Moscow says it's ready to work on a memorandum with Ukraine, one that could include a potential ceasefire.
G7 finance ministers meet in Canada, but can they find unity amid rising tensions over U.S. tariffs? And Israel's plan to take control of the entire Gaza Strip has sparked a strong pushback from key Western allies. Welcome to Road Today, a news program with a different perspective. I'm Ge'anna in Beijing. To listen to this episode again or to catch up on previous episodes, you can download our podcast by searching Road Today.
Let's first break down the latest on the Russian-Ukraine conflict. Russian President Vladimir Putin says Moscow is ready to work on a memorandum with Ukraine when that could include a potential ceasefire. Speaking after a phone call with U.S. President Donald Trump on Monday, Putin emphasized Russia supports a peaceful resolution to the conflict and remains focused on addressing what he called the root causes of the crisis.
The two leaders also discussed recent Russia-Ukraine talks held in Istanbul. Meanwhile, President Trump spoke separately with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who said Kyiv is open to a possible high-level meeting involving Russia, the United States and key European nations.
For more on this, joining us on the line is Dr. Zhang Xin, Deputy Director of the Center for Russian Studies at East China Normal University. Professor, let's start with the big picture. President Donald Trump made multiple phone calls with both President Putin and President Zelenskyy, plus European leaders. What's your take on his approach? Can this be seen as an effective mediation or more of a diplomatic play?
Overall, I think President Trump still attaches great importance to a possible mediated deal, peace-speaking deal, under his leadership.
That has been his main campaign goal for a while. It wasn't completely successful as he planned, but he still takes it very seriously. So now I think after a few rounds of trial, he's just tried to keep engagement with all parties involved, both Russian, Ukrainian and European leaders. Whether it's effective mediating so far or just diplomatic play, I think that it has both elements to it.
I think so far all parties do think the US is the most important mediator in the game. No one wants to ditch the US completely or can ditch the US completely. So in that sense, I think the US is still regarded as a potentially effective and most important mediator. But we haven't seen the final result yet.
So if the whole thing ends up without any concrete implementable political solution, then this immediate role for the US is mostly on the paper, and then it's mostly a diplomatic play. But I think we're not at that stage yet.
Professor, what stood out in this latest Trump-Putin call is that Trump put trade and ceasefire efforts on the same level. He made no secret of wanting to turn U.S.-Russia relations into something that brings tangible benefits politically and economically, possibly even a major trade deal with Russia. So how do you see this objective shaping his role in these negotiations?
Yes, you got the important point in the recent conversation. I think that Trump in this sense shows his nature as a businessman type of politician. He tries always to make deals mostly from a commercial perspective. So now he's trying to link the possible political deals with Russia.
That's consistent with his long-held negotiation style and his whole working style, even before he was president. Does that change the nature of the negotiation or conversation fundamentally? I'm not so sure. I think that part of Trump's negotiation style, his sort of emphasis is well known to all parties, including his Russian counterparts. To some extent, his Russian counterparts have been taking advantage of that knowledge of Trump's negotiation style.
We will see whether Russia would take this possible exchange between a political solution to the Ukraine crisis with some sort of commercial deals from the United States. At this stage, I don't think that's a very likely outcome because I think Russia overall is on the sort of on the more comfortable stage right now and has time on its side.
and wouldn't easily make that kind of transaction. If there is a big transaction, I would see more likely on a more strategic level, nuclear issues or even more significant, the larger issues of global geostrategic importance that Russia may be willing to do some grand transaction or grand bargain. But on trade, that's possible. That's the likelihood is rather low to me.
Speaking of Russian position, Putin says Russia is ready to work on a peace memorandum with Ukraine. So how do you look at this memorandum idea as described a framework rather than an actual peace deal? What are the strategic considerations behind this proposal? I see this as a new step in Russia's what might call stalling tactic. Still give the United States some face.
still try to keep us in the whole political negotiation but without completely giving up its position without making the most decisive compromise to push through the peace negotiation on the surface it gives all parties involved something this indicates russia is completely ready for talk or possible political solution and this keeps on giving something giving something to the united states to ukraine
giving something on the table to show that we made our efforts. And this memorandum as a new concept, a new idea, I think is a new step along that line to keep the U.S. still in it, but without to make the most decisive or meaningful compromise the United States wants Russia to do.
