Frontline special - military analyst Matthew Savill of RUSI
21:35 Share

Welcome to The World in 10. In an increasingly uncertain world, this is The Times' daily podcast dedicated to global security. I'm Alex Dibble and I executive produce the podcast. The World in 10 is partnered with Frontline, the interview series from Times Radio, available on YouTube, with expert analysis of the world's conflicts. At the weekend, we bring you Frontline interviews in full. Here's one from this week. I hope you find it interesting.

Hello and welcome to Frontline for Times Radio. I'm James Hansen and today we're talking about the latest on the war in Ukraine and I'm delighted to be joined once again by Matthew Saville, Director of Military Sciences at the Royal United Services Institute. Matthew, always a pleasure. Welcome back to Frontline. To begin with, as we start 2025, just give me your assessment, if you can, of the situation we're seeing on the Frontline, both in terms of Kursk, where we've seen renewed offensive operations by Ukraine in recent days, but also in the East. Hello.

It's fair to say, I think, that the picture overall looks like a relatively straightforward continuation of the situation that we had before Christmas in the last couple of months of last year, which is that you have a Ukrainian position that is largely speaking defensive, undefined.

And the Russians are the one that are making headway, but at incredible cost and slowly. And that is reflective of a Russian ability to sustain pretty broad pressure and

because of certain advantages they have in personnel numbers and their ability to keep kind of going with their industry. But that's, you know, that's not without significant cost. I think it feels that the Ukrainian situation and position is pretty difficult at the end of the year and heading into this year.

Because they've got some reasonably big underlying problems with, if you like, generating new forces. And a big part of that is personnel numbers. But there is also a materiel issue for them. Kursk is a bit of an outlier because what we've seen there in the past week is what looks like a relatively small operation to sort of

maybe sort of try and retake the initiative. I think I'm with the people who are being quite cautious about jumping to any broad conclusions about that, because as that has played out and more information has come out, it looks relatively small. We're talking about, you know, a number of companies, maybe, you know, a few hundred people around a battalion sized operation, probably just to deal with, you know,

redressing their front lines in a few areas, you know, to try and tidy things up, maybe spot an opportunity, rather than any sign that there's going to be suddenly a huge expansion of the Kursk incursion. And I think the role that that plays is significant.

very dependent on what happens with the new US administration. And that's actually the headline, is that everyone's stuck in a sort of holding pattern, waiting to see what the US approach will be. And in the meantime, as they have for months now, they're trying to seek out small advantages that will either improve their negotiating position or lock in certain tactical advantages on the battlefield.

We will come on to what a Trump administration may mean for the war very shortly. Obviously, we've spoken a lot about the supply issues for Ukraine, but I was struck that you said that, yes, Russia are able to make some small gains, but at a big cost. What form does that cost take? It's both material and

stuff, equipment and weapons, and people. So what seems to be coming out, and this includes sort of Western intelligence briefing, are very high levels of casualties. And the way that they're operating is relatively blunt force, essentially. They have a lot of people that they can put into positions

Small attacks, so these aren't operations that involve...

thousands of people using a combination of armor and then dismounting, you know, a large coordinated offensive. It's repeated small attacks that just wear down Ukrainian defenders, that they have to constantly be on alert, that they are constantly being pressured, that there is a high level of overhead surveillance and strike activity being conducted by drones of various types.

And that costs the Russians a lot. And now it sounds like it's costing the North Koreans who have joined them in Kursk. But what it does is it means that the pressure is relentless and that enables them to both spot small gaps and push through. It's just also the psychological pressure on Ukrainian defenders.

And the reason why that accumulates and causes larger problems for Ukraine is that it means it's very difficult for them to rotate people, particularly units, off the front line to give them a break, to re-equip them, to resupply them.

And so it becomes expensive to do so. And just it's a complicated operation. And there has been some reporting and evidence that some Russian advances have taken place when Ukrainian rotations haven't been perfectly executed. And that's produced gaps that the Russians have taken advantage of. I mean, this is all ferociously complicated.

That sounds like quite an unsophisticated approach. In and amongst this, there is then a sophisticated battle over certain elements of technology, for example, the use of electronic warfare, and then counters to that different kinds of drones, different ways that they're being used. So I don't want to give the impression that this is simply sort of a human wave attack. There is also...

a constant backwards and forwards on tactics and technology that's happening in

behind the scenes. And the electronic warfare is really interesting because there's been a lot of reporting in recent weeks about some of the innovative approaches that particularly Ukraine have been using in Kursk to disrupt Russian drones. What do we know about that? Publicly, not a huge amount, although I think there are lots of people who are now, including my team, doing research into aspects of this.

