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Panel: Can South Korea's new leader heal a fractured nation?

2025/6/6
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Rong Ying: 我认为李在明及其政党的胜利是巨大的,标志着韩国政治混乱和社会分裂的结束。尽管如此,他的胜利并不意味着问题、分裂和两极分化的结束。他面临五起刑事案件,反对党担心他会利用这一授权来实现政治和经济目标,这增加了他的脆弱性。他需要面对韩国根深蒂固的结构性问题,这些问题更加艰巨和困难。韩国经济需要进行改革和重组,但不幸的是,由于政治和社会的分裂,这些改革被推迟或变得困难。重要的是,他需要与美国这个战略或安全盟友,以及中国这个无法搬走的近邻,保持务实的平衡,这符合韩国的最佳利益。 Einar Tangen: 我认为这次选举是对俞锡悦及其武力镇压危机的否定,而非对李在明议程的信任投票。如果没有这五起案件,李在明本可以轻松获得超过50%的选票。即使是新兴经济体,主要经济体也面临着巨大的困难,投票选出一个政府并不意味着新政府有一个计划。李在明将非常务实,试图在所有压力点之间周旋,并专注于工人阶级。韩国经济的近40%依赖出口,因此极易受到任何不确定性的影响,未来几年在特朗普领导下将异常艰难。他将不得不求助于某种形式的直升机撒钱,即分配资金并以此为基础来刺激经济。韩国应该开始转向中产阶级,摆脱控制事物的财阀,摆脱旧的规模经济模式,更多地转向创新。 Josef Gregory Mahoney: 我认为李在明未能在此次选举中超过50%的得票率令人失望,考虑到其前任的政治错误给他带来的有利条件。他在政治生涯中名誉受损,韩国正经历着日益严重的政治两极分化。对李在明来说,关键在于他是否能够取得真正的进展,从而赢得选民和国家的喜爱,从而使接下来发生的事情在很大程度上变得无关紧要。韩国设法避免了中等收入陷阱,并设法推进了数字化转型。韩国能够突破并达到这种先进的经济地位,但它使用的是旧的模式,许多人担心这些模式已经过时,无法真正适应第四次工业革命。韩国仍然陷入与美国的安全陷阱中,美国在过去十年中一直试图利用这一点来离间中国和韩国。自由主义的局限性正在全球范围内暴露出来,如果不推进真正具有变革性的金融和经济改革,并且以可持续的方式进行改革,就不能简单地谈论解放妇女、承认少数群体或推进民主。

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Daily news and analysis. We keep you informed and inspired. This is World Today. Hello and welcome to World Today. I'm Zhao Ying.

South Korea has elected a new leader after six months of political turmoil. New President Lee Jae-myung began his term on Wednesday. He pledged to raise the country from what he described as the near destruction caused by a martial law crisis and revive an economy facing global protectionism. It is time to rebuild national security and peace, which have become tools of political strife.

people's livelihoods and the economy, which have collapsed due to indifference, incompetence and irresponsibility. Lee also emphasized a pragmatic and national interest-centered approach in diplomacy. We will strengthen the U.S.-Korea alliance, bolster Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation based on it, and manage relations with neighboring countries from a practical, national interest perspective.

How will President Lee unite a divided country and revive a slumping economy? And could we see a reorientation in South Korea's foreign policy? For these questions and more, we are joined by Rong Ying, Chair Professor with the School of International Studies at Sichuan University.

Joseph Gregory Mahoney, Professor of Politics and International Relations at East China Normal University. Einar Tangian, Senior Fellow at Taihe Institute and Chairman of Asian Narratives Substack. Gentlemen, welcome to you all. Glad to be here. Thank you. Thank you for having us. Professor Rong, let me start with you because we know that Li Zhiming won nearly 50% of the vote in an election with

the highest turnout since 1997. So what do you see as the key factors behind this decisive victory? Yeah, just to, I think, for President Lee and his party, the Democratic Party, it was a huge sort of victory, sort of landslide victory. For South Korea, it was also, I think, a

signify the end of chaos, political chaos, social division, and so on and so forth. There are certainly, I think, many factors constituting this result. But of course, we all know that the immediate one was the short-lived sort of martial law

by former President Yong and his impeachment and the immediate chaos and turbulence as a result of that for the past six months. So I would say if we look at the high voting rate,

indeed, this sort of signified a very strong sense of sort of frustration about the political chaos arising from by the ruling, I mean, the former ruling party, the former president, and also a kind of expectation or anticipation that the new leader leadership

would bring about something new, some changes, so that they would not only end the chaos,

political, social sort of divisions and also economic difficulties. But hopefully I think we'll begin a new era, which is of course a big question mark taking into account the challenges facing President Li. So all in all, we are