Talking about the tactics that the parties put into the negotiations, from the earlier talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul, which only resulted in a prisoner exchange, to the recent proposals of drafting a peace memorandum following multiple rounds of phone calls, what kind of shift do you think this series of events reflects in terms of how Washington are approaching the resolution of this conflict?
Overall, I think even before the Istanbul meeting, there are quite indicative evidence that the leading team in the Trump administration, Rubio in particular, is losing patience with Russia. To some extent, they begin to blame Russia as the main reason that the peace negotiation hasn't gone anywhere.
And that's slightly different from the earlier stance, earlier attitude held by Trump himself as well as key figures in Trump's negotiation team. So that indicates also Trump's impatience with slightly more level, high level of impatience with Russia over time.
And also that gives some credence to Trump's recent comments that if the peace deal goes nowhere, the U.S. may withdraw. Basically says this is a European war in the end. We've tried our best with both sticks, carrots.
But you didn't follow, then in the end it's your issue, it's your problem. It's a shame that it didn't work out, but we've tried and it's time to leave. Then we have to leave. Professor, as you said, Trump administration has hinted if talks don't lead anywhere, they are ready to go away. But given the weight President Trump put behind these negotiations, both in his election campaign and now in office,
If this round of diplomacy fails, do you think the White House will truly pull back? And could we see a shift in how the U.S. deals with both Kiev and Moscow going forward? That's a really good question. I think the chance for U.S. to pull
complete withdrawal from the negotiation. So it's likely, especially if the United States do see any peace negotiation or results, positive results coming out of the negotiation, really is out of reach after many trials. I think Trump will lose, completely lose patience
And he might decide to, as I just mentioned, shrug off to tell Russia, Ukraine, and Europeans that this is your issue. Try to sort out among yourselves. Early on, we've already seen some efforts from both Trump and his major members in his negotiation team, his political team,
to sort of modify Trump's earlier campaign slogan, campaign promise to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict either right after his inauguration or 100 days after his inauguration. Trump himself, as well as other top officials in his team, already tried several times to modify this
The promise basically trying to say, well, what we promise is not immediate end of the military conflict or a major political deal. Even what we promise is actually initiation or the start of a serious political conversation between Russia and Ukraine. That happens, that's already a successful U.S. playing a mediating role.
So I think that that kind of efforts also indicates if indeed there's no concrete targets, concrete results within reach, Trump and his team may be ready to withdraw. Professor, at the same time, we are also seeing pushback, especially from Ukraine and some European nations. Zelensky had two conversations with Trump, a private call, then a joint conversation.
call in both he emphasized the three core demands an immediate ceasefire continued sanctions on Russia and no decisions involving Ukraine should be made without Kiev at the table he also says Ukraine is open to direct talks with Russia in any format but won't compromise on territory so how do you interpret Kiev's bottom line here and to what extent will Washington stand by those demands especially
on the sensitive issue of territory where Putin has made clear Russia won't budge and requires eliminating the root causes of the conflict.
So far, President Zelenskyy still seems to hold his basic stance quite tightly, doesn't want to make any compromise, particularly regarding both the presence of troops on different parts of Ukrainian territory and the future political status for the eastern provinces, even including Crimea.
So I think that shows a very strong stance from him and the current Ukrainian government. Of course, that also makes any political compromise or political negotiation with Russia
on a political solution more difficult. I think he's feeling the support from European countries behind, despite US sort of wavering attitudes in the past few months. I think the European support seems to be still solid.
Other than EU level, I think what's more important recently is the so-called coalition of willing, led by Germany, UK, France, Poland, together with Ukraine. I think these countries are functioning at a level, a layer, both in parallel with EU, but also on top of EU.
providing leadership and coordination in terms of collective support for Ukraine, both for military support as well as possible sanctions against Russia. So I think Zelensky is also feeling this kind of support from the European side, which back up his unwavering stance on
a set of Sony issues and just described. So that seemed to be his basic stance and some of the red line. Again, the gap between the Russian and Ukrainian basic stance, even after the Istanbul meeting is still quite large. So large that it may shut out any political solution anytime soon.
