China Across CSIS: Communication Amid Competition with Chen Dongxiao
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Hello, loyal listeners of the Pekingology podcast, and if you are new, welcome. Pekingology is hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., which is home to many great podcasts. In this special episode, we are excited to feature the China Field Notes podcast by the CSIS trustee chair in Chinese business and economics. Podcast host Scott Kennedy discusses the thinking in Beijing on U.S.-China relations and the role of think tanks with Chen Dengchao. Thank you for listening.

Understanding China has become more difficult than ever, yet also more important than ever. Whether the U.S. and China are rivals, partners, or a mix of both, effective policy will only be as good as the information on which it is based.

My name is Scott Kennedy, and I'm the Senior Advisor and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I also have had the privilege of being one of the few American scholars who has traveled back and forth between Washington and Beijing in recent years. I'm a firm believer that field research, direct observation, talking, and listening to Chinese perspectives must be a part of our toolkit to understand the People's Republic of China.

So join me as I speak with Chinese leaders from business, government and academia and foreigners who have spent many years living and working in China. What makes China tick? Where is the country going? What connects us and what divides us? We'll dive into all of that and more on this podcast. Welcome to China Field Notes.

I'm delighted today to be joined by Chen Dongxiao, who is president of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies. President Chen specializes in research on the United Nations, Chinese foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and he's published extensively on a wide number of topics related to

bilateral, multilateral diplomacy. He's editor-in-chief of China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, and he's also an adjunct professor at the Shanghai International Studies University. He received his PhD from Fudan University, which has produced many of China's leading international relations

And perhaps most importantly for us, President Chun is our primary partner for the U.S.-China Global Economic Dialogue that CSIS and his institute have been carrying on for the last decade. President Chun, welcome to China Field Notes. Thank you. I'm very glad to join you and to join your program.

So maybe just to get started as a little bit of background before we dive into U.S.-China relations and Greenland and Panama and everything else that's going on in the world. Tell us a little bit about the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies and how you came to work there and sort of your vision of the Institute's role in providing insights into global issues. Well, I know that

SIS is Shanghai Institute for International Studies, which I worked for almost more than 30 years since I joined. It is the think tank with more than 65 years of history. It was initiated by Chinese late Premier Zhou Enlai. It is always positioned to serve as a strategic-oriented policy-focused think tank in China. It has six research institutes,

many important thematic areas, as well as almost 10 regional and country studies. So it is one of the top think tanks in China on international relations and China's foreign policy. As I said, I've joined the SIS for more than three decades. I took the position of the presidency 12 years ago.

And in the past 12 years, I think that I have fully recognized the fundamental change of both the Chinese domestic situation as well as international relations. So I try hard to try to improve SI's research quality, capability building by emphasizing the multi and cross disciplines methodology.

I also work quite hard with my colleagues to expand SI's international outreach and influence.

encourage my colleagues to establish many joint programs with our foreign partners, including, as you mentioned, we work very closely with the CSIs on this US-China dialogue on global economic order. And we also set up a center for China studies in Bangladesh last year. So we try to outreach and try to

have a more international connections or networkings with our local partners in

in both our neighborhood as well as in many other areas. We also highlight the role of DoTank in addition to those conventional understanding of Think Tank. For instance, since 2023, following the fundamental shift of China's policy of COVID, I myself fully recognize the challenges or difficulties in the international people-to-people contacts. So we launched particularly in

in our relationship with the United States. So I launched a program by working with John Hopkins Nanking Center of new program called Exploring Perspectives on US-China Relationship. And it has been quite successful, I think, that in the past two years, we launched two rounds of this program. In Chinese, we call it Shanghai Nanking Plus, which means that every year we will invite about 20 American

American young colleagues to stay in China for about one week. I have a lot of in-depth discussions, visitings, interactions with our business community, media people, think tanks people, universities, as well as our officials, local People's Congress and CPPCC, Politicons, Solitative Conference, to try to engage people

on those young American colleagues more deeply with local communities to have a better understanding about what is going on, what is dynamics of China. We are not only continues our traditional work of think tank, but also we will increasingly stress the importance of a do tank. But of course, our main task is still try to improve or upgrade of our consulting capacity building on foreign policy domains.

