those who haven't heard about our new offering, we have launched a community hub on the instant messaging platform Discord.

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Eamon, we alluded to it at the start there, but it's safe to say that the discourse around the Middle East has never been as fraught and wide ranging as it is now. And that is because of the tragic events in Israel and the Gaza Strip that have deep historical roots, of course.

but which began unfolding most recently on the 7th of October last year when the Muslim Brotherhood militant organization Hamas launched an unprecedented terrorist attack on Israeli civilians, killing 1,200 and kidnapping several hundred.

Israel responded with a devastating military campaign in Gaza, which sucked in the whole region and indeed the world, a campaign that is ongoing. So I think we have to kick off our conflicted community with a discussion covering the latest turns in the Israel-Hamas war. Although I hope we can maybe park the Hamas-Israel war at this episode. I don't want this podcast to become the Gaza podcast.

Indeed, definitely. I join you in this. I definitely have no interest or desire whatsoever to turn this into a Gaza podcast. Yeah, good. We're agreed there. But still, today we're going to focus on Gaza. Where to begin? We're recording this on the 27th of March, 2024.

After their offensive across northern Gaza, the Israel Defense Forces, the IDF, moved south in their attempts to find and flush out Hamas members and leaders and to free the remaining Israeli hostages in Gaza. Israel believes there are still more than 100 there, though really that's anyone's guess. Surely many of them by now have been killed.

Speaking of death, on the Palestinian side, more than 30,000 people have been killed, including more than 13,000 children and 8,000 women. And more than 75,000 people have been injured and more than 8,000 are missing.

And with well over a million Palestinian refugees now in Rafah in southern Gaza, it looked for a while like Israel's military operation was poised to attack the city, which international commentators say would have had catastrophic consequences for the civilian population there. However, recently, Israel's military operation has pulled out of southern Gaza.

And actually, as of this recording, the IDF is even drawing down in northern Gaza, they say, for tactical reasons. But could it be due to the ongoing peace talks in Cairo? Or is it in preparation for an attack on Rafah? At this point, who knows?

And dear listener, there's more. Iran has now joined the fray. After an Israeli airstrike on the Iranian embassy in Damascus on April 1st that killed 16 people, including senior IRGC commanders, Iran launched a massive and unprecedented attack on Israel on April 13th. This involved roughly 170 drones, over 30 cruise missiles, and more than 120 ballistic missiles.

Israel says that 99% were shot down, most of them before they reached Israeli airspace, thanks to the support not only of the US and the UK, but in a historic turn of events, thanks to Jordanian military help as well. Now, this is all unfolding and escalating as we speak. We don't know what Israel's response will be yet, and we won't get to cover all of this in detail in this episode. But rest assured, we'll be talking about it in future Conflicted Community episodes.

So that's the impact that the war has had on the civilian population of Gaza. Well, I mean, I say civilian. Of course, the big question always is, to what extent do those numbers include militants? That information is never released. So, Eamon, let's talk about those casualty figures. What insight can you give us into these figures? How are they being calculated? Who are they coming from? I mean, Hamas? Can we trust them at all?

I think a lot of listeners, probably like me, a couple of months ago, even before, bombarded as we were with news reports every day from the war, began to feel like, gosh, who can trust any of this? How do we know what's actually going on? I certainly felt that way. There is no doubt in my mind that the number of casualties and fatalities in this conflict is just enormous.

Too big, you know, even to comprehend. And we already have about 33,000 civilians dead, confirmed. And the possibility of possibly 10,000 to 20,000 more under the rubble, which are unaccounted for. They say 8,000 missing, possibly more. However, from what I understand, talking to people either in the intelligence community or people who are close to Hamas in Gaza,

It is clear that Hamas lost anywhere between 12 to 20,000 of their own fighters, either dead or captured. That's a lot of fighters. Yes, dead or captured. They have lost two thirds of their military capability.

And this is why they are down to the last, I would call it basically, it is the last meters from the bunker. That is what Rafah is. Rafah is the central Berlin. You know, if we take this analogy, meters away from the bunker, fighting away until the last man. The problem here is, do we trust these numbers? Well, we don't trust them entirely, but they are reflective of...

of the overall devastation and the death toll so far. Well, the photos that we're seeing from Gaza, I mean, they certainly equal a thousand words. I mean, there's so much devastation in the war zones there. It's remarkable. You say that Hamas is now sort of at the end of the line there in Rafah, although we should say that they're not going down without a fight

There are still pockets of Palestinian militants, more broadly speaking, allied with Hamas or at least allied with their war aims in the north of Gaza, still harassing IDF forces there who now run the north of Gaza under martial law. So they are fighting back. It's still a hot war. Indeed. Indeed.

But the question here is, to what end? As someone who fought in conflicts before, before I embark on any military endeavor, I need to ask myself the question, what are my aims and goals? What is the end game here? What is the exit strategy? I'm going into a conflict with another entity, with my enemy. What is my objective? And this is what I have criticized Hamas from day one.

which is the fact that there was no clear objective. What is it that you want? We're going to get back to this question about Hamas's motivations at the beginning of the conflict and what their objectives may be now. But first, I want to talk a little bit more about these casualty figures, especially the terrible, terrible figures of the number of children killed and wounded. I mean, that's a huge proportion of the dead children killed.

Why would this be the case, Eamon? I mean, it's really terrible. It's so terrible. As a father of two young kids, whenever I see the photos of the mangled and mutilated bodies of young children there in Gaza being killed as a result of the bombs falling from the sky, and you really feel that deep sense of heartbreak and the waste of it, the sense of waste that

When you look at all of this and you think why we have a heavy concentration of children being the casualties, almost 40% of the casualties are children. Oh, that must be unprecedented, Eamon, in wartime that 40% of the killed are under 16. It is unprecedented and it is tragic and it's all down to several factors.

The first thing is that we have to understand that Gaza is tiny. It's 360 kilometers and it is a densely populated strip of land. And when you look at the number of people who are living there, it's 2.3, 2.4 million people. So the dense population, that's a first factor.

The second factor is the young nature of the population. 80% of Gaza's population are below the age of 30. 80%. - 80%, goodness. - Yes. - And do we have a sense of what percentage are below the age of let's say 18, like genuine kids? - Easily half, easily half. We're talking about a society full of kids.

