Trump thinks again about nuclear sub deal
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Welcome to The World in 10. In an increasingly uncertain world, this is The Times' daily podcast dedicated to global security. Today with me, Tom Noonan and Toby Seeley. The AUKUS nuclear submarine deal between the US, the UK and Australia was signed back in 2021. It was hailed at the time by the governments of all three countries as a key agreement to renew Western naval power and improve their cooperation against the growing threats of Russia and China.

The idea is that all three would work together to develop and build a new class of nuclear-powered submarine. In the meantime, the US would sell as many as five Virginia-class submarines to Australia to replenish its ageing fleet. Now, however, Donald Trump's Defence Department has announced a review of this Biden-era deal, with an official calling it crazy, given warnings that China might attack Taiwan.

So why is Trump thinking again about this deal? What exactly are the US's misgivings? And should officials in London and Canberra be as anxious as they're reported to be? Our guest today is Trevor Taylor, a specialist in shipbuilding at the Royal United Services Institute in London. Trevor, what do we know about this US review? And specifically, do we know exactly what it is about AUKUS that the Trump administration is now worried about?

Well, I think the real question for the United States is whether the delivery of Virginia-class submarines to Australia will hit the availability of submarines for the United States Navy. That's the sort of obvious big concern that they might have. Financially, I think it's

quite a reasonable deal. It's quite a good deal for the ISH. We don't know that. But the other question is the feasibility of being able to deliver the submarines to Australia on the schedule agreed, which obviously links into the question of whether the US Navy will have to suffer if production slowed down. So those are the obvious things.

I think the less obvious thing is that AUKUS was something generated under the Biden administration, if I remember correctly, and that any long-term project initiated by the Biden administration is going to come under scrutiny from Trump if there's any opportunity for that from President Trump. So

I don't think we should be entirely surprised that this investigation is being launched.

It's interesting you mentioned the anti-Biden side of the equation here. This has been announced by Elbridge Colby, who's a Trump appointee in the Department of Defence. Government sources in the UK say that he's an influential voice, but they say he's one of many, in effect playing down his importance. Do you think that this is an overarching policy decided by the Trump administration, or is there an element here that this might be one official freelancing a little bit?

Well, we don't actually know the structure of the review and who's going to be involved and how official it is. But it obviously has got into the public domain in some detail. And I'm pretty sure it will be a real case. I think one of the big questions is not so much whether it will take place, but how quickly it will be concluded. Because the longer this thing drags out, the more people are going to be worried about it.

I think we have to recognize that even before this review was announced, there was opposition, some opposition in the U.S. to this deal because of the penalties. Well, the feasibility of delivering submarines and the cost of building, increasing the production capability in the U.S. and the possible penalties on the U.S. Navy. So it's not just

doubts about this were always present in the US. So if we anticipate the Trump administration, the financial aspects and the financial benefits to the US will be something that come up quite significantly, will play quite a big part in the discussions.

Trevor, it's not a surprise the US would be handing over these Virginia-class submarines to Australia. It's been a part of the deal since 21. Some might argue, why hasn't the US been preparing for that and replaced these submarines by now? Well, building nuclear submarines is immensely complicated, demanding. I mean, the safety regime, the demands on the vessels themselves, the construction, they're very complicated machines.

They require not just a skilled workforce, but a knowledgeable workforce that understands how to do tasks in detail. It's a problem in the UK to generate the workforce and the infrastructure that's needed bigger, it seems, in the US. And it's been known for quite a while that the company, I think it's Electric Boat, have really had difficulty in

moving as quickly as they might have hoped. The Australians have put in $3 billion, $3 billion US dollars, I think, into the United States so as to help with construction and other activities with associated infrastructure. So very few countries have

actually can make nuclear submarines. And there's a reason for that. It is extremely difficult. And trying to boost production, it takes a long time. The quality standards are very high. So it's not surprising that, you know, electric bolt might have struggled somewhat because it is fundamentally very challenging and especially to have, you know, the demand on your product to be able to surge production in the way that they've been asked to.

What sort of timeframe are we talking about? How long does it take to produce a nuclear submarine like this? Well, the full production time is probably six or seven years in the sense that you have to, there are already, there are long lead times that some components that have to be ordered, you know, years in advance. But

The aim is to be able to generate a submarine every 18 months or every year. That type of drumbeats, if you've got two and a line, that's the aim. But it's a long process because it is a difficult construction task.

Now, this is very much being sold as part of an America first agenda, that this is Trump's administration looking at Biden era deals and getting rid of the ones that it does not deem a good deal for the US. But then that runs alongside Trump's overarching strategy on the world stage, which is competition with China and a view that Beijing is the US's main adversary.

Now, Australia is a growing military power in the Indo-Pacific and some would argue a key ally against China, especially given China's naval power. So surely giving nuclear submarines to Australia would actually feed into that strategy in a positive way.

I think you're quite right in that expectation. I think one of the concerns is that Australia has a different relationship. It has a rather more cooperative economic and it's more dependent on China than is the United States. And it has certainly a less overtly hostile attitude to China than that's currently coming out of the U.S.,

One of the possible demands that the Trump administration might make is that Australia commits to making these submarines available for any conflict in East Asia, particularly most obviously as regarding Taiwan.

Whether the Australians would be content with such a commitment remains to be seen, but it certainly could be part of the price that currently wasn't in the original package, as it were. So let's address the question that will be troubling defence chiefs in the UK and in Australia today. How likely do you think it is the US is going to pull out and effectively rip up AUKUS?

Well, my feeling is that there's rather a low percentage chance that it will pull out of the Orca Steel. If I had to put a number on it, I would say, you know, it's something like 20 to 30% chance. I think it's most likely that it will stay in.

But of course, when you do risk management, you have to think about what happens if the worst does happen and if the 30% chance is there and whether there should be some contingency planning going on in the Ministry of Defence and in Australia to cope with that possibility. And I'm sure discussions are taking place now.

which at least address the question as well, if they do pull out, what happens next and what can we do to mitigate the impact of that? But I think it's less likely. But I think that getting approval might require Australia to make some difficult public choices that it may be reluctant and may find painful to do.

OK, Trevor, thank you. That is Trevor Taylor from the Russi think tank in London. As we've discussed here, the US's competition with China is a key strategic challenge facing Washington. And the question with arrangements like AUKUS is how does the US best use its allies in the region to counter Beijing?

On Monday, we spoke to the former Biden official Eli Ratner, who thinks that he has the answer. He wants a collective defence pact similar to NATO in Europe, although he is keen to stress that there are many differences. Particularly, his view is that it should only involve three key US allies, Japan, the Philippines and Australia. So as the Trump team looks again at whether to send Canberra nuclear submarines,

Should it actually be open to a much broader deal? To hear Eli's point of view, go back and listen to our episode called Does the World Need an Asian NATO? That's it from us. Thank you for taking 10 minutes to stay on top of the world with the help of The Times. See you tomorrow.