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The State of Syria

2022/4/27
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CONFLICTED

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Aemon: 叙利亚内战处于休战状态,巴沙尔·阿萨德政府控制约三分之二的领土,伊朗、俄罗斯与其共存;库尔德人控制五分之一的领土,为美国势力范围;土耳其及其代理的圣战组织控制其余地区。叙利亚是运作良好的失败国家,其现状反映了长期以来的地缘政治竞争和社会分裂。 Thomas: 叙利亚的现代民族国家建设道路充满冲突,可以从文明冲突的角度来理解。叙利亚长期以来是地缘政治竞争的焦点,其内部矛盾与西方现代化与伊斯兰传统的冲突有关。 Thomas: 艾森豪威尔主义是美国试图阻止苏联在中东影响力扩张的体现,其第一次考验发生在叙利亚。美国对叙利亚可能成为苏联卫星国的担忧,以及对石油管道的控制,是其干预叙利亚的主要原因。 Aemon: 1949年美国中央情报局推翻叙利亚总统舒克里·库瓦特利,是美国干涉中东内政的开始。库瓦特利是阿拉伯民族主义者,反对君主制和殖民主义。1955年以色列对加沙的军事行动加剧了叙利亚的政治动荡,导致库瓦特利复出并与纳赛尔结盟,这引发了美国的担忧。

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This chapter discusses the ongoing situation in Syria, including the control of different regions by various factions and the impact of foreign powers.

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This episode is brought to you by Shopify. Whether you're selling a little or a lot, Shopify helps you do your thing, however you cha-ching. From the launch your online shop stage, all the way to the we just hit a million orders stage. No matter what stage you're in, Shopify's there to help you grow. Sign up for a $1 per month trial period at shopify.com slash special offer, all lowercase. That's shopify.com slash special offer.

Aemon, you're not a fan of the Lord of the Rings, are you? Of course I'm a fan. You know, my favorite character was always Sauron. Oh, Aemon, that can't be true. Surely it's Samwise Gamgee. Come on. Everyone loves Sam. Ah, come on.

Come on, like what? A doofus gardener? I mean, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. For me, Sauron. Sauron was always the most intriguing character in the entire trilogy. You have an insatiable thirst for power, Eamon. Absolutely. What about the Silmarillion? Did you ever read that book? Yeah, I mean, it was just a little bit of, you know, history of...

Oh, Lord of the Rings, where you learn about the elves and the Maiar and the Valar and whatever and all of that. And then I got lost completely. Oh, dear. I'm afraid that our listeners in this season of Conflicted will be feeling the same way every time we go to the Bronze Age.

Because I was thinking that, like, the main storyline is The Lord of the Rings, but every time we go to the Deep Pass, it's going to the Silmarillion. But, oh my goodness, now I'm afraid they might hate it. Indeed. All right, let's get into it. ♪

This episode, Eamon, is all about Syria. But before we launch into Syria's past, what's going on in Syria right now? It's not in the news as often as it used to be. Has the civil war ended? Is it a stalemate? Like how much of Syria does Bashar al-Assad's government in Damascus actually control? Well,

I can tell you that the war in Syria is in some sort of hiatus. Like, you know, it has taken a sabbatical, you know, for better use of a word. At the moment, Bashar al-Assad is controlling, let's say, about roughly two-thirds of Syria. And in that two-thirds of Syria...

coexist two competing powers here. First is Iran and its proxies, whether it is Hezbollah or the Iraqi Shia militias stationed in Syria or the Afghan and the Pakistani Shia militias stationed also in Syria and they are part of a global Quds force. So this is one part of

you know, of the equation. The other part of the equation, you know, will be the Russians. And so the Russians and the Iranians, they have, you know, they exist, they coexist in this semi-harmonious relationship

zone of influence within the two-thirds that Bashar al-Assad controls. I see. So two-thirds of the country, Bashar al-Assad, Iran, and Russia control it. What about the other third? The other third is, well, divided. I mean, one-fifth, you know, of Syria as a whole is controlled by the Kurds, known as the YPG or the PYD, depending basically on who you ask. Okay.

The Kurds, they're mainly focused in the Jazeera, that area of northeastern Syria that's between the Tigris and the Euphrates. Is that right? Yeah, Al-Hasakah, Deir ez-Zor, these places. I mean, so this is where, commercially, this is where the Kurds are based.

And that is, to some extent, an American zone. You know, the Americans are mostly based there. And that is where the oil is, by the way. I see. So, yeah, you see, like, I mean, you Americans, wherever the smell of oil is there, you just can't resist, can't you? Yeah.

And what about the rest? What about the rest? Okay, so the belt, which is from the west of the Aleppo countryside all the way to Idlib, passing by Afrin, that is controlled by the Turks and by their proxy jihadist groups such as HTS and PYD.

The TTI, which is the party of the Turkish, Islamic, Turkestan, whatever, which is the Uyghur party that is stationed there. I see. So how would you describe Syria at the moment? I mean, does it work? Does it run? I mean, what would it be like to be there? It is a semi-functioning failed state. That's the best way I can describe it.

A functioning failed state. I like that description, a functioning failed state. In my view, that description would apply to all of Syrian history from the mid-19th century to the present, as we hope to demonstrate. Indeed. Actually, that reminds me, we were meant to be talking about a clash of civilizations in the Middle East and whether that can help us understand the conflicts going on there today.

And I think the stories we've been telling, and it hasn't been very linear, I admit, of the late Ottoman colonial and Cold War periods do shed a lot of light on that theme of clash of civilizations. In episode three on Saudi Arabia, we indicated ways in which the Sharia law and traditional ideas of Islamic governance and jurisprudence differ sharply from the modern norms. There you have in one local form a civilization. Let's call it Islamism.

Islamic. At the end of episode four on Russia, I laid out the Cold War ideological fault line between the West and the Soviet Union. Each side was championing a specific version of modernity, which each understood to be universal in character. As far as I'm concerned, this is another civilization, modernity. And despite its universalist pretensions, it is essentially Western.

Over the following three episodes on Iran, Egypt, and the Holy Land, we showed the different ways in which Western modernity forced its way into those countries, aided and abetted by the colonial powers, by the CIA, by local modernizers with big ideas, and by European settlers with nationalist ambitions of their own. Today, we're talking about Syria.

