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Frontline special - Donald Trump inauguration special (Extended)

2025/1/25
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James Hansen: 我认为特朗普就职演说中关于俄乌战争的内容很少,更多的是强调"美国优先"和重建美国实力。 Philip Ingram: 特朗普的第二次就职演说比第一次更有内容,但他主要关注"美国优先",在国际安全问题上的阐述较少,更多是从商业角度出发。他可能利用其强硬和不可预测的风格来迫使中国在台湾和东南亚问题上让步,从而为解决中东和俄乌冲突创造机会。 Scott Lucas: 特朗普的演说缺乏对俄乌战争等具体国际问题的详细阐述,而是以"美国优先"为大方向,强调美国将独立决策,而非依赖联盟或国际组织。这与鲁比奥关于"战后国际秩序过时"的言论相呼应,预示着特朗普政府将采取更强硬、单边主义的国际政策。 Philip Ingram: 我最初对特朗普的分析受到了其个人性格的影响,但后来我意识到应该从整体和战略角度出发,理解其基于商业视角的行事方式。他的强硬和不可预测性可能会迫使中国在台湾和东南亚问题上退让,从而为解决中东和俄乌冲突创造机会。虽然短期内无法解决俄乌冲突,但他可能会为冲突的终结设定方向。 关于加沙停火协议,我认为它可能在短期内失效,因为以色列国内政治存在诸多不确定因素。 特朗普对巴拿马的言论,我认为可以解读为对巴拿马的宣战,但他最终可能会从商业角度出发进行谈判。 关于对普京的态度,我认为特朗普会采取强硬手段,并利用经济手段(例如操纵油价)来施压普京,但短期内不太可能解决冲突。俄罗斯在电视上播放梅拉尼娅·特朗普的裸照,是普京对特朗普的威胁,暗示其掌握特朗普的更多信息。 关于对乌克兰的支持,我认为特朗普政府可能会采取更有力的行动,例如打击伊朗,从而间接地削弱俄罗斯。 关于马斯克对五角大楼的改革,我认为马斯克的动机既是为了提高五角大楼的效率,也是为了获得更多国防合同。 关于欧洲在俄乌冲突中的作用,我认为波兰、意大利和波罗的海国家将对特朗普政府有更大的影响力,而德国和法国的影响力则相对较弱。 关于英国,我认为英国目前正受到来自某些势力的威胁,马斯克正在试图推翻英国政府。 关于俄乌战争的未来,我认为战斗将持续到秋季,甚至更久,因为泽连斯基的底线是乌克兰加入北约,而普京则希望获得更多领土。 Scott Lucas: 特朗普的演说缺乏对俄乌战争等具体国际问题的详细阐述,而是以"美国优先"为大方向,强调美国将独立决策,而非依赖联盟或国际组织。 关于加沙停火协议,我认为它可能在短期内失效,因为以色列国内政治存在诸多不确定因素。 特朗普关于巴拿马运河的言论是"疯了",其言论缺乏事实依据,只是为了迎合民众情绪,并不能转化为实际行动。 关于特朗普对普京的态度,我认为特朗普政府对乌克兰问题的处理,存在着不可预测性,其个人行为可能会破坏其顾问团队的努力。俄罗斯人知道他们与特朗普竞选活动的合作有多深,他们会试图再次利用这一点来阻碍解决问题的途径。 关于劝说特朗普继续支持乌克兰,我认为应该强调其行动带来的好处和声誉提升,而不是强调其不作为的后果。应该向特朗普强调支持乌克兰带来的经济利益,例如获得国防和贸易合同,以及乌克兰在军事技术领域的潜力。 关于降低国际油价打击俄罗斯经济,我认为这可能会影响海湾国家,而特朗普与海湾国家的利益关系复杂,因此这并非理想的策略。更好的策略是打击俄罗斯的影子船队。 关于欧洲在俄乌冲突中的作用,我认为欧洲国家正在讨论向乌克兰派遣维和部队的可能性,但这存在法律和安全风险。 关于特朗普政府团队中是否有足够能力和经验的人员,我认为这存在不确定性,因为特朗普可能会任命一些缺乏经验或立场偏颇的人员。 关于泽连斯基的策略,我认为泽连斯基应该与特朗普政府中的关键人物进行沟通,以争取对乌克兰有利的局面。 关于俄乌战争的未来,我认为这取决于欧洲国家能否在政治和军事上组织起来,以及特朗普政府能否与欧洲国家形成统一的立场。

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This chapter analyzes Donald Trump's second inaugural address, focusing on its lack of specifics regarding Russia and Ukraine but highlighting its emphasis on "America First" and a business-oriented approach to policy. The presence of prominent business leaders behind Trump is noted as a significant message.
  • Lack of specifics on Russia and Ukraine
  • Emphasis on "America First"
  • Business-oriented approach
  • Presence of prominent business leaders

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Welcome to The World in 10. In an increasingly uncertain world, this is The Times' daily podcast dedicated to global security. I'm Alex Dibble, and I executive produce the podcast. The World in 10 is partnered with Frontline, the interview series from Times Radio, available on YouTube, with expert analysis of the world's conflicts. At the weekend, we bring you Frontline interviews in full. Here's one from this week. I hope you find it interesting.