What came out, and it's worth noting this is from a variety of sources, some of which are Russian, is that, for example, the operation over the weekend in Kursk appeared to be more successful than

than previous ones in terms of using a combination of armor and troops that were mechanized and electronic warfare to create windows where Russian observation was obscured or denied. And therefore the Ukrainians will be able to coordinate that with how they advanced. There's an,

ongoing battle about spotting forces on the battlefield. I mean, this is across the line. And then the ability to bring in artillery, for example. In many areas, artillery is still absolutely vital. But there are some cases where, particularly on the Ukrainian side, they have used first-person view drones and other systems to compensate for

for either their reduced artillery supplies or targets of opportunity popping up. Although I would add that the most recent reporting suggests that there have been some parts of the frontline where that large gap in artillery supply that was in play last year has been narrowed or indeed eradicated. So the delay caused by particularly the big US package at the start of last year

the Ukrainian cause. But lots of that material is now in the system. It is flowing in. The other thing that's come up recently that, you know, the people who really look into the detail on this have pointed out is the increasing use of fiber optic cable on the

on drones because that helps you reduce or sometimes eliminate the ability of the adversary to jam your drone. And by that we mean a drone is literally connected by a kilometers-long cable to an operator or an offset control point,

which means you are flying it whilst it's trailing cable for 10 or 15 kilometers, a very fine cable, to then conduct a strike. And I'm sure we'll then see a response to that and that there will be countermeasures applied to get at the cable or track it back to its source.

or to interfere with the ability of the drone to physically get to its target. So, you know, that battle will continue to evolve. That isn't the end point of that evolution. But that's the kind of thing that's going on around the ground on the front line. I mean, that is really fascinating about the fiber optic cables. Presumably, you can't do that at scale because if you had all these drones flying around with fiber optic cables, it would just become...

messy i mean how would that work i would have said yes that's very difficult to do at scale um

But we've seen images of apparently fiber optic cable drones operating in wooded areas, which I would have said as a layperson would have been extraordinarily difficult, but it's achieved. The big thing that is still the case with a lot of FPV drones, regardless of whether they are fiber optically controlled or not, is that broadly speaking, you have one operator per drone.

And that creates the personnel, if you like, bill for the use of those drones is that somebody is controlling a single munition that is going at a single target per strike, basically. And that is often a limiter. I think the experimentation or any innovation that we see that enables swarms to be operated, perhaps, you know, queued off,

A single human controlled drone will be the point at which people can increase the scale of those kind of effects. And that's why, for example, they're often been using to complement artillery because, you know, a single artillery piece can fire multiple rounds per minute with a small crew and then move and then fire again.

with a time lag. Whereas one of the things that FPV operators have found is that, of course, they're largely speaking static when they're controlling, and therefore they have to hide themselves and obscure the signal. Hence why you get some offset. Let's talk about, I suppose, the elephant in the room, which is Donald Trump. We're just under two weeks now from his inauguration.

I suppose the difficulty is no one really knows what approach his administration is going to take to the war. And in a way, that's deliberate. I mean, he sort of deliberately tries to pursue this policy of almost creative ambiguity and of unpredictability so that all sides are guessing. But what is your sense, Matthew, of how the administration is likely to, at least in the beginning, approach the war? So, I mean, this is a genuinely, this feels really speculative because I think,

What many of us have been trying to do is read the tea leaves of the people that have been appointed to the administration and draw conclusions from that. And the problem there is that the picture is mixed. So you have a vice president who has been pretty clear on his scepticism over continued support for Ukraine. But the proposed or the identified special representative on Ukraine, former General Kellogg, wrote a piece about

last year and has talked about being pretty tough on Russia as a means of enabling early negotiations. The question is, which of these voices wins out? And that is where it's genuinely hard to know how Trump will come down, because sometimes he's been quite open to, you know, like the last person he spoke to.

I think it's fair to say, though, his inclinations have been pretty consistently expressed as sceptical towards the value of continued support for Ukraine. I would say that what the Ukrainians have done is pin their hopes on presenting him with an argument when he comes in that the current situation is not conducive to a good negotiated outcome.

and that he wouldn't want to be associated with that. And therefore, what he should do is boost support, even if that's over a compressed timeframe, in order to give them a better chance of a win that he could credit himself with. I honestly don't know if that approach will work. You can see the way that they've been talking about it is aimed at trying to appeal to that

I just don't know if it will land because so much of it depends on when he sits down on the 20th of January or the 21st of January and he gets a Ukraine update, how does he feel about that? Does he see an opportunity there to cut a good deal? Does he see it as a largely negative situation and he wants to cut his losses?