So that's it. That's the general background of our SIS. That's quite a lot of work and evolution and not just research, but dialogues and trying to shape future leaders. And I think that's really important. So you joined SIS over 30 years ago. You took over the presidency 12 years ago that, you know, in 2013 or so. So over that time, U.S.-China relations has evolved quite a bit. When you started back in

I guess in the early 90s, U.S.-China relations were in a very different place than they are today in a lot of different ways. And China's place in the world is very different. China has moved much more to the center of the international economy and international politics. The size of its military has grown. Its regional and global influence has expanded. How has that shift in U.S.-China relations and China's place in the world changed?

how SIIS thinks about what it's supposed to do. Well, you know that you are absolutely right that in the past 12 years, more than 12 years, I think that we have witnessed the steady and increasing role of much more assertive and more active China's role

on many areas of international arena. Chinese officials, as well as the mainstream intellectual people always describe China's position as increasingly to the center of world stage. I think that this is one of the most fundamental shift of global economic and political landscape. And the rise of China

and the dynamic of the power of rebalance of the world, as well as we have seen the so-called the end of the hyper globalization with the rise of protectionism and the increasing securitization of economic relations. And so on one side, China's place on

on world arena and China's attitudes toward the tectonic change of the global political and economic order has been changing quite visibly that China would be not complacent of only being a follower of the existing rules or norms, but also try to be a creator of

or maker of those roles so that China's interests could be better expanded or realized. So I think this is one of the fundamental shift of attitudes. And in this context, we have seen increasing competitive, if not totally confrontational dynamics of bilateral relationship.

between the United States and China. So how to manage this increasingly competitive and also more confrontational bilateral relationship while at the same time to avoid the head-on

let alone the military confrontations. So I think that this is one of the biggest challenges faced both by Washington or Beijing. But I think that Beijing have been increasingly realized that given that such kind of increasingly competitiveness is the new normalcy, whether we like it or not, Beijing will have to live with this new increasing competition with the United States for a long period of time.

And the question is, while Beijing will not have the total capability of control or manage the competitiveness because it requires the interaction from the Washington side and the strategic policy change in the United States is somewhat out of control by Beijing. So whether it is likely that both sides could work out a mutually acceptable framework

so that both sides at least would agree with some primary principles guiding their relationship, let them know the floor and the ceiling, and to set up a realistic expectation about each other and to try to avoid too much fluctuations. That will be an important aspect of our bilateral relationship. But it's quite new because I don't think that both sides

Washington and Beijing are fully comfortable or accustomed to this new normalcy. So we are still in the stage of readjustment. So it is almost inevitable that the tensions, the anxieties, the perception gap and misunderstanding trouble both sides. And both of us need to not only to try to rebuild the so-called framework

but also to fresh up those mechanisms to manage those specific issues. So I think that that's quite tough ahead of us. You're telling me, you're talking about sort of getting used to the new normal. We're all trying to do that. There's been so much change in Washington over the last few years and just the last few weeks, almost head spinning change. Not only are people in other countries, including China, trying to adapt,

Americans are trying to catch up as well. You know, if we could just look back at the Biden administration, which just concluded, did the U.S. and China under the Biden administration find a manageable relationship that created a framework to identify the floor and the ceiling? Was that a stable situation that the U.S. and China had achieved? You know, by the end, there were 20 plus dialogues, extensive communication.

at the official, unofficial level, a restoration of travel and business. And was that successful? Well, I think that depends upon the expectation, right? If you check those official lines of Beijing, definitely the Beijing, I would not say that they will be happy about the existing framework or so-called the framework of floor and ceiling. There are a couple of arguments there.

points raised by Beijing. One is Beijing still not happy about the defining feature of the bilateral relationship as a long-term strategic competitiveness. Even if among scholars, myself included, I think that this is one of the fundamental features. But of course, what worries Beijing is that whether those defining features, so-called competitiveness or strategic competitiveness,

will steal the oxygen of any kind of creative thinking, particularly from Washington side, to try to explore the new areas of cooperation or collaboration.