Memorandum, as you just described, maybe just a part of Stalin's tactic to buy some time. But a genuine political solution, given the large gap between the basic stance between Russia and Ukraine.
makes a political deal very difficult to foresee in the near future. Professor, one last question. Building on European support, the Kremlin says Trump's position is more neutral than Europe's, which he claims is openly biased towards Ukraine. The region is also preparing a 17th round of sanctions against Russia. So how do you interpret this situation?
transatlantic divide. Will the EU's tougher stance help or hinder the kind of peace Trump is trying to broker?
Yes, I think that kind of transatlantic, at least difference, right, if not as severe as a divide, become increasingly clear over time. U.S. in the end is geographically and to a large extent politically distant from the European theater. Trump is also very hesitant to put a concrete
resources into both the political mediation as well as direct support for Ukraine. On the other hand, a lot of European countries see Russia's involvement in the Ukraine crisis for them as an existential threat.
So they are more willing to put concrete resources to directly back up Ukraine. And especially when the US attitudes seem to be wavering in the past few months, I think there is a push within the European bloc not to give up the transatlantic alliance, but getting more willing to put in resources and get more organized within Europe
to come up with concrete plans, concrete measures to support Ukraine on the one hand and penalize Russia on the other hand. So I think that kind of pattern probably will become a more real pattern in the next few months, maybe years. And this transatlantic difference may in the end become a real divide.
in the next months. Thanks, Professor, for your in-depth perspective. That was Dr. Zhang Xin, Deputy Director of the Center for Russian Studies at East China Normal University. Coming up, G7 finance ministers meeting Canada, but can they find unity amid rising tensions over U.S. terrorists? We break down next. This is Road Today. Stay with us.
Washington is tightening its containment of China's tech industry, launching a global crackdown on AI chips from Chinese firms, with Huawei squarely in the crosshairs. What's fueling this escalation, and how might it reshape the global semiconductor landscape? Join us on the chat lounge this week as we break down the power play's potential blowback and China's next move in this high-stakes silicon showdown.
Listen wherever you get your podcasts and on CGTN Radio.
Welcome back to Road Today. Let's move to Canada, where finance ministers and central bank governors from the G7 nations are gathering in its scenic mountain town of Banff for a three-day meeting aimed at tackling global economic uncertainty. Despite deep divisions over U.S. President Donald Trump's trade policies, host country Canada is pushing for a joint statement to present a united front.
But analysts remain skeptical. While not officially on the agenda, Trump's controversial tariffs are expected to dominate discussions behind closed doors. So for more insight on these challenges facing this year's G7 talks, we're joined on the line by Dr. Zhang Gong, professor with the University of International Business and Economics. Thanks for joining us, professor.
Thank you very much. It's great to be here. Professor, in April, the Trump administration imposed steep tariffs on goods from several allies, including a 25% duty on certain Canadian exports. Other G7 members are also under pressure. Tariffs on products from
Japan, Germany, France and Italy could double to over 20% by July. Even the UK, which secured a limited trade deal with Washington, still faces a 10% tariff burden on many goods. Tariffs are clearly the issue everyone is most concerned about, but they are not on the official agenda. So given this back job, how much real progress can Canada's proposed joint statement achieve?
in bridging this trade device? Or will it end up a little more than vague language masking deep disagreements? Well, I think it's a very difficult task. It's almost an impossible task. But I think at the end of the day, Canada is probably still able to muster enough support to come up with some kind of a joint statement, sort of a watered-down compromise statement, just as what the South Koreans have done at the AIPAC meeting.
Eventually, they did issue a joint statement, which is kind of vague and doesn't refer to the tariff issue directly. And Canada probably can do something like this as well. After all, they have a couple of agendas. The economy and tariff or trade is just one of them. I think it's kind of difficult to imagine not a joint statement being issued out of the
G7 finance ministerial meeting, they will probably come up with something, but it doesn't mean much. The US Chamber of Commerce has called on G7 nations to build a future based on shared values like democracy and open markets. But with the US itself adopting protectionist tariffs,
some see a widening gap between rhetoric and reality. In your opinion, does this contradiction between values and actions undermine the credibility of any unified G7 front?