It has been described as a fulcrum of geopolitical hegemony. A bit like Ukraine, interestingly, a fulcrum of geopolitical hegemony in the Middle East. For that reason, for thousands of years, Syria has been fought over and smashed up by invading armies from all directions, making it a somewhat amorphous patchwork of tribes, regions, and cities practicing a wide variety of religions.

More than perhaps anywhere else, Syria's road to modern nationhood has been strewn with conflict, which we'll explore through the prism of our continuing journey across the Cold War Middle East. Ready, Eamon? I was born ready. Right. The first question is, what is Syria? What is Syria? How do we define it?

What definition do you want? Do you want the Greek definition? Do you want the Roman definition? Do you want the Arab definition? Which definition do you want? We can start with a sort of geographic definition because geography is destiny. So there's this thing. It's called the Dead Sea Rift.

and it runs north-south along the eastern Mediterranean, the Levantine coast. It's a fault system where the African plate meets the Arabian plate. Now, this is fascinating. They're both moving in the same direction towards the northeast. Arabian plate and an African plate. That sounds to me pretty much like bringing ugali, and you're mixing it with feta cheese, and that's it. I mean, you end up with...

I have no idea what you're talking about. You're talking about plates, man. Plates. Tectonic plates, my friend. Tectonic plates. Sorry, sorry.

Sorry. The Arabian tectonic plate and the African tectonic plate meet along the Dead Sea Rift. They're both moving in the same direction toward the northeast. But the Arabian plate is moving faster, pulling away from the African plate ever so slowly. So there's this rift in the land. That's the reason for the distinctive geography of the eastern Mediterranean.

where after a narrow coastal plain you have rippling strips of high mountain ranges and plunging valleys including the Jordan Valley which at the Dead Sea is the lowest spot on earth. So if we're talking geography we have to think in these terms: mountains

Absolutely. I mean, Mount Lebanon, you know, was historically, since 1400, 1500 years ago, always a refuge for all sorts of fringe religious sects to go and hide there and flourish there. Absolutely. And other...

neo-founded religions like the Druze and others. So that is why Mount Lebanon was always such a refuge for these minorities. Not just Mount Lebanon. So greater Syria we can think of as basically a large plateau, quite arid, that is hemmed about by mountains. The Taurus Mountains,

in the north, so that's the southern part of Anatolia. And then there's these mountain ranges. First, the Amanos Mountains, or the Nur Mountains, and that was largely populated with Armenians. Then you have a little gap, and then you have the Al-Ansariya Mountains, which were populated by Alawites. And then you have a little gap, and then, as you said, you have Mount Lebanon with Druze and Maronites, and the anti-Lebanon mountains on the other side of the Bekaa Valley, Druze and Sunnis there. Another gap.

Mount Carmel, Jews and Christians, another gap, and then the Judean hills stretching down into the Sinai. So it's a very undulating sort of landscape down that strip. But then on the eastern side of that strip, desert. Well, Syria is not just only about, you know, hills and valleys and mountains. You know, we have to talk about the people who inhabit these hills, valleys, and mountains. And

And these are the central Semitic people. The central Semites. Yes, central Semites. So that's sort of like Canaanites, Ugaritic speakers, Aramaic speakers, Hebrew speakers, and of course, Arabic speakers. These are the central Semites. And that is why these lands are called Bilaad al-Sham, because it's named after Sam or Shem, as he is known in the Bible, the son of Noah, the biblical figure from the flood.

So that is why the land there is called Bilad al-Sham. The forefather of all the Semites. Indeed, including us, by the way.

And talking about, you know, a city that is specifically called the Sham by the local inhabitants of Syria, you know, in modern times, is Damascus. You know, whenever you hear a Syrian saying, you know, oh, I just traveled, you know, to a Sham. Well, you live in a Sham. I mean, you know, he said, no, no, no. We call Damascus, the city itself, we call it a Sham. And all the surrounding suburbs is called a Sham.

Interestingly, Thomas, do you know that Damascus is, in fact, the oldest inhabited, continuously inhabited capital city in the world? It was built in 5000 BC, so it is 7000 years of being a capital city. Unbelievable. Well, in fact, what do we mean when we say capital city? Very long time ago, it was the capital of a small principality known as Aram Damascus. But

But really, it wasn't a major capital city until it became the capital of the Umayyad

caliphate, the first big caliphate of Islam. Indeed, but still it was always the most important city in the province of Syria for the Greeks, for the Romans, and of course it was always around as an important city that controlled a significant amount of land around it. So it was always a city-state in its own, but also a capital of a larger entity.

city-state and in fact it was one of many city-states that dotted Syria.

Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, so many cities that are very ancient and that really ruled themselves for many thousands of years. They may have been incorporated into other imperial entities like the Romans and like the Umayyads, but actually the Bilad al-Sham, Syria, was for most of its history run as a collection of independent city-states who were largely left to rule themselves. Yeah.

Okay, that's Syria defined, but as you can see, it's like I said before, Syria is a rather amorphous concept. But let's get back to the Cold War. Let's get back to where we left off a couple of episodes ago because at the moment, we're aiming at the Six-Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

Those wars were mainly between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. We've covered Egypt and Israel, and today we're going to focus on Syria. We're putting our ducks in a row, as it were, or we're trying to at least. Now listen, the Arab world in the 1950s is about as complex, confusing, and convoluted as could be. It's been described as a game of multi-dimensional Cold War chess.

We're doing our best to streamline the story, but pay attention because we'll be jumping around a bit, all right? Now, first, a recap, a reminder of the Middle Eastern Cold War dynamic of the late 50s at the moment of Egyptian President Nasser's ultimate triumph when he defeated the Western powers and Israel during the Suez Crisis in 1956.

Recall, when Eisenhower came to power in '53, he condemned European colonialism and supported nationalism. But he also feared that the Soviet Union, by manipulating nationalist feelings in the Third World, would turn the Third World communist.