Hello and welcome to a special edition of Frontline for Times Radio. I'm James Hansen and today we're recording this just moments after Donald Trump has finished his second inaugural address as he begins his historic second term as president. What we're going to do today is explore the significance of his presidency and what it may mean for Russia, Ukraine, the conflict there and also for the wider world. Joining me, delighted to have the company of

Philip Ingram, MBE, former NATO planner and former military intelligence officer. Philip, welcome to you. Nice to be here. And from Dublin, delighted to be joined by Professor Scott Lucas from the Clinton Institute at University College Dublin. Scott, always a pleasure. Thank you for joining us. Thank you, gentlemen. It's a real honour to be here.

Well, it was very interesting, I thought, in terms of what Donald Trump had to say. And there wasn't much specifically about Russia and Ukraine. He did say that the golden age of America starts now. He says we will not allow ourselves to be taken advantage of both at home and abroad.

He criticised previous administrations for stumbling into a continuing catalogue of catastrophic events abroad. And he said he would stop all wars and said that America will be respected again and admired again. Philip, to start with you, give me your immediate takeaways from his inaugural address.

Well, I thought it was fascinating. There was a lot more substance to his address this time than there was when he became the 45th president of the United States. But he's had that presidency to think about it and then the time in between with Joe Biden to work out where he wants to go. As you said,

There wasn't much that dealt with NATO, that dealt with the war in Ukraine, that dealt with the Middle East, apart from his self-congratulatory bit with getting the hostages out. And I do think it was his bullying of Hamas that led to the hostages being released when they did. Nothing really about...

China directly in Southeast Asia. There was an interesting piece about China and about Panama whenever he talked about the Panama Canal, which I'm sure we're going to come on to. But the other thing that struck me very much was it was focusing on America first.

So it is, you know, all policies, all thinking is going to be what is best for the United States. And you'd expect that from a president, especially Donald Trump. And I think those that were there with him in the background, you know, with the Elon Musks and the Jeff Bezos and the whole of what Joe Biden referred to as the oligarchs, but the

the senior business leaders, the global business leaders standing behind him, I think send a very strong message out from a business perspective. Not much on the international security, but a lot in the business perspective and a lot of living up to what we were expecting him to say.

Scott, did it surprise you we didn't hear more, certainly in terms of specifics about Russia and Ukraine and the war? I mean, we did hear quite a lot about, for example, the Panama Canal. And we did hear a lot about the Gulf of Mexico and the desire to rename it the Gulf of America, but not much specific on Russia and Ukraine. Did that surprise you? No, not at all. Because first of all, this speech would have been written, albeit with Trump's input and his flourishes by Stephen Miller.

And Stephen Miller, who has been with Trump since 2016, very much a xenophobe, very much anti-immigrant, very much focused on the domestic side of things, but under this mantra of America first. So you're not going to get detailed, as it were, strokes regarding the specific global issues that we're talking about, but you're going to get that very broad brush.

And I do think that broad brush has a security implication, albeit, you know, I take the business point that Philip made. And that is that if you go and listen carefully to that speech, it was effectively that America, as in Trump or the administration, will make the decisions. They will make the decisions. Not alliances will make the decisions. Not international organizations will make the decisions. Not NATO will make the decisions. It will be America.

Now, there were a couple of specifics in there that were like red meat to the Trumpist. We'll talk about Panama. We'll talk a little bit about the short-term claim of solving Israel and Gaza, which is going to go pear-shaped in six weeks, as we can explain. But I think the big takeaway here actually is to connect that speech with something that Marco Rubio said a few days ago. That is significant.

Rubio, former presidential candidate, the Secretary of State nominee, in his hearing was asked about the post-war international order. You know, that thing that we've come accustomed to since World War II of trying to maintain security and stability. It's flawed. We know that. But it's been there for Europe. It's been there for other parts of the world. It's been part of America as being part of multilateral approaches. And Rubio said the post-war international order is obsolete.

And then he used the words America first again. And I think what we saw in Trump 1.0, which was the demeaning of NATO allies, the demeaning of European allies,

the transactional approach to this, where you're not talking about a win-win, but you're talking about what does Donald Trump get out of this? This is going to be supercharged in 2.0. And there were warning signals in that speech today, especially not only in the way that speech that Trump gave it, but as Philip has noted, who else was there and how you had that enthusiastic reception from that very carefully selected crowd, which is it's our way or the highway.

Philip, is it fair to say that if we were having this conversation maybe six months ago, you would have been relatively pessimistic about what a Trump presidency would mean for certainly Ukraine, but for the world more broadly. But I sense you are a bit more optimistic now. Why is that?

I was allowing my analysis of Trump to be coloured by his personality and some of the things that he has personally done. And I grabbed myself and said, this is not what an intelligence officer or former intelligence officer does. You need to look at things in the round and you need to look at things holistically. And I started actually to read the detail of some of the speeches that he was making and the comments that his team were making and looking at the way he was positioning things

And his manoeuvring, actually, I didn't quite turn 180 degrees in my view, but I thought what he is saying is making an awful lot more sense whenever you put it into context that, A, he isn't a professional politician. He approaches things from a business perspective, first and foremost. B, his business approach is...

I'd call it, in interrogation techniques, a harsh. He bullies his way into things. And if you look at that, he'll bully his way into something and then we'll expect compromise in business negotiations. That's not how politicians like to work and how world leaders like to work, but it's how he is going to work with different people. And as soon as you start to analyse it from that perspective, actually from a US point of view, I think...

Certainly compared to Joe Biden, I think anyone would be better. But from a US perspective, I think he has got the real potential to achieve an awful lot. And then we translate that into his relationship from an international perspective. I think...