I think the result to some extent has been largely anticipated, but that does not mean I think the end of the problems and the divisions and polarizations that was the largely primarily constitute the chaos and the problems

I think, in the past six months and redefine the way ahead. Yeah, we'll discuss that in a short while. But Aynur, you know, this is like, Li actually framed this election as a judgment day against the imposition of the martial law. So to what extent do you feel like this was a vote for Li himself and how much it was

like a rejection of Yong Sui Yeo and the martial law crisis? Well, that's the thing. I mean, democracies are very good at rejecting governments. Picking the right one is up to the parties. And what you have here is a left-leaning democracy

politician who has had a lot of controversies. He has personally five suits against him, uh, all about corruption. And then you have, uh, the domestic issues that were covered by a professor. Uh, and then the international issues, of course, with the United States and exactly what that means. So this was not a vote of confidence necessarily in his agenda. It was really about rejecting, uh, a power play by a conservative entity who had lost, uh,

the individual who had lost the faith of the people and decided that he was going to move towards an autocratic stance.

Yeah, so Professor Mahoney, what do you think? I mean, apart from the rejection to Ying Sun-yue, does Li's personal story, like his background as a former human rights lawyer, and maybe his rise from working in a sweatshop to political leader, do you think that kind of also resonates with the voters, especially the young and working class?

You know, I think it's fairly complicated. I agree with Einar and Rongying in broad strokes. And certainly, I think it's actually disappointing to see that he didn't eclipse the 50% point in this election, given the positive headwinds he had with his predecessor's tragic political mistake.

On the one hand, I think he's a complicated character. As you noted, he worked as a child laborer. He didn't go to middle school or high school because his father gambled away the family money, according to various reports. He was injured as a child worker, was disabled and therefore excused from military, compulsory military service.

He started climbing his way up through middle school as an older person and then on to high school and then got good grades and went to university, studied law and committed himself to what appears to have been the noble pursuits of human rights and workers rights, these sorts of things. And then carried this over into politics. And this is where things, I think, inevitably become a little complicated because

You know, there's this general understanding that one's hands always get dirty in politics. And I think, you know, just to point to an old paradigm in the Chinese tradition, in the dynastic tradition, you know, the idea was that the emperor was supposed to

cultivate himself as the ideal Confucian gentleman. And whenever his government had been too sullied by the inevitable dirt that attaches itself to the dirty business of politics, then it was his job to bring that person down and to bring a new political system in South Korea.

There are some really entrenched social and political and economic problems, some of which stretch all the way back to the Korean War and how that was resolved and the economic structures that came out of that, the political structures that came out of that, the security arrangement that came out of that with the United States.

And it's been the case that one, no matter how left-leaning or left-of-center one is, one inevitably has to do business with these elements that are deeply connected to

a military-industrial complex, a security complex, appeasing the United States, making sure that you don't alienate these large Chabal or these large massive companies like Samsung or Hyundai or others that have been shown through time to play a very powerful role not only in the economy but in politics.

you know i think what happened was uh his reputation was was somewhat sullied um as he went further and further into politics and certainly the south korea was experiencing this increased

uh political polarization uh very much like what we see uh in the united states and this you know tit for tat back and forth from one administration to the next each trying to damage the other's brand and to attach uh scandals to their to their uh primary uh potential candidates for the future so um these were all these were all concerns but likewise you know yoon his predecessor won power uh

in part by creating this strange coalition between young men who were feeling disaffected by progressive women their age and older people who were unhappy with the progressive policies that had been advanced by the moon.

administration, the middle-aged progressive. So there's this weird coalition of – previously of middle-aged and young women voting together versus elderly and young men. And so these – there are these deep sort of strange gender and generational problems at work also in South Korea.