And Eisenhower wasn't actually paranoid, to be honest. I mean, Stalin, before his death in 1953, he was doing everything he could in order to turn the Arabs against the West, including America, by, you know, painting them as just an extension of the colonial West, the old colonial West. And he was trying his best to bring them into the Soviet camp. Iraq and Jordan at that time were both monarchies under Hashemite kings. So they were aligned with Britain.

and Saudi Arabia under its new king, Saud. Well, it was sitting on the fence and playing a rather tricky game. But Egypt was committed to pan-Arab nationalism. Egypt's nationalism was worrying enough for Washington. Remember how Nasser bought weapons from the Soviets via Czechoslovakia in 1955? But then Nasser declared his neutrality in the Cold War. He didn't want to side with the West or the Soviets. He wanted Egypt to be independent.

neutrality wasn't anti-Soviet enough for Eisenhower. Oh yeah, because the Americans, I'm sorry to say it, Thomas, always have this mantra, which is, you are with us or against us. My way or the highway. This was definitely true during the Arab Cold War. I mean, Eisenhower was certainly convinced that Soviet influence was dangerously on the rise, especially after Egypt's victory in the Suez Crisis brought Nasser closer to the Soviets.

So, Eisenhower produced his famous doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine, in January 1957. It stated that America will intervene militarily in any Middle Eastern country threatened by international communism. And as far as he was concerned, Arab nationalism was now such a threat.

Which is ironic because as we've seen, America had already intervened several times in the internal affairs of Middle Eastern countries. In 1952 in Egypt when the CIA helped overthrow King Farouk. In 1953 in Iran when the CIA helped overthrow Mohammad Mossadegh.

But in fact, as early as 1949, the CIA helped to overthrow a democratically elected president of a Middle Eastern nation. Do you know which nation, Eamon?

Who else? Syria. Syria was the first Arab country to win its complete independence from a colonial power, in Syria's case from France, in 1943. Well, partially in 1943 and then fully in 1946. Still the first, though.

Syria's first president was Shukri al-Quwatli. Ayman, tell us about Shukri al-Quwatli. Shukri al-Quwatli, what I can say about him, first of all, he's an aristocrat. And that is important to say, that he was a descendant of a noble Hashemite family that came from the Hejaz, from Mecca, in the 18th century and settled in Damascus and worked for the Ottoman. That family worked for the Ottoman Empire

One of his grandfathers was Hassan Pasha Quwatli, who was the chief of all the traders and chief of the commerce, actually, in Damascus for the Ottomans. And yet, despite this privilege and coming from an aristocratic family, he actually was an early proponent of Arab nationalism, even during Ottoman time.

Ah, so he believed that the Arabs should be independent of the Turks. So he was a sort of pan-Arab before pan-Arabism. Absolutely. I mean, from the beginning. I mean, he was, clearly he showed such potential and he was always opposing all forms of colonialism, whether it is Ottoman as well as British and French.

And for that reason, he actually hated monarchy. He believed that the Arab monarchies were tools of the colonial powers. Even though the Arab monarchies, most of them were Hashemite at the time, and he's a Hashemite, and yet he stuck to his principles. No, no monarchies.

So back to the CIA coup in Syria 1949 the war with Israel was still raging Arab losses were causing widespread discontent inside Syria and present Coatley called on the army to crush protests there He was adamant against any negotiations with Israel unlike Egypt and Jordan. They were negotiating armistice agreements now

Syrian General Hosni Zaim, the leader of the Syrian forces in the war, had long had designs on a military coup. And in early 1949, he approached a CIA officer at the American embassy in Damascus to sound out the U.S. for support. And the reason, Thomas, why the U.S. really disliked Shukr al-Kuwatli is

can be summarized in one word, the tap line. Now, what is the tap line? The tap line. The tap line is an oil pipeline that will go from the oil fields in Saudi Arabia in the east, on the water to the Gulf, passing through Jordan, through Syria, into Lebanon, and from there, the oil will be exported to the west. Now, here is the problem, is that Shukr al-Quwatli disliked monarchies.

So much so that he didn't want, you know, an oil pipeline passing from Saudi Arabia through Jordan, two monarchies he dislikes. You know, he considered them to be the stooges of the West. And they will pass through Syria, that pipeline will pass through Syria into Lebanon. So he didn't like to play ball. Now, you know what happened when you have oil, someone doesn't like to play ball, and America involved in one sentence. Yeah.

You know what's going to happen. Well, I mean, in addition to the tap line, America had its general worries at the time that democracy would lead to pro-communist sympathies. This is not really in keeping with America's ideals. But Zayim, therefore, had a good audience in the embassy. He said, apparently, according to his own memoirs,

There is only one way to start the Syrian people along the road to progress and democracy. With the whip. Typical. Yeah.

That's very typical. I mean, pretty prophetic words, I think. Certainly fateful ones. Indeed. The U.S. gave General Zayim the go-ahead, and on the 30th of March, 1949, he launched his coup. President Kowatli was overthrown and exiled to Cairo. That's important. Keep that in your mind. With Zayim now in power, the tap line was approved, internal order was restored, and an armistice with Israel was agreed.

General Zayim's coup was the first coup out of nine that Syria would go through between 1949 and 1970 when the infamous Hafez al-Assad came to power. Or maybe even more. I mean, honestly, there were so many coups that scholars can't even agree on the number. Do you know that between 1946 and 1966,

Syria had 20 governments and five constitutions. Oh, poor Syria. Yeah, they gave the Italians run for their money, man. Yeah.

It's certainly a sign that Syria's nation-building project wasn't going well. Indeed, absolutely. Okay, so there you have it. 1949, the CIA helped overthrow President Qawatli of Syria, the first of its many attempts to control political processes inside Middle Eastern countries. Now, we started by talking about the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. And the first test of that doctrine was where?

You guessed it, Syria. To understand how, we're now going to zoom out back to the regional dimension. Throughout 1949, Israel signed separate armistice agreements with the Arab states. Yeah, I mean, there were several demilitarized zones or DMZs, as you call them. I mean, you know, along the Golan Heights,

between Israel and Syria, along the West Bank and around East-West Jerusalem, between Jordan, which now occupied the West Bank, and Israel, and you have along the border in the Negev and the Sinai deserts between Egypt and Israel. These were, to some extent, policed by the United Nations,

in a peacekeeping forces, there were some of the earliest peacekeeping forces that were ever deployed to the, you know, anywhere around the world, actually, early on in the United Nations history.

