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cover of episode Why Should We Care About China's Gray Zone Influence Campaign in the Pacific Islands? | with Cleo Paskal

Why Should We Care About China's Gray Zone Influence Campaign in the Pacific Islands? | with Cleo Paskal

2025/5/23
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Why Should We Care About the Indo-Pacific?

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Cleo Paskal
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Jim Carouso
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Ray Powell
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Cleo Paskal: 我认为目前大家开始重视地图了。美国与太平洋岛屿的联系非常紧密,特别是与美国的领土以及与美国有特殊关系的自由邦。我个人更倾向于使用菲律宾的术语“ICAD”(非法、胁迫、侵略和欺骗活动)来描述中国的活动,因为它比“灰色地带”更加贴切。要到达第一岛链和第二岛链,就必须穿过中太平洋地区,这一点战略家们已经思考了140多年。因此,美国有必要关注中国在这些岛屿上的活动。 Cleo Paskal: 麦金利总统时期,美国就已认识到控制这些岛屿的战略意义,因为从这些岛屿可以威胁到美国本土。中国在太平洋岛屿的活动,通常以商业为幌子,承诺提供发展援助,但实际上往往与战略意图和犯罪活动相关联。这种模式对当地社会造成了腐蚀性影响,导致精英俘获和国家控制。因此,我们需要采取“阻止和建设”的策略,既要阻止中国的非法活动,又要提供可持续的经济发展模式。 Jim Carouso: 澳大利亚也高度关注太平洋岛屿的安全,并投入大量资金。但许多太平洋岛民将澳大利亚视为殖民主义者,而美国仍然被视为一个不让人过度留恋的山巅之城。因此,美国需要与澳大利亚等盟友合作,共同应对中国在太平洋岛屿的影响力。

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And welcome once again to Why Should We Care About the Indo-Pacific, brought to you by our producer, IEJ Media, and our sponsor, Bauer Group Asia. We will talk more about them in due course. I am the former military officer, Ray Powell. I am in California. Down there in Arizona is Jim Caruso. He is the former diplomat. How is Arizona today, Jim?

You know, it's funny, hot, dry, and sunny. Who'd expect it? Who'd have thunk? Yeah. All right, Jim. Well, our guest today is from a probably a somewhat cooler place. She's in Washington, D.C. She is

However, a very frequent traveler to hotter places, usually much more humid, I imagine. She is Cleo Pascal. She is a non-resident senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. She specializes in the Indo-Pacific with a very special focus on the Pacific Islands. She is also among what is very likely a very small number of geopolitical analysts who can say they have testified before the U.S. Congress twice in a single month.

So, Cleo, here's the question. How did you end up on Capitol Hill twice in March talking about China's gray zone influence campaign in the Pacific Islands? And why should we care about it?

Thank you very much for having me. I have to just off the bat say this is a little daunting. It's sort of like being called before a PhD board. I would imagine not being particularly well educated. So I'm excited to be here. I've learned a lot from your other shows. You do realize that neither of us have a PhD. I can't pronounce it. It's pronounced Fid.

So I think somebody's starting to look at maps. I think basically that's what's happening. The two hearings were very different. One was from the Indian and Insular Affairs Subcommittee of the Natural Resources Committee. So a lot of the islands that the U.S. has been most deeply involved with, so the U.S. territories, which we

which is America. So Guam, Commonwealth of Northern Marianas, American Samoa, they are America. And we can get into a little bit why they are America and why in some cases they chose to become America. And the three compact states, so Palau, Marshall Islands, the Federal States of Micronesia, which are three independent countries but have a very deep and special relationship with the U.S.,

are actually the area, the jurisdiction for them falls under Interior, the Department of Interior. Not State, not Defense, but Interior. And there's historical reasons for that. So the Committee of Jurisdiction is the Natural Resources Subcommittee on Indian and Insular Affairs. A lot of terms that are somewhat archaic and describe...

a very odd relationship with the area, but also shows how old and deep the relationship is with the area. So they had a hearing on how the Department of Interior could better work with these places, especially in the context of increased Chinese population.

I like the Filipino term ICAD, illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive activity. It's more descriptive for me than gray zone. But there's a very focused Chinese attempt there. So that was one hearing. The other was a commission hearing on similar Chinese activity in the Pacific Islands. That's the...

U.S.-China Economic and Security or Security and Economic Review Commission, which is congressionally mandated.

And really we talk a lot about the first and second island chain. If you're in our circles, sometimes third island chain, but there's a realization that to get to the first and second island chain, you need to go across this huge central Pacific area, which is something that us strategists for over 140 years really have been thinking about. This is the great white fleet journey, all that sort of stuff. And now we're,

with China also looking at the area, there's a lot of concern in Congress and elsewhere that

we're getting into a situation that looks a little bit like the 30s in the Central Pacific. And this could be a really big problem for the U.S. and its allies. Could you explain why this matters to the U.S.? As you said, we have all this territory we do control one way or the other, huge expanse of territory. These are islands with tiny populations and smaller economies. Why do we care if China tries to have more influence there?