And I think that they were still – we still see that having an impact in terms of the votes that the conservatives received despite the martial law attempt by Jung.

Yeah. And Professor Rong, just now you also mentioned the deep divisions within the country, but we know that Li Zhiming actually campaigned as a unifier. So does his landslide victory truly give him a strong mandate or is his presidency still vulnerable given the political polarization? Yeah, I think we, the panel at least, I think all agree that the

The election, I mean the victory of President Li does not mean that the end of the division or the polarization, which across many layers. And that's why I think President Li himself knows very well and as a political gesture, I think in his inaugural address announced that he is going to be a president for all.

And I think the fact that he wins quite a lot, even though not as much as the simple majority,

And also that his party, the Democratic Party of South Korea, has controlled the National Assembly. That is, putting together, that is quite a strong sort of mandate. That is something I think quite strong vis-à-vis compared to his predecessor, I mean, the former President Yang.

But that, I think, arguably does not add or help to relieve his vulnerabilities. Why in terms of his, I mean, the cases? I mean, there are five cases, criminal cases, I mean, against him, even though I think constitutionally or that his, I mean, being the president, he will be exempted from that.

And another thing is, of course, this kind of sense of sort of unsafety or vulnerabilities of opposition parties that what he will be using that mandate to achieve political, economic and others.

So there are of course some testing, so there are some cases or there are some indicators, the opposition parties, all those in the opposition would like to see. Last but not least, I think

If you look at those who support the opposition parties or the conservative parties, they're still quite strong. And so I think it would be a very difficult job for him, even though he wanted to go across

the lines. And even though I think politically, he clearly knows the sort of importance of, I mean, to unify South Korea and society as a whole.

Yeah. So, Aina, how realistic do you believe is Li's pledge of national unity, given the sharp divisions along ideological, generational and gender lines? And also, do you think those legal cases against Li is going to affect his leadership? Oh, yeah. Let's answer that in reverse order. I mean, obviously, the five cases, if without those five cases, he would have easily gotten above 50 percent.

And that's just my projection. I used to run elections in the United States. I know how voters tend to look at things. And this was kind of a smirch mark against him. They're real questions. Remember, this is a country, for 30 years, only three presidents haven't gone to prison. And it's pretty certain that the former one is going to go. So that record is going to remain intact.

So when you start talking about unifying the country, they're involved in a cultural war, much the way the United States is, much the way throughout the world. Major economies, even emerging ones, are having great difficulty. The idea that you can vote a

government out doesn't mean that the new government has a plan. The tendency is just to say the other guys, as Professor Mahoney said, oh, they're bad and they have scandals. You should let me take a try. Well, the fact is they were bad. They had scandals. So you're making a choice between the impossible. It's kind of like with Harris and Trump. People, they didn't think that Trump was a great guy. They just thought we're hoping.

that he would be somebody who could address the economic tin ear that Biden had, where he kept on saying, oh, everything's great. Whereas, you know, the majority, mass majority of the working poor and lower middle classes were not thinking it was great. They were having great difficulty and no one was paying attention to it. So as I started out,

you know democracies are great at getting rid of countries but it does i mean getting rid of governments but it doesn't mean the new government comes in has a cohesive plan now turning attention uh to the new president of south korea he's indicated that he's going to be very pragmatic

that he's going to do exactly as my colleagues have said. He's going to try to go in between all of these pressure points, the troubles, interest, labor, et cetera, and try to concentrate on the working man. Now, in theory, that should be wonderful, but it's never that simple. Once you start getting into how you change things, it always comes down to if you want to spend, you need to tax. If you don't want to tax, you have to borrow.