Well, I think the US Chamber of Commerce is having a pipe dream. I mean, look at the President Trump's speech at Liyard just a few days ago in Saudi Arabia. It clearly, clearly doesn't resonate with any of the things that the US Chamber of Commerce has been saying here. On the contrary, it's the exact opposite, actually. So I don't think what the US Chamber of Commerce is saying
is going to be substantial at the G7 finance ministerial meeting at all. And I think President Trump's agenda is very clear. He likes to promote commerce. He likes to promote investment and trade. But
Definitely not, you know, these so-called values, shared values like democracy. On the contrary, I think President Trump is, he
he delivered a scathing criticism of the nation builders, where he describes nation builders and new accounts. So I think this is totally nonsense to me. Professor, US Treasury Secretary Besant has emphasized a return to what he calls the G7's core principles, criticizing China's economic practices. So what's your take on his call at this moment?
Yeah, well, I mean, this is very typical of Washington's plan and actions. I would say that Treasury Secretary Benson is very much of the old school. I think his thinking is probably more in line with Joe Biden's administration than with President Trump's administration. And I think at this juncture, to muster support out of these seven countries to
ostensibly criticize China, it might be a little bit difficult. I think Europe has a very different attitude right now vis-a-vis Washington. I mean, they are engaged in a fierce negotiation about the tariff issue. President Trump has said that the European Union is even worse than, quote, some of America's adversary or
arrival, clearly referring to China. So I think against that backdrop, I'm not sure that Europe will be fully on board to do something like this. Professor, on the US-Japan front, trade negotiations have reached an advanced stage.
with Washington again using the threat of tariffs as leverage. But this time, Tokyo appears to be taking a firmer stance. Japan's prime minister has stated he's in no rush to reach a deal with Washington and won't simply follow other nations' lead. So how do you see Japan's move, especially this time, more assertive posture shaping the dynamics within the G7?
I think Japan, as well as the European Union,
are learning from the experiences of China, indeed it was Washington. China reacted very differently from other countries and imposed tariffs in retaliation and also reached an agreement, at least a temporary agreement for 90 days a couple of weeks ago in Geneva. I think this is some experience that Japan and the European Union probably
take it very seriously. You know, one thing it's very easy to understand that the way to deal with President Trump is that you have to negotiate from a position of strength.
It doesn't pay to sort of go to Washington and yell to his demand and play nice to him using his words, you know, kissing his ass. I guess I apologize for derogatory language. But, you know, this kind of approach doesn't work with President Trump. When you do that, what you get is not something of a break from him, but not something that it gives you a good deal to you.
On the contrary, what you get is contempt and disdain. So I think Tokyo understands this very well, understands that it also has cards. It's not like Japan doesn't have any cards at all. So I think Japan is taking a very different approach now. And the European Union is probably doing the same thing right now as well.
Thanks, Professor, for your insight of analysis. That was Dr. John Gong, professor with the University of International Business and Economics. Coming up, Israel's plan to take control of the entire Gaza Strip has sparked a strong pushback from key Western allies. This is Real Today. We'll be back.
This is Road Today with Mika Anna in Beijing. Israel's plan to take control of the entire Gaza Strip has sparked a strong pushback from key Western allies. Britain, France and Canada have warned to take concrete actions, including targeted sanctions, if Israel continues new offensive into Gaza.
Israeli military is stepping up operations across the territory. Local rescuers report that more than 50 people have been killed in the latest wave of Israeli airstrikes. To delve into this and its broader implication of regional stability and the future of a two-state solution, we're joined by Dr. Wang Jing, associate professor at Northwestern University in Xi'an, China. Welcome, Professor. It's my pleasure. Thank you.
Professor Nania, who recently stated that Israel intends to take control of the entire Gaza Strip, what exactly does this mean in practical and political terms, and how does it shift the trajectory of this conflict?