So if you go back to the Spanish-American War, what McKinley said at the time, because the question was, okay,

what's the problem for the U.S. if the Spanish are sitting in the Philippines and Guam and a bunch of islands across the Central Pacific? And he was very open about saying, well, you know, they can hit us from there. If they have a base, they can hit. And he specifically said California and Oregon. So at the time, Hawaii wasn't part of the U.S. Just to clarify, so we're talking about President McKinley. Like this is the late,

19th century. Yeah. Nobody has any missiles, right? What people have are like cannon, but President McKinley was concerned that China or somebody from that part of the world could hit the mainland United States and

from somewhere in the Pacific. Yeah, specifically the Spanish. So during that period, during the 19th century, it was the European colonial powers that were all over the Pacific and the Central Pacific. And specifically, that concern at that time was the Spanish.

Because the Spanish Pacific colonies included the Philippines and Guam, but also what's now CNMI at Commonwealth of Northern Marianas, Palau, parts of the Federated States of Micronesia. So they're getting all the way to the central region.

And that European manifest destiny concept just continued. There was no end to it. And at that time, you know, it wasn't long after the purchase of Alaska, which was another strategic Pacific purchase by the U.S. You still had British forces sitting in parts of what's Canada, what's

had become kind of Canada by then. So the European presence within the Pacific was considered a strategic threat.

And even in the 1850s, the French raided Hawaii. And there was concern that the French could set up in Hawaii. So we talk a lot about Hawaii, but the U.S. commercial interests in Hawaii and that had to do with the annexation. And it did. But there are also strategic concerns that if a hostile power in the 19th century, these were European hostile powers set up in the Pacific,

the U.S. wasn't safe. And it wasn't safe in two areas. One is hardcore strategic. The other is trade, because there was also an awareness at that point that the economic future of the U.S. would be in the Pacific. Okay. So we'll definitely get to trade as this goes on, as you can imagine, given the current tariff regime. But I want to kind of pull back for a second and just, you talked about this concept of

ICAD, which is Illegal Coerce of Aggressive and Deceptive Behaviors, often known as gray zone. What do those activities by China in 2025 look like in these small Pacific islands? What is it that we're actually worried about there? Sure. And just to credit General Bronner from the Philippines who came up with the term, they've

We know what it looks like there. You've documented extremely well what it looks like there. But in the Pacific Islands, you haven't quite got to the point where they're stabbing boats. But you do have, you've got to the point where they're setting up ships

criminal proxy organizations. So the way that I look at it is the commercial, the engagement that seems to be linked to the Chinese Communist Party, there's usually a commercial front. So they'll come in and say, the West didn't help you with development. We're going to help you with development, which is true. The West has really not worked well for economic development in a lot of these areas.

Then that's usually tied to a strategic intent. So we're going to help you build a port. The port just happens to have specs that are very useful for the PLA Navy, for example. And then we're also going to help you with things like customs or immigration, or we're going to buy off some of those people, or maybe we'll buy citizenship in your country so that we can help develop your location. And then the third element,

which is almost always there is some sort of criminal or corrupt activity. So we just happen to be bringing drugs, just happen to be coming in through that port or we, or the customs guys who we bought off are looking the other way on shipments that were, that are coming in. It usually you've got drugs, gambling, prostitution, human trafficking. And for, for me, who, who I have good friends in the Pacific, I,

For them, that's actually the most corrosive element. They're seeing their societies starting to be affected in very serious ways. The drugs in particular are very destructive. It's heartbreaking what happens. But the illegal gambling or legal gambling in places like the Commonwealth of Northern Mayanis, which is the U.S., brings...

money into the system that then corrupts the political process and ends up, can end up corrupting the judiciary. So if you're an honest person,

In a place, and the Solomon Islands is an example of this, or Kiribati, actually there are many examples. And you want to stand up to the Chinese Communist Party. So there was a leader in a province of the Solomon Islands. Solomon Islands switched from Taiwan to China in 2019. One province said, issued a

A communique that I would highly recommend anybody interested in the topic read. It was issued in 2019, soon after the switch. It's called the Aukey communique, A-U-K-E-Y, because Aukey is the capital of Malaita. And it details why the provincial governor Malaita and the traditional chiefs don't want any CCP-linked businesses operating in their province.

And it talks about they don't want to become a police state. They believe in freedom of religion. They're worried about the environmental consequences. And they just put it all out there much more clearly than any or many of the think tanks in D.C. were doing, especially at the time.