South Korea already has substantial borrowing. It becomes very difficult, especially for the conservatives to say, oh, yes, we'll just keep borrowing ourselves into some sort of prosperity. It hasn't happened yet. People look at Japan and the United States and they say, OK, that's a dead end. So increasingly, the people want somebody with a plan, but they don't have the patience to allow a party to actually go forward and

and express exactly what they're going to do and give them the time to do it. Remember, these problems that we're talking about have arisen. As Professor Mahoney says, and Professor Wong was indicating, these are all old problems. You don't solve old problems that basically stem back to post-World War II era.

within one administration. It's not like waving a magic wand. These are entrenched issues. A lot of it go to the infrastructure and the economy, and those are very difficult. And even more difficult today as the uncertainty

uh that surrounds the international trade remember uh i think it's almost 40 of south korea's economy depends on exports so they're extremely vulnerable to any kind of uncertainty and they know this this is going to be this next couple of years under donald trump is going to be excretionally difficult

No one wants to invest because you don't know what to invest in because you don't know if there'll be a return if you invest on Trump's policies. He'll be gone in three and a half years and perhaps in 18 months he will lose his majorities in the House and the Senate and will basically be a lame duck.

So, I mean, it's just the uncertainty leads to a really kind of a downward spiral where lack of investment means lack of jobs, lack of jobs means lack of money. It just goes down and down. And I wish globally it

It's not just a problem that South Korea or Japan or China, this is a time for regionalism or at least resurrecting things like the WTO so that there can be a renewed certainty. And also trying to find economic drivers that weren't there before. I mean, we have the digital revolution. People are concerned about, oh, it's going to take jobs. But we have this huge untapped reservoir of people

economic activity called small and medium-sized business entities.

which are the vast majority of the GDP, employment, taxes, et cetera. At least in China, it's about 60% of tax revenues. These are entities that are the future by definition. They start out small and they become bigger. So this is where you need leaders who are saying, "Okay, we have a plan for the future." But I don't hear that, even from him. He's just saying, "Well, I'm going to manage what I have for the moment."

Okay, well, Professor Mahoney, just now, Einar said South Korea has this history of political retribution with six of the nine presidents since 1980 facing impeachment or criminal charges. Why has this cycle become so entrenched in South Korean politics? And do you think President Lee will be able to break this pattern? I think the key is,

for him at this point is whether or not he can simply make real progress that would therefore endear him to voters and to the country in a way that would make it largely irrelevant what comes next. I'd like to go back to something that Einar was saying in order to flesh out this point, and that is

uh sometime i think in the mid 90s uh i think south korea was assessed as having um broken through to the to the high income um country status i may have that number mistaken but i believe that's the case and and um and south korea is is distinctive

from Japan and other countries, and so much as it managed to avoid the middle income trap, it managed to move forward with digital transformation. You know, 20 years ago, we used to speak about Japan being one of the top countries

countries in the world in terms of electronics and digital development. And now it's not even in the top 10. South Korea, I think by some accounts is in the top three or four. And certainly, you know, at the cutting edge of a lot of tech development.

So the interesting point is that South Korea was able to punch through and reach this advanced economy status, but it did so with these old paradigms, these old entrenched political systems.

that many fear have run their course and that are not capable of really adapting as the fourth industrial revolution sets in, as everyone in the world has to sort of reposition for a multipolar world. You know, Korea is still stuck in the security trap with U.S.,

But the U.S. has sort of consistently in the last decade tried to exploit this to drive a wedge between China and South Korea and created a lot of trouble. Let's go back just for a brief moment. Before Yun, we had Moon, and before Moon, I think it was – it was

Park, right? And Park was, it was later determined that she had been elected with the South Korea Intelligence Agency, the equivalent of the South Korea CIA, manipulating the election. And, you know, this was later admitted and they apologized for this. But this was because, you know, they wanted to

overturned the sunshine policy towards North Korea. They wanted to take a stronger position. The conservatives wanted to take a stronger position against China. We saw Yun softening Korea's position with Japan. And although I think that's a positive thing,

What we saw with Yun being ousted and South Korea coming under Trump's tariffs as well was suddenly a willingness for South Korea, Japan, and China to discuss how they could work together to resist this global trade war.

Thank you. We've been talking to Joseph Gregory Mahoney, professor of politics and international relations at East China Normal University. Ina Tiangyin, senior fellow at Taihe Institute and chairman of Asia Narrative Substack. Rong Ying, chair professor with the School of International Studies at Sichuan University.