Secondly, I think that despite of the fact that Biden's tradition by working with his counterparts in Beijing tried to set up those guardrails on many aspects, on technological domains, on economic domains, even on those issues like Taiwan. But I think Beijing has a lot of complaints or has been very frustrated by the increasingly scornful

screwing those pressures or building up more higher walls or expanding those yards of science technology cooperation. So Beijing thinks that those so-called small yard high fence is very unpredictable. Secondly, in terms of what Beijing called the key of the key red line, Taiwan question, you'll know that Beijing are increasingly concerned about the huge perception gap between

between Washington and Beijing on the essence of the instability or the roots of the instability. For instance, Beijing are increasingly concerned that whether Washington would stick to the one China policy as it is, because there are more preconditions on readjustment of this policy per

perceived from Beijing. And also based on some news coverage, there are increasing number of boots of American military personnel in Taiwan, which Beijing believed that it is increasingly oversteps of those boundaries of those military cooperation between the United States and Ireland. In addition to those arms sales and disputes over United Nations resolution

2578, all right, United Nations Resolution. It's not only about those specific explanation about what this resolution mean, but from Beijing's perspective, the U.S. systematic attack of challenge Beijing's alleged position of this resolution is trying to pave the way for a further following out of one China policy. Even if during the Biden administration, Washington have stopped

stick to the so-called one China policy. But you know that just a few days ago, the Trump administration in the State Department, the fact sheet that those words of not support Taiwan's independence has been deleted. So this has, you know, make Beijing's concerns about Washington's further steps towards changing the one China policy just

justified. So I think that Beijing believes that there's a huge gap of perception. And if there's no good communication, if those red lines or messages from Beijing could not be very well received, then definitely it will be the most explosive issue. So I think that on one side, Biden administration has worked very hard to try to re-stabilize the bilateral relationship. But given the domestic pressure or

particularly those hawkish voices in Washington, given those structural obstacles, difficulties in the bilateral relationship, and given the still relatively not enough bilateral communication or dialogue between two sides. A lot of scholars, myself included, are still very concerned about the trajectory of the bilateral relationship.

That's very helpful for listeners to hear the pluses and minuses and the balance sheet of Beijing's valuation of the relationship under President Biden. If we talk about Taiwan, we might end up down a rabbit hole that we never escape because it is such a central issue. And it's so complicated. I would say the most important thing is to find a way to avoid conflict and open war. That's the most important thing. So maintain peace.

I think that's partly achieved by maintaining a balance of power, which I believe exists. The costs of any side taking unilateral action is really far too costly. And in addition, the diplomacy that's gone on related to Taiwan over the last 50 plus years has emphasized some amount of ambiguity that's been made.

that allows Beijing and Washington to maintain their positions without directly stepping on the other side's position. And that ambiguity is allowed for creativity in a very, very complex situation that's allowed us to avoid conflict. And I agree that the dangers of reducing ambiguity or space for each side probably increases pressure for thinking about alternative ways to address the challenge. So this is going to be with us. I just wanted to

offer that thought, but I don't want to go down that path too far because we'll never get to anything else. I wanted to shift now, particularly since you mentioned President Trump. I think before the inauguration, there was a widespread expectation that President Trump would pursue a foreign policy that would be relatively isolationist on trade, on a lot of different issues, on expectations for increasing defense spending, for

from allies and making the U.S. commitment to them more conditional, avoiding trying to resolve conflicts and not get the U.S. bogged down and others. But in the first few weeks, there's been discussions of potentially expanding the American territory, renaming the Gulf of Mexico, sounding, you know, actually quite expansive.

describing a totally new way to think about the rules of international trade, reciprocity and fairness, as opposed to the current rules that we have in the multilateral order. What is President Trump's overall foreign policy vision? Well, I think that he's still in the process of how to identify the deep or the basic logic. I

underlining Trump 2.0's policy agenda. I think that since President Trump has been trying to assert himself as a kind of a king-like president, so unlike his predecessors, he tried to assert himself and tried to build up its executive branch, particularly his authority, to the degrees of almost a kind of a king-like

So in that case, I myself believe that those traditional check and balance has been largely break down. And therefore, his personal understanding or his personal logic of those preferences, those interests he believed in that he will pursue will be more important. Therefore, I think that he himself is very much concerned about the economic security,

what he believes the economic security. And in addition to those borderline issue, immigration, drug issues, which are more related to domestic products, but I think that is also related to what he believed a kind of economic security. But you mentioned that he renamed Mexico to the Bay of America. And he also repeatedly said that Canada should be the 51st state

and re-control, retake the Panama Canal and Greenland. I think that that indicates he himself is quite obsessed with regrab control of those choke points of sea line communication. And he believes in those conventional theories like Mahan's Navy power,

or a maritime power back into the 19th centuries or even before. And he believed in those big powers like Russia or like China, despite of the disputes of differences and interests, should be the key player of the world arena. And he also does not believe in the so-called free trade at the expense of U.S. manufacturing or jobs.