There is the potential that he will bring a degree of security to certain problem areas that may allow him time to solve other areas. So I think his unpredictability and his aggressive nature and his business focus will force Xi Jinping in China to back off the pressure that he's putting on Taiwan and in Southeast Asia. That will allow then...

diplomatic focus and the international community to focus on what's going on in the Middle East. He'll never solve that. But more importantly, from a European perspective, what's going on between Russia and Ukraine? And whilst...

He's not going to achieve any solution there in the short term. I think he will set a path for the conflict to end. Well, this being frontline, we are going to come on and focus specifically on Russia and Ukraine in due course. Scott, I was struck by what you said a moment ago, that you think the Hamas-Israel ceasefire agreements in Gaza may not last very long. You said it may be null and void within six weeks even. Why are you so pessimistic?

I think because if we open up how we got to phase one and then why phase two will be difficult, the story behind phase one is that having, I think, basically,

not use leverage for months. The Biden administration, days after Trump won the election, when he was in the White House for the photo opportunity with Joe Biden, what was also said to him was, look, we know, you know, this would look great for your inauguration if there was a ceasefire, work with us on this. And, you know, he did. He designated Steve Witkoff, his envoy, to work with, you know, Anthony Blinken, with Brett McGurk,

And Philip was mentioning the challenge to Hamas that Trump issued. It might have been an even more important challenge that Witkoff issued in Benjamin Netanyahu, which was, you know, Donald Trump wants this. And if Donald Trump doesn't get this, you know, there's going to be hell to pay. Now, what that did is that put Netanyahu in the position of either going ahead and agreeing to phase one, right, and alienating the hard right ministers in his cabinet or saying no to Trump.

Now, after a 72-hour delay, Netanyahu decided last Saturday that we'll go ahead with phase one, in which we're seeing the first few hostages being exchanged for scores of Palestinian prisoners. But here's the stinger. Phase two doesn't turn as much on Donald Trump as it does on Israeli domestic politics. One of the two hard right ministers who has left the cabinet, that's Mr. Ben-Havir, the national security minister, and he's taken his party out of the coalition.

Now, he's agreed to support the Netanyahu coalition, but only on condition that Israel returns to military operations in six weeks' time. And there's nothing like if all the hostages come back, we won't have the military operations. It is, we will be going back to military operations. The finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, has stayed in the cabinet, but he has said he expects a military government to be declared over Gaza. Now, of course, in phase two,

The question of governance of Gaza is caught between the idea that the U.S. and Israel have, which is Hamas cannot return to power, and Hamas saying, we're the government here. I don't see any way, given Israeli domestic politics and that gulf in terms of who governs Palestine, that you get to phase two within the next six weeks.

Philip, we could talk about what Trump will mean for the Middle East for hours, but I mean, there's so much to unpack in terms of what we heard in his inaugural address. I mean, for starters, did we just hear him declare war on Panama?

Well, I think it could be read that way. He turned around and criticised the amount that the US is having to spend on transit fees for trade going through Panama, but also US warships going through Panama. He re-emphasised that it was US lives that had been lost in building the Panama Canal and at the

at the time, as a percentage of an investment of... Compared to GDP, it was one of America's biggest investments ever in building the Panama Canal. And then he said, we gave it to Panama, the Panamanian government. We didn't give it to China. And the Chinese have taken over and now operate the ports at either end of the Panama Canal, the Pacific end and the Atlantic end. And he specifically brought China out...

from that perspective. So that was a trade focus on China. And then he said, and we're going to take it back. Now, he was very clear in saying that. And that, to my mind, something that is owned by a sovereign country, that is territory in a sovereign country, when you say we're going to take it back, is as close to a declaration of war as you can possibly get. Now, whether he's going to

roll back from that again and try taking it back from a business perspective, that's probably what I think he's going to do because this is Trump, the bully, the business bully, coming in and saying, hey, militarily, we can do this. And of course, the Americans have got history in doing that. Whenever Noriega was...

president of Panama. The Americans invaded Panama to overthrow his regime before then withdrawing again. So that threat is very much there. I suspect it'll come into business negotiations over tariffs and Chinese control over the infrastructure in the Panama Canal. Scott, what did you make of that? I thought it was barking mad.

And it's barking mad in terms of the facts, which is, and I'm saying this after coming off of an interview on Irish radio, where a member of Republicans abroad, UK, told us that the Chinese military is in control of the Panama Canal, which came as a newsflash to me. The reality is, is that there's a Chinese holding company, which is Hong Kong based, if you want to be precise.

which oversees the local company that runs the ports, some of the ports in Panama. There's also U.S. and Taiwan companies that run ports in Panama because you make money out of that. There's been no holdup of the American military or of American shipping through the canal. And American ships have not been charged unfair rates. They're charged the same rates that other ships are.

But why has Trump whipped this up? I think it's because Philip's got it right. Trump's a bully. Trump likes to intimidate folks. But it gives you an easy win in terms of what people want to hear as he goes into office. I mean, it's not like declaring war on China, at least not directly. It's not like getting involved in the Middle East in terms of having a scrap with whoever you're going to scrap with. It's Panama, for goodness sake.

So, you know, it was Trump's line here, whether or not it sets up a hostage to fortune where people actually expect him to do something regarding Panama. And that's going to be difficult because here, let's get into the contradiction. Donald Trump is the guy who also is saying that Xi Jinping is an okay guy because Xi Jinping talked to him this week. So is Donald Trump really going to try to make a Chinese company divest from Panama?

just for scoring personal points. You know, that's the kind of tangled stuff that gets in. And the important thing is it gets in the way of more serious diplomacy. There are serious, serious issues with Central American countries that are going to intersect with the whole question of immigration. We've had that for years.