Or does he come up with some sort of compromise, which is, well, maybe I'll see how this plays out. And I honestly don't know. My feeling is that he doesn't have the kind of patience for the sustained investment that is necessary, both by the US and we shouldn't forget Europe, and that time is against the Ukrainians because the situation that they want to be in that is desirable for them is

requires some fairly significant battlefield success to push the Russians back. And that will take time, and it's time that they don't have. So I don't know what the answer is in terms of will he kind of help them maneuver into a reasonable negotiated settlement. But I would say that whatever –

takes place in the early months of this year is unlikely to be really where they want to be. But you wonder also if in Trump's mind, he sees what is happening in Ukraine as part of a wider thing of, well, why is America, in his view, bankrolling Europe's security? And he came out again yesterday saying that

the Europeans would be spending more of a high percentage of their GDP on defence. I think he quoted 5%, which seems completely unrealistic, but certainly a lot of people are saying it needs to be a lot closer to 3%. If Europe and Ukraine's allies in Europe did...

commit to a significant increase in their defence spending and a significant increase in the aid they are giving to Ukraine. Do you think that might change the way that Trump views the whole conflict? So first of all, he is not wrong. And that is a constant refrain of US politics, regardless of party. I'm not sure if freeloading is right, but Europe has had enormous benefit from US military support or support

of theoretical support that covers a load of gaps in European cuts that European militaries have made over the years, or lack of investment is a better way of putting it. So he's not wrong to be pushing on that point. And already you're seeing the sort of the way that people are talking is almost slightly pandering to the, oh, well, Trump might not be so bad. And, you know, yes, we should look at increasing our defence spending. And it's already gone up.

over the past 10 years since the NATO conference in Wales that made further commitments. Whether that would actually change his mind, I don't know. And there's a slight problem here is that he absolutely regards these relationships as transactional. And therefore, in theory, a number of European countries highlighting increased spending or actually making new commitments would go down well.

The issue would be is he might just bank that and say, thanks very much. I was right. And then focus on China and the Indo-Pacific anyway, as some of his advisers would like the US to do. In other words, validating his approach doesn't necessarily mean that he will be inclined to change it.

And in truth, you know, Europe should be doing more in its defense anyway. And I think the message has got through. The question is whether they will actually make significant changes in the timelines that are necessary.

And I think what is also fascinating with Trump is the extent to which personal relationships come into it. And what is fascinating now is that you're seeing Zelensky in particular really trying to woo Trump and going on a charm offensive. And, you know, Zelensky is an incredibly skilled politician, but he's got his work cut out because he now needs to. And they've got a very complicated relationship dating back to the circumstances around Trump's first impeachment. And you wonder how much that still looms in the Trump psyche. But Zelensky is

Zelensky is clearly on manoeuvres when it comes to trying to woo Trump. And that will be fascinating as well, whether they can actually form a genuine allyship. Yes. Now, I think, I mean, I'm not really an expert in this area, but I was in government during the first Trump administration. I think the honest advice I would give is that, and this is to the detriment of how these things work,

I don't think people could rely on, even if they build up a good relationship, that that would necessarily be sustained or would insulate them if a conflicting priority came up. The simple fact is that I don't think anybody could actually rely on or trust Trump over the long term. So they're going to have to move to mirror Trump.

largely transactional approach, which is that there are things that can be done to influence him and credit can be bought. But he could simply turn around in two years and make new demands or change his mind or have another priority. In essence, he is not going to inconvenience himself or the US and its interests for NATO allies or countries like Ukraine.

And so I think ultimately, you know, European countries are going to have to, if you like, reinsure themselves against risk. And Ukraine can do things to increase the prospects for U.S. support, but they will have to keep on doing things. Like there is no, I don't think there's, it's realistic or people would be foolish to believe that because they make a breakthrough or they have a good meeting,

that will stand them in good stead two years hence. I mean, the reverse is obviously true, which is that if somebody has a fairly significant falling out, there will be consequences. But it does mean they could always literally buy themselves back into favour. But I mean, look at internal US dynamics. He fell out with and had serious issues with any number of people in his first administration, and they were Americans that he had picked.

for his administration. So I think there's a cautionary tale there, as well as there being some positivity in that lots of people who criticised him, once they have effectively abased themselves before him, have been welcomed back into his orbit. But it's all temporary. Matthew Saville, we always appreciate your time. Thank you so much for joining us again on Frontline. My pleasure. Thank you.