So he pursue or impose those tariffs or even try to pursue the reciprocal trade or tariff. So I think that put all things together, I would say the economic security in his mind is one to re-grab the control of those choke points of a sea line of communication, particularly try to re-grab these areas of important criticality.

critical resources or mineral resources. We have heard that he stressed the importance of Greenland because Greenland is the land not only related to the polar area, but also is rich in the natural resources. And now he also pressed very hard to Ukraine to try to iron out the agreement on

those mineral resources in compensation for what he believed the military assistance to Ukraine. So I think that he stressed those mineral resources as an important aspect of what he believed the economic security and trade balance or rebalance, bring back more jobs or manufacturing jobs to the United States is also important dimension of those economic security.

That's really helpful to see how you're looking at him. I think all of us are trying to figure out what is that core logic that is animating policy. Every day there's new developments and sometimes they look consistent with each other and sometimes they look in conflict. I think a lot of people have been thinking about the 19th century. And I wanted to shift now to thinking about U.S.-China relations. There is

still a lot of speculation about where U.S.-China relations are going to go in the next few months and years. There's sort of three different options that people are talking about, and I'm curious how you predict which of these are more or less likely. So some people talk about some type of grand bargain between the U.S. and

And China might be around some of these economic security and trade issues. It might be thinking again back to the 19th century, some type of broader agreement about spheres of influence also involving Russia and, you know, Western Hemisphere for the U.S., Russia and Europe, China, etc.

in Asia. Some people have talked about that. Some people have talked about sort of continuity from the Biden administration, which we might call sort of a competition without conflict, sort of this low burn, sort of a drifting, increasingly tense, but not actually open conflict that we saw over the last few years. And then some people have talked about escalation, the possibilities of the U.S. really trying to limit the commercial relationship, you know, cancel PNTR, you

impose very large tariffs, expand technology restrictions quite widely, change its policies on a whole range of things that might bump up against Chinese red lines. So if you've got sort of a grand bargain, sort of a drift, an escalation, what's the most likely future for the relationship in the coming months?

Well, I think that, you know, the Trump administration's executive term is only about one month and it's still too early to predict. I think that I'm not so quite sure whether because you outlined three scenarios. I think that there are elements of possibility in all these three scenarios. If we refer to its track record or historical record in 2020,

Trump point zero. And also if we take into account of all those structural factors and also those unpredictability or uncertain leadership style,

So I think that there are elements of those in all these three scenarios. I could not say for certain which scenario will be more probable. I would say that regarding the grand bargain scenario, it will surprise me a lot.

If both sides can reach a real grand bargain and settle down on a long-term framework, which will endure for a relatively long-term period of time, I will be very surprised by that.

Partially because, as you specifically mentioned that in the grand bargain scenario, that we actually will see the repetition or revival of those 19th century's big powers bargaining over the sphere of influence, while the United States will find its main interests in the West Hemisphere, Russia in Eurasia, and China in Asia-Pacific.

But what is the biggest challenge to this scenario is there's a bipartisan consensus. I think even President Trump himself believes that the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific is now the economic, political security gravity of the world today. So it is almost unimaginable to see that Washington or United States will be pleasant.

confining its sphere of influence only to the Western Hemisphere. So even if there are talkings about such kind of a dialogue or such kind of grand bargain, I'm very doubtful about that. Regarding the drift of Biden's competition without conflicts, I think that if Trump administration or particularly President Trump himself is very much serious about no war or no interest involving confrontation with China,

He should think very serious about Taiwan because there are many concerns from Beijing towards its relationship with Washington. But on the top, it's always Taiwan. So I think that if Trump administration is serious about avoiding the head-on confrontation, or as he said, that he has no interest to engage militarily with China, then I think it is more likely that if there's agreement or tacit agreement between two

two sides on how to deal with Taiwan question will set a term for the bilateral relationship in the next few years.