Remind our listeners, if you want to hear this episode again or to catch up on previous episodes, just download our podcast by searching World Today. And for further discussion, you can follow us on XCGTN Radio. Let's take a short break here. Coming back, we'll continue our discussion. Please stay tuned.

Welcome back. You're listening to World Today. I'm Zhao Ying, joined by Rong Ying, Chair Professor with the School of International Studies at Sichuan University, Joseph Gregory Mahoney, Professor of Politics and International Relations at East China Normal University, Ina Tianyan, Senior Fellow at Taihe Institute and Chairman of Asian Narratives Substack. Professor Rong,

Beyond the political crisis, what do you think are the most pressing demands of South Korean voters? And how do you think Lee Jae-moon is going to solve those problems?

I think the two previous panelists have all touched upon the questions you raised, and I think to some extent have given their answers to the deep-rooted and structural problems or challenges that are even more daunting, more, I think, difficult.

I think it is fair to say that South Korea, so far, has the fourth largest economy. And very recently,

I think it was announced that in terms of GDP per capita, it has also taken, surpassing Japan, that of Japan. So it's quite remarkable if we look at the progress and achievement that South Korea has been made.

But again, behind these progress and given the fact that, I mean, South Korea and the Korean economy has very much, I think, I mean, in a way that the structure and, I mean, need kind of much delayed or difficult reforms restructuring, which unfortunately because of the

political sort of divisions, social, I mean, polarizations. And I suspect that

even though I'm not such an expert on that, I just suspect that behind that polarization, political polarization and divisions, these are the factors, these are real sort of reasons for the problem. And to address these problems,

or how to address problem, world, determine and define whoever comes to power. And now with President Lee coming to power, and I think he would be apt to face up with these problems. And his inaugural address, and I think the

campaigns have some give some ideas to what is going to but they are very much only in terms of rhetorical and it will take really not only time but political determination and I don't see that is what they becoming and either the

The last point, I guess, is of course, Korea being very much, I think, export-oriented economy, it's very much related to what is happening in the outside world. So if we look at the crisis, economic or financial crisis in the region,

back in 1990s, late 1990s Asian financial crisis, and of course the global financial crisis 10 years later, 2008 and 9. And now we are having another crisis that has been equally affecting

uh very much south korea so not the answer the way that they've been coming out of uh of that tells us a lot i possibly i think the debate about what south korea and a lot of other countries i mean even in terms of economies like china japan others where are the answers or what we can do

given the common or shared challenges facing us is something, well, again, maybe it will make even

And another sort of panel discussion about that. Yeah, yeah. Well, I know what do you think will be at the center of his economic policy? Because in his inaugural speech, he actually said growth and distribution are not contradictions. They complement each other. So how is he going to balance economic growth with his commitments to welfare and wealth distribution?

Well, inevitably, he is going to have to turn to some sort of helicopter money. This idea that you distribute money and use that as a basis to stimulate the economy. You know, it's the modern monetary theory. I don't believe that that you can do that forever. Obviously, during periods of crisis, you can. But let's look at South Korea. Both my colleagues have indicated that.

you know the people there are unhappy uh and we all acknowledge that this is not something that's just happened in the last six months this has been happening for a long period of time the economy has been moving sideways

Their economic benefit, let's say added value, has been depreciating. They're trapped in political and military alliances, which are not to their benefit. So it's going to take him more than just saying, I'm going to try to redistribute things and get the economy going. How are you going to do that?

And at this point, as I said, we'll probably use MMT, modern monetary theory, to try to stimulate the government. I don't know that that's enough with an economy that is 40 percent dependent on exports. It's really going to take a global economy there. You cannot replace that much internally within South Korea. I was just there recently on Half Korean. It was my Korean family.

I can tell you that they don't see life as really good. The older generation has quite a wealth, but the younger generation, they're almost detached from society. I talked to some of my youngest members and they just said, "Well, there's no hope. No matter what you do, you just get a lot of pressure, but the pressure doesn't result in any kind of benefits." They feel trapped inside.

As much as anything, you can try to curry favor with people, but in the end you have to change the realities. The reality is that South Korea is an economic driver. That's why I was suggesting that they start turning to their middle classes, away from their troubles that have been controlling things, the old economic model where it was all about economies of scale, and drive it more in terms of innovation.