Well, they weren't policed very well because over the following years, fighting broke out between both sides, between the Israelis and the Arabs in the demilitarized zones, including with Syria, and with Syria quite badly in 1951. These were part of what Israeli history calls the border wars, back and forth, tit-for-tat raids. What's more, Egypt, which had occupied the Gaza Strip during the 1948 war, remained in possession of Gaza.

Well, Gaza is always on the news these days. It's been always on the news for as long as anyone could remember. Actually, if you are listening to this podcast and you are in your 80s, then in the 1950s, you would still have heard about Gaza all the time. Because, you know, in 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, you always hear about Gaza.

Raids by Palestinian militants supported by the Egyptian military as well as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood launching raids against Israel in those days. It was always in the news then. We actually referred to these raids in our episode on the Suez Crisis because Israel would eventually choose to join France and Britain's invasion of Egypt partly as a way of stopping these raids.

Anyway, in 1955, the year before the Suez Crisis, during one of these Palestinian raids from Gaza, an Israeli citizen was killed. When the culprit was in turn murdered by Israeli forces, he was carrying documents linking him to Egyptian intelligence. So in reprisal, Israel launched operatives.

Operation Black Arrow. That raid actually was led by none other than Ariel Sharon, who would later become the Prime Minister of Israel. Well, I think of Ariel Sharon as the guy who was on life support for like 12 years. And you always ask yourself, is Ariel Sharon still alive? No, he died. But, you know, he left behind him a legacy, man. I mean, the man had a very long history of

And most of it, it was in conflict with the neighboring Arabs. You could say that again. Yeah. In 1955, I mean, he led that raid into Gaza, you know, landing with… Operation Black Arrow. Exactly. Landing with 150 of his paratroopers in Gaza, surrounded the Egyptian base near Rafah.

and they killed 38 Egyptian soldiers. Of course, that operation had significant ramifications. Yes, in Syria, Operation Black Arrow triggered a major policy change. So since the coup in 49, six years earlier, Syria had been through four more coups and a major uprising that was crushed. The latest coup had seen a return to parliamentary democracy, and the new government was anti-Nasser, anti-leftist.

Operation Black Arrow, though, caused the people to become fervently pro-Nasser, leading to further political turmoil. And guess what? There was someone in exile in Cairo who...

was reading, you know, the political scene there in Syria and reading the mood of the people and decided now is the time. So with, you know, support from Nasser himself and his intelligence services, you know, Shukr al-Qawatli, you know, the president who was toppled by a CIA coup,

you know, returned back from exile in Cairo, landed in Damascus airport and announced, I'm going to stand for president. And guess what? He won. So President Kuatli is back in power and he immediately signed a joint defense agreement with Nasser, basically creating a mini NATO. The agreement said an attack on one was tantamount to an attack on the other.

Now, Nasser had bought his Czech weapons the month before. Syria would do the same the month after. This close cooperation and coordination between Egypt and Syria was really worrying to Washington. Something like a Soviet alliance system seemed to be emerging in the Middle East centering on Syria and Egypt.

And so at this point in early 1957, Eisenhower announces his doctrine. Well, it is a fascinating speech, Thomas, and I definitely urge listeners, you know, go and read that speech. It really sheds light on, you know, the reality

you know, the fears that the United States have during those dark years of the Cold War. I was amazed at how clear and precise it is, how honest it is. You'd never hear a speech by an American president to Congress like it today. You know, it's intelligent and sophisticated. It contrasts very sharply with what we listen to these days. Indeed.

The doctrine, Eisenhower said, would "include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism." Now that's convoluted diplomatic speech for "if you think your neighbor is falling to international communism, tell us and we'll invade them."

And because only Egypt and Syria were receiving weapons from the Soviet Union at the time, the doctrine was clearly targeting them. The worry that Eisenhower and the wider U.S. administration at the time used to have is the fact that

Through Syria, two important oil pipelines were going. The tap line, which we talked about before, which the former president, Shukr al-Kuwatli, opposed, and also another oil pipeline that was going from Iraq, a major oil producer, also going through Syria, and then from there into the Mediterranean to export to the West.

Another thing also is the fact that some of the Gulf oil from Kuwait, from Saudi Arabia, from UAE, from Oman, used to go through the Suez Canal. And who is now controlling the Suez Canal?

Egypt. So you have two countries with Soviet, you know, leaning and sympathizing governments, you know, more or less putting their thumbs, you know, on the oil jugglers of the West. So keeping those countries free of Soviet control was of paramount strategic importance to the United States.

My question though, Eamon, is was there ever any real chance of communism taking hold in the Middle East? We said before that Eisenhower wasn't paranoid and it is true that the Soviet Union was pursuing a policy of convincing the Arabs to turn against the West. But I don't know. I don't really think that Arabs would ever really become communists.

Well, Thomas, I somehow never believed that the Arabs had it in them basically to become fully-fledged communists, whether Leninists or Bolsheviks or Trotskyites. I mean, I just don't see it happening because of the fact that the Arabs, whether Muslim or Kushian,

they do have that tendency towards having God being central to their lives. I mean, you can't just take away religion from everyday lives of the Arab people. And therefore, the idea that somehow you will end up with Arabs basically believing in God

the nuclear family being redundant or adopting a fully fledged communist society. No, it's never going to happen. So

But why did the U.S. believe it was going to happen in the 1950s? I think because, you know, and there were studies, you know, done at the time, which says that if the Muslim Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and other places, you know, were in fact incorporated, you know, into the Soviet communism, so will other Muslim societies.

And what happened with the Tudah party in Iran and some of the wider appeal that they had with an Iranian Muslim society, that also scared the Americans into believing that there is a real chance for communism to spread into the rest of the Muslim world. Yeah, I think you're right. I think that Muslims are too religious, really, to be swayed by atheist, godless communism.

But when I read the text of the Eisenhower doctrine and think about it, I sort of think, you see, here's an example of kind of Western modernity seeking to dominate the Middle East by invoking these universalist ideas of freedom and liberty and prosperity and progress. But it had to be on America's terms. You know, modernization

is westernization. Because you can't, I think you can't modernize without being westernized. I think modernization is a civilization and it clashes with Islamic civilization. Not necessarily. I mean, I would say that if you go back to the Middle Ages, you know, Western physicians couldn't have actually, like, become physicians and actually, you know, involved in the

medical sciences without having studied Arabic. So at the end of the day, I mean, to modernize is to Arabize, you know, in the Middle Ages. Hmm.