So that meant that the leader became targeted, obviously, immediately by the Chinese Communist Party and by their proxies in Solomon Islands. And you started to see things happen like he needed health care. Health care wasn't available in the country. He needed an MRI outside the country. The pro-PRC federal government said, we'll fund the health care, but you need to let the Chinese in. And he said, no.

And this is something I'd like to underline. There are men and women of incredible courage and integrity across the Pacific Islands that are fighting a fight for their own freedom that is very inspiring and very dangerous for them. I mean, literally lives at risk.

It's a long story, but he ended up getting health care in Taiwan, thanks to Indian intervention, actually, not official, but facilitation through India. Then money went into his parliament to flip his parliament enough to get him out as premier. Then they took away his elected seat because he wouldn't recognize the one China policy. He had to sue to try to get it back.

So this is the lawfare component. Then more recently, he's been arrested on charges that are very dubious. So you can just see how if you're an honest person, where do you go?

The police aren't on your side. The judiciary may be increasingly corrupt. Your electorate isn't being represented. The media obviously isn't covering you because if they cover it, they won't get any advertising locally. The government media won't cover it. So you start to isolate the Chinese Communist Party operatives, start to isolate the opposition and strangle them in multifarious ways.

So, you know, part of the problem, Cleo, as I mentioned before, the economies of these islands are tiny, typically based maybe on fishing and tourism. And the Chinese come in with a lot of money, a lot of promises, and it's hard to say no unless they have alternatives. Is the West, led by the United States, offering alternatives to the Chinese approach?

So we'll disaggregate that first. So, yes, the Chinese come in promising a lot of stuff, but usually there's a very small group that benefits from that and the large majority of the population don't. So, again, in the case of the Solomon Islands, logging is a major issue.

moneymaker. The regulations around logging are written largely by the loggers and the logs go mostly to China. So you get massive deforestation and environmental degradation. The money stays within a very small group of locals and a very large group of Chinese who are operating in the country and very little taxation or revenue coming off of the licenses for the logs.

So it creates, I think of, we talk a lot about decoupling, Chinese decoupling economically. For me, the model is much more like a parasite, right? It comes in and it sucks out whatever it can, IP, logs, and weakens the host economically.

So it's more like de-parasiting than decoupling. This is not helping grow the economy by and large. It's helping facilitate an elite capture and an elite dependency that then moves into a state capture situation.

So talk a little bit more about this nexus between the government of China and the Chinese Communist Party on one hand, and these criminal elements, because there seems to be this weird dichotomy where on one hand,

The government will try to crack down on some of these overseas criminals, whether it be the scam compounds in Myanmar or the casinos in, you know, maybe in the Philippines or something like that. And you'll see these sort of scattered efforts to crack down on certain things. And on the other hand, you say that they're actually using those to achieve some of their objectives. How does that whole thing work together?

Sure, I will. And also if we could after, because James, the second part of his question about what we're offering in competition or what is being offered is critical. So hopefully we can get back to that later. But in terms of the criminal activity,

So, using kind of concrete examples, what tends to happen just observationally in a place like Palau, where Broken Tooth was operating out of Palau for a while, for example, is you get… Sorry, Broken Tooth.

Broken Tooth is, probably still is, the leader of a major Chinese triad or linked to the leadership of a major Chinese triad. I mean, he's a Sopranos type bad guy. In fact, I think that Su Lin Wong during our discussion about the scam compounds talked a lot about Broken Tooth. Yeah. And my sense is, and this is something that we're trying to piece together, is it almost seems like

Soprano style, you know, you get these kinds of criminal organizations that get patches and you see, so you'll see criminal activity going from the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas, which is the U S into a place like Palau. There's a lot of linkages across the, across the zone from the, from the Chinese linked site. So my sense is that they're doing their criminal operations with the

at least acceptance and use when useful of the Chinese Communist Party. And so, for example, I mean, in the case of Broken Tooth,

He was operating in Palau. It was criminal stuff, kind of gambling, illegal gambling type stuff. But to accomplish that, you need to bribe certain people and have local partners. And then those become conduits for advancements of state interest, including at one point he was looking at setting up

or people affiliated with him were looking at setting up a casino on Angar, which was, which is an Island that was where there was a pretty vicious battle. It's within sight of Peleliu in the, in the Southern chain. And it's where the U S is putting in a over the horizon radar installation, very small place, like a hundred, 150 people. And they were talking about putting in like a big casino and they still have, there's still Chinese ownership of a piece of land that,

adjacent to the port in Anghar. This makes no economic sense. There's no reason for them to invest there except for the strategic site. So you've got, you know, they're all circumstantial evidence sort of linkages, but the pattern is consistent and persistent and advances the interest of the Chinese state.