And then we have the fact that unlike other bloody conflicts in recent time in the urban areas of the Middle East, we have...

comparable here, which is Mosul. And if you remember in that episode, I predicted that we will have a Mosul style. So yeah, this just to remind the listener, when the coalition forces led by the United States really finally did their final push against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, it kind of reached a climax.

by clearing the city of Mosul of the terrorists, which was a tremendously destructive form of urban warfare in which many civilians were killed, of course, and eventually ISIS was destroyed. Exactly. But you see...

Mosul is similar in some ways, but also Mosul explains why we have a huge death toll in Gaza. In Mosul, the death toll is still disputed as to how many terrorists were killed. Many people say it was about 9,000 ISIS terrorists.

However, the number of civilians killed could be anywhere. And until now, there is no accurate tally, but anywhere between 8,000 and 41,000. It could be anywhere in between. Whoa, that is a huge disparity. Exactly. Exactly. This is the problem with urban warfare is the fact that you don't know who's the enemy.

You don't know who was an enemy combatant. And on top of all of this, you have a heavy concentration of civilians. In Mosul, it was 1.7 million civilians living and being controlled by roughly about 20,000 ISIS and Daesh fighters. And this is where we come to why there was...

a great number of casualties, especially children in Gaza as opposed to Mosul. Eamon, let me just guess. I think I know what you're going to say. Because, you know, in Mosul, before the coalition launched their final push into the city, they, you know, they did the standard thing, released pamphlets, basically released communiques to the populace saying, we're coming, you'd better withdraw. And the people of Mosul, those who

could were able to withdraw, let's say, largely to the suburbs of what is a large, sprawling city with an open hinterland. They withdrew. They withdrew. I think the Gazans are struggling to do the same. Of course, the question is really safe corridors.

The Kurdish Peshmerga, the military force of the Kurds in Iraq, as well as the PMUs, the popular mobilization units of the Iraqi militias that were fighting against ISIS, the Shia militias, both of them opened safe corridors under the auspices of the coalition to evacuate as many civilians from Mosul as possible.

And so they had the safe corridors to evacuate somewhere. And that exposed the militants, you know, and left them, of course, like, you know, fighting street to street, house to house, door to door with the coalition.

However, this luxury wasn't afforded to the people of Gaza because of, you know, the obvious, you know, issue is the fact that from two sides, they are surrounded by their enemy, Israel. From one side, they are surrounded by the sea. And finally, the last side is

It's supposed to be by a so-called friendly Arab nation, Egypt. But Egypt sealed the border shut. You get quite heated about this topic, Ayman. You clearly find or hold Egypt responsible to some degree, at least, for the death toll in Gaza. They're not letting the Gazans in. The problem here is, from my point of view, there is a conflict. How about you let the women and the children out?

Forget the men, just like Ukraine did. Ukraine allowed their women and children and the elderly to leave Ukraine and continue the fight with the Russians, you know, with whatever male population they have. You know, if you want to leave Ukraine, you have to be a female or, you know, someone who's older than 65 or something like that, or a child. The same thing. Why didn't, you know, because what happened is that, you know, there are some

I call them the Arab nationalist assholes, you know. Whoa, amen, please don't hold back. I call them the Arab nationalist assholes who value slogans over human lives.

And would rather see the children of Gaza being paraded in front of the world in what I call, you know, victimhood pornography, you know, in order to, you know, please, you know, the sanctimonious righteousness of the people who are trying to condemn Israel and the West and everyone else to say, look, children are dying while children could be spared if you allow them to escape into Egypt.

just the women and the children. - Well, I suppose Egypt would say, look, you know, there is historical precedent for wondering whether, you know, the Palestinians who we would take in would be allowed to return, not Palestinians in the past were not allowed to return to areas that were then occupied by Israel. The real question is what sort of pressure is being put on Egypt

to open the border. I mean, the United States and Saudi Arabia really, to some degree, at least, call the shots in Egypt. Egypt is not a fully autonomous nation. It depends so much on financial aid and military aid from other bigger players. Surely those players could put pressure on Egypt to open the border. There was so much pressure put on Egypt to open the border. But the problem here is that the Egyptians stuck together.

stuck to their guns and said no, because again, we come back to the outdated, dinosauric notions of Arab nationalism that no Arabs like you know, basically should be allowed to go as refugees. Okay, one minute, one minute here.

What about the 13 million Syrians displaced? What about the 4 million Yemenis displaced? What about the 2 million Libyans displaced? What about the Iraqis? Sudanese now. Yeah, and the Sudanese. There are millions. Actually, Egypt already received 1.8 million refugees from Sudan already.

So, you know, your border is entirely open with Sudan, entirely open with Libyans. Half a million Libyans sought shelter in Egypt. And you can't just for, you know, for the sake of outdated, outdated nationalist ideas.

socialist slogans, you know, you just leave 14,000 children there in Gaza to die just to prove a point. I mean, for me, the immediate worry is not about whether they will be returning or not. The question is whether they will live.

The question is, let them live first. Yes, Egypt opened the border. Let's return to the question of Hamas's motivations. Now, we've talked many times already on Conflicted about the fact that there was no provocation, no proximate, immediate provocation before October 7th that might have in any way justified that horrendous terrorist attack.

And you mentioned in our emergency episode and in the Q&A episode that we did, Eamon, that, you know, the leaders of Hamas were facing a

a real sort of almost existential question to themselves. Either they would have to participate in the growing peace process that Saudi Arabia was participating in. They might've been brought into the Palestinian government even, joined that process. Or in order to keep the dream alive of their membership of the Axis of Resistance and the larger goals of that Iranian-led Axis, they could gamble with Gaza civilians' lives and start this new conflict, which they knew

would result in tremendous reprisals from Israel. But now, five months down the line, almost six months down the line, Eamon, what would the Gaza leadership be thinking? Do you think they regret the decision they took last year? - Remember, Thomas, that when Hamas leaders took the decision

And of course, for the seven months prior to October 7, they were given two choices. The first choice is to join the peace wagon, you know, which the Saudis were, you know, more or less constructing and putting together and leading in order to normalize relations with Israel and to finally get the two state solutions going.

And the other choice, which is to continue with Iran's program for the region, which is nothing but death, destruction and chaos, perpetual and forever. So they made their choice on October 7. They decided to go, they chose the path of blood instead of the path of peace.