I think this is really the only way that you can go forward. Professor Mahoney, what urgent reforms do you believe are needed to solve those pressing issues that Einar just now mentioned? Well, I agree with Einar that the big vulnerability is the 40% export-driven economy. And the fact that you can't just walk away from the model that's feeding you

um in a moment when you know you're you're facing um uh headwinds you know this is this this is the problem is you know the wolf has come to the door in the form of uh donald trump who's threatening both uh the security arrangement but also exports through the tariffs that he's imposed

this means that your position is more strident. So how do you reform in the midst of those challenges? In other words, reform becomes even more dear, even more difficult to advance. Now, we know that in the past he seems to have claimed some sort of political and ideological kinship with figures like Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

We know that previously he advocated things like guaranteed basic income. But again, how do you actually advance these things? How do you actually pay for them?

without resorting to a debt-fueled economy, which would be unsustainable. I think this is something that a lot of South Koreans want to avoid. They want to avoid that sort of problem that has haunted Japan for so long. What we're seeing are the limits of so-called liberalism being exposed on a global scale.

And this is one of the reasons why you had, I believe, his predecessor flirting with martial law, why you had Trump flirting with not recognizing the election after he lost his reelection attempt following his first term, why you see the growing right-wing movements

and polarization in Europe, that there's this broad perception that you can't simply talk about liberating women or recognizing minorities or advancing democracy if you don't actually

push through real reforms that financially, economically are transformative for real people and do so in a way that's sustainable. Sustainable not simply over the long term economically, but sustainable in terms of making sure that you don't worsen climate change or that you don't broach worse relations with other countries and create new security risks.

So this is the problem that a lot of countries are facing. And again, what's really interesting is that one of the things that South Korea was really, really banking on was that it had risen to this incredible position in the global economy, in this sort of WTO rules-based system, and that South Korea was now going to be a heavy hitter

in terms of ensuring the security of that system and even having some input on its reforms. And what we see is that being attacked by its first security ally, in addition to the security economic risks that the US is bringing to it. So all of these things have created pressures on top of pressures, and it bodes ill for

for South Korea in terms of him being able to construct, I think, meaningful reforms that would follow the line of pragmatism. Yeah. Well, Professor Rong, let's discuss his foreign policy because he said he will strengthen alliance with the U.S. while also pursuing pragmatic diplomacy centered on national interests with neighboring countries. So what might this balancing act look like in practice?

Yeah, before I answer your question, let me just go back a little bit about the agenda of President Li. I think he does have something in his mind when he talked about flexible, pragmatic government, talking about that formula of three –

sort of framework, which means it would focus in on development of AI and the development of national defense industry and that sector.

culture, the K-pop, and finally related to diplomacy. I think he wanted to be part of the G7. I don't know whether it's a good idea. Coming back to that, I mean, diplomacy, and definitely I think the U.S., its relationship with the U.S. is for South Korea, for President Lee, is going to be the top priority.

And unfortunately, I think because of political chaos in the past six months and also, of course, the coming

back of Trump administration and his shift vis-a-vis its allies and foreign policy in general. It raised again a lot of even bigger questions for the new administration. We are expecting important phone calls between the two leaders, but the top on the agenda is of course the shape

of the alliance, but the most pressing issue is the tariff issues as we have seen that first and foremost, the deadlines are coming. And secondly, I think it's the how to sort of

beat the deadline by reaching a deal with Trump and the administration is something I think not only a race against time, but also against, I think, what are the questions we have been talking about. Last but not least, of course, its relationship with the region. So we're talking about certainly with Japan.

and with North Korea, and of course with China and Russia, certainly we can talk about later, all creates a lot of sort of challenges for President Lee. So being pragmatic, flexible is good, but I think not enough.

Well, I know President Lee actually described the Trump administration's approach as introducing the law of the jungle into the international order. But also he still emphasizes the importance of the U.S. alliance. So how do you think he is going to navigate the relations with Washington under Donald Trump? Well, he'll do the best he can. But I mean, let's be very clear. The world is dividing.