All right. So this gets back to how do they get this? And the answer is money. And money is at a premium in these countries. The government, one official told me, you know, when I asked the Chinese for a new conference center, they build it. No studies, no questions. They come, they build it, and I get to cut a ribbon. And I need to be elected every four years. The U.S. comes and says, we'll do a study. And I can't wait the four years to do a study, which I then can't finance. So the

It's like we're fighting with one hand tied behind our back. And the folks on these islands are saying, I need help and you're not giving it to me.

Yeah. So there's, again, two parts to that. So this is the way that I think about it is you have to block the illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive activity, which then levels the playing field so that you can then build something sustainable and look beyond the U.S. for partnership. So that the Japanese are operating in the area. We're increasingly seeing the Indians. Philippines can contribute in the southern part. You're seeing Australia and New Zealand, for example.

I tend to prefer, like Japan does a great job, for example. But you can't compete. So again, looking at the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, which is the United States, it's a location where the Chinese short-term tourists and business can arrive in the United States without a visa.

They're not supposed to leave the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas, but they're legally getting on boats and going to Guam nearby in at least the hundreds where some are being found on the U.S. military bases. So this is a very odd open door. The representative for the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas Islands who waved on to that first committee hearing

is pushing not just for no visas, but she's also pushing for a lifting on caps of direct flights from China to Commonwealth of Northern Marianas. Her argument is it's tourism. They need it for tourism. Now, currently, tourism from China is very low. Korea has almost 10 times the amount of tourists that China does in the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas Islands. There used to be a lot of Japanese investment.

what people are saying in the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas is the Japanese got pushed out because of Chinese coercion. So if you allow the Chinese operators there, and this is a place that had a Chinese-linked casino that was running billions of dollars. There was no way to look at it other than

It's hard to see how it wasn't a money laundering operation. And it got shut down for reasons to do with labor. Some of these, they had some of these people who had come in without a visa who were working on the site as construction. Somebody fell off a scaffolding and died. Labor got involved. And so it got eventually now it's sort of basically shut down. But

Treasury, FBI, all of those should be looking at the books and seeing who in the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas was benefiting from this. And the current governor has asked for that. But there is no investigation that is active that I know of ongoing that can help clean it up.

And so those people are still around. And you have these very high level interests who are clearly talking about just China as the solution for tourism. And that dissuades others, including the Japanese and Koreans, from investing because the perception is that there are people in this in the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana's government who are.

pro-China and who are going to make their investments difficult. And on the ground, they might have problems with labor. They might have problems with, you know, even more direct problems. So unless you clean up that illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive activity, it makes it very difficult to bring in that other form of investment. And I think that the Chinese Communist Party, the

China likes dealing with countries that are in economic or locations that are in economic distress, and they will actively encourage economic distress in order to make it seem like China is the only answer.

Okay, so that's what the red team is doing. Let's talk about the blue team, to use sort of military terminology. So the U.S. clearly has responsibility for those that are U.S. territories. The compact states we have an extra responsibility for.

And then there are all these other places, some of which are kind of, you know, traditionally, you know, Australia or New Zealand. We'll worry about them. We have some former French colonies, things like that.

So collectively, what are these countries, including the United States, what are we doing? Are we neglecting them? Is what we're doing sufficient? I think the way that you've testified, you suggest that we should be doing what you call block and build. But first of all, are we doing enough? I mean, I'd argue clearly not. Yeah.

So I'm grateful that you sort of talked about the different areas because part of the problem has been that

I mean, this is a fifth of the planet, and there's been kind of an assumption that this is the Pacific Islands, is this one sort of blob. And they're very, very different sorts of locations, very different economic options, very different strategic import to the U.S., and very different toolkits available in each country.

So it starts with disaggregating the region and figuring out where you start to fight. And we know, and you've discussed on this show very eloquently and in great detail, the sort of Chinese Communist Party toolkit for achieving influence, gaining control of a country, that sort of thing. We know the Chinese toolkit.

What would be great is if we start to develop a counter toolkit. Okay, how do you help a country liberate itself?

from Chinese Communist Party influence. And it's very much, this is like, when China goes into the Pacific, they're going literally after the same locations that were strategically important during World War II. When they flipped the Solomons in 2019, within two weeks, the first place they tried to gain a lease on was Tulagi, which was where the British base was. And it was the first place the Japanese hit. So through political warfare,

They are trying to, they've learned in great detail from World War II. Toshi Yoshihara has written about this very eloquently. And now they're trying to emplace in the same way through political warfare.