If I was in their shoes, I would have said, look, my people need above everything else, dignified life, life with dignity. How do I achieve that? Either, you know, I take them the path of death and destruction and hope that generation after generation will keep fighting until they get what they want.

And we never know. It could be one generation. It could be 10 generations. It could be 20 generations down the line. Let us fight and see what will happen. And in the meantime, let hundreds of thousands of people die, including kids. Or I say, what can I get right now in order to keep the dream alive, but at the same time,

with it a dignified life for my people. Unfortunately, they chose the path of blood, the path of destruction. Now, I don't think they were banking on the idea that the optics of that day would be extremely ugly. And I sat down with both Palestinians and Israelis on the total opposite sides of this conflict. People who would love nothing more than to spill each other's blood.

And I noticed that what is the common theme between them was the optics. You see, for the Israeli side, one certain Israeli with a security background and someone who is very pro-Israeli, you know, right wing and all of that, he said,

that our response could have been, you know, half of what you see right now, more measured, if it wasn't for the optics, the ugly optics of our girls being raped and dragged in the streets like trophies with their limbs mangled is...

an optic that reminds the Israeli population of the worst possible darkest episodes of their history. - I mean, absolutely. If you imagine the scenes on October 7th from the Israeli perspective, you're just an Israeli civilian and you see the images coming out of the attack, you will immediately be reminded

of, well, centuries of pogroms in Eastern Europe, especially, you know, where those sorts of things happened regularly. And in your mind as an Israeli civilian, you think, well, this is what the Israeli state exists to prevent.

This is not supposed to happen anymore. We say the terrorist attack on October 7th is unprecedented. But of course, in the minds of Israelis, in the minds of Jews, it's not unprecedented at all. It is far too precedented. And the fact that it was able to happen right there in the state of Israel was very, to say the least, triggering. Exactly. So that Hamas individual who was talking to me,

said, I wish we never sent these people with the Go cameras because that...

with all the optics that resulted of it, really put us in a very difficult position with our allies and our backers. But why did they then, Ayman? What was the point of that? For goodness sake, what did they think those cameras were going to reveal? Well, the whole idea, you know, from his point of view, and this is the first time I hear this, actually, from a Hamas individual,

was that we thought that this would be the ultimate deterrence and also we thought that there will be other allies joining the fray. Well, they didn't. Hezbollah did not join the fray, Iran did not join the fray, Syria did not join the fray. We thought we are going into an end-of-time battle which never materialized.

Well, what certainly did materialize was the destruction of the standard rules of engagement between the IDF and Palestinian militants, whether Hezbollah in the north, Hamas in the south or whatever. The attacks on October 7th were so drastically different from the sort of tit for tat, unspoken gentleman's agreement, if you like, between both sides that Israel was like, well,

If you're going to throw out the rulebook, we'll throw out our rulebook, and my God, you will see what happens. And you know, Thomas, since October 7, I've been following every long-form interview that Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas, as well as Khaled Mishal, the head of the political office for Hamas, been giving in Arabic. They live in Doha. These people are not in Gaza. Right.

Not in Gaza. They are, of course. I mean, they have a private jet lifestyle going today. He is in Tehran. He's in Tehran. I mean, visiting Ayatollah Khamenei and he is saying to him, I can assure you that 90% of Hamas military capability is still intact.

You know, this reminds me of Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt, when he was telling everyone while his entire air force had been destroyed on the ground by the Israelis that, oh, we are actually just only two hours away from Tel Aviv. Yeah, so the usual Arab nationalistic slogans that have expired a long time ago. So what are the Hamas leaders saying in these interviews, Ayman?

Okay, I will give you some examples here. So, for example, Khaled Mishal was saying that...

You know, that's why he said this in January. So it's already about like, I mean, two and a half months into the conflict. And it's very clear that there is not going to be a Hamas victory. He said that our demands are very simple. We want all of historical Palestine from Naharia on the Lebanese border to Eilat.

you know, on the Gulf of Aqaba, from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean. That's it. These people need to get lost. That's what he said about the Israelis. These people need to get lost. And he repeated this twice about we are not going to give up one square inch of that entire territory. There is no two-state solution. There is one state solution, and that state is Palestine as a whole.

So he made this very clear in January. Then in March, you know, this month, I mean, he again stated that we were put in a difficult situation by the Arab countries. They were normalizing relations with the Israelis.

And we had to put an end to it. So the interviewer, who's a Kuwaiti, was asking him, but Mr. Mishal, I mean, you know, was this the right way to, you know, to calculate? He said, yes, it's a calculated adventure.

It was a calculated risk. It was a calculated adventure. And we believe that the outcome might have been, you know, lots of people dying, lots of homes destroyed, lots of suffering. But we stopped the peace, you know, train in its track.

So I was like, you are not a man. Just try to be, you know, subtle about it. I mean, he is not even subtle about it. He is not trying to hide it. Then Ismail Haniyeh...

In February, in the first week of February, he gave that interview and he said that our aim and our goal was to protect the whole axis of resistance from an Israeli aggression that the Israelis were planning against Iran and against Hezbollah. And I was thinking, oh, good. So you now have exposed yourself as using the Palestinians as

as a shield. He actually invoked the axis of resistance, did he? Could you use that expression? Absolutely. The axis of resistance and the Islamic Republic. He made it very clear. It's all there for everyone to see. That's really fascinating because, you know, since October 7th and certainly since the Israeli response,

We've seen worldwide, certainly here in Britain, a lot of intense protests sympathizing with the Palestinians very much against Israel's response to the terrorist attacks, which more and more are even kind of forgotten that they even happened, it seems. But

You know, Israel is once again the great global pariah as a result of this situation. But a lot of these protesters are thinking of the conflict in quite an old fashioned, if you like, or standard romantic nationalist way.