I think actually it is suggested that Israel wants to take something serious, because according to the reports from, for example, British and other European media, that Israel hopes to, on the one hand, construct war military zones,
from north to south of the Gaza Strip. And then, on the other hand, separate the whole Gaza Strip via the four military zones into three civilian zones. And all the civilians in the Gaza Strip, I mean the Palestinian civilians there, are forbidden to freely travel.
from one area into another. And also by holding these military zones by Israelis themselves, they hope to press Israel
and squeeze the activity room of Hamas members and supporters in the Gaza Strip. So that is why I think that what is happening now is that Israel launched a four-scale offensive against the Hamas targets in the Gaza Strip. And actually, it also suggested the violence and the kind of collapse of the dialogue mechanism between Israel and Hamas. So that is why for the Gaza Strip, it is a very critical moment.
And I think actually we are witnessing the major transformation of political scenarios in this region.
Professor, help us understand the Israeli military has launched what it describes as an unprecedented attack near Qayyounis, even while aid tracks are being allowed in. Is there contradiction in launching major assaults while beginning to open humanitarian corridors? Because its decision to open limited aid routes comes after more than two months of blockade, right?
Is this a humanitarian concession or as reported in the media, a calculated move to ease international pressure?
I think we need to understand that it's a part of Israel's strategy in the Gaza Strip, because on the one hand, as we mentioned, Israel wants to attack the major points belonging to Hamas and rescue the hostages taken by Hamas, and also to establish the four major military zones in the Gaza Strip to separate the whole Gaza Strip into different factions and different blocks.
And on the other hand, when we're talking about Israel's strategy goals, it also means that Israel has to take care of the refugees, take care of the Palestinians in the Qaeda strip. Although, of course, many criticize them, will say, okay, Israel does not care about the civilians here anymore. We cannot deny that, but
But then on the other hand, we should admit that Israel as a modern state, it has to take responsibilities to take care of the civilians on the land which is just occupied and on the land that Israel hopes to occupy in the future. Because actually in the modern world, we are not talking about occupation of land. We also mean the management of the population on this land.
So that is why Israel on the one hand launched, as you mentioned, the military strikes, and on the other hand tried to introduce new waves, but very limited humanitarian assistance to keep the level that the civilians under Israeli occupation in the Gaza Strip will not starve to death. But on the other hand, they are not able to organize enough
I mean, the capabilities and resources to launch new counterattacks against the Israeli military forces there. So that is why if we put all these phenomenons under this perspective, that we could understand what is really our planning to do. They hope to reoccupy the Gaza Strip and they hope to organize a major offensive and through this offensive to settle the problem that Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
Professor, we've seen reports say U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance may cancel a planned visit to Israel after his Rome stop out of concern that he might send the wrong signal implying Washington supports Israel's military escalation. What does this tell us about U.S. policy or support to Israel on the matter today?
I think it suggests a very major setback or a major failure of diplomacy or relations with the United States. Because as you know, just one week ago when the United States, Donald Trump visited China,
the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the Emirates. Israel hopes that and invited for quite a long time that they hope that Donald Trump would also come to visit Israel. But then Donald Trump denied. And then now the terms come for the vice president of
and advanced but then he also denied given that israel launching the new offensive against the targets in the gada strip so that is why i think it suggested the very major division between united states and israel uh united states want to maintain a status quo does not want to escalate the tension in the middle east particularly in the gala strip
while also from the perspective of Israel that they hope to maybe create a new kind of geopolitical surroundings for themselves. So actually, they suggested a very direct division between the two sides, and these divisions will not be easy to be repaired.
Professor, as we earlier mentioned, France, Britain and Canada have all spoken out against Israel's latest military escalation, calling for an immediate ceasefire and humanitarian access. In your view, how much weight do these public statements really carry? And beyond words, what concrete steps might these countries actually take, either to help civilians on the ground or to pressure Israel into changing course?
I think the pressure from the European states are always important, but not always determined. Because when we are talking about the pressure from European countries, I mean, during the past few years, European countries and also Canada, or maybe sometimes Australia, they always want to impose kind of sanctions against Israel to stop Israeli military activities in the Gaza Strip. And also they want to gather all the enough support from the
international level to Israel to hope to suspend Israeli military actions. But then, Israeli, to some extent, they care about it because they hope that to keep the very positive ties with European countries, with the Western countries. But on the other hand, I don't think they care too much. The only thing that determines
Israel's military activities and its foreign policy externally would be United States role. So when United States still keep the very ambiguous attitude and does not want to lift the support and suspend the support against Israel, I don't think Israel will take it seriously.