I think we're having a clash of civilizations right here, Eamon. I don't agree. I don't think that Western scholars reading Arabic texts to become better doctors is what I mean by modernization or modernity. Modernity is about much bigger things, about individualism, about rationalism, about a secular state that dominates every part of your life. This is a specific –

civilizational sort of impulse that runs counter to Islam? - In a sense, yes, but really, you know, does religion prevent

- No, no, I'm not saying that at all. I'm saying that Islamic civilization is different from Western civilization. - Exactly. - But that Western civilization is modernity. It is modern civilization. - But you can always have modernity in a different flavor. You can have Islamic modernity, you can have a Christian modernity, you can have Jewish modernity,

You can have Hindu modernity. At the end of the day, you can have modernity, whatever flavor you like. - Well, this is what this season of Conflicted is all about. I don't think we agree, but anyway, getting back to the story, after Eisenhower released his doctrine, Syria immediately denounced it. They weren't stupid.

It clearly stated that if one of its neighbors asked the U.S. to do so, the U.S. would order its forces to occupy Syria. It accused the U.S. of being an imperialist power. This episode is brought to you by Shopify. Whether you're selling a little or a lot.

Shopify helps you do your thing, however you cha-ching. From the launch your online shop stage, all the way to the we just hit a million orders stage. No matter what stage you're in, Shopify's there to help you grow. Sign up for a $1 per month trial period at shopify.com slash special offer, all lowercase. That's shopify.com slash special offer.

Okay, things really started to heat up from there. In July of that year, this is 1957, the Syrian defense minister flew to Moscow for talks. The Soviets were offering low-interest, long-term loans, low-cost weapons deals, and technical assistance without political strings attached. This is very different from the United States, who were always...

expecting the recipients of their aid to fall in line with their own political project, just like Nasser and the Aswan Dam. So the Syrian defense minister goes to Moscow for talks, and these talks are a success. The Soviet premier Khrushchev announces a new, even bigger arms agreement with Syria.

Then the next month, mysteriously, three American diplomats are expelled from Damascus for alleged involvement in a conspiracy to overthrow the regime. And a few days later, the president of Syria appointed a man named Afif al-Bizri as chief of staff to the Syrian army. This really freaked out Washington. Oh, yes, because Afif al-Bizri is a troublemaker. You know?

He is a full-fledged socialist without any hesitation. And he was always anti-Western, anti-colonialist, as well as being very anti-Israeli. I mean, he participated in all the wars that Syria participated in against Israel. At a press conference, Eisenhower expressed grave concerns. And the Syrians two days later had their own press conference. Our policy is anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist, they said.

not communist. They rejected the paternalism of the great powers. And Eamon, I can tell you, they had a point. I was reading some recently unclassified cables between the British Foreign Office and the State Department. And when you read these cables, the way, especially the Brits, I must say, especially the way the British talk about Middle Eastern countries, it is very paternalistic. They're always being like, maybe we'll put this guy in power here, but that would piss off this guy. So we're

We have to make sure that they think this, but we choose to put this person in power here as if they're still in control. Well, it is the hangover of the empire, you know. But I can tell you, yes, to an extent, the Syrians were right to say, well, look, I mean, we are not communists.

After all, the Syrians were always very entrepreneurial. I mean, just like their neighbors in Lebanon. They were always, you know, commercially minded people. Well, that's not how the communism hunters in the American government thought. In late August of 1957...

A telegram was sent from the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh to Washington, and the language is, frankly, hysterical. It said, "...the time is approaching, if indeed not already arrived, when Syria will cease to be effectively an independent nation, but will have been taken over, made into a Soviet satellite, having independence only in name, and it will reach out in efforts to subvert surrounding countries, thus propagating communist virus."

Wow. It's amazing. I don't know. It sounds like a trailer for a movie directed by Senator McCarthy. I mean...

After sounding out regional governments, the U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reported to Eisenhower that Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey thought that Syria would fall to communism within 60 days if nothing were done to stop it. Now, remember the doctrine. If a Middle Eastern country asks for military assistance against a Soviet puppet, the U.S. will comply.

The Turks were especially serious and were demanding a military solution. Well, Thomas, for Turkey, there was no question that they had this headache of communism. I mean, from the east, the Soviet Union, they don't want to have another Soviet satellite in the south because even to the west, they have a border with Bulgaria, which was a communist country. They don't want Syria to become yet another communist satellite country. And that is why...

They did what they did. Yeah, they began to concentrate troops at the Syrian border. And the U.S. ostentatiously begins airlifting new armaments to Jordan, which the Soviet Union denounces as an American policy of conspiracy.

Well, there were already conspiracies everywhere. I mean, you know, even the Iraqi prime minister at the time, you know, suggested that how about, you know, we just stage a false flag operation, you know, a little explosion at the pipeline, you know, stretching between Iraq and Syria. We can use it as an excuse. And then, yeah, let's invade. Let's get the U.S. to support us.

In this increasingly tense environment, the Syrians made a bold move. They sent public letters to the governments of Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon asking if they'd been talking to the West about Syria. Those governments were forced to deny it, otherwise they'd piss off their own people for stabbing a fellow Arab country in the back. And they expressed their solidarity against Zionism and imperialism.

Nonetheless, at the end of September 1957, the U.S. sends a naval fleet to the Syrian coast. Well, this is where Nasser, you know, was able to gloat and to say, I told you so, just like the British, you know, send in the gumboats, except this time it's bigger American gumboats.

America just another colonial power as far as Nasser was concerned. Right. America had shown its hand and its navy was in the Levantine Sea. At this point, everything changes and the Soviet Union gets the upper hand.

First, Syria invites the Saudi king and the Iraqi prime minister to Damascus for a conference where they make a big show of unity. The Turks are angered. But on the 4th of October 1957, Sputnik is launched. This amazing event, the first satellite in space, would technically allow the Soviets to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile at the United States.

The event was greeted by the Arabs as a sign that the USSR was technologically the West's equal, if not its superior, a big boost in Soviet prestige.