Through that sort of prison, they invoke human rights and things like that. Freedom fighting? Yeah, freedom fighting. That kind of post-colonial or anti-colonial rhetoric. But what I think a lot of the time they don't quite understand is that Hamas itself is not really animated by those considerations anymore.

anymore if it ever was. I mean, it is a Muslim Brotherhood organization. So ultimately, its aims are international, are global, are transnational, and always were. But now, if what you say is true, Eamon, I mean, overtly, the Hamas leadership are saying that our efforts in Gaza, our efforts on behalf of the Palestinians are in fact a part of a larger effort to support this transnational Iran-led movement.

let us call a spade a spade, empire. So far from a post-imperialist national state-building exercise, it's an empire-building exercise. Exactly. And this is why sometime when I look at the hundreds of thousands of naive, misguided, politically illiterate

young kids going on the streets of London, Berlin, Paris, Belgium, Chicago, D.C., New York. And I look at them and I say that, oh my God, this is why political education is so in short supply. Hamas is not a freedom fighting organization, is not a nationalist liberation organization. It is a

Pan-Islamic Muslim Brotherhood allied with Iran for the purpose of building an empire.

And they are not interested whatsoever in anything that is called national Palestinian struggle. This is why they have a split with the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority, if it wasn't for Hamas over the past 30 years, they would have achieved far greater autonomy and the ability to get more home rule for the Palestinians than what they have right now. But Hamas...

acted as a sabotage agent. Well, that's Hamas. When we come back from our break, we're going to talk about the other player in this conflict, Israel, whose right-wing governments over the last several decades, in order to cause a split within the Palestinian national movement, supported to some degree Hamas. It was useful to them to divide the Palestinians in that way. Maybe regretting it now when we come back,

We're going to talk about Israel, its perspective, its goals, its ambitions, and its mistakes. We'll be back.

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Welcome back, dear listeners, to the first episode for our conflicted community, given to you all as a gift. But if you want more, you'll have to sign up to our community on Discord. Returning to our broad update on the conflict in Israel-Gaza, we finished the first half talking about Hamas and also Egypt's current role in the war. Now let's look at Israel. Eamon, is Israel conducting ethnic cleansing in Gaza?

This is what I want to know, and I want an informed – and I really want as objective a view as possible. This is the thing that breaks my heart the most about all of this coverage, the images from Gaza and the constant allegation from those who are opposed to Israel, which you hear all the time on the streets, in the media.

that all of this ultimately amounts to nothing less than genocide and that Israel is consciously pursuing a program of getting rid of all the Palestinians from Gaza by hook or by crook so that they can settle Jews, Israelis there. Is this true? Okay, as someone who spent 14 months in Bosnia in 1994, 1995, and that was a genocide, I

How do we define genocide? Genocide is when one group of ethnic unified people are trying to extinguish the other side through indiscriminate slaughter, i.e. targeted slaughter that doesn't leave any individual life.

as well as the use of rape and weaponizing rape in order to extinguish that genetic line. I've seen this in what the Serbs did in Bosnia. They will gather all the men, slaughter them, they will gather all the women, rape them, drown them after that. That was a genocide because it followed that definition.

Now, it is tempting for those who are saying that the Israelis are committing genocide to say they are committing genocide because, you know, children are dying. 14,000 children dead. 8,400 women are dead. So you feel that there must be a genocide here because the numbers are just so great. If that is the case, then we can safely say that, okay, what are the intentions? Is it really ethnic, you know, cleansing here? Because

In order to meet that definition, the whole of the Israeli army need to be Jewish-Israeli. When in fact, roughly about 10 to 15% of the Jewish army, sorry, I would say like the Israeli army, going into Gaza have Arabs among them. So you have Arab Israelis,

fighting and dying in Gaza in order to assist the Israeli defense force. That's the first thing. So, okay, that takes away the motivation, the motivation in order to extinguish one group of people because you're already incorporating into your own army that group of people.

That's very interesting. I mean, genocide is one thing possibly. International law is notoriously difficult to really wrap one's head around. Based on what I understand, in terms of ethnic cleansing at least, things are quite complex and nuanced. What actually is and is not ethnic cleansing is not entirely well-defined. I believe that there's quite a low bar. I mean, essentially, a military actor needs to be merely creating the conditions—

for it being impossible for a group of people to live in an area for that to be considered ethnic cleansing, which is hard to really understand exactly because any war, especially in the 21st century, especially in an urban environment, by definition is going to be creating the conditions that make it hard for the civilian population to live in.

Not to mention what we talked about earlier, you know, in the first half of the episode that, you know, in operations like the one that Israel is now conducting in Gaza and which the coalition forces in Iraq conducted in Mosul.

It is absolutely necessary that the civilian population be cleared out of the urban areas that, in this case, Israel is going to attack. If they didn't clear out civilians or do what they could to clear out civilians from those areas –

they could be accused actually of committing war crimes because it is in fact their responsibility to do so. So when you see images of vast swathes of Gaza, of urban Gaza, you know, that has been attacked and empty of civilians, that is not necessarily evidence of ethnic cleansing. It's just as easily an evidence that the Israelis are doing what they can to be within international law, which requires them to clear civilians out of areas that they're attacking.

So the Israelis, you know, who God knows, based on the allegations and some evidence, you know, have been prosecuting a very intense war. Many civilians have been attacked. Many times it seems quite clear that those civilians have been attacked on purpose for whatever various reasons, you know, one could imagine. But nonetheless...

The Israelis are slightly stuck between a rock and a hard place. If they don't clear out the civilian population, they will be committing a war crime. When they do clear out the civilian population, they are accused of ethnic cleansing. They're in a very tricky spot there. They are in a very tricky spot. And in fact, legally, there is no question war crimes being committed.

But, you know, I will come back to an issue here is the fact that what I don't understand until now is the fact that, you know, why people are still stuck on the question of, you know, we must declare that Israel is committing genocide when in fact all their energy should be focused on why don't we just end the conflict?

First of all, you have to end the conflict. So how do we end the conflict? And this is exactly, I remember, when I was debating this with many either politicians or MPs or Congress people or whatever, whenever I debate this with them.

And they used to tell me about the Saudi war in Yemen and why the Saudis are not ending the conflict in Yemen. I said, well, it's not just only that it takes two to tango and it takes two hands to clap, only one hand to slap. So you need two hands here in order to end the war. The Saudis have a demand. The demand is two things, two things only, and the war will end.

And that was as far back as 2016. We're talking about eight years ago, just a year after the war started. I said there are only two demands the Saudis want, and the war will end. One is that the Houthis must give up any long-range offensive weapon that is beyond the range of the internal Yemeni conflict. In other words, anything that can be used against other parties in the region, and to give up access to the sea. So, you know, you don't threaten the maritime traffic in the region.

