Frontline special - Professor Mark Galeotti
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Welcome to The World in 10. In an increasingly uncertain world, this is The Times' daily podcast dedicated to global security. I'm Alex Dibble and I executive produce the podcast. The World in 10 is partnered with Frontline, the interview series from Times Radio, available on YouTube, with expert analysis of the world's conflicts. At the weekend, we bring you Frontline interviews in full. Here's one from this week. I hope you find it interesting.

Hello and welcome to Frontline for Times Radio with me, Kate Chabot, and today we're catching up with a regular on Frontline, Professor Mark Gagliotti. Mark is a former advisor to the Foreign Office on Russian foreign and security policy. He's the author of several books about Russia and the latest is Forged in War, a military history of Russia from its beginnings to today. Mark, great to see you again on Frontline. Thank you for your time. Thank you.

Your latest article for The Times newspaper is called Trump and Putin, the fragile relationship that will change the world, where you examine what you describe as their on-off bromance. Can we just start by rewinding and having a little look at what the relationship was like during Trump's first presidency? I mean, it was perverse. I mean, I say in the article that Trump never seemed to have met an autocrat that he didn't like, whether we're talking about

Xi Jinping in China or Kim in North Korea. But the Putin relationship was really quite something in that he kept talking up how well the relationship had been and was going to go. Whenever they met, he often would like to have little sort of personal tete-a-tetes with Putin. And inevitably, this created all this kind of palaver about, you know, is he actually compromised by the Russians or

But we have to recognize two points. One is that if he had been compromised, I imagine that if I had been an agent handler in the headquarters of Russian foreign intelligence, running Agent Orange, I would have told him to actually damp down all the positive words about Putin because it almost made it impossible for him precisely to be

pro-Russian in any practical way. But also, if we look about it, actually, American policy towards Russia at the end of Trump's first presidency was tougher than it had been at any point since the end of the Cold War. In part, this is because, frankly, Congress took over Russia policy, but certainly Trump didn't bother exerting any political capital to try and change that. So we have this strange paradox of the warmest of warm words to the point that was almost embarrassing.

And yet policy itself really wasn't particularly affected by this notional affinity. And why do you think there was a disconnect between the warm words that you say, which were embarrassing to the way the policy was being exercised? Look, I mean, it's hard enough for me to crawl into Putin's mind to go to try and head into Trump's as well is frankly asking a lot of me. Now, I mean, but it does seem to be that he has...

This desire not only to be liked generally, but nonetheless, particularly he sees himself not as the elected Democratic president of a country, but rather the sort of the strongman chief executive officer of USA Incorporated. And he looks to the other strongman figures, people who aren't held back by these sort of petty issues of law and constitution and basic decency.

And those are the kind of guys whose club he wants to be in. So there seems to be that he has this political as well as emotional affinity with the strong men. But again, when it comes down to it, ultimately, Trump is interested in Trump. And he's certainly not going to put himself in peril or even, frankly, exert himself in

in order to do something for these, as you would see it, fellow strongmen. And you write that they met five times in person. Another is potentially on the cards. The first was in Germany, but the most famous was in Helsinki in 2018. How much do we know about what really went on? Well, we don't. That's the point. I mean, actually, usually when you have these one-on-one meetings,

they're not really one-on-one. Firstly, you've had massive amounts of preparatory work by the so-called sherpas, you know, the people who are actually going to try and set up the meeting, identify the lines of discussion, etc. Then when the heads of state go in, there's usually a whole phalanx, not just of an interpreter, clearly needed in this case,

but also of advisors and observers and such like. They each had their own interpreter who was clearly sworn to secrecy, and that's it. So there was no contemporaneous written record. All we have to go on is what Putin and Trump said about that meeting, which is...

let's be honest, not exactly the soundest evidentiary base. Yeah. And afterwards, after that one in Helsinki, Trump sided with Putin against the FBI, saying he was willing to take the Russian president's word, take him at his word that the Kremlin had not tried to interfere in the US elections. That was quite a stunning thing to say at the time, wasn't it? Why do you think he came out with that? Well, he wasn't really, if you think about it, siding with Putin. Again, he was siding with himself.

