USCC 听证：中俄伊朝“专制轴心”对美国及其盟友构成重大安全威胁 - 2月 22日,2025年
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My overarching argument today is that the access of upheaval matters for the United States and its allies.

because it amplifies the military capabilities of our adversaries while at the same time diluting the foreign policy tools we have to confront them. China in particular has been Russia's most critical lifeline. It has increased its purchase of Russian oil and gas, sending billions of dollars back into Moscow's coffers, and just as critically as sending vast amounts of technology, things like tools for tanks, propellants for missiles, turbojet engines,

all enabling Russia to circumvent U.S. and Western sanctions. The axis of upheaval makes it harder to rally coalitions of countries to oppose their destabilizing actions. Beijing and Moscow have impeded Western efforts to isolate Iran. They brought Tehran into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and then orchestrated an invitation for Iran to join the BRICS.

and their parallel efforts in the information domain weaken international support for U.S. positions. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, all four countries defended Russia's actions and parroted Kremlin talking points that NATO was to blame for instigating the war. The response to the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel followed a similar pattern.

China's leadership over the last generation has invested heavily in projecting power internationally. Less obvious has been the extent to which China has used a web of relationships with other autocracies to enhance its leverage where possible to achieve multiplier effects and more generally guide the global rules of the road in a direction more friendly to the Chinese Communist Party's interests and preferences.

And as Beijing deepens its strategic cooperation and coordination with countries that include Iran, Russia, and North Korea, China functions as the keystone that makes the authoritarian whole stronger than any single one of its parts.

This development represents a comprehensive threat to the United States and other free countries. Some of my colleagues here have been noting this coalition looks really weak. Indeed, it looks anemic, as I've also tried to depict in my written testimony. Now, there are strong reasons to prevent this coalition from hardening.

If it were to harden, I think there are at least two major concerns that we should be worried about. First, nuclear proliferation, especially from Russia to Iran and North Korea.

Russia and China have in the past, as you all of course know, supported non-proliferation efforts of the international community. But the incentives are changing, and the transfer of nuclear and advanced military technology would be a real problem, especially if it goes from Russia to Iran and North Korea, or as Dr. Taylor suggested it has, from Russia to China.

Second, and of greatest concern to me as I look ahead to the future, is the possibility for opportunistic coordination in a crisis. If China attempts a military attack across the Taiwan Strait, for example, Russia might see an opportunity to attempt to take a slice of the Baltic states while Iran attacks Israel. If this happened, it would stretch American resources to the maximum and potentially beyond.

So to conclude, there are real risks here, but we should avoid making straight line assumptions about the trajectory of those risks. Most of these states' cooperation is contingent on the war in Ukraine. Their interests, while congruent, are not perfectly aligned, not by a long shot. Ending the war and stabilizing the relationship with China are therefore important strategic priorities for Congress and for America.