The Houthis said no, you know, well, this is why the conflict is happening. This is why the conflict is ongoing and you keep going. So now we come back to the question, the same with any conflict. There are always demands and counter demands. Okay, Hamas, what are your demands? And the reality is that Hamas do not have, and this is by the admission of so many people who are involved in

In the mediation, in the Egyptian side, in the Qatari side, in the Saudi side, and I meet some of them and I talk to them, Hamas seems to be having a problem formulating what do they want. Because every time we are close to ending this conflict by releasing all the hostages and by Hamas evacuating Gaza, especially the leaders,

this is when Iran and Hezbollah come and say to Hamas, no, don't. Because if you give up right now, if you allow the Israelis to claim victory, the Israelis will be emboldened then to go after the crown jewel of the axis of resistance led by Iran in the region, which is Hezbollah in Lebanon. If you give up right now, there will be a war against Hezbollah. Please don't give up. Continue. In other words,

As I said, just two hours after the October 7 attacks happened, I said that Iran is going to fight Israel until the last Palestinian. This is what's happening. This is the problem. We are now living not in a wars between two defined opponents.

We are living in the age of proxy wars. Listeners, please understand this. Why we are fighting in the Middle East something called perpetual never-ending conflicts? Because there are multiple parties involved. Proxies. Proxies on behalf of someone else.

And it means that even if you negotiate with that belligerent side, trying to find a solution to this, the other side doesn't have complete control over their own destiny, over their own fate. They have to consult with whatever capital is giving them the money and political support and the political cover. So,

Israel is negotiating with Hamas. Hamas must go back to their masters in Tehran to ask for permission. Saudi Arabia is negotiating with the Houthis, but the Houthis are always going to say, okay, one minute, I have to go and talk to my boss in Tehran.

This is, I think, why the complex realities of the proxy wars in the Middle East are taking its toll on the number of civilians killed. And one of the very key components of such war, I mean, of any war, but certainly of this sort of proxy war, is the narrative, the dominating narratives that can be created. And to return to the question of ethnic cleansing, I think this is very, very key.

First of all, you know, it's always useful, I think, or helpful to remember that even well before October 7th, for many, many, many years, Palestinian supporters have accused Israel of ethnic cleansing. So this is a basic accusation against the state of Israel. In times of relative peace, in times of open war like now, Israel is committing ethnic cleansing.

According to that narrative, it's an extremely powerful narrative because really, as a result of the legacy of the Nazis in the Second World War, an accusation of genocide or ethnic cleansing is so enormous. It has such moral enormity that it can work to shroud anything.

any given conflict or any given situation in a kind of moral fog. Once you invoke genocide, you can no longer think or consider any other

let's say, lower order moral considerations because genocide hovers over the whole thing. Exactly. This is quite clear in these protests which, you know, in which genocide is very openly expressed as an accusation against Israel and lower order, in terms of genocide, I mean, moral considerations are not there like the October 7th attacks, like the rapes, the killings, like the hostages that Hamas still carries. So,

Because, of course, when you say, well, genocide is happening, then that must stop.

If genocide is happening, it must just stop because nothing justifies it. And nothing does justify genocide, of course. The question is, is it happening? And if it was already happening before October 7th, which these same voices alleged, now they're still saying it. You get a sense of the political power of this narrative. It helps, in this case, the Iranian side.

Exactly, because you see, Thomas, goodness, there are so many conflicts in the Middle East and nearby where, you know, it's always labeled as genocide. Take, for example, you know, the Azeri-Armenian conflict immediately is genocide immediately.

ethnic cleansing. The Artsakh Republic has been, you know, destroyed and it's been ethnically cleansed of Armenians. So do we see any protests in the West or anything like that? Like, we don't. What Saddam Hussein did against the Kurds in the Anfal campaign in 1987, 1988, 185,000 people were killed, you know, and there is dispute whether Saddam used chemical weapons or not, but they were used against them. I mean, so... Well, not to mention what's happening right now in Azerbaijan and Armenia.

right now. - Yeah, exactly. I mean, we look at this and we think that there are so many conflicts that if by the standards of those who are alleging that there is a genocide in Gaza, then there must be 10 genocides that are happening right now around the world. - Let's shift back focus to Israel and to the Israeli government and to Benjamin Netanyahu. As we discussed in our emergency episode following the 7th of October, the rise of Hamas

was part of a wider conflict in the 80s, really, where the main opponent of Israeli state aims was the Palestinian Authority, Fatah, the PLO. They were considered to be the big opponent of the Israeli government. And so Islamist

actors, for example, Hamas, were seen as a useful means of splitting the Palestinian resistance movement. And so by 2006, the Palestinians were literally split between a West Bank governed by the Palestinian Authority and a Gaza Strip governed by Hamas or semi-governed by Hamas.

In all of that, Benjamin Netanyahu and the various right-wing coalitions he's managed to cobble together over the decades that he's been in and out of power have supported that effort, have supported the effort of dividing the Palestinians by giving support to Hamas in various ways. This is true. This is part of the history. Now, more approximately, Eamon, there are many conspiracy theories flying around that the Israeli government and Benjamin Netanyahu himself actually knew about October 7th

in advance and allowed it to happen in order to take advantage of that situation. Do you feel there's any truth to these sorts of allegations? Israel is such a small society. And for a group of people, no matter how small they are, to know in advance, that will leak. And there will be a day of reckoning with those who were responsible if indeed Benjamin Netanyahu and some of his people knew in advance. You don't just know in advance and cover up for it.

That's not Israel. Israel is not a forgiving society when it comes to, you know, their own internal failures. I mean, you know, if you fail the society, you meet your own demise. No, I don't believe this is the case. They were genuinely surprised, you know, by that planning and, you know, by the attacks of October 7. But we come back to the issue of what we call the chicken coming home to roost because the

Netanyahu, in his infinite lack of wisdom, decided a long time ago that Hamas could be the useful idiots, except they were not exactly very, you know, cuddly idiots. I mean, they are dangerous idiots. But nonetheless, Netanyahu believed that by keeping the Palestinian split alive,

The two-state solution will never be used as a pressure point by the West against Israel. That because the Palestinians were a unified entity under the PA, then the PA will keep pursuing the Israelis globally in the diplomatic arena in order to implement the two-state solution.

