Frontline special - RUSI Russia specialist Ed Arnold
26:36 Share

ACAST powers the world's best podcasts. Here's a show that we recommend. We all have bad days and sometimes bad weeks and maybe even bad years. But the good news is we don't have to figure out life all alone. I'm comedian Chris Duffy, host of Ted's How to Be a Better Human podcast.

And our show is about the little ways that you can improve your life, actual practical tips that you can put into place that will make your day-to-day better. Whether it is setting boundaries at work or rethinking how you clean your house, each episode has conversations with experts who share tips on how to navigate life's ups and downs. Find how to be a better human wherever you're listening to this. Acast helps creators launch, grow, and monetize their podcasts everywhere. Acast.com.

Welcome to The World in 10, The Times of London's daily podcast dedicated to global security. I'm Alex Dibble and I executive produce the podcast. The World in 10 is partnered with Frontline, the interview series from Times Radio available on YouTube, which has expert analysis of the world's conflicts. At the weekend, we bring you Frontline interviews in full. Here's one of Frontline's recent interviews. I hope you find it interesting.

Hello and welcome to Frontline for Times Radio. I'm Louis Sykes. Today we're joined by Ed Arnold, Senior European Security Research Fellow at the think tank RISI and a retired British Army officer. Ed, thank you for joining us today on Frontline. Thank you for having me back.

The UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force has announced it's launching Nordic Warden, an operation to track threats to undersea infrastructure and monitor the Russian shadow fleet, following a seeming attack on the undersea cable S-Link 2. Who's involved in this UK-led group? What is it? And how are they seemingly going about achieving those objectives?

So Joint Expeditionary Force known as the GEF is a defence framework of the Nordic and Baltic states plus the Netherlands and it's led by the UK and its core area of interests and operation are the Baltic Sea, the High North and the North Atlantic. It's a predominantly maritime framework at the moment which is given sort of

where the operations are and the threats are emanating. But specifically what has been announced this year in Nordic Warden, it's effectively a system that uses AI and algorithms and surveillance techniques to monitor vessels of interests.

And the idea is to try and identify the likelihood of vessels being Russian shadow fleets and trying to do things that are nefarious, damage underwater cables, and then they're able to sort of alert the countries within the Baltics to say, well, actually, you need to look closer in on this to try and start to interdict these vessels before they can do any damage.

And the damage to S-Link 2 was reportedly caused by a cargo ship, the Eagle S, which allegedly could be part of Russia's shadow fleet. What do we know about this damage done to this undersea cable? And is this part of a wider sort of threat posed by Russia in the Baltic Sea?

Yeah, it absolutely is. And these are just the latest incidents, really. I mean, it all started with the Baltic Connector incident on the 8th of October, 2023.

And in that case, it was a Chinese flag vessel, the Niu Niu polar bear, which again dragged its cable along the bottom of the seabed. Effectively, the anchor can destroy anything that's or damage anything that's below, which is usually where the cables just lie. And I think that was a very significant incident because it was a Chinese flag vessel. And actually, the route that the vessel took was through the northern sea route. So right over the top

in the Arctic into the Baltic. So it was a sort of first incidents of where security incidents were actually emanating from the Indo-Pacific directly. And then before Christmas in 2024, in late November, we had the Yipeng 3 incident, which was very similar, just in this case that actually the authorities predominantly in Denmark and Sweden were sort of quicker

And they sort of tried to interdict the vessel, but effectively the vessel was then let go because there wasn't sort of the political will to really take on the task and board a Chinese, well, Hong Kong flagged vessel in that case.

So I think with the Eagle S, the interesting thing is that the Finnish authorities were like, well, this is very clearly an incident that we need to address. We have a strong legal framework to do so. The Coast Guard boarded the vessel and they're going to go through legal proceedings against the vessel and the company. So it starts to enhance that deterrence and say, well, you can't get away with this anymore. And I think it's quite unfortunate that actions like that were not taken

earlier on back in the end of 2023. And as you kind of hinted at there, Finland and Sweden as well, who've been involved, of course, have largely turned this instance into a sort of legal matter rather than military and defence. Are we likely to see the British as part of the JEF kind of following Finland's lead on this and taking more of a policing rather than defence role?

Well, I mean, this is where the complication sits. And if we just take the Baltic Sea as an example, but this is sort of broadly how it works in other areas.