So that is why I think European countries, their attitudes are important, but their attitudes are not the very determining role inside Israel's decision-making circle. Professor, one last question. Leaders from these three nations are emphasizing...
Palestinian statehood as part of the path forward. But in real terms, with Gaza devastated and the West Bank fragmented, what does a two-state solution even look like today?
Okay, let's talk about it briefly, because actually we are talking about not the Israeli-Palestinian peace, we're actually talking about the very, very dangerous scenario in the future, because actually it means
that the situation in not only the Gada Street, but it becomes shattered. I mean, there are no unified factions in the Gada Street, but also we're talking about the relations inside different Palestinian factions, the Fatah and Hamas, but then Hamas shattered, and then we're looking at what we're witnessing is a possible division inside different Fatah factions and blocks.
So maybe in the future, I mean, against this backdrop, without enough international society's assistance, without enough international society's successful of the limits towards Israeli military actions and intervention against internal affairs of Palestinian people, I don't think the two-state solution will be realistic within the short term because we are witnessing the division and division and division
subdivision and sub-subdivision inside different Palestinian factions. And this would endanger the unity of Palestinian people. So that's why what they are witnessing is not only the Israeli military activities in the Gaza Strip reorganized, but also we are witnessing that maybe a new historic tragedy for the independence movement of Palestinian people themselves.
Thanks, Professor. Really appreciate your take on this. That was Dr. Wang Jing, Associate Professor at Northwest University in Xi'an, China.
Chinese tech giant Huawei has unveiled two laptops powered by HarmonyOS, marking the debut of its self-developed operating system on personal computers. The laptops are the Huawei MateBook Pro and MateBook Fold Ultimate design. The launch of the products signals the company's push to expand HarmonyOS beyond smartphones and tablets.
For more on this, my colleague Zhang Yang spoke with Professor Qu Qiang, fellow of Belt and Road Research Center at Minzu University of China. So Professor Qu Qiang, Chinese tech giant Huawei has launched its first PC powered by its own operating system, the HarmonyOS. So how important is it and how do you see its market penetration will be in the future?
Well, I think the number one importance is that it is really breaking down the monopoly dominated by Windows and Mac OS. Basically, there are two very famous American brands. So when the global sales nation want to choose from major operation systems or the operation system dominated a PC or laptop product,
And I think they don't have a choice. So there are going to be information leaking or privacy or national security considerations be there. But now I think Huawei actually stands out, bringing in more of the competition and also urge those competitors, those dominant competitors, just that you yield more of the power towards the customers, providing more choices for the customers and also encouraging
there's going to be more diversification for the technology in the PC walks of life. And also, I think it's also very important for a complete ecology on a PC because Huawei actually got the OnePlus 8 Plus in, the full scenario.
smart life strategy. So I think this OS actually becomes the last very important piece of the jigsaw of their strategy. So from the personal devices to the smart home center,
to the mobile office. And I think everything on Huawei ecology actually can now work very seamlessly. For example, right now, when you just use your mobile phone, use your tablet, and to your PC, from your home to your office, every mission can work together seamlessly.
And also, I think independence and tech resilience is very important for China's PC industry as well. Just now we're talking about how does it mean for the world industry in PC, but now I think for China itself, this can really become a milestone, reducing our reliance on foreign technology. And also, I think the most important, one of the most important choke points has been reduced. National security and privacy of citizens can
can also have more of the secure
lighting alone that shows Huawei's powerful innovation and R&D capacity. So I think it's very good for the future growth and a benefit for Huawei as a company. And HarmonyOS PC also integrates AI and intelligent interaction features into the operating system. So how do you evaluate these new features? And how close are China and the US on AI technological development?
Well, I think the Harmony OS PC actually can work on all kinds of the missions, like the daily missions in the office, like editing all kinds of the documents, making the Excel forms, PPT presentation, or supporting the WTS or Word.