Farhat Netanyahu, he doesn't want two-state solution. Yeah, it's so absolutely vital to understand this, that like Hamas, Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing allies in the Israeli government does not and do not support a two-state solution. Like Hamas, Netanyahu supports a one-state solution. Like Hamas, ideally that one state would be more or less...

especially the right-wing elements of the coalition government. In their mind, they would love nothing more than for all the Arabs to get lost. - Exactly. - Just as the Hamas leadership say openly, they want them to get lost. And the current government in Israel is the most right-wing government in its history by far. There are voices within the government openly calling for ethnic cleansing, no question.

The question is, is it actually happening? There was a minister who called for the new king of Gaza. You remember? There was a minister who called for the new king of Gaza. And so the question is, you know, circling back to this ethnic cleansing dimension, which is, you know, I don't want to be, I'm not dismissing the allegations. I'm not dismissing it at all. I know that there are many millions of,

of Israelis of a right wing disposition who if they were honest would wish that all the Arabs would be gone. There's no question. And the idea of a greater Israel is a very strong idea in the Israeli consciousness and in the current Israeli government. The question is, are they pursuing policies on the ground that would actually achieve this in fact

Or is it, as it seems likelier to me, a way of this populist government led by this populist political genius who's about to be tarred and feathered, I can tell you, when the conflict finally ends. But this political genius of great Machiavellian wisdom and sagacity, is he using these narratives in order to keep this right-wing government going? I think he is just like a desperate gambler.

in a Vegas casino and he is running out of chips. He's running out of cash.

And it's just a matter of time before the casino calls them out. That's it. And hold them out of the casino altogether. He is really into his last dimes because one, there is no question that any power would accept an ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians, whether it is from Gaza or from the West Bank. So Netanyahu is about to be really kicked out of the casino altogether because he's

It's only a matter of time before this war is over, one way or another, or he loses the support of the coalition. All it takes is one party or two parties to just withdraw from the coalition and the need for elections will come. And he will be kicked out, no question about it. So his days are numbered. But

Netanyahu is the kind of a guy that he would leave the government, you know, and he would leave the next prime minister to hold a grenade without a pin. And that grenade is a regional conflict because that's the legacy that Netanyahu is going to leave to whoever will come after him. And also at the same time, I have a feeling here, and this is just my feeling.

Netanyahu is now going to be the sacrificial lamb or ram at the altar of global condemnation of Israel, where the next government will say, OK, now we will conduct a warfare in a more measured manner now that we have subdued Hamas. We're going to look at the northern borders to fortify it and to protect it.

and we're going to fight a different kind of war. Why? Because it's all Netanyahu. And then Netanyahu can be, you know, arrested, going from one jail to another, going from one courtroom to another. He will be paraded in front of the world in order for Israel to redeem itself a little bit in front of the global media. But that's a possibility.

That's a possibility. And that Netanyahu will be presented as that kind of, okay, you know, a scapegoat for, you know, for all what went wrong with Israel's campaign over the past six months against Hamas. That's, I think, like, you know, what's going to happen to him. Let's talk about the future. Well, really starting by talking about the present, which is always a snapshot of the future in a way. Right now, the IDF...

is in control more or less of northern Gaza. There are still firefights regularly there between pockets of Palestinian militants who remain hidden here and there in tunnels wherever they are. They pop up, there's fighting. But the IDF governs northern Gaza under martial law. But that's not really the whole truth because there are many Palestinian civilians still in northern Gaza. They live there still.

What would be the reality on the ground there, the political reality right now, Ayman? And is it possibly a sign of what the future will be for all of Gaza? It looks like there are several families that started cooperating with the Israelis on the question of policing and the question of, well, keeping the peace. Gazan families, Arab families. Gazan families. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Gazan families, native families who are there. I mean, the question is, they were never supporters of Hamas to begin with. They were never friends of Hamas. They

They blame Hamas for everything that happened in Gaza. And by the way, you know, I find it ironic that there is more support for Hamas in European cities and streets than actually in Gaza itself right now. It tells you a lot.

So the people of Gaza, some of them are cooperating with the Israelis, not out of love for the Israelis, but out of necessity in order for the Palestinians to buy their necessities and, you know, what they need in terms of food and medicine and to get the services that they need. So, you know, that started to happen and it is happening.

You know, a recreation of the pre-2005 Gaza. You know, 19 years ago, you know, when the Israelis withdrew from Gaza, before that they were actually having alliance with several powerful families in Gaza who really, you know, ran things with the Israelis and even had business partnerships with Israeli businessmen

there in the Strip. The Israelis left, gave it to the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority then had a coup against them by Hamas in 2007. And since 2007, 18 years ago, Hamas controlled Gaza with an iron fist. Now, some Palestinians are really begging the Israelis not to leave northern Gaza, which is very ironically.

because they don't want Hamas to come back. In other words, if you want to leave, you leave, but you put in your place Palestinian authority people. We don't want Hamas to come back. Well, outside of right-wing Israeli fever dreams, the likelihood is that once this conflict ends, Gaza will have to return to some sort of state of normalcy for the Palestinians there without Hamas. This is the main point.

Gaza must be Hamas-free. This is certainly Israel's position. It is, from what you've told me, Eamon, also the position of every other regional... Arab country. Every other Arab country, the United States, basically the whole world, honestly, outside of Iran's nexus. Everyone would be happy if Hamas was gone. And in fact...

from that point of view, is doing the world's dirty work for it and taking a lot of shit for their efforts. But, you know, Hamas needs to be gone. That's the idea. So if a Hamas-free Gaza is the goal, how close are we to that goal, Ayman? I think by July, most likely. I think July will see an end, you know, to Hamas' presence in Gaza. Because as I said to you before, Thomas, and I said to Amir,

our dear listeners, the scenarios are like this, that Israel will go all the way to Rafah. I said this five months ago. Israel will go all the way to Rafah, all the way to the Egyptian border. - Where they are now. They've been poised there for a while, waiting to intervene. - Exactly. I said this will happen. So there is only one merciful thing that Hamas could do right now. The honorable exile.

just honorable surrender, just surrender. Like I mean, you know, you can't defeat the Israelis, it's impossible. So just surrender, spare as many lives as possible, and just accept that you can go. So bargain and just say that I will give you all the hostages in return for a safe exit. - But Ayman, sorry, you said earlier that Hamas has no, Hamas is not giving any demands. - No, no, Hamas has demands.