But instead of talking about that issue, Trump has picked this rogue issue that means basically trying to deal effectively with the region is going to be sidelined because of the white noise. Let's come on to the war in Ukraine now. Philip, is Donald Trump going to stand up to Vladimir Putin or cave into him? I think that's a $6 trillion question. We've gone beyond billions of dollars in this. It's interesting. We had that...

point after the election results came out where he turned around and clearly talked to President Zelensky of Ukraine. And President Zelensky has brought up a road piece, his roadmap to getting to a point where he can go to the negotiating table. And as part of that, he's suggested ceding some territory temporarily if there's a ceasefire linked to NATO membership and all the rest of it.

He went to Vladimir Putin to get Putin to talk about things. And after that phone call, Putin's team denied that it happened. And not only did they deny that it happened, but then the next day, as I've said several times on Frontline, they put nude pictures of Melania Trump up on Russian national television. Now, Putin's a former...

Russian intelligence officer, he threatens, but he threatens using compromise. And to do that, he was threatening Donald Trump. So clearly, there was a conversation I would assess. And clearly, the conversation didn't go the way Putin wanted it to go. And when we get into the negotiations on Ukraine, Trump, from a business perspective, will threaten both sides.

and he will expect both sides to give some concessions. Zelensky's playing a very clever game. He's already put concessions out on the table. Putin's concessions will be, I want the whole of the Donbass. I want more. I'm not going to let NATO be part of it. I'm not going to let European troops come into Ukraine. And Trump will want him to give something. And

And if he doesn't give something, Trump will want to hit him quite hard. And therefore, I think the way to do that would be to give a big package of support to Ukraine and to try and hit Russia more.

in other areas, potentially support through Iran, support through China, try and cut as much of that off as possible, cut the North Korean support off in a way that it's going to hit Putin. And the big way is economically. And I would suggest that he might try and hit international oil prices, because if he

managed to get oil prices to go through the floor. And he talked a lot about drill, drill, drill in the United States. If he brought the international oil prices down, that would potentially bankrupt Russia. That's very bad news for Putin and the Russian economy, which we know is struggling. So he'll use economic levers, I think, to bully Putin. He may use military levers by supporting Ukraine, but he's not going to achieve the end of the conflict.

by, he said, 24 hours. So tomorrow evening. Clock is ticking. As a former military intelligence officer, really interesting what you say about, you know, the compromise and the use of these naked images of Melania Trump on Russian TV. Presumably that is a shot across the bowels. Does that mean that the Russians may well have more on Trump? I think that's what Putin is suggesting. You know, if I'm going to do that,

after a phone call and, you know, it's your wife, not an ex-wife, not a girlfriend, not something else, it's your wife, I'm putting out there, then that would suggest that he's got something else because that's more than a big threat that he's put there. So we've always heard reports on Putin having some form of relationship over Trump. They certainly are closer than...

global leaders should be in many cases. We had during Trump's first presidency, he had a long meeting with Putin with no aides in the room, no one taking notes, no interpreters. And again, that's completely unheard of. So I think there's a lot more to play out in this. Scott, let's bring you in on this. How do you think Trump is going to approach Putin in his second term? Let's start with this. Donald Trump

My mother knows more about Ukraine than Donald Trump, and she's 85 and an assistant living in Florida. Okay, so it's not the question here to start off with Trump on Ukraine. It's the question of whether there are adults in the room in the Trump administration.

Keith Kellogg, envoy for Ukraine, military man. Mike Waltz, former U.S. Representative, National Security Advisor. Marco Rubio, presidential candidate and senator from Florida, who's Secretary of State. The reason why I say that is, and I want to see if Philip agrees with this as we kind of game this out, is that what...

Ukraine is effectively putting on the table, not just to America, but to European partners, is we're willing to accept the short-term Russian occupation of part of the Donbass and of Crimea and part of the South, because we can't push them out at this point. But in return, we want that path to NATO, and we want that path to the European Union. In other words, Ukraine's setting up something

which is very similar, I think, if you used a Cold War analogy to West Germany versus East Germany from 1949 on. Now, to the extent that Walsh and Kellogg have made statements, what they have said is we at least will talk about European peacekeepers, i.e. European troops giving support to Ukraine to make sure that there's no further invasion. They don't want American troops doing it, but European troops are fine.

We are willing to keep the flow of military aid going to Ukraine. What is up in the air is whether Ukraine will get that path to NATO membership. Now, if you've got those adults in the room and we weren't talking about Trump, I can see the play here, right? The problem here, as Philip's talking about, is at any point,

Trump could interject on social media. He could go off on one on a speech. He could decide he wants to go to Moscow and see Vladimir Putin. And all of that will be undone because, and Philip's absolutely, first of all, I think the compromise, remember, the Russians know how deep their cooperation was with the Trump campaign in 2016. They know how deep that was. Now, whether they would tell everybody, well, what we also know is that in 2017, that meeting that Philip referred to,

which took place on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Germany. Putin pulled Trump aside for a half hour with no other staff except the translators and told him Crimea is part of Russia, Eastern Ukraine is part of Russia. This is a historical thing. And he flipped Trump. He flipped Trump for years on that. That's what the Russians will try to do again to jam up the pathway because what Putin wants is, Putin wants not only to occupy those areas of Ukraine, he wants the international community to recognize it.

because he wants them to recognize the annexation. So I think what you've got here is the short answer is there's not going to be a day one, a day 60, a day 100 resolution of this. Trump's advisors now know this, but how much do Trump's advisors work with European partners, with NATO partners, and with Ukraine to get ourselves to some type of negotiation to at least freeze this conflict?

and forestall the threat of another Russian invasion.