I mean, each of the countries have their own international waters and then they also have their exclusive economic zones. And then you have international waters in the Baltic, which is governed by the UN and the UNCLOS. So there's a lot of issues at stake here in terms of who

has ownership, who's able to do so. Nationally, the Finnish government in the case of the Eagle S operated under Article 3 of NATO, effectively a national response. They didn't feel at the time that they needed to make it either a Jeff response or a NATO response. They thought, well, we can deal with this

and they have done so up till now. The example that I previously gave of the Yipeng 3 incident, because it was a Chinese flagged vessel, I think that was something that would have required

UK to step in to provide that diplomatic support and I was a little bit surprised actually that they didn't at the time because it's a big diplomatic incident if the Danes are going to then try and board a Chinese vessel but for the UK to say well actually we're with you on

whatever you choose to do. I think that would have been a much stronger response. And NATO's starting to also get into this area as well. And it's set up a couple of maritime awareness events

in the last couple of years to deal with this. And it's also an EU competency. So it's a very busy area. And I think within those organizations that I've mentioned, there needs to be formal deconfliction on who does what.

because surveilling undersea infrastructure itself as well is also principally done by private companies who actually own the cables and the data and everything there. So I think it's an area that everyone's focused in on, but actually if they delineated where their responsibility lined a little bit better, it'd be far more effective. And I think that's also where the Joint Expeditionary Force can do far more.

And you mentioned NATO there, of course. Since 2022, obviously more Baltic nations have joined NATO, which is separate from the Joint Expeditionary Force, although linked closely. Have these new members made standing up to these hybrid threats from Russia and, as you mentioned, partners outside of Europe as well, has it made it easier to stand up to these threats and deal with them? And how has it changed the state of play in the Baltic Sea?

Well I mean it's made it far easier, it's increased NATO control within the Baltic Sea and there's just a couple of procedural things that make a difference. So now that Finland and Sweden are in NATO they get access to NATO secret intelligence. So previously NATO would have been sharing intelligence around what is going on but then they wouldn't be able to share it with Finland and Sweden because they're members of the EU and not NATO. So there's a lot of that it makes it

procedurally very easier. Plus they then have the capabilities. I mean, like I said, one of the very surprising things from a UK audience in terms of what happened with the Eagle S is it wasn't Finnish special forces who boarded the ship, which would probably have to be the case if the UK decided to take similar action or through the Royal Marines. I mean, it was the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard are fully equipped to do those types of,

of operations. And equally, I think there's probably some consultation with allies to say, you know, notification, we are doing this. But also in terms of that legal framework, they were saying, well, you know, we are very clear that we are able to do this and we will do it. And also we're going to see this through to the finish. And that's what they're going to do now in terms of their domestic legal framework.

So all in all, I think it's much stronger. And then the Jeff activating Nordic Warden, again, it's another layer of surveillance and really monitoring in an area which is getting very, very busy in terms of activity because in the broader picture,

Russia is very, you know, the conventional capabilities are severely weakened because of the war in Ukraine. So to achieve its objectives within Northern Europe in particular, then they can't really rely on conventional means. They need to move to nuclear signaling and hybrid activity. And that's where we're seeing all of this. And also probably an element of,

post-decession aggression towards Finland and Sweden because at the time the Kremlin didn't really do anything we assumed it would be one of their red lines and they were sort of they pulled out the usual you know

Press issues that they do around it saying they were not happy, but they effectively didn't do anything So I think Russia still needs to maintain that level of threat as well against Finland and Sweden specifically, but actually it's also to a lot of other NATO countries

So, in a way, this is Putin reacting to the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO. And how would you say that impacts the threat of hybrid warfare attacks from Russia in Europe more widely?

Well, I think it raises the issue and equally, I think one of the main issues around it, I mean, they're starting to escalate in terms of they are targeting the functioning of society. So a data cable, if you know that that is a

a pretty significant piece of infrastructure. I think that's a slightly concerning escalation to say that they're looking to target these other areas. I think there's also a wider point of linkages between Russia and China because obviously if Russia is doing the cable dragging or anchor dragging targeting cables in the Baltic, it's quite clear to say well this is a

this is Russian activity and we must stop it. But it's also quite interesting that it's starting to be Chinese flagged vessels or Cook Islands flagged vessels in the case of the Eagle S. So it seems to be that the Russians are getting people to do it on their behalf to make again it a little bit more morbid and sort of, you know, allow the Russia the chance to say, well, actually, it's not us. I think that's significant.

But equally with all of these issues, I think it's also a strength that when they do happen. So as an example, when the Nord Stream 1 and 2 incidents happened in the September 2023, it was very clear that we were not looking at this with any seriousness.

And now if you look what's happened in the last couple of years in terms of strengthening our resolve to look at these issues specifically, we are far better. And you see that with the Eagle S that it was immediately bordered where the other two sort of main incidents over the last couple of years were not.

So it also is an opportunity for Western nations and NATO and the EU to say, well, actually, this is a blind spot and we have to resource this. And I think that's where we are in the position so that now we've got the example set by the Finns. If this incident happens again and hopefully it's picked up before it happens with the Nordic Nordic warden system or other,

then actually we're going to be in a much stronger position if we learn from each incident, which we seem to be doing. And so we're likely then to see more of this kind of action from the Joint Expeditionary Force itself, more of these stopping ships or combating Russian hybrid attacks. Is that just in the Baltics or might we see the Jeff expanding these sort of counter sabotage operations more widely in Europe?