And also I think they can do a lot of the designing software like processing the audios, videos and what Apple Mac OS can do. Right now you can work the similar software on Huawei PC and also all kinds of the tablet.
And also they've been supporting the education missions, entertainment, for example, play the 4K high-definition videos, all kinds of the games, because games actually have a very, very high requirement towards the synergy between the software and hardware. And also I think last but not least is the cross-device synergy. This is also very important because if you want to work one mission upon different terminals,
like on your mobile phone, your tablet, your PC. You want to, you know, a copy and a paste of one thing from your phone to your PC and, you know, wirelessly and also to, you know, share the missions on different ends. This will really require very high-end, you know, distributional technology and also those kinds of the protocols to make sure that different platforms
of different terminals can actually work for the same mission because in your mobile phone, you're going to use the Android system or Huawei-based Android system. And on your PC, you're probably going to use a PC OS. So it's going to be a little bit different.
Now you can do it together. I think this is a very, very important breakthrough for Chinese innovators. And we know that Washington began restricting Huawei's access to U.S. technology in 2019 over the national security concerns. This actually pushing the company build its own capacity to develop and produce chips and operating systems. So what has the company done right, do you think, in the past few years to shape a better future?
Well, I think in China we have one word that cannot be directly translated into English. That is crisis. Because crisis in Chinese language is called "wei ji". Because it means the combination of the danger and also the opportunities. And I think Huawei's experience actually perfectly reflected that kind of words, "wei" and "ji".
crisis slash opportunities i think what we has been done right is that they've been using and number one they try to rely on their own you know capacities well a major country smashing on uh your innovation your business model well a lot of companies will say probably okay i will kneel down i will yield to that but huawei says no i'm going to stand up under my own feet so i think this spirit
This is very important because it decided everything come after that. And secondly, I think Huawei is doing is that he tried to catch up with the Chinese advantage because what we can understand about Chinese industry is
It has a very thorough and comprehensive supply chain covering every aspect. If you want to build a PC, fine. You can find all kinds of parts on PC within like 20 kilometers radius surrounding the HQ of Huawei in Shenzhen. So right now it's in Dongguan, of course. But the previous one is in Shenzhen, another town near Dongguan. Okay.
Okay, and also secondly is, and thirdly is that Huawei actually paid attention to, you know, not only the whole supply chain's advantage, but also he's paying attention to what we call the ecology-oriented innovation. Because ever since the step one, Huawei tried to cover mobile phone, tablet, PC, wearable devices, and all the servers they will provide.
So this actually allowed Huawei to build its own fortress to fence off the competitors, especially those competitors from America, from Europe, from Japan.
So this kind of ecology has become very important. And besides the hardware ecology, Huawei is doing more on the software ecology because every year Huawei is having its developers conference and they've been supporting all kinds of the developers from the third party to join its HarmonyOS ecology. So basically, I think this strategy has been proved by Apple, has been doing very successfully.
So last but not least, Huawei has tried to use its company's capacity
to make sure that all the strategy can be delivered in a very effective way. For example, decision-making policy, decision-making capacity, enforcement capacity implementations and self-learning. And all these featured Huawei as a very, very powerful company because even though you have all kinds of these good ideas and determinations, but if your company is weak, you will not manage to do so.
So Huawei actually proved that Chinese people and the Chinese company can do the same level with a world level innovation and also implementations deliver the world level and quality products and services.
So I think this meaning of the Huawei Harmony OS PC is actually going beyond just a product. It actually are showing that the capability of this nation, of this company and of this people. That was Professor Qu Qiang, fellow of Belt and Road Research Center at the Mingzhu University of China.
Is China an Enemy Fabricated by Propaganda? That's the title of a new book by an author who has devoted decades as a historian on Shizong or Tibet Autonomous Region and other China-related issues. His book on Shizong, titled Free Tibet, Power Society and Ideology in Old Tibet, challenges the so-called Western experts on the issue and the politically correct narratives
My colleague Liu Xin earlier sat down with Albert Edinger, who has authored four books about Xi's history and China in general. Mr. Edinger, I understand that you have authored two major books on China.