A few days later, Khrushchev then reveals the US machinations about Syria in a New York Times interview. And he denounces such imperialism and offers the US a world peace agreement instead. He then sends letters to Western European socialist parties, like the Labour Party in Britain, calling for a stance against any war in Syria. This wins Khrushchev kudos as a peacemaker. So we see Khrushchev playing the diplomatic game

perfectly manipulating the Western media and exposing America's game playing for what it was and as its Arab allies now take a step back the wind is knocked out of America's sails the first test of the Eisenhower doctrine showed how toothless it was in the face of geopolitical reality and on the 13th of October 1957 Egyptian troops land at the Syrian coastal city of Latakia to a rapturous welcome

Four months later, on the 1st of February, 1958, a massive event occurs. From the balcony of the Abedin Palace in Cairo, Nasser and the Syrian president Shukri al-Kuwatli proclaimed the creation of the United Arab Republic. Nasser was made president.

This explains why the Syrian flag, you know, today, you know, got two stars. It is the Syrian flag that was actually created for the United Arab Republic. The United Arab Republic, actually, the flag remained to this day in use as the official flag of Syria. The two stars are Egypt and Syria. It's alleged that President al-Kuwaiti warned Nasser.

you have acquired a nation of politicians. 50% believe themselves to be national leaders, 25% to be prophets, and at least 10% to be gods. But Nasser tried his best. He imposed centralized dictatorial rule centered almost on a cult of personality of himself. Only authoritarian centralized control would make the ungovernable Syria governable.

all Syrian leaders after him would agree. Right, Eamon? Syria and Egypt in union. Seems weird, doesn't it?

But it's not. If you take the widest possible historical view, over the past 3,500 years, for the vast majority of that time, Syria, or parts of it at least, and Egypt, or parts of it at least, were politically united in some way. I mean the vast majority of time, like 95% of the time.

Yeah, they were either part of the, you know, Greek Empire, you know, whether they were part of the Seleucid Empire or whether they were part of the Ptolemaic Empire, the Omeyads, the Byzantines, the Romans, you know, the Abbasids, the Fatimids. I mean, we could go on and on and on about them being provinces within an empire, within the same empire.

It goes all the way back to the Bronze Age, to the 17th dynasty of Egypt. That's when the Egyptian empire was established by conquering Syria and incorporating it into Egypt. Absolutely. So they were always together as part of an empire.

History doesn't really repeat itself, but it does rhyme, sometimes eerily so. And here's a historical rhyme for you. If in 1958, Nasser came from Egypt and imposed upon Syria a modern one-party dictatorship replete with all the usual instruments of state oppression, secret police, propaganda, centralized economic planning, and so on, then the modern state itself in any form would

was also imposed upon Syria by a strongman from Egypt way back in 1831. You know who I'm talking about, right, Eamon? Muhammad Ali Pasha. You got it. If you remember back in episode 6, the one on Egypt, we talked about Napoleon's invasion of Egypt and how that event marked the onset of modernity in the Middle East.

After Napoleon withdrew from Egypt in disgrace, a power vacuum opened up there, and after several years of fighting, Muhammad Ali Pasha was the last man standing. We mentioned him in episode 6, an Albanian warlord from northern Greece, and the Sultan in Istanbul had sent him to Egypt to fight the French, but he stayed. By 1811, he'd become the master of Egypt, and over the next 20 years, he'd increasingly rule Egypt not as the

as the Ottoman Sultan's vassal, but in his own right. This power grab culminated in 1831 when Muhammad Ali's modern army, which he'd built up with European help, invaded and conquered Syria. I think what Muhammad Ali learned from the French

under Napoleon is that one, you need to abolish feudalism in the traditional sense that the feudal lord is the one who provides you with the military conscripts. No, no, no, no, no. You have to establish a professional army. You conscript from the population directly, bypassing the feudal lord's

that the Ottoman Empire used to rely on. And also, you know, just get rid of the idea that you have a special elite of force called the Janissaries. He basically, like an Amin, also abolished, at least within Egypt, the reliance on the Janissaries as a force. So he was really building an army according to European, you know, principles.

you know, line of thinking when it comes to, you know, military reorganization. That's right. He had built a modern state, autocratic, bureaucratic, with this huge conscript army, very different from the Ottoman model. Now, Ayman, why do I bring this up, you may ask? Well, because we're not here just to narrate the Cold War for the hell of it. We're trying to understand the Middle East, specifically the conflicts that plagued the Middle East.

And for goodness sake, look at Syria. It's been through an absolutely nightmarish civil war where sectarian violence erupted on a huge scale, waged on all sides, and all in the name of either overthrowing or supporting an absolutely disgusting dictatorship, one that is more or less operating according to the Nazarist model with modifications.

And as I suggested before, though we may disagree about aspects of it, I believe this conflict is the consequence of a civilizational clash between Western modernity on the one hand

and the Islamic tradition on the other. And that this clash is not just spiritual but concrete. The modern state, a piece of modern Western technology that encodes the basic principles of Western civilization was imposed upon the Middle East, upon Syria. It was an unstoppable force. But this is the point. Islamic civilization is an immovable object. And the meeting of the two causes sparks like two pieces of flint banged together.

And it was brought to Syria by Muhammad Ali and was then built upon by the Ottomans, by the French during the mandate, by Nasser, and eventually by the Ba'ath Party, which continues to rule Syria horribly to this day. This is why, Thomas, I believe that modernity can only exist in the Middle East within the framework of monarchy. And I know, like, you know, many listeners will be, you know, groaning and say,

Oh, no, Ayman, again? Come on. But seriously, if you look at the fact that the royal family of Saudi Arabia, they've been around for about 300 years. The royal family of Oman, been around for 500 years. If you look at the royal family of Bahrain, been around for 300 years. Kuwait, Qatar. And of course, the Hashemite ruling families, especially in Jordan and Morocco, I mean, they've been around for centuries and centuries. And the reality is that

These monarchies, the eight monarchies of the Arab world, are the most stable out of all of them. I'm not talking about just because of oil money. I mean, Jordan doesn't have any, and Morocco certainly doesn't have any oil. But it comes back to the fact that what is a king in the Arab mindset? It's just nothing but a glorified tribal leader. And the tribal system could actually evolve to incorporate modernity

But, you know, that is why the nation state that is built within the framework of monarchy seem to have fared better than nation states built on Western political framework, if you see what I mean.