Because the whole point was he was actually saying, well, Putin told me he didn't try and rig the election for me. Suits me to believe him. Exactly. Exactly. I mean, this is it. So I think, you know, we have to appreciate the extent to which actually the single through line is.

explaining Trump's policies has been his own self-interest. And so from this point of view, of course, he was going to say he believed Putin. And when an attempt was made on Donald Trump's life on the campaign trail in September, Putin called Trump courageous and manly, another cringeworthy kind of comment. You used it to, I mean, he used it to flatter Trump, but also to push his own narrative, didn't he? Because he'd take a little bit of a pot shot at the

the circumstances under which that kind of attempt would be made. Yes. I mean, you know, obviously Putin has identified the fact that the way to Trump's heart is through his ego and uses every opportunity to flatter him. But we've also seen this line actually coming out from several commentators of the sort who tend to sort of channel Kremlin talking points.

in Russia is that the thing about Trump is if he tries to break too much with the interests of the American deep state, then, you know, he may well face another assassination attempt. So what they're trying to do is basically do two things. One is to suggest that, in fact, the American deep state is this violent, conspiratorial, vicious, vicious creature. So unlike Russian politics.

But at the same time, there's an element of expectation management. They're trying to explain why, in fact, Donald Trump may well not be able to provide that kind of easy, quick end to the Ukraine war that they would like. How do you think Trump and Putin have been positioning themselves then ahead of any talks, the end of the fighting in Ukraine? Because they both want to come out of this looking as though they came out on top.

Yes, well, look, Trump's line is very much, you know, essentially we have to end this war because it's wasteful of human lives. And frankly, it's a distraction.

Putin, of course, doesn't just want to end the war. He wants to end the war on his terms. And I think what he's trying to do is basically sort of set up a situation in which two things. First of all, that he tries to present the Ukrainians as the obstacle. I mean, President Zelensky of Ukraine did indeed pass a decree saying that he could not have personal negotiations with Putin. Now, look, that doesn't stop. The fact is, you know, it doesn't stop there.

his foreign minister, all his various staffers from doing that. But nonetheless, that has given Putin a good line, particularly when, again, playing to this personalistic type of politics that Trump enjoys. Well, Zelensky has ruled himself out. So you and I, the big boys, essentially, have to actually sort of sort this out. So I think very much Putin, again, he's flattering Trump. He's trying to suggest that it's for Trump

to actually negotiate on Ukraine's part, which is after all, I mean, you think about an extraordinary intrusion into Ukrainian sovereignty. And in fact, there was a line that came out later in the Russian press that essentially said, well, look, America has paid for this war.

So America should have the right to be able to decide how it ends. Now, that's not how the world works, but it is how Trump's world works. And how serious, though, do you think were Trump's threats to impose tariffs, taxes and sanctions on Russia unless Putin will enter talks, which were made just days after his inauguration? Yeah, it's interesting that Trump definitely presented quite a harder line on Russia than we might have expected. But...

No, I mean, how serious is Trump on anything? I mean, I think that we are in a position in which, to a degree, he has staked a certain amount of his political capital.

on achieving something in Ukraine. Now, I personally feel that a ceasefire is possible, maybe, but a proper peace negotiation, I wish it was likely, but I don't really see it necessarily happening this year. I'd love to be proven wrong. But the point is that from Trump's point of view, he needs to have something now to deliver. And if the Russians are the ones who will be stopping that, then I think he will be peeved, to say the least. Look,

But when he went, I mean, I know it's difficult to know what he really means when he speaks, but when he went as far as saying that Putin was not doing so well and that the war was destroying Russia, he knows that if that gets any kind of...

kind of publicity or airtime in the Russian Federation, that that will not be something that pleases Putin. Yeah, but precisely things that don't please Putin do not get airtime. I mean, yes, they spread through social media and so forth, but we certainly haven't seen it on Russian television that way. And look...