They have demands, you know, but these demands, you know, basically were ridiculous and ludicrous. Like Israel must rebuild Gaza. Israel must take legal, you know, responsibility for the destruction that happened in Gaza and pay indemnity. Of course, the Israelis are not going to do that whatsoever. But in the real negotiations, in the wish list that the Hamas leaders are giving to their Arab counterparts in order to pass to the Israelis,

really it boils down to two things, allowing the Hamas leaders to leave and that there will be no reprisals against Hamas leaders in exile afterwards. That's it. You know, it's the end here. So, of course, from the Israeli point of view, we have no problem with that. But then, as soon as

You know, the Hamas leadership is about to agree. Iran comes in, Hezbollah comes in and say, ah, no, please hold on for another week or two, another month or two. Because at the end of the day, you know, it's a brilliant position for the Iranians. You know, it's not their people who are dying. It's Palestinians, disposable Sunnis. But nonetheless, Ayman, I mean-

From what we were saying earlier about Netanyahu, it's in Netanyahu's interest to prolong this conflict. Yes. He doesn't want the war to end. As long as the war is hot, he can say, I've got to stay in power. I'm a wartime leader. I've got to see this conflict to the end. So he doesn't want the war to end anytime soon. Why do you think by July they'll have wrapped it up? Or will he then say, now we've got to turn our forces north and hit the big guy, Hezbollah? Exactly, exactly, exactly. This is the idea is that

July is the deadline as far as finishing off in Gaza is concerned, but also it is the beginning of a conflict in Lebanon. The whole idea that Netanyahu is not going to prolong the war as much as possible because it's not just only one front.

And this is why the Israelis are as active in the north right now in order to really take the fight to Hezbollah, because Hezbollah is worried at the moment that they don't want to be caught up in the fight. And actually, the Israelis' demands, as far as Hezbollah is concerned, Hezbollah is ready to accept Netanyahu's demands. Netanyahu has two demands.

One, that Hezbollah remove all of their fighters north of the Latani River, which is about 40 kilometers, basically north of the border with Israel. And for Hezbollah never to have any military bases anymore near the Israeli border. And the third demand is that this has to be public.

Why? Because there are 80,000 Israelis being evacuated from the north, plus 200,000 who chose to evacuate themselves. So we're talking about nearly 300,000 people left the northern towns. This is an economic disaster as far as the Israelis were concerned. And in order for these people to turn back, it's not good enough that you have a secret deal between Hezbollah and Israel. The deal must be public because insurance companies globally don't like to insure war zones.

unless if there is a visible treaty there of, you know, and Hezbollah saying, no, we will do it, but beneath the table. The Israelis are saying, you will do it above the table with your stamp on that paper. Now, the idea of an Israeli pivot to a full scale war on Hezbollah in the north is very, very complicated politically. I mean, obviously the last person who wants that is Iran.

They would rather, I imagine, Israel stay fighting in Gaza, fighting Hamas, fighting Hamas forever and ever and ever if it means protecting Hezbollah from Israel attack. Yes, exactly. Because Hezbollah is Iran's big, you know, big gun. That's what that's their real. That's their, you know, their eldest and most dearest son in the area. It's the most important gun they hold in this grand Middle Eastern Mexican standoff.

Yeah. So Iran doesn't want Israel to attack Hezbollah. And Netanyahu, I mean, does he really want to attack Hezbollah? Hezbollah is not Hamas. Hezbollah would be very, very hard to attack.

kill as they discovered in 2006 when they tried to do that. The terrain of southern Lebanon is not the terrain of Gaza. It would be a total bloodbath. So many more Israeli soldiers would end up dying and Hezbollah's arsenal is much vaster than Hamas's. Are you telling me that Netanyahu is willing to risk all of that? Because to stay in power and to be Israel's war leader and to be actually lucky because why?

If you understand Netanyahu's mentality on his office, what is the picture that he always keep on his office? Apart from his wife, Sarah, and all of that, and his kids. What is the picture that's always there of his brother, Danny Netanyahu?

You remember Danny Netanyahu, the leader of the special forces that went to Antebi in Uganda, you know, in the late 1970s in order to free the Israeli hostages? And he was killed. He was the only fatality in that entire operation. For him, he always lived up to the legacy of his brother. His brother saved the Israelis from the middle of Africa, you know, from Idi Amin forces. And now, he now is fancying himself as...

being able to free Israel from its two most immediate dangers and enemies, the two existential threats as far as he is concerned, Hamas and Hezbollah. These two must go. And therefore, his legacy would be that even if he leaves power after that, even if he is held in front of a judge after that in a courtroom, he will say, do whatever you want to do, sons of Israel. I have...

saved you from Hamas and Hezbollah. I am the leader who will always be remembered as the one who destroyed the two immediate threats on our borders. Oh, but it's going to be terrible. Oh, my Lord. Let's talk about the ceasefire that the UN Security Council passed a resolution for, quote unquote, an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan, respected by all parties. It said,

And in the fine print, it also said, and an immediate release of the hostages that Hamas is holding. A very funny kind of resolution. Very unlikely, it seems to me, to be, in fact, carried out by any parties on the ground. But interestingly, politically speaking...