Well, it's more widely specifically in Northern Europe, like I said, the Jeff is focused on

on the North. But it was quite interesting in terms of the press release that went along with the activation of Nordic Warden, which is a system that has been developing over the last couple of years. So it's not new. It's just the fact that it's now in continuous operation is new, but also it, you know, the prime minister specifically made a link to Northern Europe security, prosperity, and his plan for change. So,

So it seems really that the Prime Minister now and also the Secretary of State for Defence really does see the value of the Joint Expeditionary Force. Really the value of the GF to not just the UK, its members and also NATO, it's an organisation of 10, not an organisation of 32. If you want to do something quickly, you can do it within a Joint Expeditionary Force construct and then scale it to NATO if required.

So I think my main point is that this is positive, but the Joint Executive Industry Force can take a lot more weight in terms of security in Northern Europe. And I think it's an absolutely opportune moment to do so as it's expected that the UK and all of these other countries are going to have to do more in European security as we expect the US under the second Trump administration to sort of pare back its commitments in some areas.

Yes. Let's just come on to that. And Trump, you know, the incoming US administration, I think, is bearing over all of these security issues in Europe. How important, as you say, are these European based security arrangements like the JF going to be under a sort of Trump led NATO at the very least to demonstrate Europe's commitments to sort of domestic defence?

I think they'll become more important and you've had a proliferation of these frameworks, defence and security frameworks, the GEF is one of many that are sub sort of multilateral in terms of NATO and EU constructs. And the benefit of them is they, generally speaking, are more flexible and they also look at things predominantly on a regional basis.

My main concern with NATO at the moment, I mean, it's really the US leadership within NATO is the glue that holds it all together in a multitude of ways. But particularly NATO's ability to the 360 degree approach, what it talks about, and that's geographically and thematically, the idea that NATO should really do everything. And that's really assured by the US. However, if US leadership starts to pull back,

No single or really grouping of the other NATO nations are going to be strong enough to really provide that leadership that currently the US does.

So in order to keep NATO going in its as close to its current construct as possible, which is obviously beneficial to all its European members, I actually think that NATO is going to have to move to a far more regional approach. And I think it's very sensible to do that because the security requirements are, for example, Northern Europe and Southern Europe, they're completely different.

You know, fighting up in the Arctic and being prepared to fight up in the Arctic is very, very different to the security challenges that are emanating from the Sahel in terms of terrorism and migration.

And I think NATO really needs to recognize that. And that's where constructs like the GEF come in. They're very geographically focused. The countries that are members have the capabilities that can operate in those types of areas. So actually, by dividing Europe up in those terms, you can be far more specific in terms of those security requirements, which I believe is a good thing.

Of course, we're just over a week away from the official beginning of the Trump administration in the US. Just today, Trump has said they're trying to set up a meeting with Putin. If there is some form of ceasefire in Ukraine, should groups like the JF, other European security members be prepared for more or less hybrid warfare or hybrid threats from Russia?

Well, I think the element of hybrid, I mean, it's constant. And also, it's been around for a long time. It's been around long before people actually coined the term hybrid warfare. But I think we just have to get used to this is the new normal. It is something that we need to address as much as other areas. And I think it is, you know, in terms of indicators and warnings, you really need to look at when these issues really start to escalate.

And that's not just in terms of targeting critical underwater infrastructure, it can also be cyber attacks.

They can also be done by state actors. They can also be done by non-state actors. They can be done by criminal organizations working on behalf of state actors. And recently, the director general of MI5 has said that they are seeing intelligence to suggest that that is happening both around Europe, but also in the UK, principally sponsored by Russia and also Iran. So this is just a constant that I think we need to address.

whether they increase in terms of what's happening or potentially will happen on the ground in Ukraine in the next couple of years.

I'm not too sure. I think it is also a separate issue now. But like I said to my previous point, Russia would struggle, certainly in the short term, to provide a real sort of credible conventional threat to Europe militarily. So to...

you know, to manage that gap until they potentially are in that position and they would be able to be in that position with any form of ceasefire because it allows Russia to then rebuild significantly. We're going to see a lot more of this. Election interference is another large one that we're looking at considering the amount of elections that are coming up within Europe only last year, but also in the future.

And I wonder if we could briefly discuss what's going on on the ground in Ukraine at the moment. Russia continues to sort of advance in the Donbass and in eastern Ukraine. How worried should NATO and Europe and Kiev primarily be about these advances?