So let's put together a toolkit. And there are people in the region who are doing it, doing bits and pieces of it, but need help. So Palau, for example, over the last few months, their president was reelected in November. And in December, he gave his national security coordination office. First of all, he has national security coordination office, which makes it easier for for

for everybody else, the Japanese, the Taiwanese, Palau is a country that recognizes Taiwan. So they can benefit from the Taiwanese assessment of the Chinese, especially criminal operations on the ground, because the Taiwanese have the language access and the technical expertise to be able to go through when they seize a computer or when the Palauan sees a computer or sees a phone, they can send it to the Taiwanese to help them understand what's going on.

So the new president came in and he gave his national security coordination office three months under an executive directive, presidential directive, to look at everybody's visas and to go after the overstayers and to assess whether the people who are in the country were desirable for Palauan security.

And her office went through, they deported over 40 people. They refused a whole bunch of visas, visa applications. They just, and this is a country of 20,000 people. So,

40 is a lot, you know, and most of them were Chinese. Most of the visas that were denied were Chinese. And she even they even blocked the entry of two Chinese operatives who had been in the Marshall Islands previously, who tried to set up a country within a country by buying up half of the parliament. This is a whole other story, but very interesting story.

They denied them entry. They went to the Philippines. The Philippines denied them entry. And they've now had their Marshall Island citizenship revoked. So it shows you how when one little country has the will to stand up, it can help everybody else in their security environment. So Palau needs help to have a better understanding of who is in its country. It has...

It doesn't have the intelligence capabilities of a larger country, but it has shown something that, frankly, the West has been a little weak on, which is the will to fight. But, you know, that's like what the Philippines has done is inspiring others. But, you know, the other issue, again, I keep coming back to this, is the need for people in these countries to have an economic future. Yes. And...

This was recognized in, for instance, like the Quad, US, Australia, Japan, India saying, all right, energy security and supply is a big problem. We're going to help finance sustainable energy so your people can have things like electricity all the time and access to the internet. Now, we've apparently are reviewing that. I'm not sure what the other countries are doing. Our reliability and...

ability to follow through on our promises is called into question again. Do you see this having any effect at this point in time in these countries turning to us? So there are a few different things here. First of all, again, I think that it would be beneficial to have a more accurate analysis

of how Chinese economics works in these countries. So I will, the second part of your question is incredibly important. I'll get to it, but I just want to just go back to Palau for a second because China tried to, in a very focused way, build up Chinese tourists to Palau and then they got pulled out and the attempt was to crash the economy so that they would de-recognize Taiwan. There was an assessment done by the Palauan Tourism Board

and showed that the mechanisms of Chinese tourism was that the Chinese tourists pay for the tour before they leave China.

And then when they so so that money stays in China. And then when they come to Palau, they're staying in Chinese owned hotels. They're eating in Chinese restaurants. They're using Chinese tour operators. They're paying in coupons. So there's no taxation involved in anything like that. And they're causing big environmental damage because they're, you know, pulling the giant clams off the reef and eating them in their hotel rooms like they're we're not good tourists.

by and large. So, but, but there were a very small number of Palauans who were making a lot of money who wanted to keep it going. And so that's what dominated the conversation. But by and large, Palauans as a whole weren't, were not, were not benefiting from it economically. So,

What is needed, as you say, is some sort of viable long-term economic development model that helps down to, how the unions put it, the last person in line. And the U.S., the role the U.S. plays is,

is, I would like to think, helping with leveling the playing field. So helping with making sure that the corruption component of it is exposed. I mean, just doing that. This is the block and build thing. If you're just building without blocking,

you're, it's not going to be successful. And this is my concern about the $2 billion thing for Yap, for example. The Chinese are very, they're ripping. You'll have to unpack that. The $2 billion thing for Yap. Yeah. So what are the- For Yap and why is there $2 billion?

So Secretary Hegseth announced that there would be up to $2 billion worth of military investment in Yap, which is one of the states of the Federated States of Micronesia. It's actually right next to Palau.

sort of. And it's Ulithi, for example, is part of the state of Yap. Again, these are places that were very strategic during World War I, but even before that. So I talked about how the Spanish were in that region. When the U.S., after the Spanish-American War, 1898-1899,

took the Philippines and Guam. They didn't take the other Spanish ones and the Spanish sold them to the Germans. And Germany bought Yap from the Spanish. And we talk now about fiber optic cables, the importance of fiber optic cables. Then it was telegraph cables. And the Germans set up a telegraph cable hub in Yap. Right. So I just, I keep going back to the history because I,

We have this huge event of World War II that has fixed the Pacific Islands in our history.

But there was good hundred years before that where powers were fighting over the same region. We're talking about China now, but at one point it was Japan. And before that it was Germany. And before that it was Spain. This area is always going to be strategically important. And this gets back to this geographical pivot of history thing, which we may talk about later, but I'll talk about Yap now. So Japan,

The former governor of Yap has gone on the record saying Chinese business interests have been deliberately creating what he called a boxing ring in Yap to try to pit one faction against another. And if you go in to Yap with $2 billion worth of investment, which sounds like it could...

solve some of the economic issues you're talking about. If you're hiring locals and you're building up civilian infrastructure to support the military emplacement and all that stuff, that could be very helpful economically.