And I suppose, Philip, this is the crucial question, isn't it? You know, if there is some kind of freezing of the conflict, what are the terms of it? Are you saying that the front lines, as they are at the moment, get frozen? Well, is Vladimir Putin, for example, going to accept that the front lines being frozen given the Ukrainian presence in Kursk Oblast? That's a big question. Does that involve some kind of future security guarantee around NATO membership? And it would have to be pretty firm because as many Ukrainians would say, well, look, we've been down this road before with the Budapest memorandum.

The Budapest Memorandum and the security assurances that US, UK and Russia gave Ukraine are meaningless. And therefore, I think President Zelensky, his red line will be NATO membership. Now, you know,

that would mean changing the way NATO is, because you don't allow a country that's got a current conflict going on to join NATO. And therefore, and Zelensky knows that, Putin's red lines will be, he will want the whole of the Donbass. He'll want something he can sell as a victory. I agree that we could be seeing a West Germany, East Germany type scenario that's coming in. But

But Putin will be wanting more and more and more. He's greedy. He does not want to compromise. He does not want to give anything away. And that, I think, will begin to rile Trump where he's coming in. And the other thing that when the grown-ups in the room, and I think it will be down to the grown-ups in the room, when they start to analyse this, they'll see that Xi Jinping is very carefully watching what solution will come into Europe today.

and will be going and trying to calculate whether he could survive the wrath of Donald Trump and the international community should he take Taiwan by force. And there's a very real danger that if Ukraine is forced to give up any territory, even temporarily,

Xi Jinping will go, OK, if I can rapidly take Taiwan whilst everyone else is focused on it, the global economic shock that that will cause will force people to look at things from an economic perspective and I can then negotiate very, very quickly a settlement and I'm just bringing in what everyone has recognised where it's a one China policy. I've brought them back into China and he'll be watching that extremely closely indeed. That's the real danger that there is here. So...

It's not an easy solution in any way, shape or form. And I think what we're seeing on the table at the moment is not going to be what is going to come out if we even get to that negotiating stance in Trump's first year. I don't think it's going to happen in his first 100 days.

Scott, I'm going to transport you into a pretty unlikely position. Let's say you are in the room with Donald Trump advising him in the White House as part of his second administration and you have to make an argument as to why he should continue to support Ukraine or at the very least not give in to Russia's most excessive demands.

Do you think tactically the best way of framing that argument that would appeal to Donald Trump, the man and the politician, is to frame it through the position of the blow, not only to America's prestige that it would be if you give in too much to Putin, but also how it would embolden China, who Trump sees now as America's main strategic foe? You can't go to Trump...

in my opinion, with the line of, you know, if you don't do this, then you're going to be perceived as weak, et cetera, like that. Trump doesn't like being told that.

You have to go to Trump and tell him, if you do this, you're going to receive credit, right? That's the Israel-Gaza example that we just saw. So what you have to say is, look, you know, President Trump, you want to be remembered as like the greatest American president here. You have an opportunity to be even greater than the presidents in the Cold War, right? You have the opportunity to be able to strike the deal that draws a line

in terms of where we are vis-a-vis Russia, and in terms of where we are in terms of American leadership in Europe. You can't even frame it as alliance with Europe. You have to call it American leadership in Europe. And you have to say, look, your leadership here is going to involve an American commitment, not of troops, but of American resource. And in exchange, you know what you're going to get for this?

you're going to get a whole lot of contracts out of Ukraine in terms of defense contracts and trade contracts. And that's going to benefit the American economy for generations to come. Because here's a little piece of the story. Kiev knows that. Kiev knows that. And a very, very good journalist named Mary Fitzgerald, who was with the Irish Times for a while, now is based out of Paris. She came back from Kiev and said the investment in Ukraine

military technology in Ukraine to position itself as a global leader when it comes to drones, when it comes to logistics, when it comes to other types of military engineering. That's what they're banking on to build the Ukrainian economy if they are caught in the long term with this with Russia.

You sell that to Trump. You sell that to Trump that Ukraine wants to be your trading partner. And building on that, I think there's a wider piece to it as well, because one of Russia's greatest exports around the world was Russian military technology. So many countries operate Russian or old Soviet equipments.

The way they've behaved on the battlefield in Ukraine means that countries are now going, we don't want this stuff, and they're going to want to get rid of it as quickly as possible. So to convince Donald Trump that that could be filled by American equipment and therefore the...

political capital that that would do to nations that have been Soviet-focused, then Russian-focused in the past, bring them into the American fold, will appeal to Donald Trump hugely. Combine all that with the, and this will get you the Nobel Peace Prize, and you've got a winner. Yes, indeed. And actually, Scott, what do you make of the point that Philip touched on earlier, which is maybe there's a way also of helping to defeat Vladimir Putin in Russia,

by, for example, you know, the economic policies of Donald Trump. You know, if he does follow his drill baby drill approach and there will be environmentalists who have concerns about that. But if you're looking at it from a purely economic point of view and the impact on the global oil price, you know, that may well cripple the Russian economy. And he may see that as a far better way of getting Putin around the negotiating table than, for example, ramping up military aid to Ukraine. You got a problem here. That's the Gulf countries.

uh because when you talk about the global oil price it affects them as well and of course donald trump is beholden to the gulf countries uh in particular i'm just going to put it out there his son-in-law jared kushner is on the hook for a lot of money being provided to his investment company by saudi arabia and the uae so this is intertwined you might with drill baby drill affect the russians

a little bit more beyond where they're affected already, but you're also going to affect some other countries as well. So I don't think that's the play here. If you want the real play in terms of if they really want to crack down on the Russians, they tighten even further up on the shadow fleet. They really crack down on the Russian shadow fleet, even to the extent of a cooperative effort. And Trump, Trump doesn't like war, but Trump does like military operations.