I mean they were very modest advances in the whole of 2024. The ground that the Russians have been able to take has been negligible in terms of wider Russian aims and also the combat losses are

astronomical by any sort of measure and they don't seem to be sort of reducing I mean from August it was around 1,200 per day of killed and wounded so effectively what you're losing from your combat capable forces that is a battle group per day and it increased to around 1,500 probably by the end of the year

which means that they are expending a lot of personnel to gain a small amount of territory. That said, the Ukrainians are still under pressure. Generally, you'll see this within war and conflict where both sides try and press an advantage, either real on the ground or a perceived advantage moving into a period of either dialogue or

or negotiation. So I think that's what we're seeing at the moment. And so another factor in this that to recognize is as well, it is the winter in Ukraine. So it is not supportive of large scale maneuver. We've seen a slight sort of increase in the last week or so of the Ukraine's operation within Kursk as well. That seems limited in nature.

Really, you know, it's what we would expect in terms of fighting with the current weather conditions at the time. And obviously, all eyes are on what's potentially going to happen in terms of any

period of dialogue and consultation between the US, Russia and Ukraine on the future of the war within the short term. President Trump during the campaign said within 24 hours. They've sort of seems to have loosened that a little while. And General Kellogg, who's his special advisor towards Ukraine, is saying sort of within 100 days. But it shows that this sort of is really a period to

to watch both what's happening on the ground, but also what's happening in national capitals, particularly in Europe. And you talk there about the Russian casualty rates. UK MOD, among many others, have been reporting about the massive Russian equipment and personnel losses that they're incurring to push forward. More generally, does that reduce the security threat from Russia for Europe? Or is that just going to create more instability?

No, I mean, I think it reduces it in the short to medium term. And I think as much as we like to talk and analyze numbers because it's easier to do so, I think the main issue on the Russian side is just the quality of forces. They are very, very poor now. You know, in some areas they're adapting, but because they're effectively fighting,

They're not able to train at a sufficiently higher echelon to enable those elements of maneuver on the ground. And the Ukrainians are in a similar position, although they are also supported by some Western training programs, which are probably insufficient for their needs at the moment, but they are sort of on a pathway forward.

to improving. So I think for me it's quality more than the numbers. But equally when you're looking at it conventionally within Europe in particular, I mean,

the Russians now have to resource the border with Finland, which they previously didn't particularly need to do, or they could at least take risk there because Finland was non-aligned, and they have to resource wherever the front line is within Ukraine. That severely restricts the amount of available forces that they're able to put against the Baltic states, which was the principal threat from 2014 onwards. That said,

Putin knows that he can't defeat NATO militarily. So he doesn't need to take over Estonia. He doesn't need to push through to Berlin or to Paris. He just needs to take an element of NATO territory and hold it and try and get NATO to politically collapse. And he can do that with a smaller subset of forces if he chose to do so.

So I think that's, you know, in one sense, we've got to look at Russian military recapitalization and the threat it poses. But I think far more important is actually the intent. What's Putin trying to achieve by that? And at the moment, he's fully focused within Ukraine because he's putting so many of these forces in. You know, he didn't reinforce within Syria because, again, he's pressing everything into Ukraine and to try and get in the best possible negotiation position going into this year.

So, in a way, a freezing of the conflict in Ukraine could bring more threat to Europe more widely rather than reduce it. Yeah, I mean, the issue is both sides are exhausted. So Ukraine would benefit from a pause in the war just to be able to stabilize their front lines, start to mobilize a bit more effectively.

train and also just recuperate, try and sort out some of the political issues that they have at home. Equally for Russia, I mean, it gives them a break as well. But actually, when you consider within NATO, at a NATO level and also at a national level, a lot of countries are saying, well, we may be at war with Russia in three, five, seven years. You know, by the end of the decade, there's no sort of

exact assessments at the moment but the point to note on all of that is they're all predicated on the fact that Russia stops fighting at its current intensity within Ukraine

So if you're saying three years, like some of the Baltic states are in Poland, well, that three-year clock starts as soon as the fighting doesn't cease in Ukraine, but starts to die down. That's sort of the concerning part of that, because again, the Russians don't have the capability of prosecuting the war in Ukraine and also threatening Europe at the same time. Ed Arnold, thank you very much for joining us today on Frontline. Thank you.

ACAST powers the world's best podcasts. Here's the show that we recommend. Hi, I'm Pace Case. And I'm Bachelor Clues. We host Game of Roses, the world's best reality TV podcast. We're covering every show in reality TV at the highest level possible. We analyze The Bachelor, Love is Blind, Perfect Match, Vanderpump, and anything else you find yourself watching with wine and popcorn.

We break down errors, highlight plays, MVPs, and all the competitive elements that make reality TV a sport. And we interview superstar players like Bachelorette Caitlin Bristow and Big Brother champion Taylor Hale. If you want to know so much about reality TV, you can turn any casual conversation into a PhD-level dissertation. You definitely want to check out Game of Roses. Acast helps creators launch, grow, and monetize their podcasts everywhere. Acast.com.