If you are at the same time blocking the Chinese illegal course of aggressive and deceptive activity, which is highly advanced in Yap, the Chinese are looking at developing an airfield in a different part of Yap. A big part of this development Secretary Hegseth is talking about is an airfield.

So you have to block it and you have to build. And the U.S. is uniquely qualified to be in a position to help on the blocking side.

As well as the building side on the big stuff, like the sort of infrastructure we're talking about. But to be able to block, you need intelligence, you need coordination with partners, you need sanctions. If you tell somebody in YAP, so YAP is part of...

this compact relationship, which means that the people of Yap can come and live and work in the United States freely and they can serve in the U.S. military. If they find out that you take the Chinese money, suddenly you can't come to the U.S. anymore and forget that scholarship you were hoping for. But at the same time, offering some of these economic alternatives, then you may start to change the cost-benefit analysis that they make when they're standing there in front of a Chinese guy with a red envelope full of cash.

So, we're actually getting, this time has flown by. We're moving very quickly. So, you know, I want to kind of get back to

what we can do, what we should be doing in these places. And I want to talk a little bit. This is not a time. This is a very strange time in U.S. political history, right? On one hand, we are very hawkish. We're growing very hawkish about China. On the other hand, we just are not in the mood nationally to do development projects in other countries, especially little countries that most Americans don't know about.

So how is that actually playing out? As you've been testifying, as you've been interacting with Congress, as you've been watching how these things are moving through legislation, are you seeing that the money that the U.S. is making, that the projects are growing, shrinking? What are the factors involved in that?

This part of the world is uniquely bipartisan. I mean, we had these compacts that we've referred to but haven't defined involve a renegotiation of the financial and services component every 20 years. And that came up for renegotiation around 2023, 2024. And it was a difficult negotiation because

And it was at a time when there was money being looked for for Ukraine and Israel and Taiwan and the compact. I mean, there were four kind of big things coming up at the same time. And it required an offset of $2.3 billion, about $2.

to cover three countries for 20 years. I mean, it's not actually a lot of money in U.S. congressional terms, but there was an ideological opposition to any offset, to finding new money for anything. And one of the people who came up to bat for finding that money was Steve Bannon.

You know, former Navy, he had been in the Pacific and he said, you know, I know the history of this region. You know, we 100000 Americans died to create these relationships. You can't get to the first or second island chain unless you can get across the center of the Pacific. I mean, all of those things. So and for our international audience, Steve Bannon in the United States is a very, you know, very close ally, political ally of Donald Trump and very much associated with the Make America Great Again faction, if you will.

Yeah, and by giving sort of permission to the Freedom Caucus, which is sort of the ones that would be the most hawkish on giving money to foreign countries, that unlocked that segment of Congress to be able to be supportive. And all the way across the political spectrum to sort of the Democrats who...

Who want to do it because of, you know, feelings over the U.S. nuclear testings in the Marshall Islands, for example, you know, feeling of that, the depth of the relationship on that front. So there there has been and I think it's probably one of the reasons why we're seeing these these hearings. Right. So at least and again to say.

The Pacific Islands is not one area. We're talking specifically about the Central Pacific and the U.S. territories and the compact states. There has been very little resistance anywhere in Congress. That doesn't mean things happen fast or smooth, but it meant that things happened. And of those four things, the compacts were the only ones that got approved. So compacts refer to those limited areas where we have this arrangement.

And the Pacific Islands, as you mentioned, is a huge region. It's like saying all of Europe thinks X. That doesn't usually happen. But one thing all Pacific Islanders say is climate change is existential for them. And they seem to really resent when we deny climate change or don't talk about need to do something to help these islands survive. Do you see in Congress an understanding of that position? Because, boy, every time I've dealt with Pacific Islanders, they've laid on. So...

This is a complicated topic, and I'll be blunt for the sake of finding solutions. I think that it is a deep concern. There are, as you know,

again, very different sorts of Pacific islands, uh, geographically, geologically. Um, and for many, this is, uh, a change in climate, uh, and a changing environmental circumstances, which can include depletion of groundwater and all that sort of stuff is, can be an existential threat. And this is also potentially an opening for China who has come in to offer their, their magic island making dredgers, um, to places like Kiribati and, and Tuvalu. Um, that said, um,

I was in an Indo-PACOM meeting not that long ago in Philippines, and somebody from the Pacific Islands asked Admiral Paparo what he thought was the biggest problem for his part of the Pacific.