I mean, yes, on the one hand, that was quite unexpected. But then if we also think about that whole statement in which he threatened tariffs, you know, he also made the point about, well, he actually exaggerated how many Soviets died in World War II. But, you know, he made the point about how he wasn't an enemy of the Russian people and so forth. You know, when we're dealing with someone who is, shall we say, so elephantine as Donald Trump and so likely just a step in accidental ways, you know,

you know, I don't know if we can necessarily parse each individual phrase too much. But what is clear is that he's coming out saying he wants a deal. He's willing to basically, you know, wave a stick at the Ukrainians. But he is at the least making the noises to suggest that he would also be willing, even if the Russians seem to be the ones stopping any kind of ceasefire, to also wave a stick at them. Do you think...

the two of them have some kind of understanding in the way that they communicate? Is there some kind of subtext there? Because when Putin made that kind of, as you describe it, the ultimate ego strike, blaming the so-called stolen victory of the 2020 presidential elections for the crisis in Ukraine, do you think he thinks he can manipulate Trump or he's just

ingratiating himself at that particular moment? I mean, is there an understanding what we say in public is nothing to do with the understanding we have in private? I mean, I don't think there's any kind of secret understanding between them. But what I do think is there is precisely kind of the strange asymmetrical assumptions. I mean, I think, you know, from Trump's point of view, you know, he sees himself as the big dog.

But nonetheless, you know, he is aware that there are other big dogs around and, you know, he wants to be in the pack in that respect. So he expects to be treated with a certain amount of respect and indeed deference. But I don't think he kind of thinks of it beyond that point. Putin clearly is a much more sophisticated operator, a cynical operator. He knows precisely how to stroke Trump's ego, but also smart.

If we look at other leaders, including Western leaders, with whom he's managed to get on, and you think of, for example, Italy's Silvio Berlusconi, another character who could be considered colourful, let's say. Actually, again, Putin does seem to have a genuine affinity for these kind of fairly flamboyant, definitely authoritarian, definitely deeply, deeply self-indulgent people.

of non-political politicians. So, I mean, I think it's not just about manipulating Donald Trump. I think it is also that, in fact, Putin does kind of feel a little bit more at home with them than with the rather more grey characters who make up most countries' leaders.

Do you believe that the traditional diplomatic way of doing things doesn't work anymore? And if so, why not? Yeah, I mean, I think in some ways it's already been dying. I mean, let's be honest, diplomatic connections between Russia and the West have almost entirely withered. And that's obviously particularly since the February 22 invasion and the phenomenally brutal and ugly way in which the Russians have conducted themselves. But it's also, I think, to a degree because we have shot ourselves in the foot.

We wanted to have that kind of hit of moral certitude that says, no, we're going to cut this particular communication channel and we're going to kick up these people. I mean, expelling spies from embassies absolutely makes sense. But closing down some of the communications channels and things, that I think was a blunder. So there's a little bit of our blame there. Prime.

primarily it's the Russians who eagerly insist on tit for tat and so forth. But it's also precisely that now as we enter the era of Trump, and Trump, I think it's fair to say, will probably define the next four years of international relations. We are entering a realm in which, first of all, personalistic politics really do matter. Trump clearly likes people and dislikes people and allows that to happen.

influences policymaking in a way that one wouldn't expect in most countries. Secondly, Trump's notion of politics is incredibly transactional. I mean, if we just look at what happened with Colombia, that when the Colombian said, no, no, we're not going to take returning illegal immigrants on military planes, immediately he threatens a 25% tariff slapped on them. Now,

That's just not the way politics tends to work. And look, some people might actually wish we could go back to that. This is the equivalent of gunboat diplomacy in an interconnected modern financial age. So I think this is this is what we all have to cope with. And we can we can try and not get sucked into that world, but we can't pretend it doesn't exist.

And how do you think Donald Trump's imperialistic noises to reclaim the Panama Canal, annex Greenland, even Canada, will have gone down in Moscow? Oh, the Russians are loving this. I mean, this is the answer to all their prayers. Even if nothing happens, and frankly, the thought of American Marines landing in Greenland or whatever is the stuff of their dreams. So even if none of these various threats come to pass,

First of all, it's a huge distraction. And that, from their point of view, is one of Donald Trump's great virtues. He is the ultimate distractor and disruptor. Secondly, though, it allows them to play one of their well-worn and often quite effective propaganda lines, which is to say, look, we're not saying we're angels. We're just saying we're no worse than everyone else. And the spectacle of America at least threatening to do precisely the things that Russia is being held in the international dock of public opinion for.

is a great sort of boon, not just inside Russia, but actually around the world. I mean, the Russians have been very good, particularly in the global south, of actually presenting them as the wounded party compared with this sort of imperialistic, hegemonic, colonialist West. And that has gone down quite well in a lot of countries whose experiences of Western colonialism has been at the hands of the British or the French or the Germans or the Italians or the Belgians or whoever.