The US is going in one direction, the rest of the world is going in another. Even when Donald Trump is gone, the bookends have moved. The United States is no longer a reliable partner. The fact that they, you say, oh, they elected Trump. Well, that was an aberration. It's not going to happen again.

But then, despite the fact that he has 42 felony counts against him, that he bankrupted six countries, that he has them morally questionable in almost everything he does, business and personal-wise.

It isn't an aberration that he's now reelected as president of the United States. It shows that America is unhappy. They want to change. They want to go to this, we're going to take it all somehow. The richest, most powerful country in the world has been cheated by not only its partners, but also by countries that can't even feed themselves. It's an odd juxtaposition.

I would posit that the only thing that he can do that is meaningful is to make a choice. That does not mean that he jumps on the side of China. What he does, he needs to do, is say, okay, the U.S. is not reliable. Trying to depend on them is not going to be useful, either economically or politically.

I would be concentrating on RCEP, TPP, perhaps looking at joining BRICS, not G7. Joining a dying organization that's relevance decreases by the moment.

is not the future. It has to be a situation where they change things dramatically. It's going to be painful, but either way, it's going to be painful and not making a decision at this point would be fatal. Yeah, well, Professor Mahoney, Lee said South Korea has cards to play in trade talks with the U.S. So what leverage does South Korea realistically have in negotiations with the U.S.?

Well, one of the biggest cards that it has to play is that it can pander to Trump's narcissism. But we saw during the Biden administration

uh south korea being forced into this this chip's debacle um we saw south korea being forced uh uh essentially to invest in the united states and um in in ways that were really quite questionable for the well-being of people now he could continue some sort of policy like this some sort of symbolic policy of

you know, building factories or investing chips production capacities in the US. And that may be something that Trump would be very happy to see, given the general failures that he's encountered in terms of his treatment of other countries and how they've responded thus far. Of course, he could continue to hold China at arm's length. He could

promise not to build a free trade agreement with Japan and China. So these are various cards that he could play. But again, I agree with Einar that I think that everyone understands that this is a dead end. And that even if you do manage to cut a deal with Trump, there's no guarantee that he would keep it.

or that whoever his successor might be would keep it. So, you know, there is a moment right now where a lot of countries, Japan, the EU and others, are thinking about strategic autonomy. How do they de-risk themselves economically, but politically and militarily from other great powers?

China has been trying to support those efforts in certain ways by working with free trade agreements and through organizations like

BRICS, which are not imposing norms or rules on their members. So I think there are paradigms and opportunities, but they would be costly. They would be very difficult. And given the highly polarized nature and given the very powerful conservative elements still at work in South Korean society and above all in the South Korean security and military apparatuses,

certainly the backbone of the economy and as much as the Chevalers represent that, it's just going to be really, really difficult for him to

to move in the direction of what's really in the best interest, long-term best interest of South Korea. Well, Professor Rong, what do you think we can expect from President Lee's China policy? Because just now Professor Mahoney mentioned strategic autonomy and actually his party, the Democratic Party has said it does not want South Korea drawn into the US-China rivalry, but also we are hearing from US Defense Secretary Pete Hexeth

who warned against countries trying to maintain economic ties with China while relying on U.S. security. So how do you think he's going to respond to this kind of pressure? Well, that's a great question. I think as far as I can see, that it would serve the best interest of China.

South Korea to not only as rhetorically talking about pragmatic balance in diplomacy and in terms – I mean its relationship with United States and sort of strategic or security ally, and China close

neighbor that cannot move away. And historically, I mean, culturally, that's very much important. But even in terms of the questions, the challenges facing South Korea, whether I think impossible without close

cooperation and collaboration. So for South Korea, for President Lee, it's not a question of taking side. Rather, it's a question of whether it would take side of its own national interest for the sake of its much-needed sort of reforms, transformation, or any possible sort of attempt to find a way out of the problems we are having.