And Admiral Paparo mentioned climate change. And I asked this person afterwards what he thought of the answer. And this is somebody from the defense and security side of that country. And he said, I'm so sick of hearing about climate change. We have criminal activity, transnational crime, illegal fishing. Like he's the defense and security people are dealing with very immediate crises.

They are not environmental issues and this sort of thing are not necessarily disaggregated. But if you're talking about when I was in Palau, right, for their elections, their three issues were taxation, drugs on the street and out migration. Right. The president will say and he believes it and it's legitimate that climate change is their biggest issue.

But those three issues were the issues that came up during the election, not which candidate is going to best protect us from climate change. It's the urgent versus the immediate. So, you know, you don't have to just deal with one. And also just on the issue of the perception of the United States, because this has come up a few times, the U.S. is seen as very different than Australia and New Zealand. The U.S. is seen, if you go to a place like Bougainville, and I've had people from Bougainville say this,

We've had waves of outsiders come through and fight on our land. The Americans are the only ones who left. The perception of U.S. not being a, I mean, you know, forget the issue with the compacts and everything that happened there. But in the rest of the Pacific, the U.S. is not perceived as a colonial power. Australia and New Zealand are.

The U.S. is still seen as a beacon of liberty and democracy and relative equality compared to many other countries. The power of the, and I say this as somebody who came from Canada, the U.S. is exceptional. And that exceptionalism is seen in much of the Pacific. And that's bigger. Everybody knows the U.S. goes crazy every now and then.

And that's fine, but that's not America. There is still, America has a cachet. You haven't spent your time around Jim. That no other country really has. And that is, the Chinese are trying to chip away at that.

And trying to drag it into nuclear issues. And some of it is legitimate. The Chinese Communist Party narrative of warfare is very good at taking a legitimate issue, blowing it up, and then giving you the wrong solution. That's kind of the thing. But for many, many Pacific Islanders, the idea of America is still very powerful and outweighs this kind of going back and forth stuff.

All right. Well, you've got me all verklempt now. So I'm going to get you out of here on an exit question that's a little more lighthearted. You just went up to Congress for a couple of times in March, as we mentioned off the top. And 15 years ago, we sort of famously had a congressperson mention during a hearing that he was concerned that the island of Guam might, quote, tip over and capsize.

Did you receive any sort of unusual questions from congressmen or congresswomen while you were up on the Hill that indicated that maybe they didn't quite get the Pacific Island problem as much as they might?

They are, I wish I could be amusing, but I found, so I did those two public ones and I did a third one, which is the, which was closed door, which was the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific had a closed door briefing, which was structured like a hearing, but there were no cameras.

So they actually asked questions and about eight members showed up, both sides. There's no reason for them to be there, except they wanted to learn about the region. And it was very civil, informed, concerned, and it's been very encouraging. I wish I could give you a nice clip like that, but on this topic...

My exchanges with the exception of the representative from the woman, the woman from the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, which is ironic because she's the only kind of one from there who sent me 12 questions for the record after the hearing, which I, which you can go and see online. It's, it was quite something. It has been, it has been, I'd say the best of what Congress has to offer and has been very encouraging.

Well, you've got me all excited and proud to be an American. So thank you, Cleo, for lifting our spirits. We've been quite a funk for the last couple of weeks. You've done a great job in getting us thinking positively. Thank you for coming. And by the way, this was great. We definitely are going to need to have you back in the future. Thank you.

And of course, we want to make sure we take time out to thank our great sponsor, Bauer Group Asia, a strategic advisory firm specializing in the Indo-Pacific. If you are looking into the Pacific Islands and you are thinking of doing business even down there, Bauer Group, I'm sure, can help you out with that.

unmatched expertise and experience to help you navigate the most complex and dynamic markets. And our friend Jim Caruso here is a senior advisor with Bauer Group, and you can find them at BauerGroupAsia.com. So, Jim, Pacific Islands, you were charge d'affaires in Australia for...

Two and a half years and there for even longer. We talk a lot about the U.S. perspective on the Pacific Islands, but the Australians have a very, very I mean, that is not a niche concern for them. Well, for sure. I mean, the Battle of the Coral Sea was basically a battle over control of the Pacific Islands, the southern part.