This sort of with America beginning to really throw its weight around in a really clumsy way, you know, I think is also going to be very good for Russian propagandists in the global south. And you write that Putin tried to invoke the Yalta spirit at the end of the Second World War in his congratulations towards Trump when he won the election. Can you can you expand when he was inaugurated? Can you expand on this and how much does it tell us?

about his vision of the world. Yeah, look, the Yalta Summit, where Stalin, Churchill and FDR sat down and basically apportioned certainly sort of Europe between them, you know, Greece can go to the West, but the occupied countries of Central Europe, they can be part of the Soviet sphere of influence.

That is definitely, well, firstly, it fits, ironically enough, both Putin's and Trump's visions of how the world should be organized. Putin in particular, he has a very kind of 19th century, almost colonial view of the world. There are countries, there are a handful of countries that really matter.

And the rest, they are just simply spaces on the global risk game board. The only real question is who gets to tell them what to do or who gets to own them. I mean, this is the whole thing about Ukraine. Putin thinks that Ukraine doesn't have agency. The only question is, does the West get to have Ukraine or does Russia? And he wants it to be Russia.

So, I mean, in that context, this is how both men really think the world is handled. You know, it's about the big powers, the great powers, dividing things between them. The irony is, of course, that Russia is not the Soviet Union in 1945. It is not a global superpower. It's not even really a great power. Yes, it has nuclear weapons, but unless all you want to do is blow up the world, that's a very limited value.

In practical terms, on almost any index, Russia is no longer in a position to be able to divide the world. But nonetheless, that's how Putin thinks Russia should be considered.

And so, you know, Putin is going to continue to try and push this idea that, well, we, the Americans and maybe the Chinese, we should be allowed to get together and decide whatever global issue matters to us. And this kind of hubris, you believe, may be the undoing in a way of Putin in that he may overplay his hand in any upcoming meetings with Donald Trump. What is the fear amongst those close to him? Yeah, the fear is that the moment Putin particularly is looking quite cocky.

You know, he's seeing his forces continue to slowly grind forward in Ukraine. He's seeing all sorts of divisions in the West. And there is a sense that a man who clearly enjoys mind games and petty exercises of power. Remember, this is a man who kept the Pope waiting for an hour. This is a man who, again, as I mentioned in the article, knowing that German former German Chancellor Angela Merkel was terrified of dogs, nonetheless, brought his great big Labrador into the room. You know, this is

This is really playground stuff. But nonetheless, clearly, Putin gets a kick out of that. And the fear and this is something I actually had from speaking to someone who back back in the day had actually briefed Putin early in his presidential career.

And we're saying the thing about Putin nowadays is 25 years in power. He thinks he knows it all. He thinks it knows it better than everyone else and that he may well not listen to his briefers and precisely try some kind of little petty one up and ships with Trump. Exactly the sort of thing that Trump would respond badly to. And the thing is that whereas the Biden administration was quite cautious about

The sense is that if Trump turns against Russia, then all bets will be off. And what do you think he's capable of if Trump does turn against Russia? Well, again, I mean, there's what Trump's initial impulse would be, and there will be what, in some ways, the Pentagon and the rest of the machine would allow him to do. I mean, I think in practice, what we would just simply see is not just a lot more assistance being provided to Ukraine, but all the old limitations on how Ukraine could use these missiles and other systems changed.

taken away. So basically, you know, more or less Trump egging on the Ukrainians to do their worst, but also sabotage. The Ukrainians carry out campaigns of sabotage. We might well find a lot of more CIA assistance for that. So really what President Zelensky should be hoping for is that Putin does exactly that and overplays his hand with Donald Trump and annoys him so that he actually...

supports Ukraine more. Yeah, and certainly that's something that we are getting now from various Ukrainian officials and commentators and so forth. There is that sense that although at first there was quite a lot of dismay about Trump's election in Kyiv, because Trump and Zelensky do not have a good relationship,

