The big global security questions for 2025
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Welcome to The World in 10. In an increasingly uncertain world, this is The Times' daily podcast dedicated to global security. Today, with me, Alex Dibble and James Hansen. As the new year begins, we're going to take a look at some of the big global security questions for 2025. For example, will Donald Trump be able to negotiate a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine? Will Iran be able to rebuild its sphere of influence in the Middle East?

And could this be the year that China makes a move on Taiwan? In short, where could 2025 take us? Our guest today is Marina Miron from the War Studies Department of King's College London. Marina, let's start with the return of Donald Trump. He's previously said he would be able to end the war in Ukraine in just 24 hours. That seems unlikely, but...

How feasible is it that Donald Trump will be able to negotiate some kind of peace between Russia and Ukraine during 2025? Well, it's a very interesting question because obviously we have the rhetoric on the one hand and there have been a lot of opinions as far as

Trump's connection to Russia is concerned and that the Russian president would be preferring Trump over any other candidate. So that is one side of the story. But the reality is the Russians do not seem very keen on any sort of negotiations or any sort of freezing of the conflict.

And because they have the upper hand on the battlefield, they surely will want, if it comes to any sort of negotiations, to negotiate from a position of strength. And therefore, for Ukraine, of course, it doesn't look good because Ukraine would have to, as some European politicians said, maybe temporarily cede the territories that Russia controls temporarily.

until further notice, so to say, and perhaps join NATO as sort of a part of Ukraine minus those territories. So the problem here is, on the one hand, is getting a compromise that benefits all and that all parties agree to, which I don't see happening here.

On the other hand, who is going to guarantee Ukraine security? Because with Trump, we also know his stance towards defense spending of European NATO members and his threats to leave NATO and to remove the security umbrellas that European NATO members have enjoyed despite the low defense spending.

And therefore, it's quite a complex situation. But can the war end is another question, because if we look at Ukraine and if we look at the manpower shortages it faces, the question is how long can it sustain the war of attrition that the Russians are waging?

So, essentially, it will have to come to some sort of reduction of at least intensity of the war. That being said, I do think that we will get to that point. Whether it will be through negotiations remains questionable.

Marina, let's turn to one of the other big areas of conflict in the world, the Middle East. During 2024, we've seen Israel strengthened and Iran weakened, notably through the degrading of Hamas and Hezbollah's leadership and also through the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.

Will Iran be able to rebuild its regional influence over the next 12 months, or will the Ayatollahs primarily be concerned with the survival of their own regime? Well, over the next 12 months might be very difficult for Iran, not just because of the fact that Iran has lost some powerful proxies,

but because we don't know what is going to happen in Syria and what the future of Syria holds in terms of its political orientation, who is going to be ruling Syria. And I think that depends to a great extent on

on what diplomatic relations the power-seeking individuals or groups can establish, as well as their ability to reach some common understanding, because we know HDS is fragmented. The Syrian National Army is also fragmented in terms of what they want and how they see the future of Syria. That being said,

Most likely Syria will be Sunni dominated. There are fears that it might invite the rise of the Islamic State. So in those conditions and with Israel now using this momentum to build up the buffer zone to strengthen its position in the Middle East,

It will certainly be difficult to rebuild its capabilities. That being said, I think I'm not excluding the possibilities that Iran might try to build up a nuclear arsenal because it has been a gray area.

And of course, Iran has to prepare for a potential confrontation when Donald Trump enters the Oval Office. If we judge by the previous Trump administration and the Middle East policy, the backing of Israel, Iran might be seeing more sanctions imposed and attempts to curtail its power even more. So I don't think that the next 12 months will be enough for Iran to

recalibrate and to regroup and recover. But I think that we also have to remember that we're waiting for a response, for an Iranian response to the Israeli strike. So in this context, Iran is not in a hurry.

And it's much more of a long-term threat to Middle Eastern stability than a short-term one. And at the time of recording, negotiations are ongoing for a deal to release the hostages and stop the fighting in Gaza.

If a ceasefire agreement is reached, how likely is it that it'll hold? That's a very difficult question because the problem is not just reaching a ceasefire agreement, but to have a reconstruction plan for Gaza and some sort of a political solution.

And I don't see that being discussed very much or at least not in open source. So the success, if it is reached indeed, will depend on what essentially happens next.

And we have seen those examples from history, and history repeats itself, seems to be very cyclical in certain scenarios, because there might be a power vacuum in Gaza. Gaza is completely destroyed. You have a humanitarian crisis there. So who is going to take the lead in Gaza? Who is going to take the political lead in Gaza? What is it going to be?

Will it be autonomous? So what political position will it have? And of course, who is going to step in and rebuild Gaza? And I think those are key questions in terms of how, let's say, effective this ceasefire would be. Because generally speaking, and again, looking at historic examples, and we just had Syria,

ceasefires tend to break down, especially if we're talking about ceasefires between a state and a non-state actor. And that's exactly the scenario we have here. So often ceasefire would benefit one side to regroup the

and recover and strike again. And Marina, for several years now, there have been concerns that China may launch an invasion of Taiwan. Over the last 12 months, we've seen Beijing launch more naval drills in the South China Sea. Could 2025 be the year Xi Jinping decides to make a move? I think it will depend on the global dynamics. At least for now, I do not foresee China taking that step.

Especially not with Donald Trump being the president of the United States, because I think should China go that far? And we have to remember why Taiwan is important to the Western world.

And the reason for that being is that Taiwan is the greatest producer of a specific type of semiconductors on which our industries depend. Yes, the United States has relocated some of the factories from Taiwan to the United States.

specifically fearing that there might be an escalation. But that being said, I think that Donald Trump and his administration being more hawkish towards China could answer with an armed response. And I don't think that China has that appetite at the moment. We have to remember that Chinese army doesn't have any battlefield experience. And

And so I think we will see those strategic signaling signs, shall we call them. But I don't think that we will actually see a blockade of Taiwan or any sort of armed confrontation.

And of course, we should also remember that the United States has nuclear weapons. China has nuclear weapons. So that would be quite a dangerous escalatory spiral should it come to that military confrontation. That being said, not everything is based on rationality, but I don't see that happening at least in 2025. And of course, we will have to see how the Middle East evolves.

where China certainly has interests how the war in Ukraine ends or maybe diminishes in intensity. So those will be the determining factors also affecting that specific region. And of course, we also have to see what happens with the relationship between China and North Korea.

That is another problem area which I foresee to be more in focus in 2025, possibly because of Russia's support to Pyongyang. Marina, thank you. That is Marina Miron from the War Studies Department of King's College London. That's it from us. Thank you for taking 10 minutes to stay on Top of the World with the help of The Times. We'll see you tomorrow.