The Japanese had taken over Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands, and it's a straight shot down to Australia. Even if the Japanese had invaded, the idea was the Japanese would cut off Australia from their supply of oil and supplies from the U.S.,

So that's why it's critical. Now they look at what the Chinese are doing, trying to influence all these different countries, have potentially bases there, and they're saying, oh my God, they're trying to replicate what the Japanese tried to have a way to cut us off. So how does Australia look at, what is their approach to trying to counter all of this Chinese influence? How do they approach that problem? Well, they set up in their foreign affairs program

a Pacific Islands branch just for the islands. And they're pouring money. They've taken assistance money from other areas of the world and are pouring into the Pacific. So they care deeply and they're trying. But as Cleo alluded, a lot of Pacific Islanders, especially in the region, sort of look at the Australians as colonialists.

which the Australians really resent. But, you know, it's hard to change people's perception. While the U.S. is seen still as, at least the last report, more of the shining city on the hill that doesn't overstay their welcome. Nevertheless, Australia is trying really hard and they need our help.

do what needs to be done to push back against China. I remember one of the really extraordinary things that Australia does is give free patrol boats. They basically make sure that every one of the islands in their orbit has these patrol boats from Australia that they are gifted and then, you know, even replaced as they start to wear out. Um, so just in terms of helping them just to manage their own, uh,

territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone. So that's very direct and an ongoing program. Right. And that actually works well with us because we were very focused on improving the maritime domain awareness of these countries, giving them imagery from satellites and buoys of what is going on in these enormous exclusive economic zones of these tiny countries. The problem is

One patrol boat isn't going to do a whole hell of a lot, especially if they don't have any gas. Yes. Yeah. Yeah. That's a problem actually throughout a lot of these developing countries where they like to have equipment, but equipment is expensive to operate. And needs to be maintained. Yeah. So speaking of maintenance and trying to maintain your self-esteem, tell me a story about your Pacific Islands.

Well, you know, I've been to actually really very few Pacific Islands. And so I don't have great stories about being there. I'll just tell you. So, of course, when I went down to Australia, this was my first assignment south of the equator. I was very much sort of focused on Southeast Asia and other places in

in Asia. And I, so when I got the assignment as defense attache to Australia, I was out there trying to learn everything I could about Australia. Again, I went in understanding basically that there were kangaroos there and crocodile Dundee was there and, uh, outback state callous was probably on every corner. And, uh, we had F 35 there, right? And so that was kind of my going in position. I had to learn a ton.

And then I get there and all of a sudden I'm in these meetings and everybody's talking about these islands that either I had never heard of or I'd heard of, I'd read about in a World War II book a long time ago or they were, it was an island on Survivor once, the Phoebe show, you know. And so I'd sort of sit there and pull my chin and say, ah, yes, Kiribati. We definitely should be concerned about Kiribati. And I have to go back and I'm like, K-E-R.

you know, because, you know, of course, actually, it actually isn't even spelled like you would expect Kiribati to be spelled. So, yeah,

I had to learn this geography of places that just didn't even occur to me before. And it's not just the geography, it's what is the strategic importance of an island with 30,000 people on it? You know, again, things that just hadn't come up in my thinking, except for maybe when I was doing World War II history a long time ago. So yeah, I mean, it was a very dislocating experience. And of course, Australia,

I learned, you know, had this sort of there was almost a two track discussion that was going on about security where foreign affairs was, I think, much more focused on the Pacific Islands, whereas defense was looking further north at Southeast Asia and China and sort of, you know, what if the big one happens? Right. The big one's probably not going to come up over the Solomon Islands. It's still a security concern. But who's concerned? Yeah.

security concern is it? Is it really a military problem or is it a police problem and a development problem, a foreign affairs problem, all of these other things. So it was very, you know, it really forced me to learn a lot in that way. Well, it's important to remember that these are all different countries with different cultures, although they all drink a highly intoxicating mouth-dumbing drink called, was it Kaba? Anyway, which I tried.

And they make it by chewing this root in their mouth and spitting it into a bowl and letting it ferment, and then they pass it around. So in my trip to Fiji, I got to try some. And that's why I am like I am today. Yeah.

All right. Well, one person who is not like you are today is our producer, Ian Ellis Jones, who produces our show and IEJ media. He has got some tremendous military geopolitical graphics. You should go check out on his X speed at Ian Ellis Jones. Of course,

Of course, if you enjoyed this episode, you should go back and listen to some of our other Pacific Island episodes. We did have a special episode very early on with former ambassador to Palau, John Hennessey Nyland. That was episode 12. And the question was, why should we care about the Pacific Island countries? And then Suzanne Bereslam came on in episode 44, which we asked the sort of provocative questions. Why should we care what the Pacific Islands think?

And so Susie was an outstanding guest in sort of explaining the perspective of the Pacific Islands.

Certainly, you should go out and find us out on social media. We're on X. We're on LinkedIn. We're on Blue Sky. You can email us at our email address, indopacificpodcast at gmail.com. We take your suggestions very seriously. And finally, we do want to make sure we thank our sponsors one more time. Bauer Group Asia. Go see them at bauergroupasia.com.

Until next time, I'm ready for this time for Jim and Ian. Join us again on Why Should We Care About the Indo-Pacific.