And at the moment, the decision by the American administration to suddenly block all non-military aid programs is clearly also having quite a serious impact in Ukraine itself. But nonetheless, there is that sense that whereas Biden stood for, in a way, slow measured defeat, with Trump, it's much more of a, you know, toss a coin, heads we lose, take

Tales we win, you know, but basically there is a chance that, frankly, they didn't think, certainly in the last year or so, the Biden administration was giving them. You mentioned earlier that after 25 years in power, President Putin may well not be listening to any of his aides anymore. And we've spoken before about the influence of his former security chief, Nikolai Patrushev.

who is now his presidential aide. And I think you told me that he had this potentially strong influence during the COVID lockdown of pouring poison into his ear and influences his worldview. What's happened to him? And is there anybody, do you think, who has Putin's ear now? There are people who have Putin's ear, but they're almost all much less visible because if you're a real Putin confidant, you don't bother going into government. You basically go into business and

Make sure that the state provides you with huge contracts or whatever and become obscenely rich. Why bother going to the hassle of actually running anything? Patrushev really seems to be actually be moving out of the president's inner circle. He's increasingly now being trotted out to do lengthy radio or TV or newspaper interviews in which he lambasts the evil Anglo-Saxons,

Brits and the Americans for all our conspiratorial bad work and such like, which which tends to be a sign of someone who's on the out, but trying desperately to retain Putin's ear. This is the interesting thing at the moment that actually it's very hard to sort of chart a geography of Putin's inner circle. There are people he gets on with.

There are people he tells what to do. There doesn't seem to be anyone who kind of bridges the gap, who actually has policy relevance and experience and knowledge. And Patrushev, for all that I frankly regarded him as about the most dangerous man in Russia, nonetheless did have, he was smart, he had experience. There aren't people like that who are still in his circle, which means that we are so much more dependent now on what Putin himself thinks,

And what people who have no real experience, but nonetheless might well have been the last person to talk to him on some particular topic, may well be advising him. Do you think that in that light, then he's becoming more isolated? Yes. I mean, I think this is this is a classic pattern for for dictators and autocrats over time. Their circle of people they listen to and trust shrinks and shrinks. Their willingness to listen to alternative perspectives, someone who actually might say it's not like that.

diminishes. The tolerance simply for people who know what they're doing. I mean, we've seen this, for example, with Elvira Nabulina, who is the chairwoman of the Russian Central Bank, phenomenally capable banker. In some ways, you know, she's the one who should be getting all the medals because that's, you know, very much her work has allowed the Russian economy to remain as effective and stable as it has. But

Even Nebulina now seems to be sort of out of favor. He's getting a bit snippy about her simply because she can't wave a magic wand and bring down inflation the way he'd like it to be done. You know, increasingly, there is this sense of a man who,

No one can really question who gives orders and expects those orders to come to pass, even when those orders actually are pretty much impossible to arrange. I mean, these are all the kind of classic signs of the sort of late stage, the senile stage of an authoritarian regime. And, you know, it's one of the reasons why I think that although the Russian state still has a lot of capacity within it politically,

Putin himself, I think, has outlived his capacities to evolve and frankly, to manage this country. So where do you see this going in the next, the ensuing couple of five years or so? Well, I mean, in terms of Putin, I mean, unfortunately, I don't think he's going anywhere. I mean, the

This is a system which is built really to ensure that there can be no real challenge to the leader. You know, so many overlapping and competing security apparatuses that balance each other. Very hard to have a political coup against him. Likewise, incredibly hard for any kind of public organization unless there's something really that starts to shatter.

Instead, this is a bit like the old days of the separation of Soviet Union back in the 1970s, just in fast forward, you know, slow, shabby slide down into stagnation and such like. I think really we're all just waiting for that day when Putin doesn't wake up.

And that's where we're at. And to return to the subject of where we're going with the war in Ukraine, can we just talk briefly about the position of President Xi of China? How much influence does he have over Putin? And where do his loyalties or interests lie when Donald Trump, for example, asks him to help stop Russia's war on Ukraine? In some ways, I mean, well, firstly, if Xi really was given the opportunity to end the war by the Americans,

That would actually be a really difficult dilemma for him because, look, on the whole, she has it. Well, China has its interests. Russia has it. I mean, at the moment, there is some kind of an alliance because they both feel that the current sort of Western led global order does not really suit them. But it's a deeply pragmatic transactional one. The Russians know that they can't ultimately trust the Chinese. The Chinese are not going to go out of their way to support the Russians.