The strategic autonomy, as far as I think that serves the best interest of South Korea, the answer would come from how South Korea, how the new administration President Lee would

find a way to navigate these problems. Another important point I would like to make is, of course, the regional economic sort of engagement. How some

South Korea, given its priorities and importance, would be doing. G7 definitely, I fully agree with our co-panelists that it's not a good answer. And the current economic and regional integration or regional arrangement

certainly is, I mean, not enough. So I'm also very much looking forward or looking at the renewed sort of efforts if possible about the trilateral sort of cooperation, China, South Korea and Japan. And also I think the APEC

as a regional economic collaboration because this year in South Korea, now hosting the IPEC, unfortunately because of the political chaos, it seems that it's been not making as much progress as it is, but

Now we have the new government, so I suppose that by the end of October when the summit is taking place and leaders will be coming, it will be another very good opportunity for South Korea to come up with some concrete ideas.

Last but not least, I think I understand that we will go back to the – coming to the inter-Korean relations. But I think possibly with that and the new government, there are also currently new ideas coming out of its relationship.

I mean, engagement with its Northern neighbors and in particular, I think economic engagement. If we went to long-term answers for the challenges facing South Korea.

Yes, I know. Actually, Lee has expressed this desire to mend ties with North Korea, and he has advocated for dialogue with North Korea as the best path to peace. So what diplomatic steps do you think might he take to re-engage with Pyongyang? Well, I don't know what's in his mind, but I can tell you what I would suggest, and that is North Korea renounced some time ago this idea of reunification under the Kim family.

So this is obviously an overture to settle borders, declare North Korea an independent country, create some sort of security guarantee that it won't be invaded or touched and that its autonomy will be respected. At that point, South Korea doesn't have any kind of security worries. Japan is not going to invade South Korea, neither is China, nor is North Korea.

So that would take a tremendous amount of, you know, emphasis away from this thinking that, you know, it's time to remilitarize and start pouring billions of dollars into defense. It would also remove this idea that it has to be under the protective umbrella of the United States. Once you change that, the whole tableau,

All right. In for South Korea changes dramatically. If the U.S. is not going to be a reliable partner and it's not necessarily needed anymore, it is time to go out and find reliable ones. And this is where I say going back to these these regional groups or even leading the charge at the WTO and saying it's if a country decides that it will act unilaterally in violation of everything that the WTO stands for.

for, it is time for three quarters of the countries to move to have that country expelled and allow the WTO to be reformed and be what it's supposed to be, a trade mechanism for countries to settle disputes peaceably without resort to violence.

If that happens, he will be a hero. He will not necessarily be liked by Washington, but Washington isn't offering anything. In fact, quite the opposite. They're going to be demanding that South Korea pay more for the troops that are stationed in South Korea. Trump has made that very clear.

So it's time to stop thinking that you can straddle a divide that is growing wider by the day and choose to, as both my colleagues have said, to choose your own interests. And those interests are in having peace,

and having an open road to development, it would mean changing some of their economic policies, emphasizing small and medium-sized businesses over the Cherubils. But the Cherubils would benefit because all of a sudden there is increased trade opportunities within North Korea. They're out from under these kind of silly tariffs and threats by the United States because if the world becomes one block away

It is not the U.S. who has blockaded the rest of the world. It will be the rest of the world has simply said, you are a pariah.

And in future generations, I assure you, leaders, the United States would be coming back. But like TPP, or it was originally TPP, that's CPTPP, they would be in a situation where the foundation has been reset. It is a working mechanism that works for the benefit of the whole world. And the U.S. could decide to join or not join, but it could not be in a position to dictate any more.

And this is inevitable. The world is moving. U.S. can say we don't want the tide to come in, but the tide is coming in. And it's time for South Korea and other countries

to make a decision about not just your own interests, I mean selfishly, because that just leads to the law of the jungle, because how can we have shared interests and create a better multipolar world, which exists already, and that one that we can all live in and have this mutual benefit instead of saying that everyone should be supporting the United States because somehow that's important for the world.

Thank you, Honor Tianyan Senior Fellow at Taihe Institute and Chairman of Asia Narratives Substack. Rongying, Chair Professor with the School of International Studies at Sichuan University. And thank you, Joseph Gregory Mahoney, Professor of Politics at International Relations at East China Normal University. And that's all the time we have for this edition of World Today. I'm Zhao Ying. Thank you so much for listening. See you next time.