Shizang or Tibet. One is called Free Tibet? State, Society and Ideology in Old Tibet and Fight for Tibet, History, Background and Perspectives on an International Conflict. That's almost 10 years ago. And you published another book, which is called
China, an Enemy Fabricated by Propaganda. In this book, you actually covered quite a number of topics such as Hong Kong, such as Taiwan and Tibet and Xinjiang as well. So first of all, tell us a bit about yourself. I understand you were a teacher. How come you started being interested in these questions and started writing about your perspectives on these questions?
Yes. My story about China goes back quite a long time. I went already to China in the 70s. So you see, I'm of older age and I was interested in China all this time. And I was...
Confronted to the Tibet question, if you want, as a teacher, because in our school book, I was teaching German literature in a secondary school and in the school book we had this subject, but it was from a very biased perspective.
So I was interested in searching Deepal, let's say. And then I decided finally in 2008, it's the year of the Olympic Games in Beijing.
And there was a huge propaganda campaign against China and Tibet subject was very important. So then I decided to dig deeper and to publish something about it. And at the end, the result were these two books, two major books. I understand, I've read other interviews of you, I understand that before you write these books, you had actually not been to Tibet or Shizang.
You only dug into the materials that you could find and you found incoherences, inaccuracies in these Western narratives and you fundamentally challenged
some of the opinions that are considered authoritative in Tibetology in Western society, such as Alexandra David-Nael, just to cite one name, because her views are written in textbooks in Europe as if they are the representation of truth. How did you do it? I mean, without being into Tibet, what did you do in the literature that you could find being in Europe to find these loopholes?
First, I have an advantage being a Luxembourger. I know several languages and I could read books both in German and in French and in English. And so I discovered, for example, one of my first main sources was Havar, who is the author of Seven Years in Tibet, a famous book.
international bestseller. And I noticed that the French edition and the British edition was in those books, whole passages were omitted. They were censored because they didn't fit in the narrative about Tibet.
So this was one important thing I discovered. And I found it even later also in other books that sometimes there are corrections, there are omissions just of those things who don't match with the Western narrative. So you find some things that don't match so well with this idealistic view of
or sweetened view of ancient Tibet and so on. I began reading what some early visitors of Tibet wrote about what they witnessed. And so I had firsthand, let's say, descriptions of what they, stories what they told.
about Tibet. So you discovered these paragraphs which were very much critical of what old Tibet was like and yet when Tibet was introduced in western textbooks it gave an idealized image, right?
concept of this region and you thought that is not correct. Let's jump a little bit, let's maybe come back to Tibet in just a moment because Tibet is just one of the topics where similar problems exist. Actually in your very latest book called " An Enemy That's Fabricated by Propaganda" you took on an enemy, a very powerful enemy, which is the mainstream media.
Right. Yeah. And why do you say that? Why do you say that China is an enemy that's fabricated by propaganda? Because I think that there are no problems between Europe, for example, and China is not really a geopolitical rival of any major European country. It's a rival of the United States.
and it has been declared to be a rival and even an enemy of the United States by the United States, not by China. And so I think that it lays in the best interest of Europe and of the European countries to have good relations with China. And unfortunately, the narrative, the mainstream media and so on is controlled, are controlled by the United States and Europe.
by people who work for the united states too so um yeah i i think uh the narrative is is very biased and um i tried to to redress this a little bit could you give an example an outstanding example of why the narrative is extremely biased oh
There's a whole long list of examples. It's difficult to choose one. But for example, in general, China is perceived in the Western media as a dystopian society and as an aggressive country, aggressive towards the neighbors and so on. And yeah,
Yeah, I find this very biased because when I look at Chinese foreign policy, for example, I see policy of peace and of peaceful coexistence since the existence of the People's Republic. And I don't see any aggressivity.
Except if you want to characterize it as aggressive, that China wants to hold its own territory and it wants to reunify with Taiwan, for example. But that's not aggressive. I find it much more aggressive when warships, American and even now European, French and German warships,
across the Taiwan Straits, whereas China never crossed the channel between England and the continent. So I find that this characterization of China as aggressive is completely biased. That's Albert Edinger. This is World Today. Thank you so much for listening.