And you basically talk about using American military operations to go after the shadow fleet.

Scott, do you think, I mean, the European role in all of this is fascinating. Do you think there is any possibility that we could see as part of Europe and Ukraine's European allies increasing their commitments to Ukraine if America steps back in some way? Do you think we could see European troops actually in Ukraine at some point? Certainly it's being discussed that you have the European troops in there. So I'll just say what's out there and then Philip can take us through the complications that are going to come out.

And that is Emmanuel Macron, a few months ago, put this out in terms of French troops being in there. Now, I have to say, my understanding is Macron were talking about support troops in terms of providing logistics, for example, providing support for Ukraine's aerial operations, probably including the strikes inside Russia. But now Macron's idea has sort of been transformed in could French troops be part of a peacekeeping force?

Then you had Keir Starmer, at least in principle, saying that this was a possibility. Now, there was a little bit of vagueness around the language and so on. But now you've got Annalena Baerbock, the German foreign minister, who is saying it's a possibility. So it's being discussed now.

The fact is, is that, you know, if Ukraine is not in NATO, Philip can help me out with this. I don't think there's an Article 5 commitment that covers those troops. So what is the protection for those troops that are in there against Russian attack? Be that, well, especially Russian aerial attack, which is a daily threat there. And so it's a gray area that I'm not sure is being untangled beyond the statements and principles at this moment.

Philip, what's your take? Yeah, it's very complex. And the UK has been talking about potentially moving Operation Interflex, which is the training of Ukrainian civilians and turning them into trained soldiers, which is currently done in the UK by an international coalition led by the UK.

moving that into Ukraine, which logistically will help. The French have talked about that as well, but that's one step before then providing a peacekeeping force in part of Ukraine to allow Ukraine to move its troops out of that area and move to the front line. But as soon as we put

European troops that are part of NATO countries into Ukraine, and they're training Ukrainian troops under international law, they're legitimate targets for Russia. And therefore, they're going to have to go in with a protection package, and that'll include an air defence package

That air defence package, the only way to properly do that would be to have a no-fly zone imposed over that area. You're then going up the escalatory ladder and the potential for NATO or European troops under a coalition, but from NATO countries getting into a position where they're having to engage Russian military capability and...

either directly or indirectly as part of a defensive posture. But again, you're running up that escalatory ladder and you're then getting into very grey areas when it comes to the potential calling of an Article 5. So there's a lot of danger attached to it.

But if that was part of Trump's peace plan, if there was a peace agreement that had been put on the table and a ceasefire that had been agreed, that would then potentially take the threat of Russian direct action away. But you'd still have the requirement to provide an overwatch capability, which could be done.

And that's a really good point, actually, because, you know, this is also the end of the Biden administration is worth remembering. And even though Joe Biden has very much kind of positioned himself as a strong ally of Ukraine,

There are criticisms a lot of Ukraine supporters would make of the Biden administration, not least the kind of incremental approach to military aid. And the fact that the shadow fleet has been allowed to operate to the extent that it has will be a source of frustration to many people. So why do you think it is that the previous administration did not do more? And do you think potentially we could see the Trump administration have a concerted effort to crack down on it?

I think the previous administration, and this was the criticism that came from Trump's team when you analyse the we'll end the war, we'll cut our support for Ukraine. It wasn't we'll cut our support for Ukraine. It was we'll cut our support for Ukraine in the way that the Democrats are approaching dealing with the issue because there is no plan B.

to end the conflict and no plan for peace. So if there's a plan for peace, we'll continue the support. And you've got the shadow fleet, you've got the ships that are cutting critical national infrastructure around the place. And I think, you know, I hear the bit about Saudi Arabia, but I think there's a sop that America could throw to Saudi Arabia. And this shows the interlinking of the different conflict zones, because Iran is at its weakest point at the moment. And if

Trump came in and decided that he wanted to exploit Iran's weakness and destroy the IRGC, destroy their elements of shadow fleet that is moving oil around into North Korea, Russia and elsewhere, destroy the armament factories that are building the Shahad drones and the long range missiles.

and to impact Iran's nuclear capability, Saudi Arabia would be very, very happy. And I think they would take an element of pain when it came to the international oil price for a period of time. If that period of time then allowed Russia to be impacted in a way, because Saudi...

Arabia has built up its reserves. It can do that if it knows that there is a reason for it and that that shock is only going to be temporary for them and they get rid of one of their other rivals, the bigger threat, because you've got that Sunni-Shia civil war that's been going on for centuries that's been fought by proxy across the Middle East. And again, that could lead to...

greater potential stability across the Middle East. But this is where Donald Trump's grown-ups need to be properly grown up and see the interrelationships between all of the different conflicts in different areas, because it's hugely complex. And Scott, do you have any faith that the grown-ups in the room will win out? Because we saw in Trump's first administration that he began by surrounding himself with, in some cases, some pretty serious people, and most of them were not there by the end.