I do see what you mean. And I think this is something that we do agree about. You know, we're going to talk about this more in the next episode in which we talk all about the Hashemite monarchies of Iraq and Jordan and other places. And, you know, listen, I don't mean to romanticize the pre-modern state in the Middle East. One thing about traditional Islamic governance that was

in a way, its blind spot, or at the very least, a weakness that modernizers have been able to exploit was its inequality. Non-Muslims were second-class citizens. Well, there was no question about it that the laws of the Ottoman Empire, in particular, and the application of these laws in the provinces, whether Syria or Egypt or elsewhere,

were discriminatory against minorities, religious minorities, whether they were Christians, whether they were Jews, or whether they were Shia even. So this is something that we cannot escape. It was part of history.

Traditional Islamic civilization was unequal and socially hierarchical. Muslims were an elite caste above the rest. And what I find interesting from the perspective of what we're talking about now is that this discrimination gave European powers their way in over several centuries. European powers were able to leverage their growing power over the Ottoman Sultan by posing as protectors of Christians.

Yeah, the French protecting the Catholics in Lebanon and Syria, the Russians protecting the Orthodox Christians in Syria and Lebanon and Iraq. I mean, yeah, unfortunately, that was the way through which these powers were able to meddle in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. If the Ottoman Empire just

you know, did not discriminate against anyone, you know, then these people wouldn't need protection and therefore they would have protected their internal affairs. Yes. And once the modern state, even at the time of Muhammad Ali, introduced the principle of equality into a civilization that for so long had been stratified with Muslims on top and everyone else beneath them, two major things happened. First,

Inter-communal tensions exploded as Sunni Muslims sought to retain their historic privileges over other communities and some non-Sunnis began forging closer alliances with foreign powers than with the local authorities.

And second, having been divided for so long, the people of Syria were forced to ask themselves, what brings us together? After all, the modern state is one. It is centralized. It not only equalizes, it homogenizes. They were forced to reckon with tough questions.

What are we? Who are we? Are we Syrians or Arabs? Or are we Damascenes, Aleppans, Latakians? Or Muslims, Christians, Druze? What brings us together? That answer was not quickly forthcoming. Remember that four centuries of Turkish-Ottoman rule had a significant effect of changing the ethnic and sectarian landscape of Syria and Lebanon.

You know, to the point where even there are many Lebanese, you know, Hashemite families converted to Christianity in order to avoid, you know, the forced conscription into the military by the Ottomans. So, you know, there you have it. So the problem is… We welcome all comers, Eamon. I don't care. If you want to convert to Christianity to escape the army, you're welcome. Yeah.

As long as you become my confessor, Thomas, then yeah, I will. I will consider it. Imagine, dear listener, imagine hearing Eamon Dean's confession. Holy moly, I don't know what dark memories haunt your heart, former spy. Oh, indeed.

Anyway, you were saying. You will need lots of antidepressants after that. So for me, I would say that after four centuries of Turkish-Ottoman rule, I would forgive the Syrians for becoming collectively schizophrenic about their identity. Who are we? The trauma of it.

Well, all those questions of identity exploded into real crisis during the Arab revolt. Now, we're going to talk about the Arab revolt that helped bring the Ottoman Empire to an end next time. What we'll say for now is what is today Syria was given to France to rule as a mandate. The locals didn't like it. They rose up against the French, but they were crushed.

The French ruled, in my opinion, scandalously badly. I mean, even worse than the British, I think by far, in the mandate. Well, look, I mean, this is the problem with the French is that

Wherever they ruled, they really screwed up, whether it's Vietnam, Algeria, and of course, in this case, Syria. Why? Because it was called man date. It should have been woman date. And then the Arabs would have been happy. Oh, man, that's a bad joke. Sorry. I couldn't resist. Yeah.

Well, the French, when they ruled Syria, they based their rule on the model they had pursued in Morocco, which they also ruled, where they encouraged the subject population to identify primarily with their tribe or with their religion. The French actively moved away from encouraging the building of a Syrian nation. Well, I mean, that's...

That is exactly what they were trying to do in Algeria. That's what they tried to do in Vietnam. And of course, basically, that is exactly what they were doing in Syria. They were not exactly, you know, pursuing a policy that would actually bring in a greater harmony. In the end, they were actually pursuing short-sighted policies for short-term stability over long-term stability.

Especially since they favored minorities against the majority. I mean, this led the French army of the Levant to have a disproportionately high number of Christians and non-Sunni Muslims, Alawites, Druze mainly. And, you know, this would have massive consequences down the line. Exactly. And this is what the British used to do, actually, in India. They were always incorporating minorities into their, you know, British military in order to

And in Iraq, as we'll find out next week. Indeed, and Iraq also. So this divide and conquer is a colonial textbook tactic, and it's going to haunt Syria for a very long time to come. Keeping Syria divided meant that it remained a collection of city-states, really, under the French. And this would also bedevil Syria long after it won its independence.

Political parties were often regional-based. They pretended to be ideological, but they were really just like regional power networks. Their foreign policy was often based on the sort of economic ties that these regions had had during the Ottoman period. Aleppo with Iraq and southern Turkey, for example, or Damascus with Egypt and Arabia. You know, one of the things I always talk to people about is the fact that

geographically even, you know, it was stupid. Just like when the British carved Iraq and they incorporated Kurds and, you know, Shia and Sunnis together, you know, they did the same with Syria and Jordan because the Arabian Peninsula, many people think that it really ends, you know, with the borders of Jordan and Iraq meeting at the northern tip of Saudi Arabia. No,

The Arabian Peninsula go all the way, you know, to the Euphrates Peninsula, you know, to the northern Syria. The Arabian Desert really is like a it's like an ocean of sand compared to which the mountains of Syria, southern Turkey and the rivers of Iraq are like the shores. And then this this this ocean of sand moves southward all the way to Yemen.

Exactly. And that is where the extension of the tribes, the Arabian tribes, especially like Al-Shammar and Al-Aqidat, Al-Baghara, Al-Jabbour, all of these tribes extend all the way north to Iraq and Syria, Anbar and...

and Nineveh and Deir ez-Zor and Palmyra, you know, so the Badiyat al-Sham as they call it, the Sham desert or the desert of Syria. You know, so this is why, I mean, you know, when the borders were created, these tribes were, you know, forcefully separated from their natural borders, actually, like, you know, from their brethren in the newly founded Saudi Arabia.