but I'm not so quite sure because his messages during the campaign and during his interviews with a lot of podcasts and during his private speech or public speeches are not consistent. And those people surrounding him, particularly those people in charge of security and in charge of intelligence, they believe in that building up the military deterrence is more important

than to just reassure Beijing that Washington will not support independence of Taiwan. So I think that I'm not so quite certain, but of course, this is the expectation of Beijing. And the escalation scenario is also not only possible, but also likely. That all depends upon two reasons. One is whether the Beijing and Washington can reach an enduring new agreement on trade issues, including TikTok,

including those tariffs, the so-called trade balance or rebalance. How patient of Trump himself towards this process of negotiation and whether he would be serious about dedicate his team to work seriously with China, Beijing on the second agreement over those trade issue. What if the trade negotiation is

is very time consuming, very bumpy, while President himself, President Trump will double down its efforts of pressure or even naming, shaming or sanctions on China. And Beijing will be forced to retaliate, not in a symmetrical way, but anyway, those tit for tat will make those process of negotiation more unpredictable. So if the

the trade negotiation process is not managed well, then it is likely that if Beijing could not deliver those issues which were to the expectation of President Trump, whether Trump will escalate the tension and whether he will use all those bargaining chips, including the so-called a tracing the origins of COVID report.

including those issues like Taiwan and including those ongoing dialogue of the Ukraine war as a new sources of conflicts with Beijing. So I think that this escalation scenario is also likely. Yeah. So that all depends. Well, I'm not quite sure whether I'm right. Grand bargain, of course, I think that it's too simplistic way. I'm very doubtful about that. Even if some Chinese people are talking about the possibility about that.

What do you think of it? In Washington, amongst foreign policy experts and the broader community, there's very many different points of view. I think some people think if President Trump very quickly...

asserts his views that you could see some deal very quickly and you could get some kind of bargain. I don't know if it would be a phase two deal or a fourth communique, but people talk about that. My sense is that as time goes on, the chances for that go down dramatically because people within his administration, Congress, elsewhere will assert their views, which you mentioned that consensus. So I

I think there's a time element to the ability to get some kind of larger stabilization. And so that's why I think drift or escalation are very...

very possible, particularly as we get into the spring and summer. And if you just look at the executive orders and policy statements and personnel, all of those things are not pointing in the direction of stabilization. But nevertheless, I think we can hope for the best. You can prepare for the worst. I think there's also people quite worried that a grand bargain would include the kinds of things that actually would go against some U.S. interests. So I

I probably am closer to you and your skepticism about some kind of big deal. But I know that there's people pushing for that and working hard. I definitely don't want escalation, but we may end up there. So I just wanted to conclude the conversation by talking about our dialogue, the global economic order dialogue and U.S.-China dialogue in general.

SIIS carries out a number of these as well in an environment where the possibilities are so far ranging from potential agreement to escalation, where we see the U.S. engaged in a fundamental shift potentially in its foreign policy and its views about trade and investment and economic security and its views about sea lines of communication and everything that you mentioned.

What's the role for dialogues like the one that we have or the others that you carry out in such circumstances? Yeah, that's a very good question. You know, since you once mentioned what kind of role SIS could play in China's foreign policy domain, my question is, what kind of role the U.S. think tank could play in your foreign policy domain? I'm increasingly doubtful about that because I think that unlike the

the past administration, either Biden or Obama, or even Bill Clinton, or even George W. Bush, you know that the think tanks in Washington, in DC, in this time, always play a kind of institutional role in shaping or leading opinions or shaping a lot of public debates or discourse in Washington. And given those

evolving doors, mechanisms. So I think that the think tank's role in Washington always play a very critical role in the real policy domain, including foreign policy. Nowadays, I'm very skeptical. When I, just in past few weeks since inauguration of President Trump's second term, it's relatively more difficult for Chinese side to try to reach out

those think tank people who really have access to the new administrations. I find that a lot of think tanks in Washington, in this town, you are also in a puzzle or confused, if not a total crazy about trying to guess what are those people in Trump institutions thinking about their policy. You are also trying to navigate or try to understand their logic.

So I'm not so quite sure. Maybe it's still too early, but I hope that this time the new administrations, they will increasingly back to those conventional or normal track of reaching out with think tanks in this time so that it will help the outsiders, including Chinese side, to have a better understanding about the policy trajectory, not just like to make outsiders like us to do those research analysis of our own,

without access to the real deep thoughts or logic of those kinds of thinking. But having said that, I still believe that the think tanks exchange is still very indispensable because I think that when I look back of the history of a bilateral relationship, there are a lot of factors which will help stabilize or improve the bilateral relationship, despite of all those difficulties and obstacles.