Well, you just answered the question, didn't you? I mean, I can tell you right now that already, you know, there are signals there. There's already Steve Bannon, who, of course, was Trump's chief strategist first term around. Bannon's out now. Bannon's out because Elon Musk is in, right? Now, that's one example. We haven't seen that because we haven't even gotten confirmation of the cabinet secretaries yet.

So we don't know how long they would last if their egos are perceived as being bigger than Trump, if they're receiving more attention, if they're receiving more credit. I think Marco Rubio is skilled enough, as Mike Pompeo was in Trump 1, to be able to play this. Mike Waltz, we'll have to see what it's like as National Security Advisor. But remember, even if those guys can last, there is a real question mark in defense because Pete Hegseth,

is an absolute non-entity. This is the Fox TV personality who has serious issues. And I won't go any further, but serious personal issues. He was being brought in not to implement military strategy. He's not being brought in to organize the military to administer it. Pete Hegs is being brought in to carry out a purge of the military.

He's being brought in to get rid of generals, admirals, and commanders. So you've got the threat that the Pentagon's going to be completely disrupted at this critical time in international affairs. And then the other threat that you've got that I would identify very quickly is your director of national intelligence. The nominee is Tulsi Gabbard. Now, Tulsi Gabbard, who's the former representative, former Democrat who swung to become a Trumpist, was pro-Assad in the Syrian conflict, but she is also pro-Kremlin.

I've watched her for years repeat the Kremlin's talking points. Now, she may not get confirmed. I think she's the person at risk, even greater than Hegseth, of not getting confirmed. But if she was confirmed at a time when we're trying to deal with Ukraine and Russia, you've got a pro-Kremlin director of national intelligence. So no, when I put the scenario out about adults in the room, it was a possibility.

And it was a rational possibility. But too often, the Trump years get into the irrational. And it could well happen sooner rather than later this time around.

See, I've got a slightly different view on his nominations for defence and for national security. And I call this the Elon Musk factor. Two of the most inefficient departments in the US government are defence and intelligence. And with Elon Musk coming in with his...

efficiency drive, you want to put two political lightweights in charge of those departments so that when Musk comes in with his broom and cleans them out to a way that is there, Trump can then say, we'll accept all of that. But by the way, you've let your departments down and sack them and then put someone else in. So I think that we're put in there to be a fall guy and a fall girl to allow you from a domestic political perspective. And he'll allow his

Secretary of State and National Security Advisor to take on the grown-up talks and do everything else. So it'll be interesting to see how that plays out. But, Phyllis, specifically on Tulsi Gabbard, I mean, let's be frank about this, and I'm interested to get your take as a former military intelligence officer. There are many, many people in America who have serious concerns that she herself may be compromised.

Do you share those concerns? I share the concerns. And, you know, I know that at a working level across US intelligence, they will be looking at that very carefully indeed. And if they can't then use their influence when it comes to, you know,

her nomination being scrutinised and whether she's accepted or not, then they get into a very interesting position where I think the intelligence output and briefings that go to the highest political levels will be tailored in a way that they're not giving all of the detail. And if they think that she's compromised, that tailoring could also use...

disinformation that if she's passing stuff on can mislead then the adversaries in particular Vladimir Putin but also Xi Jinping so they'd effectively turn her and use her as a double agent.

Scott, we talk a lot about Donald. So sorry, Scott, do you want to jump in on that point? Yeah, I think the twist here is I'm not sure. I don't think Tulsi Gabbard has been compromised in that classic since we talk about. Whereas, you know, that whether in terms of money, whether in terms of basically coercion from the equivalent against her, for example, I think Tulsi Gabbard is a true believer. And by that is there's a wider there's a wider sphere out there on social media of former American intelligence officers.

former American military officers who very much now put forth the Kremlin's talking points. I mean, the retired intelligence officers, Philip may know them, BIPs, right? People like Ray McGovern who are out there. Scott Ritter, the former arms inspector in Iraq, who now is one of the mainstays for Russian media. And I think Tulsi Gabbard got into those social media sphere with these folks and just simply was picking up the lines that they were putting out there.

That makes her harder to turn, Philip, I think, in terms of turning her back, because as a true believer, that's much more difficult than someone who's simply there because of money or because of some type of pragmatic motive, let's put it that way.

From an intelligence perspective and then a disinformation perspective and being able to feed that disinformation and runner, she's the best candidate you can possibly get because she's not motivated by anything else. And you just feed her stuff that you know is untrue that she's going to put out around that community. And I agree with you. I know US intelligence officers, militia intelligence officers that I have worked with before who have got

more Moscow-type leanings in different areas, and it surprised me enormously because I knew them very well indeed. And I've been chatting to them, and it's fascinating to hear things from a slightly different perspective. But she'll not...

therefore beheading her department. She'll not be getting access to the most sensitive information and she will be used as a tool because the Russians will know that they haven't compromised her then if they haven't and will then take what she's saying as the gospel truth in many cases. Let me ask Philip a quick question really quickly, James. Philip, do you think Musk motive is actually to carry out efficiency in the Pentagon or do you think it's to get billions more in contracts for SpaceX? I think both.

Because the more he can make the Pentagon efficient, the more money that potentially he can sidle into providing contractor support into the Department of Defence through his company.

Scott, we often focus on Trump's relationship with Vladimir Putin. But of course, Trump's relationship with Vladimir Zelensky is also very, very complicated. We remember some of the circumstances around his first impeachment, for instance. So if you are Zelensky, who has been since the election on a bit of a charm offensive with Trump, what do you think his best approach is if you're trying to get the best possible deal for Ukraine? Zelensky is not going to win over Trump.