So that created also a greater division within both Iraq and Syria, as we will see later. That's one example of the divisive nature of the European colonial period in the Levant. And all of it taken together is why, after Syria won its independence from the French in the 40s, there were so many coups in such quick

succession. We mentioned all the coups. Now, obviously, this is going to come as a burst of info. But just to give you a sense, dear listener, of what we're talking about, as we said, in March of 49, General Zayim overthrew Huatli, the president that was supported by the U.S. And then later that year, another general overthrew Zayim that was supported by the British. And then later that year, another general overthrew that general. And he ended up setting himself up as a kind of dictator. His name was Shishakli, kind of like a

pre-Nasser Nasser really. He ruled behind the scenes, but then two years later in another coup, he overthrew the president and becomes the sole ruler, but then he is overthrown two years later, and then that person is overthrown a year later. Finally, you know, creating the conditions where Kuatli comes back, becomes president, and, you know, negotiates the famous union with Egypt, the United Arab Republic.

Which brings us back to 1958 and the proclamation of the UAR. The UAR lasted only three years. Nasser's dictatorship wasn't what the Syrians had bargained for. Neither the military nor the civilian leadership there. So in 1961, they overthrew him. But the damage had been done. And once the Ba'ath Party came to power in 1963, by yes, another coup,

Military dictatorship would be the rule. This is where Syria started to enter this dark tunnel of Baathism based on sectarianism, marginalization of the majority in favor of the minority,

which the French did before, and now it's coming back to haunt Syria. The alliance of the minority is against the majority, and that will create festering grievances that will explode many years later. We haven't talked about the Ba'ath Party, which is a massive oversight. We don't have time to talk about it now. We won't have time to talk about it next time. Eventually, we will talk about the Ba'ath Party, but it is germane now to talk about the differences between the Ba'ath Party and Nasserism.

They were both pan-Arabist nationalist movements, but there was a big difference. The Ba'ath Party had an international organization with political offices throughout the region, organized in a way more like international communism, but with pan-Arabism as its goal. Nasser didn't have this sort of organization. Instead, his movement was really linked to himself, to his personality, the personality of Nasser, and the Ba'ath Party was not so linked.

There's an irony about all of this You know the the reason that the United States turned against Syria turned against Egypt creating the sense by Egypt and Syria of being under siege is because they feared a communist takeover but

Actually, the reason why Syria and Egypt united was because the Baath Party was fearful of a communist takeover. And they thought that Nasser was the only man strong enough to prevent a communist takeover. So when they united, immediately Nasser launched a major crackdown on communists in Syria. He imposed his socialist authoritarian regime, and despite that, was immensely popular.

This suggested that Arabness was more powerful at that point than Syrianness. Exactly. And this is why, you know, for Syria, they went on a program of something called Arabization, you know, to the point where even the teaching of medicine

in Syria became Arabized. You know, they have translated all the medical Latin terms into Arabic, and they were insisting on teaching every single scientific subject under the sky in Arabic. That's funny, because earlier you said that the West only got modern medicine because we translated text from Arabic, and you're saying that the Arabization of Syria in the modern period is by translating Western medical text back into Arabic.

Yeah, I mean, but nonetheless, in my opinion, you know, this actually made the Syrian doctors disadvantaged. I mean, they actually made them disadvantaged in comparison to other doctors around the world because they have to catch up with the Latin phrases, you know, that they needed in order to, you know, practice medicine. It shows, you know, short-sightedness and pig-headedness when it comes to, you know, what Arab nationalism was, actually.

Oh, poor Syria. You know, Eamon, I lived in Damascus for one very happy year in 2008 before the civil war. I was naive then. I know now that the peace and harmony I felt as I traveled around was only surface deep. In fact, the country had been poorly governed for decades. Age old rifts and modern resentments were festering and outsiders as always were keen to intervene.

But when I was there, one of my favorite places to visit was a pilgrimage site halfway up Mount Qasiun, which is the mountain that towers above Damascus. The pilgrimage site is known as the Cave of Blood, Magharat al-Dam. This cave, according to Islamic tradition, is where Cain, the son of the first man, Adam, killed his brother Abel. He lured him inside and killed him dead.

The cave itself is meant to have cried out in alarm and shock at the sacrilege of the murder. And to this day, you can see a large tongue in the rock, stained red from the blood, frozen in an anguished cry. The Bible and the Quran both agree that Cain murdered Abel out of envy.

Cain, in some unexplained way, hadn't worshipped properly, and so God rejected his sacrifice. But he accepted Abel's, so in a rage, Cain killed him.

After the murder, Cain is cursed. He builds the first city, Erudu, in Mesopotamia. And it is from his descendants that all the instruments of man's domination over other men originate. Cities, agriculture, pastoralism, music even, writing, law, war. I think the story of Cain and Abel pretty much sums up everything.

There are two halves to humanity, to the human heart. One, inclining toward truth, humility, piety. The other, toward violence, control, pride. And the truly virtuous will always incur the wrath of the proud. Traditional civilizations, for all their Cain-like flaws, recognized and even prioritized sometimes what the myth calls the works of Abel,

The modern state, on the other hand, valorizes and prioritizes the works of Cain and his descendants. And just as the myth teaches, in Syria, as elsewhere throughout the world, the growth of the modern state saw the death of Abel and everything he symbolizes. That is a clash of civilizations.

What do you think about that little sermon, Eamon? For me, I slightly disagree. We still can have always, you know, benevolent civilizations. We can always have benevolent cities. We can always have benevolent industries. I know Abel represents the romantic vision of the, you know, noble wilderness living, but you can't ask that of 8 billion people. Yeah.

Because there is not enough wilderness. A typical Islamic response to my little Christian homily there, Eamon. Well, that's the difference between idealistic Christianity and realistic Islam. Well, that's it. There you go. Next time, we focus on Iraq and also Jordan and the Hejaz. All things Hashemite.

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As always, thanks for listening and do join us in two weeks' time for our next episode. Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Rowan Bishop with production support and fact-checking by Molly Freeman. Sondra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley. ♪