The United States abstained from the vote and did not vote against it. That's very unusual in a case like this involving Israel. What do you think that means, Eamon? I think it's the question of the election year, Thomas, that where I think your expertise will be more valuable than mine as an American. Well, I mean, expertise, one reads that, you know, that the Democratic Party in the United States is increasingly pro-Palestinian and very, very upset with Biden's

current pro-Israeli line in this conflict. And so maybe he's throwing them a bit of red meat so that in a few months when he starts campaigning in earnest, he can say, well, look, we didn't prevent the ceasefire resolution at the UN over Ramadan. So we love the Palestinians. Exactly. And then they can blame the Palestinians because at the end of the day, the famous saying in the White House and in the State Department and in the foreign office and everywhere else,

that the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. Hamas is a good example of that. I don't think Hamas will take this offer again because of the fact that their decision isn't entirely theirs. But Israel also has said it's not going to respect the resolution. They have no interest in respecting this resolution. No, of course not. Because again, we come back to the question of if Israel was fighting only Hamas, Hamas only, in a Hamas only conflict,

In the past, they always reach ceasefire very quickly, except this one, because Hamas is no longer in the driving seat. And actually on the ground, you know, Israel is fighting more than just Hamas in Gaza. They are every day coming into armed clashes with Palestinian militants throughout the West Bank.

some of whom are supported directly from Iran, some of whom Iran supports via Syria. And then every day there are clashes with Hezbollah. So from the perspective of Israel, the war they're fighting is much wider, strategically speaking, than just the campaign, hot though it is in Gaza. They are fighting in their minds, and I think on the ground, they are fighting Iran and its proxies all around their country. So the ceasefire for Ramadan, you know, it's really small beans from the wider perspective.

So what about the future? I think, Eamon, well, I want to be optimistic. It's very unlike me. You're usually the optimist. I'm the pessimist in this show. I want to be optimistic in this case. I want to believe that

That when this campaign does result in Hamas vacating Gaza with as many Hamas militants being killed as possible, that with the aid of Gulf partners and the United States and maybe even Egypt now playing along, playing a more positive role, Gaza can be rebuilt.

And Gaza can be a Islamist free zone for the civilians of Gaza. I want to believe that. I also want to believe that that half of the Israeli voting public who hate Netanyahu and hate the right wing government will succeed in

next time in getting rid of it, and a more emollient, more moderate, more wise Israeli government will come to the table and be able to create better conditions, working relations with the Palestinian Authority. I want to believe that Saudi Arabia will play a very constructive role indeed, not just in the negotiations for peace with Israel, but in rebuilding state institutions

For Palestinians, God knows they need it. I have an idea, though, Eamon, and I think you might like this idea, because basically, you know, I was wondering, does it really matter now who governs Gaza as long as they provide good governance? So what do you think about this? This is almost a joke, but not really.

The international community creates a new Gaza where a cadet branch of the Saudi royal family, and there are many cadet branches of that family, is given Gaza as an emirate of its own to govern. Its own emirate. The emirate of Gaza with a member of the Saudi royal family governing it. What do you think? Do you think that would ever fly? No, because the Gazans will kill them. It's simple as that. Ugh. I don't know.

The problem is just only a question of the governance, the question of the culture. And Gaza is a very difficult place to govern. I think if the people of Gaza just... I think they might have learned a lesson right now that...

resistance is futile. Just go with the flow. Go with the flow. And I think if I was in their shoes, I would choose a chief among them who would govern with, I would say, an iron fist, but at the same time, with the interests of the people ahead of everything else and to make

Are you optimistic, Eamon, honestly speaking? Or do you think, as I basically do, that this conflict will just continue to go on and on and on and will continue to go on?

rage hot in the north sometimes, will rage hot in the south sometimes. The West Bank will continue to be a scene of great injustice as more Israeli settlers do their dirty work there and as militant groups infiltrate it and fight with the IDF, fight with settlers.

As the Israeli politics continues to be incredibly polarized with more and more right-wing voices able to grab more and more of the electorate as the Israeli population demographically changes, becomes more radicalized in the face of militant intransigence, etc., etc.,

While Saudi Arabia and big countries like that try their best, but also have their own interests. They want Hamas to be destroyed on the one hand, but this war is very tricky for them. They want it to end because it's undermining a lot of their anti-radicalization efforts as more and more Muslims

once again are taking up the call of jihad in various ways, not to mention the Houthis suddenly muscular again, animated in a new way, more recruitment, literally fighting the international community in the Red Sea. So Saudi Arabia, they're being a bit equivocal. They're not being as single-minded as they otherwise might be.

All of this doesn't strike me as necessarily leading to a happy and neat and positive outcome. What do you think? No, I'm not optimistic at all because I think we were in front of a great opportunity to eradicate once and for all the cancer that is the non-state actors in the Middle East.

Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, the Iraqi militias, all of these people need to be eradicated. Because as long as the authority doesn't belong to the state, and as long as Iran always continues to undermine the concept and the institutions of the nation state in favor of an empire they want to build, if we don't end these proxies, these proxies will end us.

And it is a pity that Israel chose to go alone in fighting against Hamas and not having the wisdom and the foresight to go and build a coalition, global coalition with regional allies also.

to put an end to this phenomenon once and for all. Do you think that was even possible, Ayman, honestly? It would have been possible if there was a will for it. Arab states cannot fight alongside Israelis. They can't. Their people won't let them. But they would be able to fight alongside Americans.

and Europeans against the Houthis. On behalf of the State of Israel? On behalf of themselves. Because this cancer is not just only going to plague Israel, it is actually plaguing, you know, the Arab world. I know in real terms it would be to the benefit of them, but I'm talking about the narrative, I'm talking about the PR.

The Iranian-led narrative, now many, many decades old, is so strong and it shackles Arab leaders from doing anything that is seen to be benefiting Israel. In my opinion, it's not just a question of benefiting Israel. Just because I am fighting the Houthis, it doesn't mean basically I'm an ally of the Israelis.

Just because I am trying to free Lebanon from Hezbollah doesn't mean I'm an ally of the Israelis. If the Israelis end up benefiting from that, so be it. It's a nation state after all. My aim and my goal is to

create a Middle East that is prosperous, future-embracing, living in the future and not living in the bloody past, and seeing past the superstitions and the idea of a fairy tale in the name of the Messiah, Mahdi, coming to rule. No, we want a Middle East based on the rule of law of a nation-state-state.

But you say that dream is further away now than before because Israel went it alone in Gaza. Yes, and because Biden is a gutless coward who wouldn't sign up to this idea.

Well, that brings us to the end of this first episode of our Conflicted Community podcasts. Thank you so much for listening. We'll be back in two weeks' time with another episode where we're looking at the recent terrorist attack in Moscow and how the Taliban's return to Afghanistan has caused an uptick in global terrorism. That's right, dear listener, we're going back.

to our bread and butter. We're moving away from Gaza and Israel, and we're talking about good old-fashioned Islamist terrorism. And dear listeners, don't fret. Season five of Conflicted is in the works and will be coming to you soon. Watch this space. Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle. ♪