I'm just going to tell you this right now. He won't win over Trump, first of all, because 2019, Trump blamed Zelensky in part for, you know, Trump's, let's call it misstep that led to the first impeachment, that attempt to blackmail Ukraine to disturb on Joe Biden. Secondly, he's not, Zelensky's not going to win over Trump because there's too many Trumpists out there

who are going to bend the ear of the president with this line that Zelensky is ripping off the United States. Or as Trump put it in his speeches, you know, Vladimir Zelensky is one of the world's greatest salesmen. Every time he comes to Washington, he leaves with a billion dollars. You know, and Trump thinks in terms of those transactional terms. Zelensky has to talk nice to Trump. But what I think Zelensky and...

the key of establishment have to do is they've got to get to the people around Trump. They've got to get to the adults in the room and talk about what the stakes are here. Because I do think that, you know,

Marco Rubio, although he's become more Trumpist in his lines because he wants to become Secretary of State, Rubio starts off talking about the Russian threat to Ukraine. Mike Waltz talks about the Russian threat to Ukraine. Keith Kellogg's a military man who knows what the Russian threat is. So you've got to get to those agency folks. And of course, you get to them not only in D.C., but remember, you get to them in NATO, right? And that's going to be a really important thing to watch.

And it's not just Zelensky. The one thing I'd be interested in, and maybe we could schedule another discussion because I'm loving this so much. The balance of power in Europe arguably is shifting a bit in that within NATO, within the EU, I think the Baltic countries, I think Poland, I think the Czech Republic have become far more important.

I think France and Germany are looking to be a bit weak right now. I think they're looking uncertain because of their domestic politics. But you look at how much those countries have come to the fore in terms of galvanizing opinion for support for Ukraine. And I, you know, when Zelensky talks to America, he's not talking alone. He will be talking to these other countries as well to maintain links through NATO and also through their American contacts.

Philip, do you want to come in on that? Yeah, no, I agree completely. I think the Baltic countries, including new NATO members, Finland and Sweden, will have, and Poland in particular, will have a greater ear of Trump because German politics is...

messed up at the moment and we've got German elections coming earlier this year. The French are in free fall politically, so they've lost their influence. Maloney in Italy will have Trump's ear, I think, because she's on the right side of politics there. The UK's position is extremely weak indeed because our military has been hollowed out

And Trump's team will see Keir Starmer effectively as the Joe Biden of the UK. So this special relationship that Keir Starmer was talking about in his congratulatory note to Donald Trump will be meaningless unless it's backed up with substance and justice.

Trump would have used or the United States would have used the UK to help bully things through Europe and to bully things in through NATO and to support the United States. He doesn't have that anymore. And that will force him to look at Poland, Italy and the Baltic states. I'd go even farther in the UK because I've just written about it in the past week. And again, I just throw it out there. Maybe we could pick it up at a later point.

I think Elon Musk, in fact, I analyzed it, that since January 1st, Elon Musk has been running a mission to try to overthrow the UK government.

And that is, you know, a campaign across social media, which is calling for Keir Starmer to be imprisoned, calling for labor ministers and MPs to be imprisoned. He's using the grooming gangs issue as the jump off point for this. Musk is very much linked up with the Reform Party now. The Reform Party have got two national British outlets.

that are effectively running their lines. That's a really dangerous media and political sphere. And for Musk to be on the inside of the administration and for the Reform Party to be trying to get on the inside of the administration, which they were doing all week during the inaugural ceremonies,

I think the UK right now is not just simply on the sidelines. I think the UK is actually under threat from element. Gentlemen, this has been an absolutely fascinating discussion. Just before we go, quick question for each of you. Scott, we'll start with you first. Do you think the war in Ukraine will still be a hot war by the end of this year? I think it depends. It depends on how much, in particular, the Europeans are able to organize themselves politically and militarily.

It depends on conduits. It was interesting that Philip picked up on one I should have, like Georgia Maloney in Italy, who's been very strong in support for Ukraine. If the Europeans and if NATO can get their act together, if the Germans would stop messing around, and I got to argue with you, get rid of Olaf Scholz, to be honest, right? Then I think you've got a unified line that could bring this to negotiations, because I think then you've got buy-in from people around Trump.

But the Europeans are going to have to have the difficult task of both not antagonizing Trump in the meantime, but also being very, very firm here. If you do that, yeah, I think you can get to negotiations before the end of it.

Philip, same question for you. I think we will see fighting continuing into the autumn. There's a possibility, I think, that towards the end of the year, when you were starting to get winter coming in and it's difficult for manoeuvre operations for the first negotiations to happen. But I don't think I can see a way for...

Ukraine being brought into NATO and Zelenskyy being able to sell anything less than NATO membership because of what's happened in the past with international agreements as a security guarantee. So if there is a pause, it will only be a pause. So I can see the fighting going on for quite some time.

Well, Philip, Scott, this has been an absolute pleasure. Thank you both so much for joining us. Whatever happened during the Trump presidency, we will be here to cover it, every twist and turn, in particular how it affects Ukraine, Russia and the rest of the world. Thank you for watching Frontline for Times Radio with me, James Hansen. For more on the war in Ukraine and other global conflicts, you can subscribe or sign up for a membership for exclusive videos. You can also get the latest news and analysis on Times Radio or from thetimes.com.

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