This war is one that, frankly, the Chinese don't mind. I mean, I don't think it's that they could see huge benefits, but it forces the Russians to be more and more dependent upon Beijing. It keeps the West distracted. But the chance to actually be the ones to end the war, to be the peace brokers, I mean, that would be a massive fillip for China. China has been trying to present itself, especially again in the global south,

as the kind of the new, not just the new player on the global scene, but the grown-up player. I mean, they have used Ukraine as a way of saying, look, you know, the Russians, the Americans, the Europeans, they're all busy fighting, they're all busy competing, they can't solve anything. All they're trying to do is put sanctions on you and drag them into their conflict. So I think that might be, that really might be quite a temptation. But that said, I don't think that Xi would want Putin to lose.

He would want to broker some kind of peace that Putin can then take to his own people and say, look, we've sorted this out. And that's not necessarily what the West would want. And also unlikely that Donald Trump would want President Xi to be the one to be seen who ended the war either. Yeah. When it comes down to it, you know, Trump, as ever, he throws out all sorts of potential ideas and talking points. But when it comes down to it.

A major global event that does not have Trump centre stage. I don't think that's really what he has in mind. If we could just talk a little bit about the 80th anniversary of the liberation of the Nazi death camp Auschwitz, which was commemorated this week. Quite interesting to see what Vladimir Putin said on that day and his comments, because he was using it as an opportunity really to sort of

put his slant on history. How do you see that as in the way he's evolving his revisionist kind of stance on history? Yes, well, obviously it ties in with this ludicrous idea that Ukraine is a neo-Nazi state.

And therefore, the fact that Auschwitz was liberated by Soviet soldiers, which kind of has become elided into Russian soldiers, even though we must remember that those Soviet soldiers also included a lot of Belarusians and a lot of Ukrainians, as well as all the other nationalities of the USSR. But nonetheless, the fact that Russia was not present and that Soviet symbols were not shown in a death camp, which was liberated by Soviet soldiers,

allows him to do two things. One is just basically play the victim. You know, why are the sacrifices of all of our compatriots to save the world from Nazism being sort of ignored and excluded and such like?

And secondly, to again make this point of, you know, when it comes down to it, we are the ones who are fighting Nazis. And isn't it a shame that the West is celebrating the liberation of Auschwitz, but nonetheless supporting the neo-Nazis of Ukraine? And I don't think he expects us to have any real traction in the West, but it still does have traction at home. I mean, the Great Patriotic War, as they call it, the Second World War, is still something that genuinely unites so many Russians.

And therefore, everything that he gets a chance to not just say, remember our glories, but the West is denying them. That's a good propaganda line for him. And just finally, Mark, you write about the fragile relationship between Trump and Putin. And to return to the title of your article in The Times, how will it change the world? Well, precisely, I think we have to recognise that we're entering a world in which I think all the old assumptions about that

But the baseline was the etiquette of the liberal world order in which things would be sorted out consensually through discussion and through multinational bodies and UN resolutions and all that. Frankly, it was already fraying very, very substantially. But now I think, you know, Trump is actually going to rip right through what's left.

And look, it doesn't mean to say that we're entering into some kind of dog-eat-dog world of anarchy, because as I said, we can, as individual nations, as alliances and so forth, still choose to decide how we interact with each other. But these kind of platitudes about the way the world works, that for so long, particularly Western democratic, European democratic governments tended to trot out, and pretty much everyone realised that

was a bit of an old, you know, old imagined order. I think we have to recognize that that doesn't exist. And if there's going to be a new world order, we actually have to build it. Mark Gagliotti, great to speak to you. Thank you for your time. My pleasure.

You've been watching Frontline for Times Radio with me, Kate Chabot. If you'd like to be the first to get exclusive content, you can sign up for membership with the link below. You can also listen to Times Radio for the latest news or read it on thetimes.com. My thanks to our producer today, Louis Sykes, and to you for watching. Bye for now.

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