And we talk about the importance of maintaining the official communication channels. We talk about the importance of expanding the list of those corporations and also institutionalize a lot of agreements between two sides. And we also talk about the people contacts, including think tank exchanges. I think that in the past, the Chinese side

always prioritize these institutional mechanisms, including governmental institutional mechanisms over personal networkings. Beijing also prioritize the governmental relationships over those people to people or city to city or local to local contacts. But I think that now situation has shifted quite dramatically.

And Beijing will have to accustom to the new reality that we have to rely more upon a personal connections, including the top leaders' personal dialogue and less upon those governmental or mid-level communications. Because without the leaders' term setting, those governmental or institutional communication dialogue, even if

They play some role, but I think their role has been marginally shrunk. Yeah. And also regarding the dimension of those official agreements on the list of cooperation, I think that in the past few years, we have seen fewer and fewer substantial agreements between two sides on those specific issues. Maybe fentanyl, who knows? Very limited.

official agreements in the future that both sides can work on. So I think that we have to rely more on maybe your state and the Chinese provincial level or minister levels interaction, local to local exchanges and people to people contacts, including think tanks exchange.

Therefore, I will not say whether it's fortunate or unfortunate that Beijing will have to stress the more importance of those think tanks people's exchange because those official channels before importance has been resumed as used to that the governmental organizations, they have to rely more upon those think tanks exchanges. Well, right. Yes. I think that that will, to some extent,

give us more opportunity to try to work out a more creative or innovative ideas. But I do not know that even if Beijing is still quite interested in the inputs

of our Chinese think tanks in their foreign policy domain. I'm not so quite sure whether on your side, this is a similar case, frankly speaking. Yeah, well, this might be a conversation between two disempowered people and institutions. And I think, you know, particularly the early part of your remarks,

It's a reasonable and very important question is what are the role of think tanks in Washington and American foreign policy? You mentioned the first question is about access. And I still think actually there is access to different parts of the U.S. government.

But we also are very early in an administration and people are still being appointed. Those that are appointed are still getting used to their jobs. There's a lot of ongoing transition as well. But I think the other issue that you mentioned is sort of like in terms of the ideas and substance and direction of foreign policy and the extent to which think tanks that have a more traditional view about the American role in the world –

in the 21st century and the issues that they think deserve attention. I do think that there is some tension between the emerging Trump view of foreign policy in the U.S. role in the world and what the establishment think tanks in Washington have been proposing and what they do. And so I think what that means is that think tanks, if they want to, they can still focus on being influential today. And if

incrementally improving existing policies or criticizing specific policies and measuring their impact by what happens in U.S. foreign policy in the very near term. But at the same time, they might need to think about sort of longer term strategies of looking at where America and the world is heading, not just today, not just in the current four years, but beyond the

And trying to think very creatively about what are the most important problems, how can they be solved? Just simply going back in time and hoping that existing previous institutions will solve things is not going to be enough. There's a lot of creativity that's going to be required, a lot of reform in international institutions and the way the world works.

works. And so I think that's one way to think about what think tanks roles in the U.S. will be. I think in that context, I hope that there's still a place for U.S. and Chinese think tanks and research organizations to interact with each other, to, in the short term, reduce the chances of miscalculation and miscommunication, avoid escalation into open conflict,

And then also together, think creatively about the kind of solutions and changes that we need. You know, China is been a clear advocate for reform of global governance institutions and things.

The U.S. has traditionally sounded like a defender of the status quo, but actually the U.S. needs to advocate reform and change as well. Maybe our visions of reform and change are somewhat different. I think there are significant differences, but looking for ways in which we might bridge those differences, I think that's going to be a central role for think tanks and dialogues like the ones that we have on the global economic order. I really want to thank you, President Chun, for joining us on China Field Notes.

and sharing your views about the world, US-China relations, the role of think tanks. This has been hugely informative, and I look forward to continuing our dialogue, individual to individual, institution to institution, country to country. Great. Thank you. I also appreciate it very much, and I also agree many of your points. I hope that we could continue our joint program and further to extend our cooperation. I agree with you that think tank's role

should not only, you know, to try to read or interpret the policies of current administrations in short term, but also need to continue to work out a long term and more innovative ideas about what the world are heading and what kind of best policy that both sides should choose in interest of the peoples, not only in the short, but in the medium and long term. Super. Again, thank you very much for joining us today. Thank you.

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